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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
SHARON R. HAMMER,

)
)
Plaintiff/Appellant,
)
)
vs.
)
)
NILS RIBI,
)
)
Defendant/Respondent.
)
_______________________________________ )

Supreme Court No. 44447

RECORD ON APPEAL
Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District
of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Blaine.
_______________________________________________________________________________
HONORABLE ROBERT J. ELGEE, DISTRICT JUDGE
_______________________________________________________________________________
JAMES R. DONOVAL
1048 N. Torrey Pines Ave.
Eagle, Idaho 83616

KIRTLAN G. NAYLOR
950 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 610
Boise, ID 83702

Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
Attorney for Defendant/Respondent
_______________________________________________________________________________
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Fifth Judicial District Court - Blaine County
ROA Report
Case: CV-2015-0000428 Current Judge: Robert J. Elgee
Sharon R Hammer vs. Nils A Ribi

Sharon R Hammer vs. Nils A Ribi

Other Claims
Date
8/14/2015

8/17/2015

Judge
New Case Filed - Other Claims

Robert J. Elgee

Plaintiff: Hammer, Sharon R Appearance James R Donoval

Robert J. Elgee

Filing: AA- All initial civil case filings in District Court of any type not listed
in categories E, F and H(1) Paid by: JDIDAHOLAW, PLLC Receipt
number: 0004675 Dated: 8/14/2015 Amount: $221.00 (Check) For:
Hammer, Sharon R (plaintiff)

Robert J. Elgee

Complaint for Civil Assault and Demand for Jury Trial

Robert J. Elgee

Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any File Or Record By The
Clerk, Per Page Paid by: Naylor Hales Receipt number: 0004687 Dated:
8/17/2015 Amount: $11.00 (Credit card)

Robert J. Elgee

Miscellaneous Payment: Technology Cost - CC Paid by: Naylor Hales
Robert J. Elgee
Receipt number: 0004687 Dated: 8/17/2015 Amount: $3.00 (Credit card)
8/28/2015

Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any File Or Record By The Robert J. Elgee
Clerk, Per Page Paid by: Desiree Fawn Receipt number: 0005005 Dated:
8/28/2015 Amount: $6.00 (Cash)

1/20/2016

Summons: Document Service Issued: on 1/20/2016 to Nils A Ribi;
Assigned to Returned to Counsel for Service. Service Fee of $0.00.

2/4/2016

Filing: I1 - Initial Appearance by persons other than the plaintiff or
Robert J. Elgee
petitioner Paid by: Naylor & Hales, PC Receipt number: 0000703 Dated:
2/4/2016 Amount: $136.00 (Check) For: Ribi, Nils A (defendant)

Robert J. Elgee

Defendant: Ribi, Nils A Appearance Kirtlan G. Naylor

Robert J. Elgee

Defendant's Answer to Plaintiff's Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial

Robert J. Elgee

Return Of Service

Robert J. Elgee

Summons: Document Returned Served on 2/1/2016 to Nils A Ribi;
Assigned to Returned to Counsel for Service. Service Fee of $0.00.

Robert J. Elgee

Hearing Scheduled (Scheduling Conference 04/28/2016 04:00 PM)

Robert J. Elgee

Notice Of Hearing

Robert J. Elgee

3/15/2016

Motion to Appear Telephonically for Schedule Conference

Robert J. Elgee

3/24/2016

Continued (Scheduling Conference 04/18/2016 01:30 PM) attorneys for
defendant to appear by telephone

Robert J. Elgee

Amended Notice Of Hearing

Robert J. Elgee

Motion to seek punitive damages against defendant Nils Ribi

Robert J. Elgee

Motion to require an IRCP Mental examination of defendant Nils Ribi

Robert J. Elgee

4/14/2016

Defendant's Proposed Scheduling Plan

Robert J. Elgee

4/15/2016

Stipulation for Scheduling and Planning

Robert J. Elgee

4/18/2016

Hearing result for Scheduling Conference scheduled on 04/18/2016 01:30 Robert J. Elgee
PM: Hearing Vacated attorneys for defendant to appear by telephone

4/19/2016

Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 02/08/2017 09:00 AM) 5 days except Mon. Robert J. Elgee

3/9/2016

3/11/2016

4/13/2016

Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference 01/09/2017 01:30 PM)

Robert J. Elgee

Civil Case Scheduling Order, Notice of Trial Setting and Initial Pretrial
Order

Robert J. Elgee
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Sharon R Hammer vs. Nils A Ribi

Other Claims
Date
4/20/2016

Judge
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Require an I.R.C.P. 35(a) Mental
Examination of Defendant Nils Ribi

Robert J. Elgee

Memorandum in Support Motion to Seek Punitive Damages Against
Defendant Nils Ribi

Robert J. Elgee

Affidavit of Sharon R. Hammer in Support of Motion to Require an I.R.C.P. Robert J. Elgee
35(a) Mental Examination of Defendant Nils Ribi and Motion to Seek
Punitive Damages
Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Motion to Require an I.R.C.P. 35(a)
Mental Examination of Defendant Nils Ribi and Motion to Seek Punitive
Damages

Robert J. Elgee

Notice Of Hearing

Robert J. Elgee

Notice of Filing

Robert J. Elgee

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 05/09/2016 02:30 PM) Mot. to Require
Mental Health Examination
Mot. to Seek Punitive Damages

Robert J. Elgee

Notice of Filing

Robert J. Elgee

Notice of Filing

Robert J. Elgee

Notice Of Hearing

Robert J. Elgee

Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss

Robert J. Elgee

Motion to Dismiss

Robert J. Elgee

4/26/2016

Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Dismiss 05/09/2016 02:30 PM)

Robert J. Elgee

4/29/2016

Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Punitive Damages

Robert J. Elgee

Motion to Seal, Motion to Shorten Time and Notice of Hearing

Robert J. Elgee

Defendant's Response to Motion for Mental Health Examination

Robert J. Elgee

Motion to Amend Complaint

Robert J. Elgee

4/25/2016

5/2/2016

Objection/Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Under I.R.C.P. 12(c) Robert J. Elgee
5/3/2016

Reply in Support of Motion to Seek Punitive Damages Against Defendant
Nils Ribi

Robert J. Elgee

5/5/2016

Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Under
I.R.C.P 12(c)

Robert J. Elgee

Reply in Support of Motion to Require an I.R.C.P. 35(a) Mental
Examination of Defendant Nils Ribi

Robert J. Elgee

Supplemental Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Motion to Require an
I.R.C.P 35(a) Mental Examination of Defendant Nils Ribi and Motion to
Seek Punitive Damages

Robert J. Elgee
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Other Claims
Date

Judge
Court Minutes
Hearing type: Motion to Dismiss
Hearing date: 5/9/2016
Time: 2:37 pm
Courtroom: District Courtroom-judicial Bldg
Court reporter: Susan Israel
Minutes Clerk: Crystal Rigby
Tape Number: DC
Party: Nils Ribi, Attorney: Kirtlan Naylor
Party: Sharon Hammer, Attorney: James Donoval

Robert J. Elgee

Hearing result for Motion to Dismiss scheduled on 05/09/2016 02:30 PM:
District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter:Susan Israel
Estimated Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing: less 100

Robert J. Elgee

Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 05/09/2016 02:30 PM: District
Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter:Susan Israel
Estimated Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing: Mot. to Require
Mental Health Examination less 100
Mot. to Seek Punitive Damages

Robert J. Elgee

5/10/2016

Order Sealing Document

Robert J. Elgee

5/12/2016

Order Granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Granting Plaintiff Leave Robert J. Elgee
to Amend the Complaint

5/9/2016

Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion Re: Punitive Damages

Robert J. Elgee

Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for a Rule 35 Mental Examination of
Defendant

Robert J. Elgee

Motion to reconsider denial of motion to required mental examination of
defendant Nils Ribi

Robert J. Elgee

Motion to reconsider dismissal of complaint

Robert J. Elgee

5/20/2016

Amended Complaint For civil assault and demand for jury trial

Robert J. Elgee

5/27/2016

Notice Of Hearing

Robert J. Elgee

Defendant's motion to dismiss amended complaint

Robert J. Elgee

5/31/2016

Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Dismiss 07/11/2016 03:30 PM)

Robert J. Elgee

6/3/2016

Notice Of Hearing

Robert J. Elgee

Re - Notice Of Hearing

Robert J. Elgee

Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

Robert J. Elgee

Memorandum in Support of Motion to Reconsider Dismissal of Complaint

Robert J. Elgee

5/16/2016

6/6/2016

Memorandum in support of Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment Robert J. Elgee
Memorandum in support of motion to reconsider denial of motion to require Robert J. Elgee
an IRCP 35(a) mental examination of defendant Nils Ribi
Second supplemental affidavit of counsel in support of motion to require an Robert J. Elgee
IRCP 35(a) mental examination of defendant Nils Ribi

6/10/2016

Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motin to Dismiss Amended
Complaint

Robert J. Elgee
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Date

Judge

6/14/2016

Disclosure of Retained Expert Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 26(4)(A)(1)(i)

Robert J. Elgee

6/27/2016

Defendant's Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions

Robert J. Elgee

Defendant's Response in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment

Robert J. Elgee

Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Motions for Reconsideration

Robert J. Elgee

Notice Of Hearing

Robert J. Elgee

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 07/11/2016 03:30 PM) for Rule 11 Sanctions Robert J. Elgee
Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions

Robert J. Elgee

Motion to strike or stay sanction petition pending rulings on motions

Robert J. Elgee

Notice Of Hearing

Robert J. Elgee

6/29/2016

Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Strike 07/11/2016 03:30 PM)

Robert J. Elgee

6/30/2016

Defendant's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Rule 11
Sanctions

Robert J. Elgee

7/5/2016

Reply in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

Robert J. Elgee

Notice to Court

Robert J. Elgee

Response to defendant's motion to dismiss amended complaint

Robert J. Elgee

Reply in support of motion to reconsider dismissal of complaint

Robert J. Elgee

Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration

Robert J. Elgee

6/28/2016

7/6/2016
7/7/2016

Defendant's reply memeorandum in support of motion to dismiss amended Robert J. Elgee
complaint
7/11/2016

7/19/2016

Court Minutes
Hearing type: Motion
Hearing date: 7/11/2016
Time: 3:44 pm
Courtroom: District Courtroom-judicial Bldg
Court reporter: Susan Israel
Minutes Clerk: Crystal Rigby
Tape Number: DC
Party: Nils Ribi, Attorney: Kirtlan Naylor
Party: Sharon Hammer, Attorney: James Donoval

Robert J. Elgee

Hearing result for Motion to Strike scheduled on 07/11/2016 03:30 PM:
Hearing Vacated

Robert J. Elgee

Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 07/11/2016 03:30 PM: Hearing
Vacated for Rule 11 Sanctions

Robert J. Elgee

Hearing result for Motion to Dismiss scheduled on 07/11/2016 03:30 PM:
District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter:Susan Israel
Estimated Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing: less 100

Robert J. Elgee

Defendant's errata to memeorandum in support of motion for rule 11
sanctions

Robert J. Elgee

Order on Pending Motions and Dismissing This Case

Robert J. Elgee

Judgment

Robert J. Elgee
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Other Claims
Date
7/19/2016

Judge
Hearing result for Pretrial Conference scheduled on 01/09/2017 01:30 PM: Robert J. Elgee
Hearing Vacated
Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on 02/08/2017 09:00 AM: Hearing Robert J. Elgee
Vacated 5 days except Mon.

8/18/2016

8/23/2016

Civil Disposition entered for: Ribi, Nils A, Defendant; Hammer, Sharon R,
Plaintiff. Filing date: 7/19/2016

Robert J. Elgee

STATUS CHANGED: Closed

Robert J. Elgee

Notice Of Appeal

Robert J. Elgee

Appealed To The Supreme Court

Robert J. Elgee

STATUS CHANGED: Inactive

Robert J. Elgee

Filing: L4 - Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal to Supreme Court Paid Robert J. Elgee
by: Donoval, James R (attorney for Hammer, Sharon R) Receipt number:
0005458 Dated: 8/23/2016 Amount: $129.00 (Check) For: Hammer,
Sharon R (plaintiff)
Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 5459 Dated 8/23/2016 for 100.00)

Robert J. Elgee
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James R. Donoval, ISB #8142
4110 Eaton Ave., Suite D
Caldwell, ID 83607
Telephone: (312) 859-2029
Facsimile: (208) 649-1603
Email: jdonlval@aol.com

Clerk~,:

JoLynn Dr8Qleo·
Court Slalne u

NII

Attorney for Plaintiff Sharon R. Hammer

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

SHARON R. HAMMER,
Case No.

~VdOJ 6- 4Jg

Plaintiff,
vs.
NILS RIB!, in his individual capacity,
Defendant.

COMPLAINT FOR CIVIL
ASSAULT AND DEMAND FOR
JURY TRIAL

ROBERT J. ELGEE

COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Sharon R. Hammer ("Ms. Hammer"), by and through her

counsel of record, James R. Donoval, and for her Complaint against Defendant Nils Ribi
("Defendant Ribi"), complains and alleges as follows:
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

1.

Plaintiff Sharon R. Hammer seeks damages in this civil action against Defendant

Ribi for committing civil assault against Ms. Hammer under Idaho law during an altercation
which occurred on September 15, 2011, which is more thoroughly detailed herein.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE

2.

This action was originally brought in the U.S. District Court For Idaho on May 3,

2013 in the matter of Hammer v. Sun Valley, et al., 1:13-cv-211-EJL (the "Federal Case"), as a
pendant and supplemental claim to multiple other federal claims raised by Ms. Hammer in the
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Federal Case.
3.

In entering summary judgment on Ms. Hammer's final pending Federal claim in

the Federal Case on July 28, 2015, Hon. Judge Edward Lodge decided not to continue to assert
supplemental jurisdiction over the civil assault claim, and dismissed the assault claim pursuant
to 28 US. Code 1367(c).
4.

Pursuant to 28 US. Code 1367(d), Ms. Hammer is allowed to file the civil assault

claim herein within thirty (30) days of the entry of Judge Lodge's July 28, 2015 Order regardless
of whether the statute of limitations of a civil assault claim in Idaho has tolled pursuant to Idaho
Statute 5-219(5).

5.

Venue is proper in this judicial district as Defendant Ribi resides in Blaine

County, Idaho.
PARTIES

6.

At all times relevant hereto, Ms. Hammer resided in Blaine County, State of

Idaho. Ms. Hammer served as the City Administrator of the City of Sun Valley, Idaho ("Sun
Valley"), from June 1, 2008 until January 19, 2012. Ms. Hammer also worked as a paid-on-call
firefighter and EMT for Sun Valley during that time.
7.

At all times relevant hereto, Defendant Ribi was an elected Sun Valley City

Council Member. Defendant Ribi's first term on the Sun Valley City Council began in or about
January 2006 through January 2010. Defendant Ribi's final term on the Sun Valley City Council
expired in January 2014.
8.

The alleged acts engaged in by Defendant Ribi were done outside of the course

and scope of his role as a member of the Sun Valley City Council and with malice or reckless
disregard for Ms. Hammer's protected rights.
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Other Relevant Sun Valley Actors

9.

At all times relevant hereto, but ending on January 3, 2012, Wayne Willich

("Mayor Willich") acted as the elected Mayor of Sun Valley. Mayor Willich's term as Mayor of
Sun Valley ended on or about January 3, 2012.
10.

At all times relevant hereto, but ending on January 3, 2012 when he was sworn in

as the Mayor Of Sun Valley, DeWayne Briscoe ("Council President Briscoe") acted as the
President of the Sun Valley City Council.
11.

At all times relevant hereto, but ending on January 3, 2012, Joan Lamb

("Councilwoman Lamb") acted as an elected Sun Valley City Council Member. Councilwoman
Lamb's term as a Sun Valley City Council Member ended on or about January 3, 2012.
12.

At all times relevant hereto, Adam King ("City Attorney King") was employed by

Sun Valley as the City Attorney.
13.

At all times relevant hereto, Cam Daggett ("Police Chief Daggett") was employed

by Sun Valley as the Sun Valley Police Chief.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
The Sun Valley Anti-Harassment Policy

14.

Prior to commencement of Ms. Hammer's tenure as the Sun Valley City

Administrator, the Sun Valley City Council formally adopted a Sun Valley Personnel Policies
And Procedure Manual (the "Personnel Manual"). The Personnel Manual remained in effect
during Ms. Hammer's tenure as the Sun Valley City Administrator.
15.

Within the Personnel Manual, Sun Valley expressly adopted a harassment policy

that prohibited "harassment in any form, including verbal, physical and visual harassment" either
"by or against any of its Employees." (the "Anti-Harassment Policy"). Although not specifically
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defined in the Anti-Harassment Policy, the general definition of "harassment" in Black's Law
Dictionary is "repeated conduct that is not wanted and is known to all parties as offensive".
16.

Pursuant to the Anti-Harassment Policy, when a Sun Valley employee believes

that he or she has been harassed "by a co-worker, Supervisor, any City official, or individual
outside of the City organization," the Anti-Harassment Policy guidelines instruct the employee to
"immediately notify his/her Department Head of the facts of the incident or incidents and the
name(s) of the individual(s) involved." Further, if the harassment complaint is against "a
member of the City Council, the Employee should report the complaint to the Mayor."
Ms. Hammer's Complaints Against Defendant Ribi For Harassment Under Sun Valley's
Anti-Harassment Policy

17.

Throughout her employment with Sun Valley, Ms. Hammer was repeatedly and

continuously harassed, physically and emotionally intimidated, verbally abused, and assaulted by
Defendant Ribi.
18.

Ms. Hammer repeatedly reported such incidents of harassment, intimidation, and

abuse by Defendant Ribi, as well as her fears regarding her personal safety related to Defendant
Ribi, to Former Mayor Willich, City Attorney King, and/or Police Chief Daggett.
19.

On multiple occasions, Former Mayor Willich met with Defendant Ribi and

directed Defendant Ribi that he was to cease any form of harassment, intimidation or hostility
toward Ms. Hammer.
20.

In October of 2010, Defendant Ribi was provided a copy of the Anti-Harassment

Policy specifically because of the allegations Ms. Hammer was making of harassment,
intimidation and hostility against Defendant Ribi.
21.

On multiple occasions Ms. Hammer met with City Attorney King and described

in detail the harassment and intimidation she had been subject to from Defendant Ribi.
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22.

During 2010 and 2011, Former Mayor Willich held multiple discussions with

Councilwoman Lamb in which both agreed that Defendant Ribi' s conduct towards Ms. Hammer
was disturbing and that Defendant Ribi should be made aware that his conduct of harassment and
hostility towards Ms. Hammer must cease.
23.

During several Sun Valley City Council meetings during 2010 and 2011,

Councilwoman Lamb advised Defendant Ribi that his conduct towards Ms. Hammer was
improper.
24.

During the early months of 2011, Former Mayor Willich and Council President

Briscoe held meetings in which Council President Briscoe was made aware of the harassment
allegations of Ms. Hammer against Defendant Ribi. Council President Briscoe refused to take
any actions against Defendant Ribi or to make public the allegations of Defendant Ribi' s
violation of the Anti-Harassment Policy because Council President Briscoe did not believe that
doing so was part of his job as the Sun Valley City Council President. On information and belief,
Council President Briscoe thereafter held private conversations with Defendant Ribi regarding
Ms. Hammer's harassment allegations against Defendant Ribi.
25.

In May of 2011, Ms. Hammer held a meeting with City Attorney King in which

the predominant topic was the continued harassment and hostility that Ms. Hammer was being
subjected to from Defendant Ribi.
26.

At some time during 2011, City Attorney King contacted the Idaho Attorney

General's office to obtain advice about what Sun Valley, Former Mayor Willich and Ms.
Hammer should to do about Defendant Ribi's violation of the Anti-Harassment Policy.
27.

In August of 2011, Former Mayor Willich met with City Attorney King during

which the predominant topic was Defendant Ribi's harassment and abusive conduct towards Ms.
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Hammer, and what Sun Valley, Fonner Mayor Willich and Ms. Hammer should do about
Defendant Ribi's violation of the Anti-Harassment Policy.
28.

At the August of 2011 meeting, City Attorney King told Fonner Mayor Willich

that because Defendant Ribi was an elected official that there was really nothing that could be
done to Defendant Ribi, other than to inform Defendant Ribi that his harassment of Ms. Hammer
needed to cease, and that any disclosure of Defendant Ribi's harassment of Ms. Hammer would
be considered "political", especially considering that a municipal election was coming up in
November of 2011.
29.

At the August of 2011 meeting, Mayor Willich told City Attorney King that after

the November 2011 municipal election that he was going to publicly disclose Defendant Ribi's
harassment of Ms. Hammer and other improper conduct.
30.

On information and belief, City Attorney King thereafter held discussions with

Defendant Ribi and advised him of the concerns of Ms. Hammer and Fonner Mayor Willich of
Defendant Ribi's harassment of Ms. Hammer in violation of the Anti-Harassment Policy, and
that Mayor Willich was going to disclose Defendant Ribi' s harassment of Ms. Hammer publicly
after the November 2011 municipal election.
31.

After the August meeting with City Attorney King, Mayor Willich also held

discussions with Defendant Ribi in which Mayor Willich told Defendant Ribi that Defendant
Ribi must cease any hostile conduct towards Ms. Hammer.
32.

During 2011, Ms. Hammer held meetings with Police Chief Daggett in which Ms.

Hammer discussed Defendant Ribi's harassment and hostility towards her and in which Police
Chief Daggett acknowledged that Defendant Ribi was a "bully" towards Ms. Hammer. Police
Chief Daggett advised Ms. Hammer that the Sun Valley Police Department would be "on notice"
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when Defendant Ribi was in Sun Valley City Hall and that Ms. Hammer should lock her Sun
Valley City Hall office door when Defendant Ribi was in Sun Valley City Hall.
33.

Mayor Willich has confirmed, under oath, that the conduct of Defendant Ribi

towards Ms. Hammer, prior to September 15, 2011, was "harassment, by anyone's definition of
harassment."
The Detailed Assault Allegations

34.

Prior to September 15, 2011, based on all of the prior incidents of harassment,

hostility and abuse Ms. Hammer had previously suffered at the hands of Defendant Ribi, and
because of all of the discussions Ms. Hammer held with Former Mayor Willich, City Attorney
King and Police Chief Daggett regarding Ms. Hammer's fears of Defendant Ribi, Ms. Hammer
held a heightened sense of concern over Defendant Ribi' s potential for physical violence towards
Ms. Hammer.
35.

Prior to September 15, 2011, based on all of the prior discussions that Defendant

Ribi had been part of with Former Mayor Willich, Councilwoman Lamb, and potentially Council
President Briscoe and City Attorney King, and that Defendant Ribi had been provided a copy of
the Anti-Harassment Policy specifically because of Ms. Hammer's numerous harassment
complaints against Defendant Ribi, Defendant Ribi was on notice that Ms. Hammer considered
Defendant Ribi to be potentially physically dangerous to Ms. Hammer.
36.

On or about September 15, 2011, a Sun Valley City Council meeting was held.

During the meeting, discussion was held regarding acceptable methods for modifying budgeted
line items.
37.

During a break in the meeting, Ms. Hammer left the Sun Valley City Council

Chamber to make copies of some documents. Defendant Ribi followed Ms. Hammer to the front
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area of Sun Valley City Hall near the reception desk and copy room area.
38.

Defendant Ribi began to demand that Ms. Hammer make changes to certain

documents related to the Sun Valley budget. Ms. Hammer tried to explain to Defendant Ribi the
generally accepted accounting practices and procedures for modifying municipal budgets.
Defendant Ribi became very agitated and continuously interrupted Ms. Hammer to tell her how
he wanted the particular procedure done. Defendant Ribi' s proposed budgeting procedure
contravened the generally accepted accounting practices for municipal governments.
39.

Every time Ms. Hammer tried to speak to Defendant Ribi about the correct

budgeting procedures, he would cut her off, raise his arms in the air and begin waiving his hands,
saying angrily: "You don't understand!" As the conversation continued, Defendant Ribi became
more and more enraged.
40.

Eventually, Ms. Hammer told Defendant Ribi that she was going to discuss the

matter with Mayor Willich. At that point, Defendant Ribi raised his arms, turned toward
Ms. Hammer, and in a physically threatening manner yelled: "No! You will not talk to the
Mayor!"
41.

In reaction to Defendant Ribi's physically and verbally violent outburst,

Ms. Hammer's heart began racing, she became alarmed, immediately stepped back towards the
copy machines and away from Defendant Ribi, and stated: "Whoa!" As a result of Defendant
Ribi's physical actions and yelling directed at Ms. Hammer, she was fearful of immediate harmful or
offensive contact with her body by Defendant Ribi.
42.

Ms. Hammer then turned away from Defendant Ribi and walked past Defendant

Ribi, down the hallway of Sun Valley City Hall and back into the Sun Valley City Council
Chamber where Former Mayor Willich, several Sun Valley City Council Members and several
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Sun Valley staff members were present. Defendant Ribi followed Ms. Hammer down the
hallway and into the Sun Valley City Council Chamber, and acted as if nothing had happened.
43.

The assault of Ms. Hammer was witnessed by former Sun Valley Administrative

Assistant David Blampied. Upon information and belief, several other Sun Valley employees
either witnessed Defendant Ribi' s assault of Ms. Hammer or heard some or all of the altercation.
44.

Immediately following the Sun Valley City Council meeting of September 15,

2011, Ms. Hammer held separate meetings with Former Mayor Willich, City Attorney King, and
Police Chief Daggett. During each meeting, Ms. Hammer described the physical altercation by
Defendant Ribi. Ms. Hammer also expressed her concern over Defendant Ribi's increasingly
agitated, erratic and threatening behavior, which now had become physically threatening, and
sought advice on how to respond to Defendant Ribi.
45.

Upon information and belief, thereafter Former Mayor Willich spoke with

Defendant Ribi about the assault incident and directed Defendant Ribi not act with aggression
toward Ms. Hammer and to come to Former Mayor Willich with any issues that Defendant Ribi
would have otherwise sought from Ms. Hammer or any other Sun Valley employee.
CIVIL ASSAULT AGAINST MS. HAMMER
(Against Defendant Ribi, Outside The Scope Of His Role As A Sun Valley City Council
Member)

46.

On September 15, 2011, Defendant Ribi acted intending to cause a harmful or

offensive contact with the person of Ms. Hammer, or intending to cause an immediate fear of
such contact.
47.

As a result of Defendant Ribi's act, Ms. Hammer feared that such harmful or

offensive contact with her person was imminent.

COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 9
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48.

As a result of Defendant Ribi's act, Ms. Hammer was injured and is entitled to

damages as awarded at the trial in this matter.
49.

The alleged acts engaged in by Defendant Ribi of assaulting Ms. Hammer were

done outside of the course and scope of his role as a member of the Sun Valley City Council and
with malice or reckless disregard for Ms. Hammer's protected rights.
50.

Ms. Hammer reserves the right to file a petition and seek a ruling of the Court

allowing her to seek punitive damages against Defendant Ribi.

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
Plaintiff demands a trial by jury in this action on all issues and all claims herein.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Sharon R. Hammer respectfully requests judgment against
Defendant Nils Ribi, as follows:
1.

For special and general damages that fully and fairly compensate Ms. Hammer for

Defendant Ribi's wrongful acts complained of herein;
2.

That, upon filing a petition seeking punitive damages, that Ms. Hammer be

granted an Order allowing for punitive damages against Defendant Ribi for assaulting Ms.
Hammer in bad faith and with improper motives, and for his willful, reckless, wanton and callous
indifference to Ms. Hammer's protected rights, especially considering Defendant Ribi's role as
an elected public official;
3.

For Ms. Hammer's attorneys fees, cost of suit, and disbursement herein;

4.

For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and equitable.
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DATED this _ _ _ day of August, 2015.

SHARON R. HAMMER
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
SHARON R. HAMMER,

_,

Case No. CV2015-428

c:(

Plaintiff,

2

DEFENDANT'S ANSWER TO
PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT AND
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

vs.

-er:

(.!)

0

NILS RIBI, in his individual capacity,

a

Defendant.

Defendant, Nils Ribi, by and through his attorneys of record, Naylor & Hales, P .C., answers
Plaintiffs Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial on file herein as follows:
1.

Defendant denies each and every allegation contained in Plaintiffs Complaint not

herein specifically and expressly admitted. Defendant reserves the right to amend this and any other
answer or denial stated herein, once he has had an opportunity to complete discovery regarding the
allegations contained in Plaintiffs Complaint.

DEFENDANT'S ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT
AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 1.

Page 18 of 526

2.

Answering paragraph 1 of Plaintiffs Complaint, entitled "Preliminary Statement,"

Defendant admits that Plaintiff filed this lawsuit, but denies the remainder of the allegations.
3.

Answering paragraphs 2-5 of Plaintiffs Complaint, entitled "Jurisdiction and Venue,"

Defendant admits that this Court has jurisdiction over properly pled matters involving Idaho Code
Sections 6-901 and 6-910. However, in making this acknowledgment Defendant does not admit that
any such matters are actually properly pled in Plaintiffs Complaint or that the facts set forth in
Plaintiffs Complaint actually justify the exercise of such jurisdiction. To the extent this Court has
jurisdiction over these matters venue is proper.
4.

Answering paragraph 6 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Defendant admits.

5.

Answering paragraph 7 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Defendant admits that he was an

elected Sun Valley City Council Member during the relevant times of the Complaint.
6.

Answering paragraph 8 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Defendant denies.

7.

Answering paragraph 9 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Defendant admits that Wayne

Willich was a former mayor of Sun Valley during the relevant times of the Complaint.
8.

Answering paragraph 10 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Defendant admits that DeWayne

Briscoe was an elected Sun Valley City Council Member and then was mayor during the relevant
times of the Complaint.
9.

Answering paragraph 11 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Defendant admits that Joan Lamb

was an elected Sun Valley City Council Member during the relevant times of the Complaint.
10.

Answering paragraph 12 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Defendant admits that Adam King

was the Sun Valley City Attorney during the relevant times of the Complaint.

DEFENDANT'S ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT
AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 2.
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11.

Answering paragraph 13 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Defendant admits that Cam Daggett

was employed by Sun Valley as the Sun Valley Police Chief during the relevant times of the
Complaint.
12.

Answering paragraphs 14-16 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Defendant admits only that the

City of Sun Valley had a policy manual that contained numerous provisions, including provisions
related to "anti-harassment." To the extent an answer is necessary to Plaintiffs summary ofthe policy
manual and her personal legal conclusions, Defendant states that the policies speak for themselves
and denies Plaintiffs legal conclusions.
13.

Answering paragraphs 17-33 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Defendant denies.

14.

Answering paragraphs 34-35 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Defendant denies.

15.

Answering paragraph 36 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Defendant admits only that a Sun

Valley City Council meeting was held and that budget issues may have been discussed. The minutes
and recordings of that meeting speak for themselves.
16.

Answering paragraphs 37-45 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Defendant denies.

17.

Answering paragraphs 46-50 of Plaintiffs Complaint, entitled "Civil Assault Against

Ms. Hammer," Defendant denies.
18.

Answering Plaintiffs paragraph entitled "Demand for Jury Trial," Defendant has no

current objection to a jury trial on these issues.
19.

Plaintiffs Complaint last contains her "Prayer for Relief," and to the extent any

answer is required thereto, Defendant denies the allegations contained therein, deny that Plaintiffhas
stated any valid cause of action, or that Plaintiff is entitled to any of the relief requested.

DEFENDANT'S ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT
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DEFENSES
Defendant has not been able to engage in sufficient discovery to learn all of the facts and
circumstances relating to the matters described in the Plaintiffs Complaint and therefore requests
the Court to permit Defendant to amend his Answer and assert additional defenses or abandon
defenses once discovery has been completed.

FIRST DEFENSE
Plaintiffs Complaint fails to state a cause of action against Defendant upon which relief can
be granted and should therefore be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c) of the Idaho Rules
of Civil Procedure.

SECOND DEFENSE
Plaintiffs has failed to act reasonably or to otherwise mitigate Plaintiffs damages, if any.

THIRD DEFENSE
Plaintiffs claim is barred by her failure to comply with the Idaho Tort Claims Act.

FOURTH DEFENSE
Plaintiffs claim is limited pursuant to the provisions of the Idaho Tort Claims Act. In
asserting this defense, Defendant is in no way conceding or admitting liability.

FIFTH DEFENSE
Defendant is immune from liability under the Idaho Tort Claims Act.

SIXTH DEFENSE
Plaintiffs Complaint fails to state a claim for relief against Defendant entitling Plaintiff to
either punitive damages or equitable relief.

DEFENDANT'S ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT
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JURY DEMAND
Defendant, pursuant to Rule 38(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, hereby demands
a trial by jury of the Plaintiffs action for damages.
ATTORNEY FEES
Defendant has been required to retain attorneys in order to defend this action and are entitled
to recover reasonable attorney fees pursuant to state law and applicable Rules of Civil Procedure.
WHEREFORE, Defendant prays for judgment against the Plaintiff as follows:
1.

That the Plaintiffs Complaint be dismissed with prejudice and that the Plaintiff take

nothing thereunder.
2.

That the Defendant be awarded any and all costs and reasonable attorneys fees

available under Idaho law.
3.

That judgment be entered in favor of Defendant on all claims for relief.

4.

For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and equitable under the

circumstances.
DATED this 4th day of February, 2016.
NAYLOR & HALES, P.C.
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 4th day of February, 2016, I caused to be served, by the
method(s) indicated, a true and correct copy of the foryng upon:
James R. Donoval
4110 Eaton Ave., Ste. D
Caldwell, ID 83607
Attorney for Plaintiff

_i/'U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Fax Transmission: 649-1603
Email: jdonoval@aol.com
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James R. Donoval, ISB #8142
4481 N. Dresden Pl., Suite D
Garden City, ID 83714
Telephone: (312) 859-2029
Facsimile: (208) 649-1603
Email: jdonoval@aol.com
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APR 1 3 2016
Jolynn Drage, Clerk District
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Attorney for Plaintiff Sharon R. Hammer

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
SHARON R. HAMMER,
Case No. CV-2015-428
Plaintiff,
vs.
NILS RIBI, in his individual capacity,

MOTION TO REQUIRE AN
LR.C.P. 35(a) MENTAL
EXAMINATION OF
DEFENDANT NILS RIBI

Defendant.

COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Sharon R. Hammer ("Ms. Hammer"), by and through her
counsel of record, James R. Donoval, and prays that this Honorable Court require an LR.CP.
35(a) mental examination of Defendant Nils Ribi by Psychiatrist Scott Eliason, M.D. (see
Exhibit A and B herein). Ms. Hammer intends to file a memorandum and affidavits in support of
this motion within fourteen (14) days. Ms. Hammer seeks a hearing on the matters described
herein.

DATED this

}3th

day of April, 2016.

S. HAMMER'S ATTORNEY
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The undersigned certifies that a true and correct copy of the attached document was served by
facsimile
mail, _Rroper postage pre-paid to the above listed recipients on or before 5:00
t}rJ
/.3 , 2016.
p.m. on
To:

Kirtlan Naylor
Naylor & Hales
950 W. Bannock St., Suite 610
Boise, ID 83 702
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Scott Eliason, M.D.
Boise Forensic Psychiatry
2976 E State St. 120-432
Eagle, ID 83616
(208) 275-9202

AprilS,2016

Dear Mr. Donoval:
You requested that I develop a proposed plan for a mental health Evaluation of Mr. Nils Ribi. An
appropriate evaluation of Mr. Ribi would involve several components as listed:
1.
2.
3.

Two psychological test (multiple choice) called the MMPl-2 and the MCMI.
A psychiatric interview with Mr. Ribi for approximately 2-3 hours.
A review of any relevant records (psychiatric records, medical records, criminal
history).

The MMPl-2 is a test with 567 true or false questions designed to test adult personality and
psychopathology. The MCMI is another test designed to detect psychopathology and has 175
true or false questions.
The psychiatric interview would involve a detailed history of Mr. Ribi including past and current
psychiatric symptoms, past medical and psychiatric treatment, family history of mental illness,
social history and mental status examinations.
The purpose of this evaluation would be to determine whether Mr. Ribi has a mental illness and
whether that mental illness would cause him to have an increased risk of violence or have a
propensity to be deceptive.
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Scott Anders Eliason M.D.
Forensic Psychiatrist
Boise Forensic Psychiatry
2976 E State St, 120-432
Eagle, ID 83616
Phone: (208) 275-9202
Fax: (208) 493-4209

Education

July 2007 -July 2008 Forensic Psychiatry Fellowship
Specialized training in civil and criminal forensic psychiatry cases including
evaluations, report writing, forensic consultations, and expert testimony
UCSF Psychiatry and the Law Program
San Francisco, CA 94143
San Quentin Prison
San Quentin, CA 94964
Maguire Correctional Facility
300 Bradford St.
Redwood City, CA 94063
2006-2007 Chief Resident
University of Washington Psychiatry Residency, Spokane Track
Sacred Heart Medical Center, Spokane Mental Health Clinic
Spokane, WA 99202
2005-2007 Residency Training - Graduated June 2007
University of Washington Psychiatry Residency, Spokane Track
Sacred Heart Medical Center, Spokane Mental Health Clinic, Eastern State Hospital
Spokane, WA 99202

Eastern Washington State Hospital Forensic Unit
Medical Lake, WA 99022
2003-2005 Residency Training
University of Washington Psychiatry Residency, Spokane Track
University of Washington Hospital, Harborview Hospital, VA Hospital
Seattle, WA 98125
1999-2003 Doctor of Medicine
Medical College of Wisconsin
Milwaukee, WI 53216
1996-1999 Bachelor of Science, Microbiology
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Brigham Young University
Provo, UT 84604
1993-1994 College Courses
Ricks College (now Brigham Young University - Idaho)
Rexburg, ID 83440
Teaching Experience

2009-Present

Supervising and Training Nurse Practitioners and Nurse Practitioner Students,
Physician Assistants and Physician Assistant Students

2008-Present

Clinical Instructor, University of Washington Psychiatry Residency- Boise Tract.
Supervise and train psychiatry residents from the University of Washington.

2007-2008

Forensic Fellow, taught medical students, law students, psychiatric residents, and
community mental health providers through lectures, classes, and work supervision.

2006-2007

Chief Resident, University of Washington, Spokane Tract, collaborated with faculty to
modify teaching curriculum for both medical students and psychiatry residents.

2003-2006

Resident, Outpatient Clinics and Inpatient Rotations, taught medical students in both
continuity clinic and clerkship rotations.

Recent CME

NCCHC Mental Health Conference July 2014
NCCHC Spring Meeting April 2015
Professional Associations

Member of American Psychiatric Association
Member of American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law
Member of the American Medical Association
Member of the Suicidology Committee of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law

Licensure & Certification
2013 Certified Correctional Healthcare Professional- Mental Health
2010 Certified Correctional Healthcare Professional
2009 Board Certified Forensic Psychiatrist
2008 Certified Diplomate of the American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology
2008 Qualified Medical Examiner State of California
2007 American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology Board Eligible
Step 1 of ABPN Board- passed
.
2007 Advanced Clinical Trainer for Suicide Risk Assessment at QPR Institute
2006 Idaho State License #: M-9576
2005 Buprenophrine Certified
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20M USMLE Step 3 Passed
Employment
May 2011- Present

Psychiatric Director at Ada County Jail

April 2010- Present

Full Time Regional Psychiatric Director for Corizon in the State of Idaho

March 2009- Feb 2013

Inpatient Psychiatrist at Eastern Idaho Regional Medical Center, Behavioral
Health Center one weekend per month

January 2009-Present

Part Time Private Practice and Medical Director of Boise Forensic Psychiatry

August 2008-April 2010

Full Time Community Mental Health Psychiatrist at Region IV Adult Mental
Health Clinic
Medical Director State of Idaho Health and Welfare, Behavioral Health
Division

July 2008- December 2008 Clinical Director at the Idaho State School and Hospital- managing treatment
of both inpatient and outpatient clients with developmental disability and
mental illness.
Idaho State Forensic Psychiatry Director- Helping design, plan, and then direct
the first locked forensic psychiatry unit in Idaho.
Forensic psychiatry private practice -Performing independent medical-legalpsychiatric evaluation and expert testimony.
August 2005- April 2007

Managed locked inpatient psychiatric unit at Sacred Heart Hospital in Spokane
Washington two weekends a month.

Sept. 2005- Feb. 2007

Conducted nine disability evaluations a month for the Washington State
Department of Social Services.

Child and Adolescent Psychiatry Experience
May 2008- Present Inpatient Psychiatrist at Eastern Idaho Regional Medical Center. Evaluating and Treating
children and adolescents one weekend per month.
January 2009- Present Outpatient Psychiatrist at Eagle River Psychiatry, treating and evaluating adolescents
August 2008- December 2008 Psychiatrist at Region III mental health clinic evaluating and treating children
and adolescents
July 2008- December 2008 Psychiatrist for the Support and Outreach Team at the Idaho State School and
Hospital. Performed Consultations for patients with mental illness and developmental disabilities throughout
the State ofldaho.
September 2005-June 2007 Managed the Child and Adolescent Psychiatry Unit at Sacred Heart in Spokane
1-2 weekends a month.
Page 3 of 5
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January-October 2006 Spokane Mental Health Clinic Outpatient Child Psychiatry
January-April 2006 Inpatient Child and Adolescent Unit

Presentations
NCCHC Conference Presentation: Genetic Testing in Psychiatry: Practical for Corrections?
NCCHC Conference Presentation: Psychogenic Polydipsia
NCCHC Conference Presentation: Suicide Risk Factors
NCCHC Conference Presentation: DSM 5 in corrections
Presentation at the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law conference in October 2011: Management
of Deliberate Self Hanning Inmates: Novel Uses ofDBT
Idaho Department of Corrections Trainings- Differential Diagnosis, Traumatic Brain Injury, and PostTraumatic Stress Disorder
Grand Round: Correctional Psychiatry
Grand Round: When Patients Lie
Grand Round: Pregnancy and Psychiatry
Presentation at the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law conference in October 2008: MurderSuicide: A review of the recent literature.
Grand Rounds: Violence Risk Assessment
Forensic Lectures at University of California San Francisco: Murder-Suicide
Guest Lecturer at University of San Francisco: Forensic Psychiatry
Grand Rounds: Drugs for Drugs: Using Medication to Treat Chemical Dependency
Grand Rounds: The Truth about Benzos
Grand Rounds: Insomnia
Resident Didactics: Complementary and Alternative Treatment in Mental Health

Forensic Experience
Competency to stand trial evaluations
Insanity defense evaluations
Pre-sentencing evaluations
Board of Parole evaluations
Three-strike law mitigation evaluations
Psychiatric Malpractice evaluations
Fitness for duty evaluations
Violence Risk Assessment
Psychological Damages
Child custody evaluations
Worker's Compensation evaluations
Disability evaluations for Department of Social Security
Civil Commitment evaluations of Sex offenders
Psychosexual Evaluations
Death Penalty Mitigation evaluations

Publications

1. Scott Eliason. Murder-Suicide: A Review of the Recent Literature. J Am Acad Psychiatry Law, Sep
2009; 37: 371 - 376
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2. Seott Eliason and John Chamberlain. Competence to Stand Trial. J Am Acad Psychiatry Law, Jun 2008;

.36: 255 - 257

3. Scott Eliason and John Chamberlain. Immunity for Professional Review Committees. J Am Acad
Psychiatry Law, Jun 2008; 36: 257 - 258.

Research Experience
September 1997 -December 1998
Brigham Young University, Animal Science Department
Bench researcher
Dr. David Kooyman
February 2006 - 2007
Washington State University Spokane Campus
Literature Review
The Addictive Potential of Benzodiazepines
Dr. Clarke St. Dennis
September 2006-March 2007
Washington State University Spokane Campus
Literature Review and Data Analysis
Epidemiology of Major Mental Disorders in Methamphetamine Users
Dr. John Roll
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James R. Donoval, ISB #8142
4481 N. Dresden Pl., Suite D
Garden City, ID 83714
Telephone: (312) 859-2029
Facsimile: (208) 649-1603
Email: jdonoval@aol.com
Attorney for Plaintiff Sharon R. Hammer

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

SHARON R. HAMMER,
Case No. CV-2015-428
Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION TO REQUIRE AN
LR.C.P. 35(a) MENTAL
EXAMINATION OF
DEFENDANT NILS RIBI

vs.
NILS RIBI, in his individual capacity,
Defendant.

COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Sharon R. Hammer ("Ms. Hammer"), by and through her

counsel ofrecord, James R. Donoval, and in support ofher Motion To Require Anl.R.C.P. 35(a)
Mental Examination Of Defendant Nils Ribi states as follows:
INTRODUCTION

Ms. Hammer's Complaint asserts that during her employment as the Sun Valley City
Administrator, after she had made numerous, confirmed complaints of hostility and harassment
against former Sun Valley City Council member Nils Ribi ("Defendant Ribi")1 to numerous Sun
Valley officials, on September 15, 2011, Defendant Ribi assaulted Ms. Hammer during a break
in a Sun Valley City Council meeting.
1 Defendant Ribi chose not to run for re-election as a Sun Valley City Council member in November of2013 after
the numerous harassment complaints and the assault complaint of Ms. Hammer against Defendant Ribi were made
public.

Memorandum In Support Of Motion To Require l.R. C.P. 35(a) Mental Examination - 1
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The Extensive Harassment Of Ms. Hammer By Defendant Ribi Prior To The Assault

The claims in this cause of action have also been part of several filings and law suits that
have been brought against Defendant Ribi, Sun Valley and various Sun Valley officials related to
Ms. Hammer's employment as the Sun Valley City Administrator between June of 2008 and
January of 2012, and her termination "without cause" in January of 20122 • The proceedings in
the various matters have confirmed that not only did Defendant Ribi lash out at Ms. Hammer
before her termination - after her termination, at the instigation of Defendant Ribi, Sun Valley
officials made very public false criminal allegations against Ms. Hammer related to Ms.
Hammer's use of compensatory time and a Sun Valley auto which the Sun Valley officials,
including Defendant Ribi himself, had approved3• Finally, almost a year after Ms. Hammer's
termination, the Blaine County Prosecutor put an end to the false criminal allegations by issuing
a written report exonerating Ms. Hammer of any possible criminal conduct4 .
As will be further described, the discovery in the various matters has confirmed that
between 2009 and 2011 Defendant Ribi engaged in an ever more threatening course of conduct
towards Ms. Hammer which included verbal abuse, hostility, harassment, and ultimately the
assault incident in September of 2011 upon which this cause of action is based, which Sun
Valley officials failed to disclose or do anything about.
When the issue of Defendant Ribi's harassment and assault of Ms. Hammer initially
became public immediately after the November of201 l election, Defendant Ribi feigned that no
such complaints had ever been made, and denied that he was ever advised that he was treating

Hammer v. Sun Valley et al., E-0112-241; 38C-2012-00122 (IHRC/EEOC) (the "IHRC/EEOC Case"); Hammer v.
Sun Valley et al., 1: 13-cv-211-EJL, (U.S. Idaho) (the "Federal Retaliation Law Suit"); Hammer v. Sun Valley, et al.,
CV-2012-479 (Blaine County) (the "State Retaliation Law Suit").
3 See Affidavit Of Counsel, Exhibit 0.
4 See Affidavit Of Counsel, Exhibit 0.

2
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Ms. Hammer in a hostile and abusive manner5• His statements have subsequently been directly
contradicted by most Sun Valley officials, who have confirmed Defendant Ribi's abusive and
hostile conduct towards Ms. Hammer, and that he was warned that his conduct was improper,
well before the assault incident in September of 2011.
Former Sun Valley Mayor Wayne Willich ("Former Mayor Willich") has confirmed in
various Affidavits6 and in his deposition7 that Defendant Ribi was harassing Ms. Hammer on an
on-going basis over the course of 2009 through 2011. Former Mayor Willich, a former 30 year
Boeing Co. executive, stated, "It's inappropriate, and it was harassment ... I know what
harassment looks like" 8 . On several occasions, Former Mayor Willich admonished Defendant
Ribi that his conduct towards Ms. Hammer was unacceptable9 , and provided Defendant Ribi
with Sun Valley's "Anti Harassment Policy" 10 in September of 2010 11 which also applied to Sun
Valley City Council members 12 . At his deposition, when faced with the email which confirmed
that he had been provided the "Anti Harassment Policy", Defendant Ribi claimed he did not
remember receiving the email 13. Defendant Ribi's response to Former Mayor Willich related to
the harassment complaints of Ms. Hammer, was, basically, "screw you" 14 •
Former Mayor Willich acknowledged that Ms. Hammer asserted that she was being
targeted by Defendant Ribi because she was a female 15 . Former Mayor Willich believed that

5

See Affidavit Of Counsel, Exhibit K; Nov. 23, 2011 Affidavit Of Defendant Ribi, Para. 4-5 and 12.
See Affidavit Of Counsel, Exhibit Band Exhibit D.
7 See Affidavit Of Counsel, Exhibit A.
8 See Affidavit Of Counsel, Exhibit A,Willich Dep., Pg. 136.
9 See Affidavit Of Counsel, Exhibit A, Exhibit B, and Exhibit D (generally).
10 See Affidavit Of Counsel, Exhibit J.
11 See Affidavit Of Counsel, Exhibit A, Willich Dep., Pg. 83; and Exhibit L, Ribi Dep.
12 See Affidavit Of Counsel, Exhibit J.
13 See Affidavit Of Counsel, Exhibit L.
14 See Affidavit Of Counsel, Exhibit A, Willich Dep., Pg. 139-140.
15 See Affidavit Of Counsel, Exhibit A, Willich Dep., Pg. 137.
6
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Defendant Ribi "targeted females" 16 and testified that Defendant Ribi's abusive conduct towards
Ms. Hammer was gender based and that "He has a little bit of difficulty with females, especially
if they're smarter than him" 17 • According to Former Mayor Willich, in describing Defendant
Ribi's attitude towards Ms. Hammer, "He didn't like her because she was smarter than him, and
he didn't like her because she was a female smarter than him" 18 .
Former Mayor Willich sought advice from former Sun Valley City Attorney Adam King
("Former City Attorney King") about what to do about Defendant Ribi's harassment of Ms.
Hammer 19 . Former City Attorney King admitted to Former Mayor Willich that Defendant Ribi's
conduct towards Ms. Hammer was "unacceptable"20 . Former City Attorney King then sought
advice from the Idaho Attorney General's office about what to do about Defendant Ribi's
harassment of Ms. Hammer2 1• According to Former City Attorney King, the extent of the advice
of the Idaho Attorney General's office about Defendant Ribi's harassment of Ms. Hammer was
that Sun Valley officials "would have to deal with it"22 . Former City Attorney King advised
Former Mayor Willich that there was no mechanism for disciplining Defendant Ribi because he
was an elected officiai2 3 . Former Mayor Willich described that had Defendant Ribi been an
employee of Boeing Co., his conduct towards Ms. Hammer would have been cause for
termination24 . However, Former Mayor Willich did formally find Defendant Ribi to have
violated the Sun Valley "Anti Harassment Policy" in his conduct towards Ms. Hammer prior to

16

See Affidavit Of Counsel, Exhibit B, Willich Aff., Para. 13; and Exhibit D, Willich Aff., Para. 11.
See Affidavit Of Counsel, Exhibit A, Willich Dep., Pg. 136.
18 See Affidavit Of Counsel, Exhibit A, Willich Dep., Pg. 35.
19 See Affidavit Of Counsel, Exhibit A, Willich Dep., Pg. 138-139, 144, 146; Exhibit B, Willich Aff., Para. 13;
Exhibit D, Willich Aff., Para. 11; and Exhibit G.
20 See Affidavit Of Counsel, Exhibit B, Willich Aff., Para. 13; and Exhibit D, Willich Aff., Para. 11.
21 See Affidavit Of Counsel, Exhibit G.
22 See Affidavit Of Counsel, Exhibit G.
23 See Affidavit Of Counsel, Exhibit A, Willich Dep., Pg. 146; Exhibit B, Willich Aff., Para. 13; and Exhibit D,
Willich Aff., Para. 11.
24 See Affidavit Of Counsel, Exhibit A, Willich Dep., Pg. 34, 148.
17
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the end of his term as Mayor Of Sun Valle/ 5, which was a "final and binding" determination of
Sun Valle/6 .
Former City Attorney King advised Ms. Hammer that the only thing she could do in
regards to Defendant Ribi was report Defendant Ribi's conduct to the Blaine County Prosecutor
if he ever did anything "criminal"27 . Former City Attorney King also spoke with Defendant Ribi
in regards to Ms. Hammer's harassment complaints against Defendant Ribi 28 .
Ms. Hammer discussed her concerns about Defendant Ribi with former Sun Valley
Police Chief Cam Daggett ("Former Chief Daggett") 29 . Former Chief Daggett advised Ms.
Hammer to notify the Sun Valley Police Department whenever Defendant Ribi was in Sun
Valley City Hall, that she should lock her Sun Valley City Hall office door when Defendant Ribi
was in Sun Valley City Hall, and she should record all telephone calls from Defendant Ribi on
the Sun Valley telephone system30 . Former City Attorney King affirmed that Ms. Hammer
should take the actions related to Defendant Ribi that Former Chief Daggett had advised Ms.
Hammer to take 31 •
Former Sun Valley Mayor DeWayne Briscoe ("Former Mayor Briscoe")3 2 , who was also
a member of the Sun Valley City Council between 2008 and 2011, and the Sun Valley City
Council president between 2010 and 2011, admitted that he had been made aware of Ms.

25

See Affidavit Of Counsel, Exhibit C, Willich Aff., Para. 12.
See Affidavit Of Counsel, Exhibit J.
27 See Hammer Aff., Para. 3-5.
28 See Affidavit Of Counsel, Exhibit A, Willich Dep., Pg. 138; and Exhibit B, Willich Aff., Para. 13.
29 See Hammer Aff., Para. 6.
30 See Hammer Aff., Para. 7.
31 See Hammer Aff., Para. 8.
32 Former Mayor Briscoe chose not to run for re-election as Mayor Of Sun Valley in November of2015 after the
Idaho Mountain Express reported that he had not paid real estate taxes for three years and that his former fiance had
obtained a stalking Order Of Protection against him from the Blaine County Court in March of 2014.
26
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Hammer's harassment complaints related to Defendant Ribi in early 2011 33 , but did nothing
about it because it was not his job as president of the Sun Valley City Council to do so 34 .
Former Sun Valley City Council Member Joan Lamb ("Former Council Member Lamb")
also acknowledged that Defendant Ribi's abusive and hostile conduct towards Ms. Hammer was
inappropriate35 . Former Mayor Willich confirmed that he had discussed Defendant Ribi's
verbally abusive and hostile conduct towards Ms. Hammer with Former Council Member Lamb
on several occasions and that Former Council Member Lamb had confirmed that Defendant
Ribi's conduct towards Ms. Hammer was "hostile" and unacceptable 36 • On several occasions
Former Council Member Lamb chastised Defendant Ribi because of his improper contact and
treatment of Ms. Hammer37 .
During most of 2011, well before the assault incident, Ms. Hammer also sought
professional help in regards to her concerns of Defendant Ribi's harassment of her. Ms. Hammer
spoke to her counsel/therapist Evan Hanson 38 , who acknowledged that Defendant Ribi was
"disruptive and manipulative" and was making Ms. Hammer's life at Sun Valley difficult39 . Mr.
Hanson acknowledged that Sun Valley employees needed to be protected from Defendant Ribi
because of his "very narcissistic ways" 40 . Ms. Hammer also held discussions with her medical

33

Former Mayor Willich also disclosed that he had discussed Ms. Hammer's harassment complaints against
Defendant Ribi with Former Mayor Briscoe on several occasions (see Affidavit Of Counsel, Exhibit A, Willich
Dep., Pg. 34-35).
34 See Affidavit Of Counsel, Exhibit F.
35 See Affidavit Of Counsel, Exhibit E.
36 See Affidavit Of Counsel, Exhibit B, Willich Aff., Para. 9; and Exhibit D, Willich Aff., Para. 9.
37 See Affidavit Of Counsel, Exhibit A, Willich dep., Pg. 33; Exhibit B, Willich Aff., Para. 9; and Exhibit D, Willich
Aff., Para. 9.
38 Evan Hanson is an Oregon based Licensed Marriage and Family Therapist who Ms. Hammer received personal
counseling from in 2010 and 2011. Mr. Hanson also treated several other Sun Valley employees (Michelle
Frostenson (former Treasurer), Diane Shay (former Planner), and Mark Hofman (former Planner), all of whom also
complained to him of Defendant Ribi's abusive conduct towards Sun Valley employees. Mr. Hanson was also
retained during 2011 by Sun Valley itself to discuss handling "difficult people" (i.e. Defendant Ribi).
39 See Affidavit Of Counsel, Exhibit H.
40 See Affidavit Of Counsel, Exhibit H.
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professional, Nanette Ford41 , who acknowledged Ms. Hammer's "threatening encounters" with
Defendant Ribi, that Defendant Ribi "rages inappropriately", and that Ms. Hammer was fearful
that "he is going to snap"42 .
As described in Ms. Hammer's Complaint, Ms. Hammer asserts that on September 15,
2011, during a break in a Sun Valley City Council meeting, Defendant Ribi assaulted her
because she would not make changes to a budget line item that was being discussed by the entire
Sun Valley City Council. As was a recurring problem with Defendant Ribi, Defendant Ribi had
no authority to direct Ms. Hammer's actions as the Sun Valley City Administrator43 , and
Defendant Ribi had no authority to unilaterally seek any actions of Sun Valley outside his
limited role as one member of the Sun Valley City Council. When Ms. Hammer would not do
what Defendant Ribi demanded, Defendant Ribi lunged towards Ms. Hammer in, what Ms.
Hammer believed was, an imminent threat to her physical safety. Ms. Hammer asserts the assault
was witnessed by former Sun Valley Administrative Assistant David Blampied. Former Mayor
Willich has confirmed that Ms. Hammer immediately reported the assault by Defendant Ribi to
both Former Mayor Willich and Former City Attorney King, that Defendant Ribi had "seriously
scared" Ms. Hammer, and Ms. Hammer was "visibly distraught" and "visibly upset" after it
occurred44 . Former Mayor Willich discussed the assault with former Administrative Assistant
David Blampied, who witnessed the incident45 . Former Mayor Willich confirmed that shortly
after the September 15, 2011 assault of Ms. Hammer by Defendant Ribi he discussed the matter

Nanette Ford is a Ketchum based Licensed Physician's Assistant who Ms. Hammer received medical treatment
from during 2009 through 2012.
42 See Affidavit Of Counsel, Exhibit I.
43 Both the Sun Valley Personnel Policies and Ms. Hammer's job description specifically described that Ms.
Hammer reported solely to the Sun Valley Mayor, not the Sun Valley City Council.
44 See Affidavit Of Counsel, Exhibit A, Willich Dep., Pg. 33-34, 145; Exhibit B, Willich Aff., Para. 14; and Exhibit
D, Willich Aff., Para. 12.
45 See Affidavit Of Counsel, Exhibit A, Willich Dep., Pg. 33.
41
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with Defendant Ribi and told Defendant Ribi that he could not act that way towards Ms.
Hammer46 .
There is extensive evidence in the record generated by the IHRC/EEOC Case, the State
Retaliation Law Suit and the Federal Retaliation Law Suit that Defendant Ribi continually
harassed and was abusive towards Ms. Hammer during most of 2009 through 2011. Ms. Hammer
certainly had the right to consider Defendant Ribi to be dangerous and have the potential for
physical violence when he assaulted her on September 15, 2011, as is alleged herein.
THE BASIS FOR THE I.R.C.P. 35(a) EXAMINATION
l.R. C.P. 35{a) states in relevant part as follows:

"Physical and Mental Examination of Persons. When the mental or physical condition
... of a party ... is in controversy ... the court in which the action is pending may order
the party to submit to a physical or mental examination by a physician, or a qualified
mental health professional as defined in Section 6-190 l, Idaho Code, excluding nurses, if
the mental health, emotional, or psychological condition of a party is at issue ... The
order may be made only on motion for good cause shown and upon notice to the person
to be examined and to all parties and shall specify the time, place, manner, conditions,
and scope of the examination, including any tests and procedures to be performed, and
the person or persons by whom it is to be performed. Upon giving of reasonable notice to
the other parties, the party being examined or the person having custody or legal control
of the person being examined, shall have the right to have a representative of his or her
choice present."
Idaho Code§' 6-1901 defines a "Mental Health Professional" as follows:
"(l) A physician licensed pursuant to chapter 18, title 54, Idaho Code;

(2) A professional counselor licensed pursuant to chapter 34, title 54, Idaho Code;
(3) A psychologist licensed pursuant to chapter 23, title 54, Idaho Code;
(4) A social worker licensed pursuant to chapter 32, title 54, Idaho Code; or,

(5) A licensed professional nurse licensed pursuant to chapter 14, title 54, Idaho Code."
There is little Idaho case law on when it is appropriate to require a civil litigant to
undergo a mental examination. In Navarro v. Yonkers, 144 Idaho 882, 886, 173 P.3d 1141 (Id.
Sup.Ct. 2007) the Idaho Supreme Court confirmed that a district court may, in its discretion,
46

See Affidavit Of Counsel, Exhibit B, Willich Aff., Para. 14; and Exhibit D, Willich Aff., Para. 12.
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order a mental examination of a civil litigant pursuant to 1.R. C.P. 35(a) when the mental
condition of a party is in controversy. In Perry v. Magic Valley Regional Medical Center, 134
Idaho 46, 50, 995 P.2d 816 (Id. Sup.Ct. 2000) the district court in that case allowed a mental
examination of the plaintiff because it was asserted that the plaintiff suffered from a character
disorder affecting her truthfulness, as is asserted herein related to Defendant Ribi.
However, in federal cases which analyze mental health examinations under F.R. C.P.
35(a), which includes the same language related to examination of a party when the mental
health of the party is "in controversy", federal courts have discussed, and allowed, requiring a
defendant to undergo a mental examination under certain circumstances. In Schlagenhauf v.
Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 112-119, 85 S.Ct. 234 (U.S. Sup.Ct. 1964) the U.S. Supreme Court
discussed the parameters under which any party may be required to undergo a mental health
examination, including a defendant. In fact, in Schlagenhauf(@ 112) the U.S. Supreme Court
stated that F.R.C.P. 35(a) "on its face applies to all 'parties' which under any normal reading
would include a defendant". In Schlagenhauf, the U.S. Supreme Court did not limit situations
for when a mental examination of a party (the defendant in that case) is warranted to situations
where the party has, himself/herself, put their mental health at issue, but instead requires a court
to make two determinations. First, the mental health of the party must be "in controversy".
Second, there must be "good cause" shown for the need for the mental health examination.
In Goodman v. Harris County, 571 F.3d 388, 399-400 (U.S. App.5th 2009) the U.S. Fifth
District Appellate Court affirmed the requirement made by the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Texas that a deputy constable (one of the defendants in the case) be subject
to a F.R.C.P. 35(a) mental examination related to his use of force. The Goodman v. Harris Court
went on to also affirm the use of testimony of the psychiatrist that evaluated the deputy constable
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at trial. In the Goodman v. Harris County (@399-400) case, the psychiatrist was allowed to
examine the deputy constable related to his "cognitive weaknesses, some short-term memory
problems, and attention span limitations". The Goodman v. Harris County Court concluded that
the psychiatrist's testimony related to the deputy constable's mental health and the deputy
constable's "ability to accurately recall" the incident in question was "highly relevant".
MENTAL ILLNESSES WHICH DEFENDANT RIBI POTENTIALLY SUFFERS FROM

Ms. Hammer asserts that she is entitled to seek that this Court mandate that Defendant
Ribi be required to proceed through a mental examination pursuant to I.R.C.P. 35(a). Ms.
Hammer asserts that Defendant Ribi suffers from one of several personality disorders, including
either Antisocial Personality Disorder ("APD") or Dissocial Personality Disorder ("DPD"), or
Narcissistic Personality Disorder ("NPD"), all of which make Defendant Ribi prone to hostility
and physical threats, and prohibit Defendant Ribi from telling the truth and recognizing that he is
not telling the truth. Defendant Ribi' s mental illnesses should be allowed to be presented to the
jury so that Defendant Ribi' s predilection towards hostility and violence, and his lack of
credibility, can be put into proper perspective, and so that the jury can understand that Defendant
Ribi is incapable of telling the truth or telling wrong from right in regards to his conduct and
actions towards Ms. Hammer.
Antisocial Personality Disorder or Dissocial Personality Disorder

What was formerly described as either sociopathy (i.e. being a sociopath) or psychopathy
(i.e. being a psychopath), is now defined in the mental health industry as either APD or DPD.
The American Psychiatric Association 's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual ofMental Disorders
(the "DSM IV-TR") and the International Statistical Classification ofDiseases and Related

Health Problems ("ICD-1 O"), the two mental health industry recognized publications defining
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mental health disorders, describe APD and DPD in roughly the same way.
The DSM IV-TR definition of APD is:
A pervasive pattern of disregard for and violation of the rights of others, occurring since
age 15 years, as indicated by three or more of the following:
1) Failure to conform to social norms with respect to lawful behaviors, as
indicated by repeatedly performing acts that are grounds for arrest;
2) Deceitfulness as indicated by repeated lying, use of aliases, or conning others
for personal profit or pleasure;
3) Impulsivity or failure to plan ahead;
4) Irritability and aggressiveness, as indicated by repeated physical fights or
assaults;
5) Reckless disregard for safety of self or others;
6) Consistent irresponsibility, as indicated by repeated failure to sustain consistent
work behavior or honor financial obligations;
7) Lack of remorse, as indicated by being indifferent to or rationalizing having
hurt, mistreated, or stolen from another.
According to the DSM-IV-TR, the essential feature of APD is a pervasive pattern of
disregard for, and violation of, the rights of others. Persons with APD disregard the wishes,
rights, or feelings of others and are frequently deceitful and manipulative in order to gain
personal profit or pleasure. Persons with APD repeatedly lie, con others, or malinger. People
with APD lack empathy and tend to be callous, cynical, and contemptuous of the feelings, rights,
and sufferings of others; have an inflated and arrogant self-appraisal; and may be excessively
opinionated, self assured, or cocky. Those with APD are manipulative to gain profit, power, or
some other material gratification.
The ICD-10 defines DPD as characterized by three of the following:
1) Callous unconcern for the feelings of others;
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2) Gross and persistent attitude of irresponsibility;
3) Incapacity to maintain enduring relationships, though having no difficulty in
establishing them;
4) Very low tolerance to frustration and a low threshold for discharge of
aggression, including violence;
5) Incapacity to experience guilt or to profit from experience, particularly
punishment;
6) Marked readiness to blame others or to offer plausible rationalizations for the
behavior that has brought the person into conflict with society.
According to the DSM-IV-TR up to 3.3% of the general population suffers from APD. A
2010 article in Psychology Today entitled "60 Million People in U.S. Negatively Affected By
Someone Else's Pathology", asserts that 1 in 25 people, or roughly 4% of the population, suffers
from some form of APD/DPD.
Narcissistic Personality Disorder
A related personality disorder to APD/DPD is NPD. Those who suffer from NPD,
generally, also have some of the same characteristics of those who suffer from APD/DPD.
The DSM IV-TR definition of NPD is:
A pervasive pattern of grandiosity (in fantasy and behavior), need for admiration, and
lack of empathy, beginning by early adulthood and present in a variety of contexts, as indicated
by five (or more) of the following:
1) Has a grandiose sense of self-importance (e.g. exaggerates achievements and talents,
expects to be recognized as superior without commensurate achievements);
2) Is preoccupied with fantasies of unlimited success, power, brilliance, beauty, or ideal
love;
3) Believes that he or she is "special" and unique and can only be understood by, or
should associate with, other special or high-status people (or institutions);
4) Requires excessive admiration;
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5) Has a sense of entitlement (i.e. umeasonable expectations of especially favorable
treatment or automatic compliance with his or her expectations);
6) Is inter-personally exploitative (i.e. takes advantage of others to achieve his or her own
ends);
7) Lacks empathy: is unwilling to recognize or identify with the feelings and needs of
others;
8) Is often envious of others or believes that others are envious of him or her;
9) Shows arrogant, haughty behaviors or attitudes.
According to the DSM-IV-TR, the essential feature ofNPD is a pervasive pattern of
grandiosity, need for admiration, and lack of empathy. Individuals with NPD have a grandiose
sense of self-importance. People who suffer from NPD routinely overestimate their abilities and
inflate their accomplishments, often appearing boastful and pretentious. Sufferers ofNPD
assume that others attribute the same value to their efforts and may be surprised when the praise
they expect and feel they deserve is not forthcoming. Individuals who suffer from NPD are
preoccupied with fantasies of unlimited success, power, and brilliance. People with NPD expect
to be catered to and are puzzled or furious when this does not happen. NPD sufferers get irritated
when others fail to assist in what they consider to be their very important work. Because of their
sense of entitlement and their lack of sensitivity to the wants and needs of others, someone with
NPD will consciously or unwittingly exploit others, and expect to be given whatever they want
or feel they need, no matter what it might mean to others. Individuals with NPD have a lack of
empathy, and are contemptuous and impatient with others. People with NPD are oblivious to the
hurt they inflict on others. Arrogant, haughty behaviors characterize someone with NPD. People
with NPD are often snobbish, disdainful, or patronizing, and may react with disdain, rage or
defiant counterattacks.
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Because diagnosing NPD is difficult due to the refusal of someone suffering from NPD to
cooperate with mental health professionals, the DSM-IV-TR describes that the percentage of the
general population that could suffer from NPD could be as high as 6.6%.
The Difference Between NPD and APD/DPD
As the DSM IV-TR describes, the most distinguishable feature of someone who suffers
from NPD, as opposed to APD/DPD, is the grandiosity characteristic and overblown sense of
self-importance ofNPD sufferers. Individuals with APD/DPD may not be as needy of the
admiration and envy as those with NPD. In many ways, contrary to those who suffer from NPD,
those who suffer from APD/DPD purposefully seek to avoid any attention being paid to their
own conduct.
Most mental health professionals differentiate APD/DPD and NPD by stating that those
who suffer from NPD are clueless that they are causing injuries to others, because the overriding
reason for their conduct is to seek to show their own specialness, even at the expense of harm to
others. Those who suffer from APD/DPD do not need to focus any attention upon themselves as
they either don't care about others at all or actually take pleasure in causing injury to others. In
essence, people who suffer from NPD don't know that they are hurting someone or lying, while
those who suffer from APD/DPD know they are hurting others and lying but don't care.
Those Who Suffer From Either APD/DPD Or NPD Have The Inability To Tell The Truth
And/Or To Recognize That They Are Not Telling The Truth And Because Of That Are
Difficult To Treat
What all individuals who suffer from either APD/DPD or NPD share is that their illness
causes them to lie. Most APD/DPD sufferers do so knowingly and purposefully. However, many
APD/DPD sufferers, and almost all NPD sufferers, have no clue that they are lying, as they
believe their own lies. In their 2012 book entitled The Everything Guide To Narcissistic
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Personality, Cynthia Leehan Goodman and Barbara Leff state "Lying can be just a tool for
getting what the narcissist wants. He may view it as being clever or being superior to others.
Often the narcissist feels he is above normal consequences. If caught in a lie, he will probably
see it as a threat and find a new lie to overcome this threat." In his 2014 book The Narcissist
Next Door, Jeffrey Kluger adds that, "Narcissists aren't thinking down the line when they liepartly because the immediate self-enhancement need is so great, partly because they just don't
plan to be around that long."
That inability to recognize that they are lying makes treatment of many APD/DPD
sufferers, and most NPD sufferers, almost impossible. In The Everything Guide To Narcissistic
Personality, Cynthia Leehan Goodman and Barbara Leff state, "Patients with NPD tend to
criticize and devalue their therapists, as these clients do with most authority figures, making it
difficult for therapists to work with them." In The Narcissist Next Door, Jeffrey Kluger
describes that, "When people with a personality disorder at last enter treatment, it's typically
because family or friends push them there. Absent that kind of coercion, they really see no need
to change. This is especially true of narcissists, who not only don't think they need a doctor but
are convinced they're smarter than the doctor."
MS. HAMMER'S REQUEST FOR A MENTAL EXAMINATION OF DEFENDANT RIBI
Ms. Hammer Has Retained a Psychiatrist Who Can Determine Whether Defendant Ribi
Suffers From Various Mental Illnesses Which Affect His Ability To Recognize His
Misconduct Or To Tell The Truth
Ms. Hammer has retained Psychiatrist Scott Eliason, M.D. to diagnose Defendant Ribi's
mental health. Dr. Eliason has an extensive background in evaluating an individual's capacity for
truthfully testifying at trial, and has worked as part of several prison and court systems,
evaluating convicted criminals and those charged with crimes, including at the Ada County Jail
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(see Exhibit B of Motion herein).
Dr. Eliason has proposed that he would conduct a mental health evaluation of Defendant
Ribi which would consist of two psychological tests, an interview with Defendant Ribi, and a
review of Defendant Ribi's medical and mental health records (see Exhibit A of Motion herein,
and Affidavit Of Counsel, Para. 18). Dr. Eliason asserts that based on his evaluation of
Defendant Ribi he would be able to opine on whether Defendant Ribi suffers from a mental
illness or personality disorder which increases the risk of violence and a propensity to be
deceptive, both of which are at issue in this case.
CONCLUSION
I.R. C.P. 35(a) does not limit mental health examinations to only plaintiffs or only to

parties who place their own mental health at issue in the matter. The only conditions to requiring
a mental health examination of any party is whether the mental health of the party is "in
controversy" and whether there is "good cause" for the mental health examination (see
Schlagenhauf v. Holder @112-119). Based on the testimony and other evidence produced by

numerous individuals in the various cases between Ms. Hammer, Defendant Ribi and Sun
Valley, there is certainly sufficient evidence that Defendant Ribi's mental health is "in
controversy".
As to "good cause", there has been extensive evidence presented to the Court that
Defendant Ribi had a long history of harassment, hostility and abuse of Ms. Hammer such that
the Court can conclude that Defendant Ribi possessed a heightened level of anger and hostility
towards Ms. Hammer when he approached her with his demands that budget line items be
changed, which he had no unilateral authority to claim, during the break in the Sun Valley City
Council meeting on September 15, 2011, when he lunged towards Ms. Hammer, in what Ms.
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Hammer had a right to believe was an imminent attempt to physically harm her. Defendant
Ribi's insistence that he neither harassed Ms. Hammer, nor was made aware of the complaints
about his conduct, with the overwhelming evidence presented herein, is evidence itself of
Defendant Ribi's sociopathic/psychopathic/narcissistic ailments. As was the case with the deputy
constable in Goodman v. Harris County (@399-400), there is "good cause" that Defendant
Ribi's mental health should be assessed to determine whether he has a propensity towards
violence, has the inability to recognize wrong from right, and has the inability to be truthful in
testifying regarding his harassment of, and assault of, Ms. Hammer, at trial.

WHEREFORE, Ms. Hammer prays that this Court enter an Order, under such terms and
conditions as it finds to be just, equitable and proper, requiring that Defendant Ribi be required
to undergo a mental health evaluation pursuant to I.R.C.P. 35(a) by Dr. Eliason.

DATED this

/qlh day of April, 2016.

S. HAMMER'S ATTORNEY
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PROOF OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that a true and correct copy of the attached document was served by
facsimile a US mail, r.roper postage pre-paid to the above listed recipients on or before 5:00
p.m. on
7
f
, 2016.
To:

Kirtlan Naylor
Naylor & Hales
950 W. Bannock St., Suite 610
Boise, ID 83702
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James R. Donoval, ISB #8142
4481 N. Dresden Pl., Suite D
Garden City, ID 83714
Telephone: (312) 859-2029
Facsimile: (208) 649-1603
Email: jdonoval@aol.com
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APR 2 0 2016
Jolynn~, Clerk Disttict

_..;;COU=7!~l!Je_q_gunty,
lt!aho
,._........_,.,_._.

Attorney for Plaintiff Sharon R. Hammer
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

SHARON R. HAMMER,
Case No. CV-2015-428
Plaintiff,
vs.
NILS RIBI, in his individual capacity,
Defendant.

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Ada

AFFIDAVIT OF SHARON R.
HAMMER IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO REQUIRE AN
LR.C.P. 35(a) MENTAL
EXAMINATION OF
DEFENDANT NILS RIBI AND
MOTION TO SEEK PUNITIVE
DAMAGES

)
: ss.
)

I, Sharon R. Hammer, being first duly sworn upon oath, depose and state as follows:

1.

I am the named Plaintiff in the above-captioned matter.

2.

I have personal knowledge of the facts contained herein and if called upon to

testify about the same, I could do so competently.
3.

On several occasions during 2010 and 2011, I sought advice from former Sun

Valley City Attorney Adam King ("Former City Attorney King") regarding what to do about
numerous incidents in which I was verbally abused and harassed by Defendant Ribi.
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4.

During 2011, I was advised by Former City Attorney Adam King that he had

discussed the issue with the Idaho Attorney General's office and that there was nothing that Sun
Valley could formally do to Defendant Ribi in regards to his harassment of me because he was
an elected official.
5.

Former City Attorney King advised me that the only thing I could do in regards to

Defendant Ribi' s harassment of me was to report Defendant Ribi to the Blaine County
Prosecutor if Defendant Ribi ever did anything criminal.
6.

During 2010 and 2011, on several occasions, I also spoke with former Sun Valley

Police Chief Cam Daggett ("Former Chief Daggett") about Defendant Ribi's harassment and
hostility towards me.
7.

Former Chief Daggett advised me to notify the Sun Valley Police Department

whenever Defendant Ribi was in Sun Valley City Hall, that I should lock my Sun Valley City
Hall office door when Defendant Ribi was in Sun Valley City Hall, and I should record all of
Defendant Ribi's phone calls to me on my Sun Valley telephone.
8.

Former City Attorney King affirmed that I should take the actions related to

Defendant Ribi that Former Chief Daggett had advised me to do.
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

/Jfli

day of April, 2016.

Page 53 of 526

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on t h i s ~ day of April, 2016, a true and correct copy of
the foregoing document was served on the following individual(s) by the method indicated:
Kirtlan G. Naylor

[ J U.S. Mail

NAYLOR&HALES, P.C.

[ ] Fax: 383-9516
JX! Hand Delivery
f. Email: kirt@naylorhales.com

950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 610
Boise, ID 83 702-6103

t

'
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James R. Donoval, ISB #8142
4481 N. Dresden Pl., Suite D
Garden City, ID 83714
Telephone: (312) 859-2029
Facsimile: (208) 649-1603
Email: jdonoval@aol.com

Fl LE-D ~........,...._....,.,.
APR 2 O2016
Jolynn Drage, Clerk District
Court t,/alne Coun Maho

Attorney for Plaintiff Sharon R. Hammer
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

SHARON R. HAMMER,
Case No. CV-2015-428
Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO
REQUIRE AN LR.CP. 35(a)
MENTAL EXAMINATION OF
DEFENDANT NILS RIBI AND
MOTION TO SEEK PUNITIVE
DAMAGES

vs.
NILS RIBI, in his individual capacity,
Defendant.

I, James R. Donoval, being first duly sworn upon oath, depose and state as
follows:
1.

I have personal knowledge of the facts contained herein and if called upon

to testify about the same, I could do so competently.
2.

I am counsel to Ms. Hammer in the matter herein.

3.

Attached as Exhibit A is relevant portions of a transcript of the deposition

of Wayne Willich, former Mayor of Sun Valley, ("Former Mayor Willich") held on May
28, 2014 in the matter of Hammer v. Sun Valley, et al., 1:13-cv-211-EJL (U.S. Idaho)(the
"Federal Retaliation Law Suit").
4.

Attached as Exhibit B is relevant portions of an Affidavit of Former

Mayor Willich filed in February of 2012 with the Idaho Human Rights Commission and
1
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Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the "IHRC/EEOC Case") in the matter of
Hammer v. Sun Valley, et al., E-0112-241, 38C-2012-00122, the precursor to the Federal
Retaliation Law Suit.
5.

Attached as Exhibit C is relevant portions of an Affidavit of Former

Mayor Willich filed in December of 2012 in the matter of Ribi v. Donoval, CV-20111040 (Blaine County), which was a defamation law suit filed by Defendant Ribi against
me, which was dismissed at summary judgment.
6.

Attached as Exhibit D is relevant portions of an Affidavit of Former

Mayor Willich filed in November of 2013 in the matter of Hammer v. Sun Valley, et al.,
CV-2012-479 (Blaine County) (the "State Retaliation Law Suit").
7.

Attached as Exhibit E is relevant portions of a transcript of the deposition

of Joan Lamb, a former Sun Valley City Council member, ("Former Council Member
Lamb") held on June 10, 2014 in the Federal Retaliation Law Suit.
8.

Attached as Exhibit F is relevant portions of a transcript of the deposition

of DeWayne Briscoe, the former Sun Valley City Council president (2010-2011), and
former Mayor of Sun Valley (2012-2015) ("Former Mayor Briscoe") held on May 29,
2014 in the Federal Retaliation Law Suit.
9.

Attached as Exhibit G is relevant portions of an investigative report of

Patricia Latham-Ball related to allegations of harassment and other misconduct against
Defendant Ribi, dated December 20, 2011, which was included by Sun Valley in
pleadings in the IHRC/EEOC Case and published in its entirety in the Idaho Mountain
Express on-line website during portions of 2012 and 2013.

2
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10.

Attached as Exhibit H is relevant portions of medical records of Ms.

Hammer's personal counselor and therapist Evan Hanson, from January of 2011,
provided to Sun Valley in discovery in the Federal Retaliation Law Suit and the State
Retaliation Law Suit.
11.

Attached as Exhibit I is relevant portions of medical records of Ms.

Hammer's medical professional Nannette Ford, from April of 2011, provided to Sun
Valley in discovery in the Federal Retaliation Law Suit and the State Retaliation Law
Suit.
12.

Attached as Exhibit J is relevant portions of the Sun Valley Personnel

Policies formally adopted by the Sun Valley City Council, including Section 7.5
HARASSMENT POLICY (the "Anti Harassment Policy") and Sections 8.1 through 8.7
DISCIPLINE.
13.

Attached as Exhibit K is relevant portions of an Affidavit of Defendant

Ribi filed in the matter of Hammer v. Ribi et al., CV-2011-928 (Blaine County) (the
"Original Retaliation Law Suit").
14.

Attached as Exhibit L is relevant portions of the deposition of Defendant

Ribi in the Federal Retaliation Law Suit dated May 30, 2014, including a copy of an
email and the Anti Harassment Policy provided to Defendant Ribi on September 30,
2010.
15.

Attached as Exhibit M is relevant portions of the Sun Valley Personnel

Policies formally adopted by the Sun Valley City Council, including Section 3.9 HOURS
OF WORK, Section 3.11 WORK SCHEDULES, and Section 4.8 OVERTIME PAY.
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16.

Attached as Exhibit N is relevant portions of Ms. Hammer's City

Administrator Employment Agreement with Sun Valley, including SECTION 10.
OTHER TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT.
17.

Attached as Exhibit O is relevant portions of a letter issued by the Blaine

County Prosecutor dated November 21, 2012, related to allegations of criminal
misconduct against Ms. Hammer.
18.

On behalf of Ms. Hammer I have retained Dr. Scott Eliason, a licensed

psychiatrist with extensive experience in analyzing individuals for trial who has agreed to
perform an evaluation of Defendant Ribi as to whether he suffers from a mental illness of
personality disorder which Defendant Ribi more prone to violence and to lying (see
Exhibit A and B to Motion To Require An I.R.C.P. 35(a) Mental Examination Of
Defendant Nils Ribi).

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

/1 fl,day of Jtpn / 1 Z,tJ /¢.

4
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

J..3!!!._

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
day of April, 2016, a true and correct
copy of the foregoing document was served on the following individual(s) by the method
indicated:

r . U.S. Mail

Kirtlan Naylor
NAYLOR & HALES
950 W. Bannock St., Suite 610
Boise, ID 83702

[ ] Fax:
[XI Hand Delivery
[ ] Email:
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IR TBB URITBD S'l'ATBS DISTRIC'l' COtJ'R'l'
POR TBB DIS'l'RIC'l' OP IDAHO

SDROR' R. BAIIIIBR and JABS R.

)

DONOVAL, husband and wife,

)

Plaintiffs,
vs.

)

Case Ro. 1:13-cv-211-BJL

)

CITY OF SUB VALLBY; RILS RIBI, in his)

individual and official capacity; and)
DBWAYRB BllSCOB, in his individual

)

and official capacity,

)

Defendants.

__________________

)
)

DBPOSITIOR OF WAYRB WILLICll
KAY 28, 2014

REPORTED BY:
ANDREA L. CHECK, CSR No. 748, RPR
Notary Public
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Page 18

Because your stenographer here can use the very same
2 words, but if you don't have the body language
3
associated with it, they don't mean anything.
4
What I'm suggesting to you is body language.
5
She was -- it's as if she was trying to get me engaged
6 in the - and I'm not going to use the word -- in a
7 collusion.
a
Q. (BY MR. SWARTZ)
g a.Ir 7111118
lO
Al II NNIJ th lb I
I 1I la Ifyou
11 take the VIN number -- later on I looked at the trade-in
12 value. It was $1,650, which is way below the asset
13 control point that we had in the city of$5,000. And
14 when you look at CARFAX and you see a surplus police
15 vehicle with 130,000 miles on ih it's basically junk.
1

•r

l!ldlllll!R111JIRQl!JIJII likue

16
..-i-9-.1 H
l 7 ~
18
alllB1li
,,.

21
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22
23
24
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11~
12
.ALIIIMep.
13
MR. NAYLOR: Object to the fonn.
14

TU@WMHiSfii:Jf I JJR..__~'ffl#

~: =~t:=atiilg
sWARTZ)id you

Q. (BY MR.
relay to Michelle
Frostenson that you didn't have any concerns about
19 Sharon Hammer's use of the vehicle?
20
A. Didn't talk to her.
2l
Q. Afterthe-22
A. She left. In fact, I didn't engage her in a
23 discussion. She left, and I didn't discuss it with her.
24
Q. Did you look into any of the allegations that
25 she brought to you on October 5th?
11

1a

~ ' , i ~. . . . . . .?

19
20

Valley at 3:00 in the morning to get the plowing
started, and the county hadn't started doing Highway 75,
3 he'd be able to get back to our city with a proper
4 vehicle to start plowing.
s
So, for instance. with the Brad Mitchell, was
6 the Brad Mitchell stuff specifically authorized by city
1
policy? No, but I thought it was good management.
1

2

Pf li~i~
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4
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1
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usedrit12'm.:~flt'Jillcfaal411DCM~or,

pel;Mllllltme., NoWJ.._,~omed -

speeifiealiy authorized,~
I allowed the assistant fire chief, Ray
Franco, to take a command car home to his home in
13 Ketchum. And you might say, well, what's that all
14 about? Well, the bulk of the fire incidents, in my four
15 years as the mayor, occurred right down Warm Springs
16 Road in Ketchum, and he was first on the scene in
17 probably four or five fire incidents. And I thought,
1s "Good public service. We've got an assistant fire chief
19 over there, you know, first on the scene."
20
I also allowed Brad Mitchell, in the
21 wintertime -- he's in the street department. He lives
22 in Hailey -- and I authorized him to take the pickup
2 3 truck with the plow on it home to Hailey if there was
24 the thought of a stonn coming up, with the idea being
25 that ifhe wanted to come back into the city of Sun

s
6

7

a
9

10

10

11
12

12

Min-l -Script(!!;

11

13

u
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16
17
18
19
20
21
22

23

24

2s

A. No. All of that was - I did all of that work
when the staff members that were put on administrative
leave were all gone. And that's when Tammi Hall and I
and others went through things like the mischarging of
the - to BLM; bogus. 133,000; bogus. The use of a
surplus city vehicle; trivial. So I dismissed it all.
Q. Was that before or after Nils Ribi called a
special executive session on November 11, 2011?
'MR. NAYLOR: Object to the form.
THE WITNESS: The analysis that I did?
MR. SWARTZ:Yes.
THE WlTNESS: Afterwards.
Q. (BY MR. SWARTZ) Was that before or after the
November 14, 2011, executive session?
I believe it was the 14th. Maybe it was the
17th.
A. Well, now you're -MR. NAYLOR: It was Monday the 14th.
THE WITNESS: After. I'm trying to recall
when various people were put on administrative leave.
MR. SWARTZ: Sure.
THE WITNESS: And what I did is waited until
the building was clear before starting to go through
material, just so that the -- all of the people,
Michelle, Kelly Ek, all of the people-- those people

M & M Court Reportiq Service., Inc.
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1

the allegations and have an opportunity to respond to

1

2

them?

2

3

3

s

A. Didn't have that discussion, no.
Q. Did anyone raise the allegation that what
Ms. Hammer had allegedly engaged in was criminal in

6

nature?

4

4

s
6

A. There was -- I have to be really, really
a careful, because this is an accusation, I think. So I
9 have to be very, vecy careful of trying to rack my
10 memory of a
"th no notes or an
There
7

,
8
9

10

11

11

12

12

13
14

15
16

13

'

Q. Do you recall leavmg
14
meeting, along with Adam King, and telling Sharon Hammer 1s
that the allegations being made against her in that
1,

1,

11 November 11th executive session included allegations of
1a criminal misconduct?
1a
19
A. I didn't say that, but Adam King. I think,
19
20 said it.
20
21
Q. Was that relayed to Sharon Hammer, as you
21
22 recall it?
22
23
A. In her office, yeah. Now, you may ask me, are
23
24 you perfectly, perfectly 100 percent sure about that?
24
2s
25 What I just said was I thought - Q

-t

Q. Right. We won't question you on the location
of meetings, just what you recall from those meetings.
Okay?
Prior to the November 11, 2011, executive
session, had Sharon Hammer ever come to you and
complained about N'lls Rt"bi's conduct toward her?

A. Yeah, multiple times over a period.
especially, oftwo years.
Q. Two years predating this November 11th, 2011,
meeting?
A. Right.
Q. Prior to the November 11th, 2011, meeting. had
you ever spoken to Mr. Rt"bi about Ms. Hammer's
complaints about his conduct toward her?
A. Yeah. "Hey, you ean't do that. Hey, what are
you doing?'" Did I sit with him in a reccm:led session
with television? No. Did I, over a period of time, at
various times - especially after Council Member Rl"bi
won n:electioo in November of '09 with 77 percent of the
vote, I think. Right aftEr that, he was on a roll. His
behavior became just untenable.
Q. Did you obserw his conduct toward
Ms. Sharon - Ms. Hammer- specifically any conduct
that you found to be untenable?
MR. NAYLOR: Object to the fonn.
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DIE WITNESS: Yes.
Q. (BY MR. SWARTZ) Can you recall any specific
3 ineident where you saw Mr. Rt"bi approach Ms. Hammer in a
And when he said that. l was thinking of
4 threatening manaer?
s
MR. NAYLOR: Object to the form.
cheating the BLM. And I'm thinking. yeah. So I kind
,
THE WITNESS: Let's put it in context.
of, you know, said, "Man. we really have to get to the
bottom of this." I do vaguely recall Adam King telling
7 Multiple times in public meetings he was chastised, for
8 iOSlmlce, by Council Member Joan Lamb about his behavior
Sharon that there could be criminal charges involved
, publicly. ~ so you don't even have to - you can go
here.
Q. After your discussion with Adam King and
10 to 1be - go to our Granicus audio system and listen to
Sharon Hammer, following the November 11th meeting. did 11 that behavior.
But there's one that stands out to me tbatyou convey to the city council that Sharon Hammer was 12
13 and once again, with the dates and everything. I can't
not accepting the offer of resignation?
14 recall. I think it was part of a budget session where
A. I think that occurred at the next executive
is Sharon came around the comer after - we were at
session.
16 recess, and Sharon came around the comer going back
Q. And I'll represent to you 11 into council chambers, and she was visibly distraught
A. Now you're getting to stuff that I'm really
vague about. I don't even remember where the executive u that - I wasn't present exactly where - where Council
l9 Member Ribi used abusive language on her, but he did
session on that Monday was held.
20 this in front of David Blampied. And you'll have to ask
Q. The November 11th 21 David exactly what happened, because I wasn't there,
A. I'm still under oath; right?
22 right there, but I did talk to David afterwards.
Q. Yes.
23
And let's talk about body language again.
A. I can't remember that. Because how can you
2
4
Okay?
Which, of course, you can't put, so you're going
jump from remembering something really clearly, and then
25
to
have
to
figure out how to describe this. For
there's the next meeting and it [sound effect].
1
2

3
4

s
6

7

a
9

10
11
12
13

14
15
1.6

17

1s
19
20
21

22
23

24

2s
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1
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21
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24
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inslance. you can tell somebody, ~ Sharon. I've
asked you multiple times to do these spreadsheets a
certain way. and you've refused to do them. You keep on
telling me~ you know - that you have to ask the
mayor. Well, that mayor doesn't know what his job is."
Okay? And that's close to it.
Now watch diffel'ent body langnage. •ttey,
Sharon. rve told you multiple times. and I want you,
the next time you see how the words are the same?
And what I think is that that borders on assault, to me,
when you approach somebody like that.
Going bm:k to my experience at Boeing Company,
Council Member Ribi. would have been disciplined over a
period of time, and at some point would have been fired
in the corporate world Apparently, the public service
world is - I don't know if the rules are different.
They shouldn't be.
But I had no authority to tire him, but r
would have. In fact, I mentioned to Mayor Briscoe that
had I been reelected, I would have figured out some way
of asking for Council Member Ribi's resignation. That's
how serious I am about it.
Q. (BY MR. SWARTZ) And that was in response to
his treatment of Ms. Hammer and others at the city?
A. Yeah.
0

-

1
2

3
4
5

'

7
8

9

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

youmeanQ. (BY MR. SWARTZ) Sure. I mean, do you recall
any executive session where the issue of Mr. Ribi
possibly having a bias against Sharon Hammer because of
her complaints against him would have disqualified him
or should have disqualified him from participating in
discussions about Sharon Hammer's employment?
MR. NAYLOR: Object to the form.
THE WITNESS: Absolutely. As soon as Sharon
Hammer filed suit in November, I thought the -- and I
can't remember who all was named in the suit. but I was
thinking that Co1D1cil Member Ribi, Yomigman -- I don't
know if Adam King was named in that first round. But I
thought all of- all of the people named there should
not be then going to meetings strategizing how they were
going to blunt the suit. I thought it was weird.
Q. (BY MR. SWARTZ) Did you raise your concern?
A. I thought I did.
Q. Do you recall when you raised your concern?
A. It must have been after the lawsuit - no.
No. No. It had to be before that, because it was
already - I have to try to get the time line in my
mind. but rm thinking that the accusations had already
been made on November I Ith.
So right away there were at least three
Page37
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MR. NAYLOR: Object to the form.
THE WITNESS: Yeah. He was - he - he has a
personality characteristic that it's his way or the
highway. l mean, it's just - it's just the way it is.
Thats the way he is. But he especially - he really
stepped up the rhetoric with Sharon. He didn't like her
because she was smarter than him, and he didn't like her
because she was a female smarter than him. That's my
opinion. You can put that down. That's my opinion.
May I add something?
Q. (BY MR. SWARTZ) Please.
A. The first two years ofmy position as mayor,
CoW1cil Member Rtl>i was the council president We spent
two years working very closely together, projects, going
to meetings together, doing all kinds of, I think, good
things, and as soon as Council Member Ribi was
reelected, it went [sound effect]. It flipped. He just
{sound effect] ...
Q. Did you ever discuss with Mr. Ribi that in
light of Sharon Hammer's complaints about his conduct
toward her, that he should not be participating in
discussions regarding allegations about her?
MR. NAYLOR: Object to the fonn.
THE WITNESS: I was -- you have to rephrase
that. I'm getting a little bit confused about what do

'.\1in-l-Sc ript@'

council membeis that were on the other team, and so I'm
thinking. okay, council member. you've brought
allegations and everything and now you're sitting in on
3
4 meetings where you're strategizing how to, you know, go
s after this lady. It didn't - it wasn't right to me.
And I - when I mentioned it, it was just dismissed.
7 Just kept on coming to the meetings.
MR. SWARTZ: Why don't we go ahead and take a
8
break,
everybody can stretch their legs, we'll come back
J
10 and pick up.
1

2

'

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

(Break taken.)
MR. SWARTZ: Back on the record.
Q. (BY MR. SWARTZ) Mr. Willich, I'm going to
hand you a document. It's a November 12, 2011, letter
from James Donoval to you, and it's Bates No.
SH-Timeline 8 through 12.
I'll ask you to take just a moment and review
that and let me know when you're done.
MR. NAYLOR: What tab is that? Is that from
your exhibits?
MR. SWARTZ: Tab 3.
MR. NAYLOR: Thanks.
THE WITNESS: There's a good chance that I
never saw this.
Q. (BY MR. SWARTZ) You don't recall one way or
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l.3
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Mr. Donoval was requesting that her leave not be

mean? I mean, you know.
Q. Do you have any recollection of ever
3 authorizing Mr. Ribi to publicly disclose what was
4 transpiring in the November 11, November 14th executive
s sessions?
A. Authorizing?
6
Q. Yes.
7
A. I had no ability to authorize or not authorize
8
9 him to do anything. That was his decision.
Q. He didn't check with you before publicly
10
11 disclosing what was transpiring in those executive
12 sessions?
A. No. That was just a violation of our council,
13
1'11 say, methodology, because we had come to an
l.4
l.S agreement early on that all of the executive session
16 deliberations would be confidential. If you think about
17 it for a moment, you go into executive session to
18 discuss confidential matters.
19
I mean, otherwise you just talk about it in an
20 open meeting, you know, like contract negotiations or,
21 you know, something along those lines. And so, yeah, it
22 was understood that it should be confidential.
23
Q. Did you ever - do you recall asking Patti
24 Ball to reinterview Sharon Hammer and her decision not
25 to?
l

characterized as administrative leave, but be
characterized as working from home?
A. Remember the -- you may be referring to some
material that you have seen or know about. I don't.
Q. You've never heard of that request, that her
leave be characterized as working from home versus -A. Heard about?
Q. Yeah. This is the first time you're hearing
it is today?
A. No, I've never read anything, because remember
the manila envelope story? So did I hear it?
Scuttlebutt? Yeah.
MR. NAYLOR: Object to the form, foundation.
THE WITNESS: Did I hear about it? Yes, I
absolutely heard about that idea, that concept, that
would really be good. I don't recall where I -Q. (BY MR. SWARTZ) Did you -A. Did I consider it?
Q. Yes.
A. No.
Q. Is there a reason why?
A. I thought --yes. If you're going to be
evenhanded, Sharon Hammer's on leave, Michelle
Frostenson's on leave, Kelly Ek is on leave, the Carnes'

2
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family is on leave. Okay? So what we're going to do
1
2
is, okay, everybody is on leave because there's
allegations flying all over the place against Sharon
3
4
Hammer, Sharon Hammer against Nils Ribi, and so forth.
And so I'm thinking, okay, I can't have -5
okay. Well, Sharon, you can -- because that's not the
6
definition of administrative leave. You're supposed to
7
leave everything in your office and everything. So it
8
really wasn't a consideration, to be quite honest with
9
you. Because there could be an impropriety there that
10
somebody, you know, might say, "Oh, okay. Well, I know l1
l.2
what's going on here."
13
Q. Did you ever consider putting her back into
active duty as an EMT or a firefighter while she was on
l.4
15
leave?
16
A. I did not, because that would have been that
17
same kind of thing. I wanted to pretty badly, but
l.8
didn't think I could, because that would mean that Nick
Carnes would be back on, you know, as an EMT, and some 19
20
other talk about, "Gee, well, maybe Michelle could do
21
some work at home."
22
"No. No. Whoa, whoa, whoa." All we want
23
Tammi Hall to do is to call -- talk to Michelle
24
Frostenson to get material to bring to the office, but
not do work. Otherwise, what does administrative leave 25

:'\-1in-l-Seript:R
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A. I do not recall telling her to reinterview
Sharon Hammer, no.
Q. Do you recall any discussions about whether to
release the Patti Ball report to the Blaine County
Prosecutor's Office?
A. Did I authorize? This is another one of those
cases where I told Attorney Naylor, "Go right" --you
know, "You're on your own. Go ahead. Take whatever you
want." You're -- because I was quite assured that that
would go nowhere.
That was a - in my opinion, that was part of
the intimidation package that he was working with
threats. Boy, we're going to the attorney general,
we're going to the county prosecutor, we're going to fix
you.
Did he say that to me? No. Was it inferred
to me, being a 68 -- 71-year-old man and been around for
a while knowing what the game is? Yes.
Q. Do you ever recall - or do you recall ever
telling Mr. Ribi that he should be seriously concerned
about the allegations that Ms. Hammer was making against
him?
MR. NAYLOR: Object to the form, foundation.
THE WITNESS: Let's see. The allegations -prior to that first lawsuit, I was completely aware of
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the fonn of the allegations. In public meetings, in
comments that I made to Council Member Ribi in the hall,

and so forth, yeah, rm totally aware of the
allegations.
When they popped up, I'll say, publicly, the
smart thing for me to do is shut up. Don't confront
Council Member Ribi, don't discuss anything with him
relative to that. So the simple answer to your question
is, no.
Q. (BY MR. SWARTZ) Other than communicating with
him about her complaints, you didn't express an opinion
whether he should be concerned or that the allegations
were trumped up or anything to that effect?
MR. NAYLOR: Object to the form, foundation.
THE WITNESS: No, because that took some time
to flow out. And so in the early meetings, I wasn't
I 00 percent sure that I knew what was going on until
after, you know, Tammi Hall and I got together and
everything. This took time. This didn't happen in
45 minutes. It happened over a period oftime.
And so by the time I got to the point where I
knew that the allegations were bogus -- this was all in
the court system and everything. So I said the smart
thing for me to do is not have any conversation with
Ribi or Mayor-Elect Briscoe or anybody, or minimal.

1
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putting it in front of you to have some reference on
time -A. Okay.
Q. -- as to certain events. And so we're now
looking at the November 17, 2011, meeting minutes. And
there was an executive session -- you'll see on page 2
an executive session was entered into. It doesn't state
why.
My question to you is: Do you recall what was
discussed in that executive session on the 17th?
A. Okay. I notice down here it says -- this is
the one where we reconvened at the Sage Room at the Sun
Valley Lodge. Boy -- okay. Because when you look at
what we did coming out of the public part of this, it
says, "Move to amend to include appointment of assistant
city clerk."
See, because Kelly Ek was on leave, and we
needed -- I think, from a statutory standpoint, you need
an appointed city clerk. I don't think you can just
say, "Hey, Joe, why don't you be the city clerk today."
So we appointed Diane Shay as the assistant
city clerk, and that was approved by the council, and
she was -- she started the city clerk assignment. Okay.
Now, what did we talk about in the executive session? I
don't recall. I don't know.

Page 83

Q. (BY MR. SWARTZ) Do you recall Mr. Ribi asking
you to see a copy of the harassment policy that the City
3 of Sun Valley had and you asking Sharon Hammer to email
4 it to him?
5
A. Vaguely. Veryvaguely. Ikindofrecall
6
something - the word "harassment," yeah, somewhere
7
along the line. I have no idea when that might have
8
been. It was late in -- it was maybe 2011, not 2009.
9
So,yeah.
10
Q. So in that time frame, then, do you recall
11 Mr. Ribi expressing to you that he didn't believe that
12 his conduct violated the harassment policy?
13
MR. NAYLOR: Object to the fonn.
14
THE WITNESS: I don't recall anything like
15 that. You mean like email, telephone, hallway?
Q. (BY MR. SWARTZ) Correct. Did he ever
16
17 communicate to you that he didn't think his conduct
lB violated the policy, and he wanted to see a copy of the
l!I policy?
20
A. [ don't recall that, no.
Q. Let me have you tum to Tab 6.
21
A. You know you're showing me stuff that's like
22
23 news to me?
Q. I can believe it. And some of this stuff I
24
25 realize that you've not seen before, and I'm just

Page85
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Q. Okay.
A. Come to think of it, in those appointed
positions, I think city administrator, city clerk, and
treasurer, all have to be appointed and approved by the
council, but I may be wrong on that.
Q. It's been a while.
A. Yeah. Did I tell you I was an engineer, not a
lawyer?
Q. Youdid.
MR. NAYLOR: At Boeing.
COURT REPORTER: I'm sorry, what?
MR. NAYLOR: At Boeing.
THE WITNESS: Yeah, B-o-e-i-n-g. And put in
there I know about 737 airplanes, that's it.
Q. (BY MR. SWARTZ) Do you recall a period of
time when Mr. Donoval, on behalf of Ms. Hammer, was
making settlement offers, which included terms where
Mr. Ribi would resign as a city council person?
A. Now, I'm trying to remember if I learned about
that later or at the time. I think at the time I didn't
know about that. Now, you might ask me, well, how about
later? And help me -- ask the question, because I'm
trying to get clear in my mind, well, what do you
mean -- I don't recall at the time that all of that
activity was going on that there were settlement offers,
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Q. For the city, that was being sued? I mean
ICRMP wasn't -3
A. Yes. All right. But there are individuals in
4
the city. The corporation wasn't being sued. There
s were individuals named in the suit. They were -6
Q. So was the City of Sun Valley?
7
A. Yeah, and the individuals.
s
~itlam, tbs si1M[ JM181ilWJhetrw; I i nffei.

1

2

9

10
11

12

13
l.4
15
16
l7

1e
19
20
21
22
23
24

t*s lhat you

hon1e4id.yeu · ·
a~1ou~~-oll.tlll1u11tW'e?
A. _¥$,. I can give you an example. When I
authorized Brad Mitchell to take the plow home all of
the way to Hailey, Idaho, 15 miles away, ifhe used that
vehicle to drive over and pick up kids from school, to
go over to Albertson's and buy groceries, and maybe go
down to Bellewe to see if his other car's mechanical
work had been done, blah, blah, blah, yes.
Q. That would be acceptable to you?
A. Perfectly.
Q. Do you know if that's in violation of the city
policy?
A. I have no idea

25

1
2

pal111l1011t1M~,:--ti:

Q. And in that situation, 1 you review the
policy manual to see if you had the authority to provide
4 her that car for personal use?
s
We just have to get this on the record.
6
A. I know. I was told -- I was told, a long time
7 ago with some attorneys at Boeing, don't use smart
a remarks, you know, in your answer, because it doesn't go
9 well. And my smart remark is, one more time, rm an
10 engineer not a lawyer.
11
Did I pore through city policy manuals to
12 figure out everything that I was doing over four years?
13 No. Did I have a feeling of a certain level of
u authority - because I made the example before, it was
1s time to buy a $30,000 bush truck.
16
I just knew, inherently, I didn't have to look
l 7 at the policy - the city policy to say, hey, I think I
18 better take this to the city council, I'm not going to
u write a $30,000 check on my own.
20
Q. So did you tell Sharon that she could use the
21 car at any time as much as she wanted for personal use?
22
A. Did I specifically sit her down in a meeting,
23 a formal meeting, and say, "Sharon, this is what I
24 understand"? No, I didn't do that. We just understood.
25 See, I had written that thing off in my mind a long time
3

Page 109
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l ~«.tl\ese-~iOll?,

1

2

2

3

4

s
6

~ aJ9.1!@r.ause'1,. .~•••flf,tff'My

allfflfflllry to'do;')'8tt'know~g~e:1\lky,>
Q. So it didn't have anything to do with any side
agreement or contract, it was your inherent authority as
the mayor to be able to give these cars for personal

ago.

It would be like that printer that I talked to
you about. I didn't have a big long discussion with
4 anybody. I didn't look in the city's policies on
s whether or not I could get rid of a printer-· you know,
6
an $800 printer, surplus it, because it wasn't working
7
or anything. I just did it, because it was within
a normal bounds of running the business.
3

use?
A. You mean, did I sign a contract with Brad
9
Mitchell to say, "I need you to sign this before you
c~~<>~@l~~=ofthe
10 leave this afternoon with the vehicle"?
11
Q. No, what I'm saying 11 citffv~hicle for personal use n·t ftii'l~ 'benefit that
12
A. What's the nature of the question?
12 neeaectto be consideredJw .tax p ~ s by anybody?
13
Q. What I'm saying is: There was no side
13
~i.'tthink~~14
. . _ , . , . ther'e'. any limitati6ds!j!Jlacea on her use
l.4 agreement with Brad that he would get a city vehicle
1s while he was employed, it was simply you were providing is 'Ofthe vehicle?
16
~one that l know of.
16 him this benefit pursuant to your inherent power as the
17 mayor?
17
Q. So would you agree that if she wanted to drive
1s to Fairfield on personal business, that that would be
1a
A. Yes. There was no written agreement with Brad
19 Mitchell to use the plow to go to Hailey, right.
19 acceptable?
2o
~"·'Anttwhen1iic:l'o/OU, .ik toSharob ·Hammer about
20
A. Yeah.
21
Q. What about if she wanted to go to New Mexico
21 fifflUSing a city vehicle?
22 for a two-week vacation, would that be acceptable?
23
A. With that vehicle?
24
Q. Yeah.
2 4 hertftfsband, Jim, "'..asn't due to arri~J~ f..c~WtJi,nd
25
A. No. I think that would -- no, that wouldn't
2s
I saf~ "Hey, we've gotthe" - "we've·got thaf ~ing
7

s

~~

1:

~~=~:r~=~1-ar:,

\-1 in-l-Seript®
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be - I would think that that would be a little far
afield.
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q..what,ew~--
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pCISOiiid-.lWSUltr1l'Sing ~~J.,e~
~ah.
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15
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vehicle for her personal use?
Do you want me to reread that?
A. No. No. I don't need you to do it. I'm just
wondering what kind of notes fonner Cowicil Member Ri"bi
was taking? What are we doing?
Q. Let me ask you the question again. So you
never authorized her, Sharon Hammer, to use the Sun
Valley credit card to put gas in that vehicle for her
personal use, did you?
A. My understanding was that Sharon Hammer was
purchasing fuel for that vehicle with her own credit
card.
Q. So if that was your understanding - and I
just need you to answer that question that I've asked -did you ever authorize her to use a city credit card to
put gas in that vehicle for personal use?
A. That's a clever way of asking a question, but,
of course, that's your job, isn't it?
See, the inference in your question is that you've already prejudged it to the point where you
already know she inappropriately used the credit card
for personal use without my authorization. That's the
way you've framed the question.
Q. No, I'm just trying A. And I'm going to answer your question. That's
Page 113

Page 111

what I have going in my mind. And the answer that I
have, in my mind, did I ever specifically, in writing,
3
3 email, telephone conversation, or whatever, tell Sharon
4
4 Hammer, "Sharon Hammer, you're authorized anytime,
5
P8SlilMib9ntbon~en~f9.r~~-@ij...Valle)'Fand 5 anywhere, anyplace, any distance, to use a city credit
6 heJlels<thisiittle,.serapwluo,~
6 card to put fuel in that vehicle for any use
7
7 whatsoever"? No, I never did that.
li~ts"to·theeity,
8 sa1/i*¥eah,.go.aheam", Md lsayspfl61fi · y, "Y'eah,
Q. And what Ms. Hammer alleges is - just so
8
9 grahead"? No, I jUSt'i•.
we're clear - she alleges that you authorized her to
9
10
QY"What do you mean, did yoti"say specifically •go
l.O use a Sun Valley-issued credit card to put gas in a Sun
l1 ahe§d''? Go ahead what?
l l Valley-owned auto for all uses. whether they be Sun
12
A...+"4id not specifically sit her down and say,
12 Valley related or personal in nature. That infers that
l.3 this,is·whatl understand abQ1.¢,thJ1H•nd,Jay out a whole
13 you affinnatively authorized her to do that.
14 -· whaH'just did for you. l'never·~1tlds long
MR. SWARTZ: Objection; incomplete
14
15 discussion.that ljusihad with·ydtf~itli'her. rt didn't
15 hypothetical.
16 happen 1hat way.
THE WITNESS: I have no idea what you're
16
17
Q. What about the city credit card, did you
17 talking about.
18 authorize her to use that Sun Valley-issued credit card
l.S
MR. NAYLOR: Let me just ask you -19 to put gas in the Sun Valley-owned auto for all uses,
THE WITNESS: Well, there's a piece of paper
l.9
20 including her personal use?
20 you're reading off of that has some kind of discussion
21
A. I was under the assumption, and I believe
21 about what Sharon Hammer said. She's not here, so I
22 if-· that it's been established that she paid for her
22 don't know.
Q. (BY MR. NAYLOR) I just need to ask you this
23 own gas money for her personal.
23
24
24 question: Did you ever authorize Ms. Hammer to use a
Q. So the answer is no you never authorized her
25 to use a Sun Valley credit card to put gas in that
25 Sun Valley-issued credit card to put gas in a Sun
1
2

8jj!ielelook at night?"

"WeH~ to·~ism~~I, fn
colll!IMof what she was perftm'MU!rftbfflll'worl
staaapeintfor.~Ci~-Sun•¥eHo~thatshe

l

2

rw~r".::.~tai:i~, ..
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Valley-owned auto for all uses, whether they be Sun
Valley related or personal in natural?
3
MR. SWARTZ: Objection; asked and answered.
4
THE WITNESS: Would you go back to my original
s answer? I'm just going to -6
COURT REPORTER: Okay. Wait. Hold on a
7 second.
s
MR. SWARTZ: Objection; asked and answered.
9
COURT REPORTER: Okay. Now go ahead.
1.0
THE WITNESS: Will you go back to my original
1.1. answer, and that remains my answer, that great big long
1.2 discussion. And I'm not going to answer that question.
1.3 I think I've answered his question already.
u
Q. (BY MR. NAYLOR) Okay. Mr. Willich -- Mayor
1.s Willich?
1.6
A. Yes, thank you.
1.1
Q. You haven't --you've told me that you had
10 never - I'm going back to your answer. It says, "And
19 the answer that I have in my mind, did I ever
20 specifically in writing, email, telephone conversation,
21. or whatever, tell Sharon Hammer, 'Sharon Hammer, you're
22 authorized anytime, anywhere, anyplace, any distance, to
23 use the city credit card to put fuel in that vehicle for
24 any use whatsoever'? No, I never did that."
2s
Is there anything you want to add to that?
1.

II
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1.2
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~ J . l agree with Jpat?
A.A 11't1l·f!ing. b&Qk
an ,....,,...the last

~

I

all."iif eio~es;;i.l@ ~ Q. So if she used the city credit card for
personal use of gas, then you would not have any
objection to that?
A. You'll have to -- you have to go - you're
going to have to give me way more details than just some
kind of remark like that That's just a hearsay, casual
remark. I have no -- do you have any information that I
can look at it, or do you have something Q. I'm just asking you for the parameters of how
much -- if she used the credit card to buy gas to go to
New Mexico, would that be acceptable to you?
A. I don't know. We're -- you're going to have
to give me a lot more detailed !lllderstanding of what the
nature of your question is, because you're trying to
wind me around into a position of-- kind oflike
setting up the circwnstances where I disapproved of her,
but I don't know what the circumstances are.
I~had t o ~ ~ " e l ! Y '
q ~ d It's low mr~'S~1ffld,swipes

Page 115

Page 117

yeah, sure. ~voulcnow, I dot't't know. Tell me

1

A. Yes.

1

~;

2

Q. What?

2
3

whaihc:exact circumstances are.
Q. She drives to New Mexico for a two-week

4

vacation and uses the city credit card to pay for all of

3
4

s
6
7
8
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1. o
1.1
1.2
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15
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11
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19

2o
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A. See, that's the detailed, formal, answer to
the question. You asked me a formal question: "Did you
write something? Did you have a discussion? Did you
email? Whatever." ~tifsd'M~~'lile
infermal answer is JtS•wnr~tfP~.-d. WiC good
j ll!lgment.
Q,,,"6eyou authorizedber to llSe'her~udgmentto
use'l:tre city"<>wned credit'ard for, gas mthat 1lll' foo
pe~,,use, JQd. if she did,that,you W9~ nqt,have a
problem,with that; is that,what you're testifying?
Ar"What rm testifying to is we bad a cuJtµre in
01,1i;,eity..,wbere people took on lots oflJCnODal
reaportsibility. In her',particular case; she':was given
w¥ieij,wide, wide latitude to use good judfprreiit. And
tliat's the answfM°.
Qt,~y. I'm going to read you,a~enuhllt
she's made, and just tell me if you agree wiihlfor'
disagree. "During his tenn as mayor of Sun Valley,
former Mayor Willich orally confirmed to Ms. Hammer that
pUl'suant to his statutory powers as the mayor of Sun
Valley, and pw-suant to the flexible benefit provision,
he possessed the authority to, among other things, allow
MS': Hammer to use a Sun Valley-issued credit canf,to put

Min-t-Sc!"ip~

II

s that gas. Would that be, in your estimation, within the
6

7

s
9

1.0
1.1.
12

13
1.4

15
16
11

1s
1,

20
21.
22
23

24

2s

authority you gave her?
MR. SWARTZ: Objection; incomplete
hypothetical.
THE WITNESS: Yeah. I -Q. (BY MR. NAYLOR) You used that hypothetical,
didn't you?
A. Well, I suspect that she would have used good
judgment and not done that
Qt«What abou.tMF:fl~e•. how did that work?
Wlmdid-youiell-her-,t:hu.she could do about
vacation, sick leave, flextime?
A.•~he was the seniOF eKeCUtive in· a corporation.
Yo.u..haveto, okay, remember I come ·from a corporate
b8'qround. In fact, I don't oven understand what the
flelltim&- people have usod-that,ttRDioelogy, and I'm
notieven sure what it was.
Did I have a time card on Sharon Hammer? No,
she,,~~ mrt a time card employee. Did 1 have, oh, some
ki~ip,(.~cific 9:00 to 5:00 requirenumts. for her? No.
D1cl,jie,genera)ly have to perfonn the duties of her
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Q. So you're saying she never took time off? She
was always there 8:00 to 5:00, other than on vacation?
A. Would you ask that one again?
Q. Yeah. You just said-A. I'm trying to give you an answer that Q. You just said, did I ever go down the hall and
look and see Sharon was gone? No. So I'm asking you:
Does that mean that other than her being on vacation,
was she always there at least 8:00 to 5 :00?
A. Let me answer it my way. You just
rephrased -- or reframed the answer, and I want to
reframe it back again. What I'm trying to suggest is I
wasn't - in three-and-a-half years, I don't recall ever
being unaware of her absence. Now Q. "Unaware of her absence"?
A. Of her absence from the office. J.ilaa:t

re~l•~c080§~.hllal~.and
sa~"H'ey,-whffl'!'Sharon?""N~ippifiM. ,twas
eitbar aware of vacations, aware,Qf. ,!!Ma~1mgoing
ow,t:foll-:!!J~ot a.doctors~~<'.~
aiernoon;"-etcetera, et eotoriJ.
s..-was-....,-4n111'1ituat:ion~·~ in

thaonectcts·she'?" fn.faat; if·wuoverly aWtlfttofher
beias--werking in the office-in-€ity HaJJ;waybeyond
t h ~•. J,,was,.more'(;()ftetffled abouttbat1hand"was
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fact,~teeatl"l'tinf~or n~:iciymg ~ coming
inM;>-.the,offieeend say~·,venlt~--'
3
aftemotm·becausel"•"it•may,'\'be~n•~ "of a
4
doote1"!1l'ppt)intment'' ·or·SOJ.Bething.- ,Buf'lli~'there
s a~"time,,and, in fact,,-evergme.
6
Q. What about if she wanted to take two weeks'
1

2

2o
21
22
23
24

vacation, would you expect her to count her - to charge
her vacation time against that time?
So in other words, if she took two weeks'
vacation - she's earned vacation time; correct?
A. Sure, yeah. Everybody did.
Q. So when she took vacation, did you expect her
to use her vacation time for that time on vacation?
A. Yes. And when we did the little analysis of
accrued vacation time, as I recall - I'd have to get
the little report out -- but I don't think she had very
much, if any, over-accrual. So, yeah.
Q. But if she left on Friday at noon, she didn't
check in with you, and you didn't need to authorize her
to leave early on Friday; is that what you're saying?
You just left it to her judgment?
A. Let's see, to answer your question, in
three-and-a-half years, did I ever walk down the hall
and say, "Where's Sharon?" I don't recall that ever

25

happening.
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An~the flextime,
4 ev.a,ybody:else ·calls ·it. WharwSu y. · · ctil 1t?'
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A. ~-ever walkectin·my·office·aftll¥said, "I'm
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le~uecauseGf~,flextim~."
Q. ~S'Otif~l!lle' teft'ell'ly, wc,Qlct,ou"be
c~!d'aboufthalif they diditfftell,you, Michelle
Frostenson is gone to ~p••Yes; ·Let me give you an example. Kelly Ek
was - is a lot - had a lot of health issues, lots.
And so I, shall we say, cut Kelly Ek a lot of slack for
doctor's appointments, et cetera, et cetera, because
of - why is that - just because of her health.
So we just made -- I think the whole staff
made adjustments, I'm going to say. Were there times
when I walked down the hall and said, "Well, where's
Kelly?" Yeah, quite a few times. How was I on
discipline relative to that? Pretty poor, actually, in
her case. That should have been resolved, you know,
sometime ago.
Other people? I don't know. Michelle
Frostenson? Remember, these are the appointed people.
These are the senior people in the organization. Did I
not know Terence, you know, in the street department -
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was I totally aware of all of his comings and goings?
No. The reason is he was working for Bill Whitesell,
the head of the street department. Was I aware of Q. So was it okay for anybody to take time off-A. No.
Q. Okay.
A. No. I'm just trying to explain it to you.
Terence works in the street department. he works for
Bill Whitesell. Bill Whitesell was responsible for
keeping track of Terence's time, et cetera, et cetera
Did I have a general policy that said that Terence could
just take time off anytime he wanted or anything? No.
Q. Was Terence an hourly employee?
A. He is -- let's see, was he hourly?
~just-talkmg'abbut1~ knpleyeesithot
dffl'P'-punch a time clock.
~'Right.
~ came and·••1it was okay with\yl,u,
s~ilS they didn't a);,w1~tiit? ,

,'WaiftW'senior people, yelh.
Q. Now-A. Three people in particular, Michelle, Kelly
Ek, and Sharon.
Q. Now, these two issues, Sharon's use of the
car, and gas purchased by the city, as well as the

employees relative to improprieties. I had no
inclination whatsoever, in a kangaroo court, to have a
discussion with this council. They had the bit in their
3
4 teeth, and they were on their way, and I shut up and did
5 not say anything.
Q. So as of November 11th, who was the chief
6
executive officer responsible for the supervision of all
7
8 employees?
A. Me.
9
10
Q. And you did not feel that it was - would be
11 beneficial to impart on that information?
12
A. Not in that setting. I was going to -- I
13 wanted - which ultimately happened, poorly -- a real
14 investigation into the allegations to start a -- to
15 start a discussion with council members that were
16 oriented a certain way.
I said, "Let them go, let them talk, let them
17
18 put their program together" - come to think of it, I
did that with you, too, Mr. Naylor. "You just go right
19
20 ahead" 21
Q. So on Monday, November 14th, when you met back
22 with the city council, isn't it true that at that point
23 you said that you had already - that you had given
24 Sharon Hammer permission to use the car?
A. That's the meeting we decided to hire an
25
l
2
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flextime time off and vacation time, those were two
issues that Sharon - that Michelle Frostenson brought
up in that November 11th meeting, weren't they?
A. I'm going to say, yes, except that, you know,
the credit card thing, I don't recall that being a big
part of the November 11th meeting. There was a
reference to it, I think, but I don't recall that.
Q. At the November 11th meeting in executive
session, when these issues came up, did you, at that
time, tell the city council, "Oh, well, I gave Sharon
permission to use this vehicle"?
A. I had no discussion with the council on
anything. I listened the whole time and shut up.
Q. So wouldn't - didn't A. I didn't defend anything or comment about
anything.
Q. But if you had given her permission, wouldn't
that have pretty much resolved it in your mind?
A. I have no idea. I did not discuss it with the
council, I didn't defend anything, nor did I comment on
anything.
Q. Why not? Why didn't you clarify that you had
already given her pennission for that?
A. Remember what I said earlier? The council is
responsible for bringing issues to the council about

l
2

3
4

s
6

7
8
9

10
11

12

13
14
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16
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21
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24
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investigator.
Q. But isn't it true that you told the city
council -A. I don't recall it that way, no.
Q. You don't?
A. No.
Q. So you deny saying that or you just don't
recall as you sit here?
A. Don't recall. All I recall is we said we're
going to hire an investigator.
Q. And you don't recall telling the city cmmcil
on Monday, November 14th, about that you had authorized
flextime or this vacation time flexibility?
A. Don't recall that
Q. Do you remember Bob Youngman saying to you, on
November 14th, something to the effect, "Well, that
would have been good to know, what you're just telling
us now, last Friday"?
A. I don't recall that.
Q. You just don't have a recollection?
A. Don't have a recollection. Because all I do
recall is that all I had in my mind was investigation.
Didn't want to have some kind of offline interaction
with council members and other people having a
discussion of issues that may have turned out to not be
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and go to a staff member and start demanding stuff. You
A. Yeah, multiple times. And I know
l
specifically, you know, this place, this place. No.
can't do that. It's inappropriate, and it was
2
3 But if you take it in total context. if you look at
3 harassment.
4 Council Member Ribi's behavior during public meetings,
4
Q. Did you ever look at the policy manual to see
5 and you say, oh, okay, well, he's a certain personality
5 what- how harassment is defined by the city policy
6 type6 manual?
7
Q. No, I'm asking you about -7
A. No. No, rm going to say that I didn't. I
8
A. I'm getting to that, but I need context.
8 didn't. Did I go through the manual, no, I didn't do
9
Q. No, I'm asking you: When did Sharon - what
9 that. I know what harassment looks like.
10 did she say to you? Not what did you observe or
l.O
Q. All right. There can be sexual harassment?
l l anything yet. I'll get to that. But what did she
ll
A. Yeah. it wasn't that.
12 report 10 you was the conduct that she found offensive?
12
Q. It wasn't that. Was there - was it gender
13
A. At these times, "He's at it again. He's
13 harassment?
14 shouting out things." This person's a pretty clever guy
l4
A. Someofthat.
15 in the way he handles himself. and he's - even though
15
Q. How was it some ofthat?
16 he'd get overextended in public meetings where he would 16
A. He bas a - my inclination is my - what I've
17 blurt out and everything. but quietly, more quietly,
17 o ~ he has a little bit of difficulty with
18 more surreptitiously, catch Sharon in places where he
18 females, especially if they're smarter than him.
19 would have demands by giving her orders and everything. 19
Q. And that's just your opinion?
20
And she would continue to say -- she would
20
A. That's my opinion.
21 come over to my office and say, "Hey, he's completely
Q. Did Sharon ever say he's targeting me because
21
22 revamped all of these spreadsheets." I'll just use the
22 I'm a female?
23 term "spreadsheets."
A. Did she specifically say those words? No.
23
24
And I'll say, "Well, let me see."
24
Q. Did she say anything like that that led you to
25
"Well, he wants to do this, and he wants to do
25 believel
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that." I just can't, you know, go off and do all of
l
A. Yes.
this stuff that -- you know. it has to be in front of
2
Q. - that she believed that she was being
the council, it's got to be approved so the other
3 targeted because she was a woman?
council members are aware of what all of this activity
4
A. Yeah, I think so.
is and everything.
Q. What did she say?
s
A. I think it's along the line of when Michelle
And the impression that I had was that
6
Cowicilman Ribi really believed that Sharon Hammer
7 Frostenson made a mistake and didn't properly notify the
worked for him in some strange way. In fact, he told me 8 public on a budget meeting, man, he - publicly in a
public meeting he really ripped into Michelle. And I
one time, he said, "I'm a taxpayer, she works for me."
9
I says, "What?" I said, "Go look at the org
10 took the heat for Michelle. I said, "Michelle, you take
chart. She doesn't work for you."
l1 it easy. I'll take care of that."
Kelly Ek, boy, she's - it turns out that the
Q. So now rm going back to my question. She
12
13 females in there in the staff were, oh, kind of-he
came in - and just to restate what you said- she
would come in and say that Mr. Ribi was asking her to
14 has a really poor attitude toward females, including
15 Joan Lamb, the female council member. Did other members
change or revamp spreadsheets?
A. Demanding. Let's use the correct words.
16 of the staff get chewed on by him? Yeah, the males did,
17 but not to the extent of the females, and not to the
Demanding.
18 level of Sharon Hammer. He picked her out especially.
Q. And that was what she was complaining about?
19 Now, did other council members, other male council
A. Right.
members act in that same way? No.
20
Q. Did you consider that to be harassment?
Q. I'm trying to remember if you answered my
21
A. Yeah.
question.
Did you look in the policy manual and see if
22
Q. Why?
23 this conduct violated the policy manual?
A. Sme did. He's going way out of the scope of
A. I didn't specifically look at it, no.
24
who he is, what his assignment is, what his role to play
Q. Did you - when she would come in and talk to
in the government is. You can't take a council member 25
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you about him being involved in these projects, what
action did you take? Did you ever write this down that
Sharon came in and complained?
4
A. I'm an engineer.
5
Q. Did you ever respond to her complaint?
6
A. Respond?
7
Q. To her about it.
8
A. Yeah.
9
Q. What did you tell her?
10
A. I said, "we'll" - •tms is really, really a
11 problem." I went to pay a visit to Adam King -12
Q. When was that?
13
A. -to complain. Augustof'll. And I said,
14 "This guy is" - ·he's getting worse and worse. He's
15 not getting better. He doesn't respond to anything. n
16 And now we get into this little difficulty about talking
17 about lawyers and what the lawyers have told you in a
18 private conversation.
19
Well, I had a private conversation with Adam
20 King. and I have a feeling - I have a suspicion that in
21 my conversation with Adam King that he contacted Nils
22 and other council members 15 minutes after I left his
23 office. My impression is that.
24
Q. And do you believe that that was
25 inappropriate?
J.

l

2
3

2

3
4
5
6

A. Screw you. He didn't say that. Nils has a
way of saying screwing you without verbalizing it.
Q. Did Sharon Hammer, prior to September 2011,
ever come to you and say anything to the effect of

"Mayor, you haven't taken care of this problem with Nils
Ra"bi. I need you to 1ake care of it"? Did she ever

indicate to you that she felt that you hadn't done
enough?
9
A. I don't have that impression, no.
1.0
Q. Tum to the book right there -ll
A. I'm going to add. Because we bad - there
1.2 were so many incidents and everything else, and
13 especially with Councilman RI'bi being an elected
14 official, you can't just -- you can't just make a
l.S pronouncement in some kind of a meeting that says
1.6 "You're fired" or "Get out of the building" or whatever.
17 You're very limited in what you can do.
18
Q. But you felt that you were doing everything
19 that you needed to do?
20
A. Trying to do, right.
21
Q. And Sharon Hammer never indicated to you
22 anything but the fact that you had been doing what she
23 expected you to do; correct?
24
A. What is this? What am I looking at here?
Q. Let me ask that question again first Mayor?
25
7
8

Page139
l

A. Totally.

2
3

Q. And did you --

:Vlin-t-Scr:pt'R

A. Yeah.
Q. "And Sharon Hammer never indicated to you
3
anything but the fact that you had been doing what she
4 expected you to do; correct?"
5
A. No. Rightly so, I think she was disappointed
6 in, I'll say, the system, and I think she was as
7 frustrated as I was in not having a real overt event to
8 occur of some sort.
Q. If you look at Hammer 138. At the bottom it
9
10 says "138." I think I had it open for you.
1.1
A. Yeah.
Q. This is a letter from Mr. Donoval?
12
Page4?
A.
13
Q. Yeah. Dated November 16th, 2011, to you. And
14
15 in the last paragraph it says, "On a personal note,
Ms. Hammer wishes to thank you for all of your efforts
J.6
17 in seeking to ensure that Ms. Hammer has been protected
18 from Mr. Ribi and his insults, abuses, misconduct and
l9 attacks during your term as Mayor. As has been stated,
20 Ms. Hammer has refrained from seeking the legal recourse
21 she is certainly entitled to against Mr. Ribi based in
22 large part on your personal promises and integrity."
Do you have any reason to disbelieve those -23
24 that statement from Mr. Donoval on behalf of Sharon
25 Hammer?
1
2

A. I warned him in the meeting, I said, "Adam,
this is a private conversation. I'm having a discussion
5 with you about behavior, and I need" - "I want to
6 discuss with you what recourse I have, either legally or
7 administratively or whatever."
8
Q. Did you ever ta1k to Nils Ribi about any of
9 these complaints by Sharon Hammer?
10
A. In two years?
ll
Q. Yes.
12
A. Yeah.
13
Q. When was the frrst time you talked to him?
A. I don't know.
14
Q. Do you have any recollection what it was
15
16 about?
A. 2010. I said. "You can't do that. You can't
17
talk
to her that way."
l8
Q. About what?
19
A. Language that he's used in a meeting, in an
20
21 open meeting.
22
Q. Public meeting?
A. Public meeting. Afterwards I said. "You
23
24 can't" -- "hey, what are you doing?"
Q. And what was his response?
25
4
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1
A. No.
A. What am I supposed to answer?
2
Q. So-Q. Did she ever indicate anything different than
3
A. Was she ever presented with the allegations
what I just read?
4
and allowed to respond? No.
A. You mean like that [as read] "As has been
s
Q. Well, we're just talking about the issues
stated, has refrained from seeking" -- da-da-da-da -6
dealing with her claims of -- or concerns about Nils
"in large part on your personal promises and integrity."
7
Ribi's conduct with her.
Yeah, okay. Yeah, we did what we could.
a
A. Right.
Q. Right. And she agreed with that. Now, so far
9
Q. So was there -- so prior to the election on
you've explained -- you've described the conduct by
10
November
8th, when was the last event that Sharon Hammer
Mr. Ribi as loud in public meetings, demanding in
11
complained
to you about Nils Ribi's conduct, that you
private to do certain things work related.
12 remember?
Is there anything else that you can describe
A. I think - I don't know exactly, but I kind of
that Sharon Hammer complained about Mr. Ribi's conduct? 13
14 think August -- that meeting with Adam King when I
A. Okay. Well, lefs change a couple of words
1s was -- went to his office to detennine what kind of
around. You've just used the word "loud." Yeah, you
can be loud and shout out to somebody, but how about in 16 formal recourse we could take with his behavior, that it
11
kind of went underground until the election.
the appearance of being unstable? That's different.
is
So I have a feeling, between the first part of
Loud and appearance ofinstability are two different
19 August and the election in November, it was pretty
things.
Stomping down from the dais, throwing papers
20 quiet. But if you work your way backwards from August,
in the air in a public meeting -- and Mayor Briscoe was
21 it was a steady escalation in his behavior from, I'm
there when that occurred. I gaveled Council Member Ribi 22 going to say, January of'10 to August of'J 1.
to remain up in his area -- up at the dais, because it
23
Q. And as you sit here today, between
was disrespectful to the people in the room and to his
24 January 20 IO and August 2011, do you remember any
fellow council members.
2s
specific incident related to any specific topic where
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Q. And was that -- was Sharon Hammer the -1 Sharon Hammer came in and said, "Nils Ribi's conduct is
involved in that?
2
a concern"?
A. Yes. Then -- sitting in the room.
3
A. This is really over the top. There were many
Q. Okay. I mean, was-4
instances along the way. Then there was one, and I'm
A. I'm painting a picture of instability, okay,
s trying to remember- it was a budget session. But we
which leads to this discussion about being concerned
6
had some discussions, we went into recess -- I've
about his behavior, being nervous about him in his
1
already answered this earlier - we went into recess,
approach to Ms. Hammer, because this was escalating
s and Councilman Ribi and Sharon Hammer went into the
g front part of the building to run some copies, and
toward the -- and it reached kind of a crescendo. As
soon as Mayor Briscoe won the election, they said,
10 that's when, I'm going to call it, an altercation
11 occurred. Not physical, but verbal.
"Okay, now we've got it."
1.2
Q. And to clarify, you weren't present?
Had I been reelected, this thing would have
gone back down, would have stayed below the radar, and 13
A. Was not present. She came back down the hall
14 -- because you asked me when did she tallc to me about
other approaches might have been made. But in any
1s it -- she came down the hall, and then she said, "Man,
event, the winners -- the winners became very arrogant
in the way they were approaching this thing. And this
1& this is" -- "he's really out ofit now."
11
Q. And did she ask you to do anything about that?
just reached the crescendo. So you said "loud." I'm
11
A. Well, yeah, we're going into a meeting -- what
not using that word. I want to move that up a step and
19 do you mean "do"? You mean go and attack him? Like do
say, no, apparent instability, very erratic.
20 what?
Q. So you said that after the November 8th
21
Q. No. Did she file a complaint, wanted you to
election, it escalated; is that your testimony?
22
follow
up, investigate it?
A. It had been escalating up through
A. Yeah. Yeah. I'd say, "Well, I wonder what
November 8th, and then the punch line was the November 23
24 we're going to do about this?"
11th executive session.
2s
Q. Did you follow up after the meeting and talk
Q. Now, Sharon Hammer wasn't there, was she?
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1
2
3

to her about -A. Yes.
Q. - what - when did you talk to her?
A. I don't recall that meeting. I think that

meeting might have gone -- you know, the next day-ish.
Q. And what did you say?
A. I said that that -- "this is really a
problem," because, once again, he doesn't work for me, l
can't fire him.
Q. This is what you told Sharon?
A. Told Sharon. I said, "I can't discipline him.
I don't have a mechanism, so I want" - "I don't know
what we're going to be able to do." And I said, "I'm
going to start asking like the lawyer, like Adam King,"
which was the wrong idea.
I called-- who did I call? I called a guy up
in Caldwell, Idaho. Oh, gosh, what was his -- and he
was put on to me by somebody. Because I had made a
complaint to the ICRMP guys, and they just-- they
stiff-anned me. The executive director shuffled me.
The claims manager shuffled me.
And so I called a guy up in Caldwell, Idaho,
to say, "What mechanism do you have?" And then he
started asking me about, "Do you have any city policy
relative to censure or discipline?"

4
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A. Basically, "Do what you can, Mayor. Give
me" - "help me figure this out." And I said, "I'll do
everything I can."
Q. Did you feel that this was more of an abuse of
authority, as you recall it from your Boeing days, where
somebody over authority of somebody else is
intimidating?
A. From the Boeing days, if you're in authority,
you're the supervisor, and you have somebody working for
you - which wasn't even the case in this case -- it's
especially bad if a -- let's say a vice president from
this division goes way over to a different division of
Boeing and starts chewing out a lower-level employee
than reports to him in this division, that would be that would be nailed immediately, if not sooner. Be a
nice talking to, and that would come under - that would
be a disciplining kind of an action.
Q. But what I'm getting at: Was this, in your
estimation, observation -- this intimidation more
related to Mr. Ribi's perceived authority over Sharon
Hammer or Kelly Ek or Michelle Frostenson or David
Blampied?
A. Yeah. And it could have been -- it could have
risen to a lower level. Like, for instance, you know,
"He's really a pain in the butt. isn't he?" And
Page 149

Page 147

And the one time I went to the city policy
manual -- or Sharon did, I guess - and say, "No. No
city policy. You can't" - "we're high and dry on
4 taking a council member and disciplining him," which is
5 bizarre. Every agency of government has something
6 somewhere in there that allows censure.
7
Q. So your recollection is the copy - copy
8
center issue occurred prior to your August meeting with
9
Adam King?
10
A. I think so.
11
Q. Because you said between August -12
A. I'd have to go and - yeah.
13
Q. Between August and November it was kind of
14 quiet on this part?
15
A. I believe so.
16
Q. Other than -- well, just for the record, then.
17 did you ever do a formal investigation - well, back up.
Did Sharon Hammer ever tell you, "I'm filing a
18
19 formal complaint pursuant to the policy. I want you to
20 investigate this and do something to protect me," or
21 were they just these conversations you had?
22
A. Just conversations.
Q. So she never asked you to follow up and do
23
24 anything other than what you had -- what you've
25 testified you did?
l.
2
3
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everybody would say, "Yeah, he's kind of a pain in the
butt." But it's beyond that. It's aggressive pain in
the butt, which is a whole different thing than just
being ajerk. You know, all ofus in this room are
jerks at different times. But then when you really act
it out aggressively, that's different.
Q. When Michelle Frostenson met with you on
October 5th, you said that she talked to you about the
car and Sharon's use of the car.
Did you tell Michelle at that time that you
had given Sharon permission to use the car?
A. I did not discuss -- I listened to Michelle
Frostenson, and I -- and she started with -- let's
remember, she started with 133,000, not the car. And I
listened to her and didn't engage with her at all, no
interaction. "Tell me what you're talking about. Yep.
Okay, I got that. Yeah. Uh-huh. Uh-huh. Uh-huh."
Q. Did you share that information with anybody
else after that meeting?
A. Not that I recall, no. In fact, I don't think
I even -- did I even talk to Sharon about this? Between
October 5th -- I may not have even talked to Sharon
about it. I'll tell you why. Once again, it smelled a
little -Q. It smelled in October?
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BEFORE THE IDAHO HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION
AND THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
)
)
)

SHARON R. HAMMER.
Complainant,

v.

)
)
)
)

THE CITY OF SUN VALLEY,
Respondent.

No. E-0112-241
38C-2012-00122

AF.FIDAVlT OF WAYNE wq.J,JCB
FORMJGR MAYOR OF THE CITY OF SUN VALLEY

I. WAYNE WILLICH, first duly sworn on oath, depose end state as follows:
1) That my name is Wayne Willich, and from the first week of January of2008
through the first week of January of 2012, I was the duly elected Mayor of the City Of

Sun Valley, Idaho, and that I am competent to testify as to the matters herein. I certify
pursuant to Rule 11 of1he Idaho Code Of Civil Procedure, that the facts alleged herein
are true and accurate and are made with personal knowledge, and would further swear to

such under oath and at trial if required.

The Termination Of Former Citv Administrator Virginia Egger
2) Subsequent to becoming Mayor Of Sun VaJJey, Sun Valley City Council Member

Nils Ribi showed me a binder he bad kept related to acts of .financial misconduct that he
believed former Sun Valley City A~inistrator Virginia Egger had per.formed while she was

the Sun Valley City Administrator through the summer of2007. The information that

Council Mombor RJbi lwl ooUecred relating to M.s. B-'s fimneial misconduct h,d b o ~
1
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The Tenns Of Sharon R. fipmmer's Citv AdgaiD.istrator Employment ,Aereement

4) In lune of 2008, the City Of Sun Valley entered into a written City Administrator
Employment Agreement with SharonR. Hammer, which was drafted by then Sun Valley
City Attorney Rand Peebles. At the time I entered into the City Administrator Employment
Agreement with Ms. Hammer, there was no discussion related to whether Section 3,
Paragraph A waived any potential discrimination, harassment, retaliation or other noncontract claims should the City Administra.tor Employment Agreement be terminated, nor
was there any intent on my part that Ms. Hammer waive any future discrimination,

harassment, retaliation or otlm' non-contract claims if the City Of Sun Valley chose to ever
terminate the City Administrator Employment Agreement pursuant to the "without cause"

provisions of Section 3, Paragraph A. Any assertions by the City Of Sun VaJley or its cwrent
attorneys that Ms. Hammer waived any discri~on, harassment, retaliation or tort claims,
.separate from her contract claims, including her claims presented to the Idaho Human Rights
Commission and in her Idaho Protection Of Public Employees Act law suit, are simply not
based on mine or Ms. Hammer's agreements entered into in Jwie of2008
I

ML Bemmer's CongpJaiat& Of Coupdl Me,pl!fl'. Ribi's Harapept. Abpe Apd Other
ffgstile.As;ts
.
5) On multiple occasions between October of2009 and September of20I l, Ms.

Hammer reported to me that Council Member Ribi had been hostile to her and had harassed
her because Ms. Hammer had told Council Member Ribi that he was not authorized to

contact Sun Valley planning staff employees Mark Hofi:nan and Diane Shay in regards to
zoning matters pending before the Sun Valley City Council for which Council Member Ribi
was to vote. In particular, it is my opinion that Council Member Ribi inappropriately tried to

3
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influence the City Of Sun Valley staff members mentioned, and thereafter treated Ms.

Hammer improperly and in a hostile manner when Ms. Hammer told him to refrain from
influoncing such staff persons, inclu~ but not limit.ed to:

October of 2009 during hearings on the De Novo Independence. LLC comprehensive
plan amendment;
July through November of20l0 during hearings on the 429 Dollar MOlUltain Zoning
Map Amendment;

June of 2011 during Sun Valley area of impact bearings;
August and'Septcmber of201 l during Sun Valley Co. comprehensive plan
amendments;

Sepmnber of 2011 during Sun Valley area of impact discussion.
6) On multiple occasions between April of2009 and September of 2011, Ms.

Hammer reported to me that Council Member Ribi bad also been hostile to her and had
harassed her because Ms. Hammer b~ told Council Member Ribi that Ms. Hammer took
direction from me and that Cotmcil Member Ribi was not authom.ed to give Ms.Hammer any
directions without my approval. In particular, it is my opinion that thereafter Council

Member Ribi treated Ms. Hamm.er ilAProperly and in a hostile manner, when she told
Council Member Ribi that she would follow my direction and not bis in regards to:

April of'2009 enactment of fund balance, property tax levy, budget and appropriation,
council powers, and telecommunication devices policies;
May of 2009 council priorities;
1uly of2009 Amtrak service resolution;
January of2010 through May of2010 council powers and ethics;
March of2010 CAFR report;

June of2010 amendment of property tax policy;
August and S~ber of2010 contract for .Sun Valley 1-esortmarketing;

4
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~ber of2010 contract for audit preparation;

November of2010 policy on ~xternal contracts;

March of2011 audit comments, policy on consolidated dispatch and council member
powers and ethics;

April through. September of201 l capital improvement plan;

April of20l l audit comments and management responses; mandatory garbage
coll~on and marketing alliance bylaws;
July of2011 Cox Cable contract;
September of 2011 contract for emergency services and budget amendments.
7) On multiple occasions descnoed in Paragraphs 5 and 6 herein, Ms. Hammer

described to me that when I was not present in the Sun Valley City Hall, that Council
Member Ribi would stand in the doorway of her office and in a hostile manner argue with her
when Ms. Hammer would tell Council Member Ribi that he needed to get approval from me
before Ms. Hammer would do something that Council Member Ribi wanted Ms. Hammer to
do. During several of those incidents, Ms. Hammer told me that Council Member Ribi had
yelled at her ''The Mayor Does Not Know What His Job Is!". In addition. on several
occasions I was present in Sun Valley City Hall and observed Council Member Ribi being
_______....,onfrontationaLwith..Ms.-I:lammer..in-Ms....Hamme~S-office.------------------;

8) On multiple occasions related to the incidents descn'bed in Paragraph 5·and 6
above, Ms. Hammer complained to me about Council Member Ribi's inappropriate and
hostile conduct towards her, and that she was becoming more concerned about Council
Member's hostility. During several of these discussions, Sun Valley City Attorney Adam
_King was also present. ~ed on my discussions with 1'18. Hammer, on more than one

._

occasion I mentioned Ms. }lammer's complaints to Mr. Ribi and publicly reminded Council

5
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Member Rtoi in Sun Valley City Council meatings to not contact Sun Valley staffmembers

about administmtive or operational matters without my ~edge, and to "treat all City Of
Sun Valley employees in an appropriate manner.

9) On multiple occasions after my election as Mayor OfSun Valley in November of
2007, I held discussioos with Sun Valley City Council Member Joan Lamb in which Council

Member Lamb disclosed to me that Comill Member Rt"bi had been verbally abusive and
hostile to several Ciq Of Sun Valley staff members going back to Council Member Rtbi's
service as a member of the Sun Valley Planning And Zoning Commission. Subsequent to Ms.

Hammer's appointment as the Sun Valley City Administtator in June of2008, on several
occasions Council .Member Lamb also disclosed to me her concems about Council Member
Rtoi's unacceptable and hostile attitude towards Ms. Hammer, and I told her that I had
discUSlled the issue with Ms. Hammer and City Attorney King as well as Council Member

Ribi himself. On several occasions between 2009 and 2011, in public Sun Valley City
Council meetings. I remember Council Member Lamb chastising Council Member Rtoi for

his improper contact and treatment of City Of S1DJ Valley staff members. including Ms.
Hammer.

10) Duringpublic Sun Valley City Council meetings of April l~ 2009; January 21,
2010; May 2, 2010; and, April 21, 2011, l was required to specifically remind Sun Valley
City Council members, and in particular Council Member Ribi, that Sun Valley City Council

members should not contact staffmembers, including Ms. Hammer, and instead contact me
regarding City Of Sun Val1ey issues, which had been the source of Council Member Rl'bi's
hostility towards, and harassment 0£ Ms. Hammer.
6
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11) During my 1enUre as Mayor Of Sun Valley. on multiple occasions l held

conversations with Sun Valley City CJerlc Kelly Ek. in which City Clerk Ek complained that
I

Council Mc:mber Rt"bi had been verbally abusive to City C1erk Ek and otherwise harassed
her. On several of those occasions, City Clerk Ek told me that Council Member Rt"bi's
actions had caused her distress and caused her to cry. On several occasions. City Clerk Ek

was so upset with how she had been 1reated by Council Member Ribi that I authom.ed her to
go home until she waneady to return to worlc.

12) During my tenure as Mayor Of Sun Valley, on multiple occasions I held

conversations with Sun Valley Treasurer Mi~lle Frostenson, in which City Tzeasurer
Frostenson a1so complained that Council Member Ribi bad been verbally abusive to City

Clerk Frostenson and o1herwise harassed her. City Treasurer Frostenson told me that Council
Member R.i.bi 1ried to get City Treasurer Frostenson to revise documents and perform
functions that Cowtcil Member Rt"bi was not autboriz.ed to do without mine or Ms. Hammer's
approval. On several ofthose occasions, City Treasurer Frostenson told me that Counci1
Member Rt'bi's actions had caused her distress.

----r
l

-----·--------

l

!i

13) On Aupat 2, 2011, i met with City Attmmy King at his offico in Kcrtohum,

Idaho. I told City Atlomey King dJlt I wankld to ccmtidadia1ly di9cuss issues telated to
CoWlcil Member Ribi. City Attorney King told me he would keep our discussion
confidential. I then toki City Attorney King that since Council Member Rl'"bi's re-election to
the Sun Valley City Council in November of 2009, I had been approached by multiple Ci1;y
Of Sun Valley staff members complaining about Council Member Rioi's improper contact

and attemnh, to direct Citv Of Sun Valley staff members as to what to do, without mine or
r-

"

.
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Ms. Hammer's approwl. l lllated to Civ Atttsm,Jy JGns that many ofthe Cit)' Of Sun Valley
staff membcra atso comp1aiDod that Comdl Member Rlbi was verbally abusive ad hostile

towards them. I toJd City .A#omey King that my peamst concem, however, wu 1hat CouDoil
Member Jllbi seemed to C1raet fmnalal in partioular. I told City Aamney King that both City
Clerk Ek and City Treasurer Frostenson had discussed with me Council Member Ribi's
hostility towards both of them on multiple occasions, and City Attorney King told me he was
also aware of City Clede Bk's and City Treasurer Frostenson' s complaints abol.lt Council
Member Ribi. I also ren1incled City:Ataomoy King ofthe mnlfiplo convemations he, I and Ms.

Hammer bad heldJ:8811dinB Council Member Ribi's haruamem, abase and hestilltytowards
Ms. Hammer. City Attorney King told me be aareecl t h a t ~ Member Ribi's conduct

towants Ms. Hammer was unacceptable, but that booauae Counoi1 Mrmber R1bi was an

elected oflioial there was aotbing 1hat I coukf do to discipline O>uncil Member Ribi. other
than 10 dilcuas the issues with Council Member Ribi and ask Council Maher Ribi to act

apptuJJtiale)y. Subsequent to my discussion with City Attorney King, based on City Attorney
King's billings (Exhibit A) indicating that he thereafter held a conference with someone other

than myself that day after our m~g, on information and belief. City Attorney King
dillOIJ8fled my concerns about Council Member Ribi's harassment and abuse of City Clede Ek.

·-------------------------------------City Treasurer Frostenson 8lld Ms. Hammer directly with Counclt Member Rt'bi.

14) OnSepamber lS,2011,attheeadofa Sun ValleyCityC,ounciJmeeting. Ms.

Hammer repotted to me that Council Member Rfbi bad assaulted her during a break in the

meedna, Ms. 8-mer told mo that when Ms. Hammer1k>ld Counoil Member Ribi that she

would have to discuss a matter aboutI budget ameadmenis with n rather than doing what
Council Member lb'bi had ubd. Council. Member Ribi raised bis arms in a ~118

manner, came towards her and shouted at bet, seriously searing Ms. Hammer. Ms. Hammer
8
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was l'ialbly 1lplllt •OJaaaD Mambcr llihi's aclioDI. CJty Mlmawy King w ,..,at whm
Ms. ffemm!Df ~ dis ineidmtto IDL Subleqllm1:to tbD Sepnmber 1S, 2011 iaaidmt, J
diseuaed the iDDidlllt wllh Couaoil ~ Ribl 111d 1Dlct him fhatbe simply CIDD« aot 1bat
way towards Ma. Hamme.

The Flaped Ipyfltteetigp Into Cogen Mebe,:Ribi's ffer!enuint, Abuse And Boa1ile
Am Towards Ma, B•wmer
·
·
15) On November 14, 2011, I.and the Sun Valley City Council commenced what was
supposed to be an independent investigation of several matters, to be performed by Special

Investigator Patti Ball. The investigation was iDlendcd to include a thorough investigation of
Ms. Hammer's, City Clede Bk's and City Treasurer's Frostcnsoo's harassmoot oomplaints
against Counoil Member RibL It was my intent that Special Investigator Patti Ball was to
report solely to me. After Ms. Hammer filed an Idaho Proteetion Of Public Employees Act

Jaw suit against the City Of Sun Valley on November 21, 2011, 1be City Of S1m Valley's
insurance company (''ICRMP") appointed attomey Kirtlan Naylor to defend the City Of Sun
Valley against Ms. Hammer's law suit. Thereafter, Attorney Naylor demandod that he be in
control of and dhect the Speoil Investigation, and against my wishes, Special Investigator

. Ball thereafter n,ported to Attorney Naylor instead of me. Ms. Ball's billings for the period of
November 27, 2011 to January 4, 2012 {Exlu'"bitB), clearly indicates1hat.immediatolyupon

her appointment as the Special Investigator she began reporting to Attorney Naylor rather
than to me, and continued to do so through my tenure as Mayor Of Sun Valley which ended
on January 3, 2012. Special Investigator Ball's billings (Exlul>it B) indicate that there were at
least twenty one (21) correspondences~ Special Investigator Ball and Attorney
Naylor during a two month period, when Special Investigator Ball was supposed to have

been independent of Attorney Naylor'B influence in defending Council Member Rlbi against
9
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James R. Donova4 Pro Se (ISBA No. 8142)
4110 Eaton Ave., Suit.e D
Caldwell ID 83607

OEC \ 1 2ui2

(312) 859-2029
I ~ Atty No. 8142
j~@aoLcom
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE ffl'IB JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OJi'. THE STATE OF IDAHO~ IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
NILSJUBI,
Plaintiff{Dismissed)-~

)
)

PATRICIA BllOLIN-RJBI,

)

)

-· . - - - - - - ·-· . -- P)aial:Ut ·-

-·-- - ··- - - - ..1 )
)
)
)
)

v.

J.AMeS R. DONOVAL
DefeDdlnt~

No. CV-2011-1040

.

SDPPLpfRNTAL-AffJDAVIT OF WAYNE waLICH

.FORMJIMAY0ll0".IBEC0:X0lSJJNYALLEY
I. WAYNB WILUCH,. first duly swom on o • depose and state as follows:
1) My name is Wayne Wdlich, and ftom the first week of Jap.uary of 2008 to

January 3,. 2012. I was the duly e l ~ Mqor of the Ci1y Of Slm Valley~ Jdaho,. and that

I Bin competent to testify as to the matters herein. I cerµfy pursuant to Rule 11 of the
Idaho Code Of C i v i l ~ that the facts alleged-~ me 1rue and accurate and are
made with personal knowledge, and would further swear to such under oath. and at trial if

2) On or about December 4~ 201Z the Idaho Mountain Express posted on its online versi~ a document puq,orting to be a report issued by Investiga1Dr Patti Ball dated

December 20,. 2011 {~ ''Questionable Patti Ball Report") (ExbibitA),. which was

l
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10) Based on the Final Patti Ball Report, and my authority to make final and
b~g disci!)linary findimJS purswm.t Section 8.7 of the Sun Valley Peno~el Policy
And Proced~ I concluded that Ms. Hammer had no.t committed any infractions of Sun

·Valley policies related to a) her use of.a Sun Valley automQbile because I had authorized
her to use the automobile at all hours _.or botJi Sun Valley and personal use10 b) 1- use of

ilex time to comDeDSBte
her for non-standard work homs she bad been reauired
to·work
-· .
over the course of 2008 through 2011 because I bad authorized her to use the flex time,
and. c) her use of a Sun Valley creditcantbecause Sun Valley Treasurer Michelle
Frostenson and the Sun Valley City ~uncil had already 'specifically appr_oved ·as

le2itimate
all exnenditures
Ms. Hammer
. .....
.. had incurred on the Sun Vallev. credit card.

11) Based on my findings related to alle~ons of misconduct against Ms.

Hammer. and my authority pursuant to Section 8.7 of the Sun Valley Personnel Policies.
I considered all disciplinary actions against Ms. Hammer to be concluded as of December

12) Based on the Final Patti Ball Report and)lly own bowl.edge ofMs.
Hammer's multiple complaints and my knowl~ of Council Member Rloi's conduct
towards Ms. Ham~r during 2009.tbrough 2011, and my authority to make final and

bindin2- disciolinarv
Section 8.7 ofthe Sun Vallev
- . findines
- oumumt
..
·. Pei:smmel Policy
And Proced~, I concluded that Council Member Ribi had violated the Sun Valley

Personnel Policy on Harassment (Section 7.S) related to his treatmellt ofMs. Hammer on

•
4
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n
multiple occasions over the course of 2009 .through 2011,, including that Council Member
Rlbi had assaulted Ms. Hammer dlll'll12- a break in a Sun Vallev- Citv. CoUJl(;il :r:m:etimz
. - on
~15.201·1.

13) I certify that between ~ b e r 13, 2012 until my tenure as Mayor Of SlDl
Valley terminated on J~uary 3. 2012. I gave Investigator Ball no authority .to contact
attorney Kirtlan Naylor, to discuss the issues assoc,:iated with the investigation which
resulted in .the Final Patti Ball Report or to take any direction of~ sort from Attorney

Naylor.

14) I certify that between December.13, 2011 and the termination of my tenure as

Mayor Of Sun Valley on January 3. 2012. l gave Investi~r Ball no authority or no
direction to modify the Final Patti l\all Repo,:t in any fashion or to prq,are any additional .

or suoolemental
reoorts
for Sun Vallev
investi2ation
she had
... . related to the disciulinarv
.
...
. "

been retained to perform on behalf of Sun Valley.

15) I have reviewed t h e ~ of 2011 invoice oflnvestigator·Ball (Exlu"bit

B) which indicates that~ direct violation ofmy authority and without my .knowledge or
approval, between December IS; 2011 and December 20,, 2011, Investigator Ball

sU1Te1>titiouslv c:ommunicated with Attomev Navlor and mmarentlv meoared the
....

,

.. •

•.

•

--

..

.... -

~

..

#>

•

Questionable Patti Ball Report at Attorney Nayior's direction without my authority,
.knowledge or direction. and dated 1ne Questionable Patti Ball Report on December 20.

i>
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Erie B. Swara, ISB #6396
Joy M. Vega, ISB #7887
JONES & SWARTZ PLLC

FILEDA.M~-.t

z

1673 W. Shoreline Drive, Suite 200 [83702]
P.O. Box 7808
Boise. ID 83707-7808
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Telephone: (208) 489-8989
Facsimile: (208) 489-8988
Email: eric@jonesandswartzlaw.com
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· NOV O\ 2013

.joy@jonesands\Vartzlaw.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff Sharon R. Hammer

IN TIIB DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIF1H JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STAIB OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR TIIE COUNTY OF BLAINE
SHARON R. HAMMER,
Case No. CV-2012-479

Plaintift

vs.
CITY OF SUN VALLEY;
NILS RIB!, in his- individual and official capacity;
DeWAYNE BRISCOE, in his individual and official
capacity;

Defendants.

AFFIDAVIT OF WAYNE WILLICH
FORMER MAYOR OF THE CITY OF' SUN VALLEY
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO COMPEL
I, WAYNE WILLICH, first duly sworn on oath, depose and state as follows:
1) My name is Wayne Willich; _and from the first week of January of 2008 to January 3,
;

2012, I was the duly elected Mayor of the City Of Sun Valley, Idaho ("Sun Valley"), and that I
am competent to testify as to the. matters herein. I certify pursuant to Rule 11 of the Idaho Code
Of Civil Procedure, that the facts alleged herein are true and accurate and are made with personal

Page 87 of 526

knowledge, and would further swear to such \lllder oath and at trial if required.
2) During my ten~e as Mayor of Stm. Valley, the attached Section 3.2 of the Stm. Valley
written Personnel Policies And Procedures (Exhibit A) was in existence and in full force,
including that the following provision related to Sun Valley City Attorney Adam King ("City
Attorney King") was in full force and effect:
"The City Administrator and .City Attorney shall be directly supen,l.ced and evaluated by
the Mayor (emphasis added). All other personnel, including the City Clerk and Treasurer,
shall be directly supervised and evaluated by the City Administrator."
3)·During my tenure as Mayor of Sun Valley, the attached Section 8.7 of the Sun Valley
written ·Personnel Policies And Procedures (Exhibit A) was in existence and in full force,
including that the following provision related to Sun.Valley employee disciplinary matters was
in fu11 force and effect:

"The decision ofthe Mayor shall be fmal and binding (emphasis added)."

The Harassment Allegations Of Former Administrator Rammer Apinst Council Member,

Bil!!
4) On multiple occasions between April of2009 and September of 2011, fonner Swt Valley

City Administrator Sharon R. Hammer ("Fonner Administrator Hammer") reported to me that Sun
Valley City Council Member Nils Ribi ("Council Member Ribi") had been·hostile to her and had
hara.~sed her.

5) In particular, Former Administrator Hammer reported·to me that Council Member Ribi

had been hostile to her and had hara.c;.cred her because Fonner Administrator Hammer had told

Council Member Ribi that Former Administrator Hammer took direction from me and that Council
Member Ribi was not authorized to give Former Administrator Hammer any directions without my.

approval.
6) In particular, it is my opinion that thereafter Council Member Ribi treated Fo~~r

Administrator Hammer improperly. and in a hostile manner, when Fonner Administrator Hammer
told Council Member Ribi that Fonner Administrator Hammer would follow my direction and not
2
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Council Member Ribi's direetions in regards to:
a) April of 2009: Enactment of fund balance, property tax levy, budget and appropriation,
council powers, and telecommunication devices policies;
b) May of 2009: City Council priorities;
c) July of 2009: Amtrak service resolution;

d) January of 2010 through May of 2010: City Council powers and ethics;
e) March of 2010: CAFRreport;
t) June of 20 I 0: Amendment of property tax policy;
g) August and September of 2010: Contract for Sun Valley resort marketing;
h) October of 2010: Contract for audit preparation;

i) November of 2010: Policy on external contracts;
j) March of 2011: Audit comments, policy on consolidated dispatch and City Council

member powers and ethics;
k) April through September of 2011: Capital improvement plan;

I) April of 2011: Audit comments and management responses; mandatory garbage collection
and marketing alliance bylaws;
m) July of2011: Cox Cable contract;

n) September of 2011: Contract for emergency services and budget amendments.

7) On multiple occasions described in Paragraphs 5 and 6 herein, Former Administrator

Hammer described to me that when I was not present in the Sun Valley City Hall, that Council
Member Ribi would stand in the doorway of her office and in a hostile manner argue with her when
Former Administrator Hammer would tell Council Member Ribi that he needed to get approval from
me before Fonner Administrator Hammer would do something that Council Member Ribi wanted
Fonner Administrator Hammer to do. During several ofthose incidents, Fonner Administrator
Hammer told me that Council Member ~bi had yelled at her."The Mayor Does Not Know What His
Job Is!". In addition, on several occasions I was present in Sun Valley City Hall and observed
Council Member Ribi being confrontational with Fonner Administrator Hammer in Former
Administrator Hammer's office.

3
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8) On multiple occasions related to the incidents described in Paragraph S and 6 above,

Former Administra~or H~er complained to me about Council Member Ribi's inappropriate and
hostile conduct towards her, and that she was becoming more concerned about Council Member's
hostility. During several of these discussions, City Attorney King was also present. Based on my
discussions with Former Admini~tor Hammer, on more than one occasion I mentioned Fonner
Administrator Hammer's complaints to Council Member Ribi and publicly reminded Council
Member Ribi in Sun Valley City Council meetings to not contact Sun Valley staff members about
administrative or operational matters without my knowledge, and to treat all Sun Valley employees
in an appropriate manner.
9) Subsequent to Fonner Adminisfrator Hammer's appointment as the Sun Valley City

Administrator in June of 2008, on several -occasions former Sun Valley City Council Member Joan
Lamb ("Former Council Member Lamb") disclosed to me her concerns about Council Member

Rabi's unacceptable and hostile attitude towards Former Administrator Hammer. I told.Former
Council Member Lamb that I had discussed the issue with Former Administrator Hammer and City
Attorney King, as well as Council Member Ribi himself. On several occasions between 2009 and
2011, in public Sun Valley City Council meetings, I remember Former Council Member Lamb
chastising Council Member Ribi for his improper contact and treatment of Sun Valley staff members,
including Former Administrator Hammer.
10) I;>uring public S~ Valley City Council meetings of April 16, 2009; January 21, 201 O;

May 2, 2010; and, April 21, 2011, I was required to specifically remind Sun Valley City Council
Members, and in particular Council Member Ribi, that Sun Valley City Council Members should not
contact staff members, including Former Administrator Hammer, and instead should contact me
regarding Sun Valley issues, which had been the source of Council Member Ribi's hostility towards,
and harassment of, Former Administrator Hammer.
11) On August 2, 2011, I met with City Attorney King at his office in Ketchum, Idaho. I told
City Attorney King th.at since Council Member Ribi's re-election to the Sun Valley City Council in
November of 2009, I had been approached by multiple Sun Valley staff members complaining about
Council Member Ribi' s improper contact and attempts to direct Sun Valley staff members as to what
to do, without mine or Former Administrator Hammer's approval. I stated to City Attorney King that
4
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many of the Sun Valley staff members also complained that Council Member Ribi was verbally
abusive and hostile towards them. I told City Attorney King that my greatest concern, however, was
that Council Member Ribi seemed to target females in particular. I also reminded City Attorney King

of the multiple conversations he, I and Former Administrator Hammer had held regarding Council ..
Member Ribi's harassment, abuse and hostility towards Former Administrator Hammer. City
Attorney King told me he agreed that Council Member Ribi's conduct towards Fonner Administrator
Hammer was unacceptable, but that because Council Member Rl"bi was an elected official there was

nothing that I could do to discipline Council Member Ribi, other than to discuss the issues with
Council Member Ribi and ask Council Member RI"bi to act appropriately.
12) On September 15, 2011, at the end of a Sun Valley City Council meeting, Former
Administrator Hammer reported to me that Co~cil Member Ribi had.assaulted her during a break in
the meeting. Fonner Administrator Hammer told me that when Former Administrator Hammer told
Council Member Ribi that she would··have to discuss a matter about budget amendments with me
ratber·than doing what Council Member Ribi had asked, Council Member Ribi raised his anns in a
threatening mmmer, came towards her and shouted at her, seriously scaring Fonner Administrator

Hammer. Former Administrator Hammer was visibly upset at Council Member RibPs actions.
Subsequent to the September 15, 2011 incident, I discussed the incident with Council Member Rtbi
and told Council Member Ribi that he simply cannot act that way towards Former Administrator
Hammer.

The Retaining Of Investigator Ball As A "Fact Finding" Investiptor Related To The
Hammer Disciplinary Iilvestb!ation And Other Matters

13) On November 11, 2011, a special Sun Valley City Council executive session was
held, which Former Administrator Hammer was not allowed to attend, in which Council Member
Ribi and form.er Sun Valley Treasurer Michelle Frostenson ("Former Treasurer Frostenson")
made undocumented allegations of misconduct against Foriner Administrator Hammer.
14) At the November 11, 2011 special Sun Valley City Council executive session,
Council Member Ribi, Sun Valley mayor elect DeWayne Briscoe ("Mayor Elect Briscoe") and
Sun Valley City .Council Member Robert Youngman {"Council Member Youngmanu)
determined not to allow Former Administrator Hammer to respond to any of the misconduct
5
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47) Based on the conversations with Attorney Naylor and Special Investigator Ball at the
December 9, 2011 and December 12, 2011 meetings, it became clear to me that during the
course of the Special Investigation that both Attorney Naylor and Special Investigator Ball were
seeking to find anything that would substantiate Council Member Ribi's public assertions that
Former Administrator Hammer had done something "criminal" in order to protect ICRMP from
potential damage claims asserted by Former ~dministrator Hammer in the Hammer Retaliation
Law Suit, rather than performing an "independent" investigation.
48) Based on the obvious errors Investigator Ball made in the Authorized Ball Report, it

brought the entire Authorized Ball Report'into question. And, based on Attorney's Naylor's
·improper influence over Investigator Ball, I considered the Authorized Ball Report to have been
mishandled, poorly done, and it looked like some kind of attack piece that was crafted or put
together possibly by Attorney Naylor.

Jilrrer~i\.rdl ·1iJM.fi\iflllffl1.lS~llll0~~1~DD,'i~J~dl)e
Atffltmu.ed: Ball Report was~,ifnd fltatiione ofthtndlegations against Fopner

Aaliaistrator Hammer that ba,i'been't'8ised by,either Former Treasw:.w ff0stell$9J!., <>1.Co11ACil
Membet1Ribi, or bad been investigate(ll,y.Jn~Balli"1'CQuired any further diseiplm3ey
1

ilwestigation« disciplinary actions against.ForJJlef,~r Hammer, because each

a.Degation·was covered by some ~ c authorization that either-I or the Sun Valley City
Cawicilhad provided Former Administrator Hammer as was allowed pursuant to Former

.Mdmi.nistrator Hammer's written employment agreement with Sun Valley and Sun Valley
,.,policies.

56>)':After reviewing. the Authorized Ball Report and discussing ·matters with Investigator
Ball, I determined that Former Administrator Hammer had not violated any Sun Valley
Personnel Policies And Procedures and that Former Administrator Hammer had done nothing
«41iohJg.e.should be disciplined for. I also determined that there could not possibly be anything
~ e r Administ,:ator Hammer could be criminally charged with.
13
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58) At no time.after. December 12, 2011, did I authorize City.Attorney King, Attorney
Naylor, Investigator Ball or any other Sun Valley official or employee to release the Authorized
Ball Report or any information related to the Hammer Disciplinary Investigation to the Blaine

County Prosecutor or to anyone else d ~ my tenure as Mayor of Sun Valley through January
3, 2012.

diiAiti'WiUl1¥ &dings pursuant to seetion 8.7 oP1he SuftcValley Peffo'nnel· Policies And·

t

~edures,lconch#'-d~tnilllWtbf'H~~~~.
i'P8un·¥alley pelicies related to a) her use of a-Sun Valley automobile because I had authorized

her1'5lise the automobile at all hours' for both Sun '.Valley and personal use, b) her use of flex,
1JMe10 compensate her for n o ~ hours she had been i'eqUired to workoverthf.
ceme'Of2008 through 2011 because I had abthorized1* to use the flex time; and,~) •;use o:f

a ~elley credit card because Former l'reasure-F~n:aJMl,-0.Btm. ¥alley City Council
h ~ y specifically approved as legitimate alFexpenditmes1Former Administrator Hammer

BlliPincurred on the Sun Valley credit eard>
60) Based on my findings related to allegations against Former Administrator Hammer,
and my ·authority pursuant to Section 8.7 of the Sun Valley Personnel Policies And Procedures~ I
considered all disciplinary actions against Former Administrator Hammer to be concluded as of
December 12, 2011.

The J?ecember 16, 2011 Meeting With Attorney Naylor
·61} I certify that from the moment he was appointed by I~RMP as defense counsel in
regards to the Hammer Retaliation Law Suit, I considered Attorney Naylor to have acted in
contradiction ·to my directions and authority and to the best interest of Sun Valley, in favor of his
defense of Council Member Ribi and ICRMP, and therefore I never considered or recognized
Attorney Naylor to have been either Sun Valley's attorney or my personal attorney.

15
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* * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
SHARON P. HAJINBR and JAMBS R. DOJJOVAL,

P1aintiffs,

Case No. 1:13-CV-211-BJL

vs.

CJ:TY OP SUN VALLBY: NJ:LS R:rs:r. in his individual and
officia1 capacity; DBWAYBB BRXSCOB, in his individual
and official capacity.

Defendants.
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MR. NAYLOR: Do you recall? Just tell him
what you recall.
A. OfNovember 14th?
4
Q. Correct.
s A. You know, I have to read the agenda or have
6
specific questions asked to be able to tell you what I
7 recall.
8
Q. I asked specifically about the executive session,
9 not the public portion of the meeting, okay? So we have
10 the same understanding?
A. Yes.
11
12
Q. Was there any discussion of what transpired,
13 following the November 11th executive session in the
14 instruction to Mayor Willich to demand the resignation
15 and the offer of severance?
16
A. What I remember mostly was just a discussion
17 about how to move forward in terms of determining
18 whether the allegations were correct or not.
19
Q. Was there, if you can recall, did anyone voice a
20 dissent to wanting to investigate and wanting to -- take
21 action on the information that was being presented.
22
A. Would you repeat that? You just you cutout just
1
2
3

23
24

a little bit.
Q. Yeah. You said that there was discussions about

25

wanting to look into whether the allegations were true.

l.
2

3
4

s
6

7
8

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

21
22
23
24
25

that Ms. Hammer feh like Mm (sic) Ribi's conduct
toward her was inappropriate?

A. Yes.
Q. That sbc believed bis conduct was in violation of
the ~s harassment laws?

MR. NAYLOR: Object to the fonn.
A. Yes.
Q. Have you ever witnessed Mr. Ribi engage in
conduct towmd Ms. Hammer 1hat you felt was
inappropriate?
MR. NAYLOR: Object to the fonn.
Foundation.
A. Yes.
Q. Can you recall what it- the type of behavior
that you observed was?
A. It was a raised voice to the extent you could
call it yelling, reprimand about either opinion or
actions that she bad taken. I can remember some of that
in council meetings and then some in the hallway, out in
the hallway during council meetinp. where he disagreed
with an opinion she'd expressed.
Q. Did you did you believe 1hat his conduct toward
her violated the city's harassment policy?
MR. NAYLOR: Object to the fonn.
Foundation.
Page25

Page23

And my question to you is, did anyone voice an
objection to wanting to investigate any of the
3
allegations, but instead just rely upon the information
4 that had been presented?
5
A. I don't recall that.
6
Q. Do you recall anybody being opposed to
7 investigating the allegations?
A. No. There may have been, but I don't recall any.
8
Q.
Do you recall any discussions about Miss Hammer's
9
10 conduct being criminal in nature during the November
l.l 14th executive session?
1.2
A. I don't recall it in that session. I recall the
13 discussion, I believe, with Adam King and also
14 separately with Wayne Willich, but I don't believe those
15 discussions were in this meeting.
1.6
Q. Do you recall any discussions dming the November
17 14th executive session about Ms. Hammer's allegations
1.8 against Nils Ribi and his conduct toward her?
19 A. I don't recall those. It's bard for me to say
20 whether I recall a discussion, whether they were in that
21 session or an independent phone call with Wayne, with
22 Mayor Willich. rm not sure. I think they were in she
23 independent phone call. I remember a - definitely
24 remember a discussion about it.
Q. A discussion regarding her allegation? Was it
25
l

2

:\-1 in-l -Script®

A. I believed that it was inappropriate for anyone.
either a public official, employee. It was
3 inappropriate behavior.
Q. Did you observe that Mr. Ribi's conduct toward
4
s Ms. Hammer was different than his conduct toward city
council members?
6
A. No. I'd have to say no. he showed that behavior
7
8 nwnerous times with the mayor.
Q. Was his conduct toward women different than it
9
10 was toward men, as far as you could observe?
MR. NAYLOR: Object to the form.
1l
A. I can't say that it was, but it's different when
l.2
13 you're an employee than when you're an equal.
Q. What do you mean by that?
14
A. Well, if someone is exerting - using their - if
1.5
16 they're in a position of potential power relative to
17 your employment, if they're being abusive verbally, it
18 takes a different - carries a different weight than if
19 it's someone who is of equal stature position or above.
Q. Did you feel like Mr. Rt"bi•s conduct toward you
20
21 was the same as conduct toward 1he male city council
l

2

22
23
24
25

membets?
MR. NAYLOR: Object to the fonn.
A. He was much more deferential to the other male
council members, to the male council members. yes.

M & M Court Reporting Service, Inc.
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Q. Do you recall what you believed Ms. Hammer might 1 Q. Nonetheless, he was the proponent?
2
A. Yes.
sue the city for?
3
Q. Any other proponents?
3
MR. NAYLOR: Object to the form. You're
4
A. I don't recall.
4 just asking for her own thoughts, not what attorneys
s Q. Please tum the page to SH-TIMELINE 10 and you'll
5 told her?
6 see a subject line: Sun Valley City Attorney Adam King
6
MR. SWARTZ: That's what I'm asking.
7 should be barred :from further participation?
1
A. Well, I think, as I recall, the two issues that
a A. And can I just comment on that. I can't actually
a seemed to be a concern were wrongful termination in some
9
recall if I heard that in the meeting or I heard that
9
fashion and sexual harassment allegations that had been
10
afterwards
from Mayor Willich.
10 made. Not sexual harassment, excuse me, just
11.
But I do recall being told that. I do recall Mr.
11 harassment.
12 Ribi being the one who wanted the investigation.
12
Q. Do you recall any discussion during the November
13
Q. Into Miss Hammer's flex time and use of the
13
14, 2011 executive session about Nils Ribi abstaining
14 from any discussions regarding the allegation against
14 vehicle?
is Ms. Hammer in light of Ms. Hammer's allegations against 15 A. Yes. I'm sorry. You want me to go to Page 1O?
16 Mr. Ribi?
16
MR. NAYLOR: Next page.
1. 1
A. I don't recall.
17
A. Okay.
18
Q. Turning back to Mr. Donoval's November 12th
1a Q. And specifically. the section on stating that
19 Adam King should be barred from further participation.
19 letter, theemsue1tisw4'u 11ititi14 Ms l;fuJIRQLWAI~
20 Did you see that?
20~
,·
21 ~"Vat1e,-velfiele:~
21
A. Yes.
22
Jw,,ii¥es.
22
Q. Was there any discussion that you can recall
23
~ere
., ."14,
23 about that in the November 14, 2011 executive session?
24 201 t exeeotfVectisiod ~tiesn if
s. 24 A. Not that I can say happened, that I heard in that
25
25 meeting, no.
1

2

~eatf~-,;ti~cmaTliffi~a:~a1;-

Page 31

1
2

3

4
5
6

1

e

s
10
11

12

13
l4

1s
J.6

17
18
19
20
21
22

23

24
25

autilerisdrtt,,usethif;etty ~ ~ l t c t e ?
MR. NAYLOR: Did you say whether there was
any discussion or whether there was any dispute?

Page33

Q. How about any discussion at all?
A. I wasn't able to hear everything that happened in
3 that meeting.
4
Q. You were not?
MR.SWARTZ-~~~!-t;;:,~~,.,"~affydne1tt1iv- · -what MF.'-:'
tir'U:as
s A. Yeah. I -- my recollections relate to the
statingin'that first.topic?
6 discussions about needing to hire the professionals.
A.•+>don't-t»elieveso,,~Whlkl'all'W
7
Those, I quite clearly remember. The rest of it, I'm
infflfftrea''tn,the·eity.~il · ~ . , t 1 h i s .
8 not I'm as clear about.
Q,,•il!ft"'U~·of the 'lack'oiidis~fopic,
9
I had a - there was a conversation with Mayor
w ~ - . « ! ~ ~ - f . l a m m e r ' s use of 10 Willich I had about Adam King and his - the
~onaf flexible time;i{d
City of SW1
11 appropriateness of whether he participate further or
V'fdley vehicle?
12 not, and I do remember that
13
Q. And do you recall what the outcome of your
k'· Mltiat time, I didn't know of any reason.
Q. Do you recall who on the city council found that
14 discussion with Mayor Willich about that topic was?
there was a reason to investigate these matters despite
1s
A. Mayor Willich had told me that there had been
the fact that there was no disagreement over her ability
16 ongoing problems between Ms. Hammer and Mr. King because
17 she was taking on more and more of his work and he
to use flex time and the vehicle?
MR. NAYLOR: Object to the fonn.
18 wasn't happy with that because she was -- she is also an
19 attorney.
A. Mr. Ribi.
20
Q. Did you or Mr. Willich, to your knowledge, go on
Q. When you identify Mr. Ribi as being a proponent
21 and discuss that with any of the city council members or
of investigating these matters, despite the fact that
22 Mr. King?
they were not being disputed, was it that he was vocal
about needing to investigate them or vocal about wanting 23 A. I think Mr. Willich brought that up in front of
24 the entire council, but I'm not certain about that or
to investigate them; do you recall?
25 when it happened.
A. No.

:Vlin-l -Scrip~;

1

2

~useofthe
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Paga38
1

2
3

4

5
6

7
8

9

10
11

12
13
14

-:1.s
16

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

A. The mayor had requested that we go through him
immediate action to terminate Miss Hammer by having her
1
resign.
2 with respect to questions that we had of the city
Q. Was there any discussions that you were part of
3 attorney years prior at the beginning of his tenn. He
where tenninating Ms. Hammer's employment by firing her 4 sort of set that up as his preferred way of operating.
But my understanding had been that we as council
was discussed?
5
6 members could individually seek counsel from the city's
A. I recall the city attorney stating something to
7 attorney. And I had on several occasions called with
that effect to me.
Q. That immediate action should be taken just to
8 questions.
And this case, Mr. King was just bringing me up
terminate her employment, don't offer resignation., don't
go through an investigation, just terminate the
10 to date on things that I had missed in the executive
employment?
11 sessions.
MR. NAYLOR: Object to the fonn to the
12
Q. From the November 11, 2011 executive session?
extent it calls for legal advice and privileged. Let's
13
A. Well, and - and it may have been infonnation
go ahead and take a - go off the record for a minute.
14 that came out subsequent to that as well. I don't
(Discussion off the recon:l.)
15 actually recall when, dming that week, we had this
MR. NAYLOR: Okay, Eric, the question as
16 conversation.
framed called for legal advice and 111 instruct Ms.
17
Q. Turning back to the November 14, 2011 meeting
Lamb not to answer.
18 date.
Q. Ms. Lamb, the statement that you previously
19
If you'll look under Tab 4 of your binder, and
attributed to Mr. King. was that being made just to you
20 the third page, specifically, that I'Jl have you take a
or to the city cotmcil at large?
21 look at. The that page number on that one is 2070.
A. We better repeat all of that, what the statement
A. Okay.
22
was. Can we have that...
Q. Ifl understand the meeting minutes correctly,
23
Q. Yes, yes. Mr. King discussed terminating, not
24 you all came out of the executive session and amended
asking for resignation, but terminating Ms. Hammer's
25 the agenda and hiring an independent investigation. Is

'

Page41

Page39
1
2

3
4

s
6

7
8

9
10
11
12
1.3

l4
1S
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
2,
25

employment?
MR. NAYLOR: That's the question that was
posed as far as what the legal advice was. Why don't
you just restate.
MR. SWARTZ: We can back up on the record,
if you wish, but stated in response to the generali7.ed
question whether anyone discussed terminating Ms.
Hammer's employment, she identified Mr. King as
discussing that
My question to her now is whether that
discussion was with her individually or the city council
at large.
A. With me individually.
Q. Based on your experience as a c~ cowicil
member, could a city council member act on their own or
is an act of a city council required to be done by
resolution and vote?
MR. NAYLOR: Object to the fonn.
Foundation.
A. Act on their own in what regard?
Q. Well. with the exception of reviewing - being
designated to review expenses on that monthly basis,
could a city council member, for example, go to unless otherwise directed by the council, go to Adam
King and ask for legal advice?

6
7

that on the agenda? Sorry on the meeting minutes?
A. Yes.
Q. The independent investigation that was - that
was to be conducted, was that into the allegations
against Miss Hammer or into the allegations against Mr.
Ribi by Ms. Hammer or both, if you recall?
A. I recall it to be the allegations against Ms.

8

Hammer.

'

Q. Do you recall what the plan of action was with
regard to the allegations by Ms. Hammer against Mr. Ribi

11

at the November 14, 2011 meeting?
A. No. I recall discussing hiring an employment
specialist, but I don't recall at what meeting that was.
<r.Y<JO'stale'4~oft1Rffaetthat
~ II() di~.lf&i1Halnffier'&.flex time
afliose ofthe vehicle, that Y<>JJ di4n't,b,,J.iffl that
IIM·was need for 1111 investigation.
O.,,.U recall that need for an investigation? Do
yett·recall that?
A""...¥:es;l recall that we were·:... we-couiu:il members
wl!ll'e'aw&re that she bad the use ofthe vehicle and flex
t•: That was presented to us when she was initially

1
2

3
4
5

10
12
13
14

15
16
17
18

19
20
21
22
23
24
25

hired
Q. Was there something else that you believed was
going to be investigated as part of this new agenda item

M & M Court Reportinc Service. lac.
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Q. You used the term "inaccuracies" in reference to
Mayor Willich talking about the Ball report. And what
did you mean by that?
A. I just remember him saying something along those
lines. And I don't know what he meant, ifhejust meant
that he thought that there would be clarification of
some of the points raised. So there was nothing
specific that I recall.
Q. After you reviewed the Ball report, did you have
an opinion on whether you considered it to be a fair,
reasonable, accurate, thorough report?
A. It seemed.
MR. SWARTZ: Objection. Compound.
A. It seemed to be very thorough to me. But it also
raised questions in my mind, as I read it, as to what
the other side of - what's the other side of the story.
And fair and accurate, I mean, it's hard to say
fair and accurate without, again, the person who is
accused of these things having a chance to rebut it, so
to speak.
Q. Now, you recall in that Ball report that she had
already interviewed Sharon Hammer?
MR. SWARTZ: Objection. Foundation.
A. Yeah. I recall that there was an interview of
Sharon, yes. Yeah.

within the confines that Mayor Willich had authorized
her?
A. lt seemed as though the city treasurer had some
questions about that So - that she had raised them.
But again, this is -- I wasn't at that meeting. And so
5
6 I think the major thing that I recall was more about 7 at that time, was more about the vacation time. That
8 that was the bigger issue, bigger dollar amount, that
9 she had been paid for vacation time or somehow had
10 hadn't appropriately recorded the vacation time, so it
11 had been overpaid, something related to that, but that
12 was the major issue.
13
Q. So what was the reason for -- well, even though
14 you didn't apparently vote on the motion to retain an
15 attorney to do an independent investigation at the
16 November 14th or November 17th meeting because your
17 phone cut out, were you supportive of the mayor hiring
18 an investigator?
A. Yes.
19
20
Q. And what was your reasoning for hiring an
21 investigator at that time?
22
A. Well, that the city's treasurer had come forth
23 with allegations that she thought were substantive and
24 that it was possible for us to ascertain what the -- for
25 us, the city council to ascertain, what was factual and
1
2
3
4
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Q. Okay. And some of the conclusions that Ms. Ball
raised were that there needed to be further additional
follow-up on some issues?
A. That's what I remember. That, yes, that some
items raised questions that she thought needed
follow-up.
~ow, at the tim'Hliitll\e·~welli'l'-believe you
teetified that the city council ,knew that Sharon Hammer

;~~:;:~;r~1ti~:,~1~.

Q. And so then, what was the need to - for Patty
Ball to follow-up and investigate with regard to that
issue?
A. Well, again, I wasn't at that executive session
meeting. But my understanding was that there was
allegations that some of the - let's see. That perhaps
in some of the personal use -- well, again, you know, it
was about the gas credit cards. And I don't remember
when the gas credit cards came out.
But I thought that was part of the treasurer's
initial allegations, some charges on the gas credit card
for personal ~ weren't appropriate. There was
particularly a trip to Boise.
Q. And was there any issue at that time that needed
to be investigated about whether her use of the car was

:V!in -C-Scl'ipt@:

what wasn't without an independent third-party doing
such an audit, looking at the issues that had been
raised.
4
Q. Did Mayor Willich object to the recommendation to
5 have the independent investigator?
A. I don't recall. I don't recall any objections.
6
7 I mean, sometimes he would - I mean, he would say
8 himself, sometimes he would have a reaction to something
9 and then he'd settle back down and then move back
10 forward with whatever the plan was, so I don't recall.
Q. Do you know why Mayor Willich hired Patty Ball
11
12 over somebody that you recommended at Stoel Rives or
13 Perkins Coie?
A. Perkins Coie. I thought that was at your
14
15 recommendation, but I'm not sure. I don't know.
16 Somebody had recommended -- I think one of the attorneys
17 somewhere along the line, maybe it was at Holly Troxell,
18 I don't recall, that recommended hiring Patty because
19 she was local and had just done something similar and
20 would cost less.
One-man shop. She would cost less than a large
21
22 lawfinn.
Q. Did Mayor Willich ever tell you why he chose
23
24 Patty Ball?
25 A. Just, I think he told me those reasons, that she
l

2
3

M & M Court Reporting Service, Inc.
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have any recollection?
A. I don't have any recollection.
Q. Do you recall who was the first to consent to
the decision to offer her severance in exchange for her
resignation?
A. Please rephrase it again.
Q. Do you recall who was the first to consent to
the decision to offer her severance in exchange for her
resignation?
MR. NAYLOR: Object to the form.
THE WITNESS: I believe it was a suggestion of
Mayor Willich.
Q. (BY MR SWARTZ) To offer her money in
exchange for her resignation?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you recall - you said you were the last to
consent.
A. No. I'll rephrase that. r was the last to
voice an opinion.
Q. Had you ever come to know of Sharon Hammer
complaining about Nils Ribi's conduct toward her?
A. Would you phrase that.
Q. Have you ever come to know of Ms. Hammer
complaining about Nils Ribi's conduct toward her?
MR. NAYLOR: Object to the form; foWtdation.
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didn't know exadly what he was even talking about.
Because I knew there was - WUlich had animosity
towards Colm.cilman Ri'bi at that time, so I didn't
question it.
He mentioned it perhaps several weeks in a
row. And I said, What are you referring to? And he
said that - rm paraphrasing, but he said that there is
allegations that he is baras.1ing Sharon Hammer, the city
administrator. And at that time I said, Where is this
going? What is happening? And he said, Well, when he
runs against me - when he runs against me, I'll kill
him with this infonnatfon.
And I think it was probably in the start of
the summer, because he didn't know whether he was going
to run again or not. It was the start of early swnmer,
late spring when he informed me at one of these meetings
he was going to be a candidate and was going to run
again. And he again mentioned that Ribi is going to be
my opponent.
And at that time I said, What is this about?
You have alluded several times to Sharon Hammer -harassing Ms. Hammer. And he said, Yes, and he said,
When he runs against me, I'm going to kill him with this
information. I said, Is this serious? He said, Weti
it's serious. I said, Why are you not reporting it now

Page59
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It's in all the litigation. Are you talking about up to
today?
MR. SWARTZ: I'm talking about ever.
Q. (BY MR. SWARTZ) Do you know that Sharon
Hammer while she was employed with the City of Sun
Valley made complaints about Nils Ribi's conduct toward
her?
A. The way you first phrased it. I was - okay.
Yes, by Mayor Willich.
Q. When did Mayor Willich make you awme of
Sharon Hammer's complaints about N'tls Rlbi's conduct
toward her?
A. It was in the spring of - it was the spring
of the election year. What wa& the election year?
Q. 2011? You took office in 2012.
A. Yes, 2011. I would usually meet with Mayor
Wlllich on Thursday momiDg at 10:00, the week before
the reauiar council meetina, to go over the agenda as my

duty as council president. And Mayor Willicb was
concerned IS to who might be running against him for

election.
So in the spring of the year, it could have
been late wilder, spring. he first mentions that, I
think N"tls Ribi is going to nm against me. And he
25 said, I have some information that will kill him. And I
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if it's serious? And he said, No. He says, I'll wait
Wttil election time. I said, Isn't this obstruction of
justice by withholding this infonnation if you think
it's serious? And he said, No.
Q. When you became privy to Ms. Hammer's
complaints about Nils R.i"bi harassing her, did you do
anything to look into those allegations?
A. h's not my responsibility or audlority to do
so ll1der the statutes or otherwise.
Q. Did you discuss it with anyone?
A. No.
Q. Did you discuss it with Nils Ribi?
A. No, not at that time.
Q. At what time did you discuss it with Nils
Ribi?
A. When it became public and - discuss it is a
different word. When we were aware of it was when, I
believe, Ms. Hammer and Mr. Donoval filed a complaint
with the Idaho Human Rights Commission.
Q. That is the first time you believe it became
publicly known?
A. To my knowledge.
Mayor Willich had backed off on mentioning
this to me, because I think at the start of the summer
he said, I fowtd out Nils is not going to run against
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City of Sun Valley - Investigative Report

December 20, 2011

Patricia Latham Ball, Esq.
pball@mnwlegal.com
www.mnwlegal.com
Ph: (208)342-7342 - Fax: (208)975-7805
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INTRODUCTION
On November 21, 2011, the undersigned was retained by the City of Sun Valley
("the City") to perform an investigation concerning complaints raised and asked to assess
whether Councilman Nils Ribi ("Ribi") had engaged in conduct against City
Administrator Sharon Hammer that was in violation of the City's harassment policy.
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ALLEGATIONS AND INVESTIGATOR'S FACTUAL FINDINGS
Nils Ribi - Harassing Conduct
At issue is whether Councilman Nils Ribi ("Ribi") engaged in conduct against Hammer
or another City employee that was in violation of the City's harassment policy located at
7.5 of the Manual.
This policy states in pertinent part:
The City prohibits harassment in any form, including verbal, physical and visual
harassment.
A. Sexual harassment includes, but is not limited to, making unsolicited and
unwelcome sexual advances, request for sexual favors and/or other verbal,
physical, or visual conduct ofa sexual nature which occurs under the following
circumstances:
1. Submission to such conduct is explicitly or implicitly made a term or
condition of employment; or
2. Submission to or rejection ofsuch conduct is used as the basis for
employment decisions affecting the Employee or applicant; or
3. Such conduct has the purpose or effect ofsubstantially interfering with
the individual's performance and/or creating an intimidating, hostile or
offensive work environment.
B. Racial or ethnic harassment includes, but is not limited to, ethnic slurs, jokes
or other verbal or physical conduct relating to an individual's race, national
origin, or ancestry where such conduct:
1. Has the purpose or effect ofcreating an intimidating, hostile, or
offensive working environment,; or
2. Has the purpose or effect ofunreasonably interfering with an
individual's work performance; or
3. Otherwise adversely affects an individual's employment opportunities.
C. Also similarly prohibited is any form ofharassment against a person because
ofthat person's religious creed, physical handicap, medical condition, sexual
orientation, marital status or age.
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Adam King, City Attorney, recalls a meeting with the Mayor and Hammer on or about
August 2, 2011, wherein Hammer reported observing abusive treatment of City
employees. He recalls that she felt it was directed toward women. King's notes state that
it "appears to be with females - Sharon, Kelly, Diane, Michelle." She did not cite any
sexual-based comments or gender-based comments. Hammer referenced Ribi's negative
treatment of a worker after she made a mistake on an Excel spreadsheet. Attached as
Exhibit EE are King's notes from this meeting. Cited in Exhibit EE is a noted statement
from Hammer to Ribi telling him to "talk to the Mayor" in response to Ribi's "offhand
remark" that he wanted to see change made. Ribi's apparent response was that the "Mayor
and all of you need to see what's up." Hammer reported that Ribi's conduct was hurting
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morale. King recalls obtaining advice from the Attorney General's office that censure of
the Councilman would not be allowed and that all parties "would have to deal with it. 11

Finding: Sufficient evidence was presented to support a fmding that Ribi engaged in
disrespectful conduct towards others and that Hammer reported perceived abusive
conduct toward City employees to the City Attorney and Mayor. '

Dated this 20th day of December, 2011.
Management Northwest

~/~
Patricia Latham Ball
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CITY OF SUN VALLEY
PERSONNEL POLICIES & PROCEDURES MANUAL

Adopted by the Mayor and City Council
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SECTION 7: STANDARDS OF CONDUCT
7.1

PURPOSE

This policy shall assure that all Employees are aware of important policies, procedures and
regulations governing their employment with the City. In addition, the City expects that this
policy shall ensure that Employees at all times conduct themselves in a manner that reflects
favorably on the City and builds and supports the integrity and credibility of the City
organization. Violation of any of the policies included in this Section may be grounds for
disciplinary action, up to and including termination of employment, depending upon the severity
of the violation.

7.2

SAFETY POLICY

Safety and health is the primaiy concern and responsibility of every Employee working for the
City. The City recognizes its obligation to provide adequate safety equipment, to train
Employees in safe operations and practices, and to establish and enforce safety regulations.
All Employees are obligated to perform their assigned duties safety by following established safe
work procedures, using the proper safety equipment, and by reporting or correcting unsafe acts
or workplace conditions.

7.3

CONFLICT OF INTEREST

City Employees are expressly prohibited from engaging in any activities which could represent a
conflict of interest with their City employment.
It is the responsibility of the Employee to notify his/her Department Head when the
Employee's circumstances or work assignment change and create a situation wherein a conflict
of interest may arise. The Department Head will notify the City Administrator in writing of the
potential conflict. The City Administrator, in consultation with the City Attorney, shall make
recommendation to the Mayor and Council as to what action should be taken to avoid the
potential conflict of interest.

7.4

CONFIDENTIALITY OF RECORDS

Employees having access to confidential records such as personnel actions, medical records,
payroll records, etc., shall maintain strict confidentiality of such records. City records may only
be released or disseminated by the Mayor, City Administrator or City Clerk in accordance with
the public records laws of the State of Idaho.

7.5

HARASSMENT POLICY

The purpose of this policy is to set forth the City's position prohibiting harassment by or against
any of its Employees or applicants. The City's harassment policy is in keeping with the City's
c01nmitment to provide a work environment that is free of discrimination. The City prohibits

7-1
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harassment in any form, including verbal, physical and visual harassment.

A. Sexual harassment includes, but is not limited to, making unsolicited and unwelcome
sexual advances, requests for sexual favors and/ or other verbal, physical, or visual
conduct of a sexual nature which occurs under the foll.owing circumstances:
1.

Submission to such conduct is explicitly or implicitly made a term or
condition of employment; or
2. Submission to or rejection of such conduct is used as the basis for
employment decisions affecting the Employee or applicant; or
3. Such conduct has the purpose or effect of substantially interfering with the
individual's performance and/ or creating an intimidating, hostile or
offensive work environment.

B. Racial or ethnic harassment includes, but is not limited to, ethnic slurs, jokes or
other verbal or physical conduct relating to an individual's race, national origin, or
ancestry where such conduct:
Has the purpose or effect of creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive
working environment; or
2. Has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's
work performance; or
3. Otherwise adversely affects an individual's employment opportunities.
1.

C. Also similarly prohibited is any form of harassment against a person because of that
person's religious creed, physical handicap, medical condition, sexual orientation,
marital status or age.
Guidelines:
A. An Employee who believes that he or she has been harassed by a co-worker,
Supervisor, any City official, or individual outside of the City organization, should
immediately notify his/her Department Head of the facts of the incident or
incidents and the mune(s) of the individual(s) involved.
B. If the complaint is against the Employee's Department Head, the Employee should
report it directly to the City Administrator. If the complaint is against the City
Administrator, o.t a member of the City Council, the Employee should report the
complaint to the Mayor. If the complaint is against the Mayor, the Employee should
report it to the President of the Council.
C. A Supervisor or Department Head who is notified of a complaint or othe1wise
becomes aware of a violation of this policy must immediately notify the City
Administrator. Failure to do so may result in disciplinary action up to and including
termination.
D. Once an incident has been brought to the attention of management, an investigation
will be conducted by the City Administrator's office or other person designated by
the City Administrator or the City Council to determine all the facts surrounding the
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incident including, but not limited to,
the totality of the circumstances, the nature of the conduct, and the context in which
the alleged incident occurred. The City has the right to retain an independent third
party to conduct the investigation.
E. If the complaint is against a patron of City services, the City will take those steps
within its power to investigate and eliminate the problem.
F. If a violation of this policy is found to have occurred, the Employee who is found to
have violated this policy will be subject to discipline, up to and including
termination.
G. Retaliation: Retaliation against a person for filing a harassment charge or making a
harassment complaint is prohibited. Employees found to be retaliating against
another Employee shall be subject to disciplinary action, up to and including
termination.

7.6

SUBSTANCE.ABUSE

The City maintains a "zero-tolerance" policy toward the use or possession of illegal substances
and toward an Employee being impaired or incapacitated by alcohol or any other controlled
substance.
The unauthorized possession, consumption, transfer or sale of any illegal drug shall be grounds
for immediate disciplinary action.
An Employee may not, under any circumstances, report to work impaired by or under the
influence of alcohol or any illegal or controlled substance. Any Employee who does report to
work under the influence of alcohol or any illegal or controlled drug will be relieved of duty and
subject to disciplinary action.
7.7

OUTSIDE EMPLOYMENT

The City Administrator shall have the authority to limit outside employment activities of City
Employees when in his/her judgment that employment would create a potential conflict of
interest, a potential breach of confidentiality on substantive matters of City business, or would
have the potential to detrimentally affect the Employee's ability to perform for the City. Prior to
engaging in outside employment, City Employees must submit a written request to the City
Administrator who shall approve or deny the request within five working days.

7.8

PROPRIETARY RIGHTS

Any and all work products including software design, reports, and research analysis completed
by City Employees while in the employ of the City are deemed to be the property of the City.
No Employee may sell, copy, or otherwise use such information for outside economic gain
without the express written consent of the City.

7-3
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SECTION 8: DISCIPLINE
8.1

POLICY AND PURPOSE

The purpose of this policy is to establish a disciplinary system to assure a fair and consistent
procedure for the prevention and correction of Employee performance deficiencies. It is the
policy of the City to promote a posirive discipline process wherein the objective is to assist the
Employee to succeed in his/her responsibilities whenever possible.

8.2

SUPERVISORY RESPONSIBILITY

It is the responsibility of each Supervisor to identify, evaluate, and institute measures to correct
performance deficiencies. Supervisors are expected to utilize the following strategies:
1. Communicate and explain the City's expectations and performance standards.
2. Communicate and explain the City's disciplinary policies.
3. Provide Employee training, recognition, and feedback on performance standards.
4. Conduct periodic performance reviews and appraisals.

8.3

APPLICABILITY

1"his policy shall apply to all regular full-time and regular part-time Employees. It shall not apply
to the City Administrator, City Clerk, City Treasurer, City Attorney, or any seasonal or
temporary Employees, paid call firefighters or volunteers.

8.4

CAUSES FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION

Any action or inaction which is a hindrance to the effective performance of City operations, or
reflects discredit upon the City or its Employees, will be considered just cause for disciplinary
action. Disciplinary action may be taken for (but is not limited to) the following actions:
1.

2.
3.
4.

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Violation of any City policy, rule, or regulation, contained in these Personnel
Policies or in any other City communication of general distribution.
Violation of the Drug-Free Workplace Policy.
Violation of lawful duty.
Insubordination, including refusal to obey a reasonable order and promoting work
unit insubordination.
Absence from the workplace without prior authorization (unexcused or excessive
absenteeism).
Habitual tardiness or absences.
Abuse of sick leave benefits.
Failure to perform assigned work in an efficient and acceptable manner.
Abusive language or conduct toward the public or fellow Employees, or other
conduct unbecoming a City Employee, including disrespect toward Supervisory or
other authority, disorderly conduct, disregard or neglect of duties, abuse of
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10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

15.
16.
17.

18.
19.

20.

8.5

authority over other Employees, or on or off-duty conduct which may bring
discredit to the City.
Being wasteful of City materials, property, or time.
Unacceptable interpersonal skills, to the extent that the workplace environment is
below standard.
Conviction of a work related felony.
Use of religious, political, or fraternal influence for personal gain.
Theft.
Personal acceptance of a fee, gift, or other valuable item in the course of the
employee's work for the City.
Release of confidential information.
Falsification of forms, records, or reports, including but not limited to time cards
or job applications.
Participating in unlawful harassment toward any member of the City staff or the
public, including but not limited to sexual or racial harassment.
Violation of safety laws, regulations, or guidelines.
Use of position, City property, or confidential City information for personal gain;
or for the gain of others.

FORMS OF DISCIPLINARY ACTION

Disciplinary action may take any of the following forms, in any order, depending upon the
seriousness of the infraction, the Employee's previous work history and longevity, and other
relevant factors. Progressive discipline shall be applied only where the Supervisor believes that
the potential for improvement and curative behavior is possible.
A. Oral reprimand: An oral reprimand is a warning rather than a punitive action, and is
designed to prevent the Employee from being placed in a position where formal
discipline must be used. A Supervisor may make a brief note documenting the
conversation and will retain the note for future reference. Documentation of an oral
reprimand will not be placed in the Employee's personnel file.
B. Written reprimand: A written reprimand is also intended to be a warning procedure;
however, the written reprimand also serves to place the Employee on official notice
that future abuse will result in a more severe form of disciplinaty action. As such,
the written reprimand will be placed in the Employee's personnel file.
C. Suspension without pay: Suspension without pay is a form of discipline which is
usually taken either after a written reprimand has failed to correct the performance
deficiency or when the severity of the violation is such that it warrants a suspension
without pay.

D. Disciplinary probation: Disciplinary probation is a form of discipline which is
usually taken when a written reprimand or suspension without pay have failed to
correct the performance deficiency or when the severity of the violation is such that
it warrants it. Disciplinary probation consists of placing an Employee back on
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probationaty status. The Employee loses regular status, and must bring his/her
performance up to a "Standard" rating in order to regain regular Employee status.
E. Salary reduction: A reduction in salary is the reduction of the Employee's salary to a
lower step on the salary range to which his/her position is assigned. This form of
discipline may be used for any length of time that the City Administrator deems
appropriate, and is generally but not exclusively used when it is advantageous to
have the Employee on the job but the seriousness of the violation or performance
problem warrants more disciplinary action than a written reprimand.
F. Involuntuy: demotion: A demotion to a lower classification may be used as a form
of disciplinary action, when dismissal is not warranted, or when the Supervisor feels
that the Employee has the potential for correcting the misconduct. When demotion
to a lower classification occurs, the salary of the Employee will be equal to, or less
than, the Employee's present salary, at the discretion of the Supervisor and City
Administrator.
G. Dismissal: Dismissal from City service may be necessary after other attempts to
correct the performance deficiencies have failed or when the seriousness of the
infraction is such that dismissal is warranted.

8.6 ADMINISTRATION OF DISCIPLINE
The following is a list of positions with the authority to impose discipline
1. The Employee's Supervisor may administer an oral reprimand and a written
reprimand and recommend other levels of discipline.
2. Consistent with 8. 7 below, the City Administrator will review and approve all
recommendations for suspensions without pay, disciplinary probations, reductions in
salary, involuntary demotions, and dismissals from City service.

8.7

INFORMAL REVIEW

A regular, full-ti.J.ne Employee shall have the right to an Informal Review regarcli11g disciplinary
actions consisting of suspension without pay, disciplinary probation, salary reduction,
involuntary demotion, or dismissal from City employment within 5 working days after receiving
notification of the proposed disciplinary action.
The following steps shall be followed in submitting and processing a request for an Informal
Review. For purposes of this Informal Review process, the City Administrator shall be deemed
to be the Department Head for all Employees. The Chief of Police shall be deemed to be the
Department Head for the Police Department; the Fire Chief shall be deemed the Department
Head for the fire Department; and the Community Development Director shall be deemed the
Department Head for the Community Development Department.
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Step 1: In disciplinary actions imposed by the Department Heads, the affected Employee may
submit a request for an Informal Review of the disciplinary action to the City
Administrator within five (5) working days after receiving notification of the proposed
disciplinary action. The Department Head shall review the Employee's request for an
Informal Review and provide to the City Administrator any and all relevant information
regarding the proposed disciplinary action within three (3) days after notification of the
Employee's request for an Informal Review.
Step 2: The City Administrator shall meet with the affected Employee and the Department
Head to review the reasons for the proposed disciplinary action and any relevant
information the Employee desires to submit in connection with the disciplinary action or
the information and/ or events upon which the proposed disciplinary action is based.

Step 3: Upon the conclusion of the Informal Review, the City Administrator shall prepare his
decision in writing upholding, modifying, or rescinding the proposed disciplinary action.
Step 4: If the affected Employee is dissatisfied with the decision of the City Administrator, then
the Employee may request that the City Administrator's decision be informally reviewed
by the Mayor within five (5) working days after receiving the City Administrator's
decision. The Mayor shall meet with the City Administrator and the Employee, review
the Employee's written material and relevant information regarding the proposed
disciplinary action and provide his written decision within three (3) days after the
meeting. The decision of the Mayor shall be final and binding.

In the event of disciplinary action proposed by the City Administrator acting in the capacity of
the Department Head, such proposed disciplinary action shall be reviewed directly by the Mayor
consistent with Step 4, above. The decision of the Mayor shall be final and binding.
If the request for an Informal Review is not initiated within the time limits established by this
Section, then the right for an Informal Review shall be deemed to be waived. Any disciplina1y
action not taken to the next step of the Informal Review procedure within the time limits
established by this Section shaU be considered settled on the basis of the last decision made.

The time limits prescribed in this Section for the initiation and completion of the steps of the
Informal Review procedure may be extended for a reasonable amount of time by the reviewing
City Employee.
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The Roark La~ Firm, LLP
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409 North Main Street
Hailey, Idaho 83333

TEL: 208n88-2427
FAX: 208/788-3918

4

Attorneys for Defendant Nils Ribi

5

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DlSTRTCT OF THE

6

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
7

8

SR.<\.RON R.. HAMMER.
Plaintiff,

9

)
)
)

Case No. CV-11-928

)

vs.

10

) AFFIDAVIT OF NILS RIBI IN
J OPPOSITION TO MOTIOJI\ FOR
)TEMPOR4.RYRESTRAININGORDER

11

12
13

'.NILS RIB~ and individual; THE CITY OF
SUN VALLEY, and Idaho municipal
Corporation; and, ADAM KING. and
Individual,

14

15

Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)

STATE OF IDAHO, )

16 1 County of Blaine.

) ss.
)

NrLS RIBI, being sworn upon oath. deposes and states as follows:

17

I am a resident of the State of Idaho, County of Blaine and make the averments

18

1.

19

contained herein of my own. personal knowledge.

20

21

22

l have- read and attempted to undersuu1d the Compiaint, Motion for Temporar~

Restraining Order and Affidavits filed i.11 suppo11 thereof.

Althouf!h the form of the pleadings in th.is car;;e make it difficuh if not impossible to

I
I

understand with precisfon the matt..-rs set forth therein, vour affiant car, make some response.

24
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OF NlLS RrEtl IN OPPOSITIO~
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1 R£stRAINI1'G ORDER - 1

J
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I
1
2
3

4

5

I 4.

At no time have 1 threatened by word or conduct to do any violent or physical act

against the Plaintiff in this matter.
5.

At no time ·until aft.er 1he end of City Council meeting of November 11, 201 l did

I

anyone, including the Mayor. City Attorney or my fellow City Council members advise me

that the Plaintiff had complained to them abow. my "threatening" behavior toward her.

6
7
8
9
10

14

6.

I was completely unaware of any potentiaHy improper or illegal activities the Plaintiff

I

had engaged in while employed by the City of Sun Valley until it was brought to my
attention by Michelle Frostenson, the City Treasurer that she had uncovered evidence that
indicated possible wrong doing by the Plaintiff.

11

7.

12

2011. The meeting in question wa::; called, pursuant to IdahQ ~(?de 50-706, by three council

13

members for the purpose of holding an executive session to hear evidence uncovered by City

)4

Treasurer, Michelle Frostenson. A motion to go into executive session was made and passed

15

by all three members of the council in attendance.

1 did not '·call" a special meeting of the Sun Valley City Council on November 11,

16
8.

During the course of the executive session matters were presented to the council that

17
caused all members serious concern about
18

19

20
21

9.

Following the City Council meeting and executive session of November 14, 2011

and the other council members learned that a Sun Valley City Police officeT had listened inlo

the executive session and then reponed to the Plaintiff \,.·ho, notv.-ithsta11ding her clear
'l ...
- ...'1
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knowledge of the impropriety of such intrusion, prn..:eeded to question the officer about wha1

2

...

had gnnc on in tha1 closed meeting from which she had been intentionally excluded .

I

.:i

110.

4

j placed the

5

6
7

8

9

By his letter of November 18, 2011, the Mayor, not the City Council or mysdf,
Plaintiff on administrniive leave. At and since the time of the Mayor· s lener, the

Mayor and Council had reason to believe that
~
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frllf;--b~Plj!Jl\lfle~-~,~-• Because the Plaintiff. in the 1

position of City Administrator, has unfettered access to the records of the City of Sun Valley,
including records whfoh may he essentiai to a determination

of~t#~~i·-~~;.;

10

11

12

essential tha1 she be placed on administrative leave and ordered not to be ill Sun Valley City

hall until appropriate investigative measures have been comple1E4-

13

14
15

11.

The adminis"i.rative ]eave is not a disciplinary action but is intended to protect the city.

its officer and employees while an investigation into -

.

16

17
18

12.

At no time have I ever demanded or even so much as suggested that the Plaintiff be I

I

ter~ted or placed on administrative ~eave or ~isciplined in ~y mmmer for reponing

19

anything to anyone about me. Indeed, I did not until after the meenng of November J 1.

20

even become aware of any alleged report to the Mayor or City Attorney by the Plaintiff

21

regarding my alleged conduct or behavior.

.,_.,.

13.

2(11]

The Ploin:t.iff ~ attorney. who is also her husband. has made a series of threats to me .

the Mavor.
the Cit\'. Anornev. and mv. \:\ife that demonstrate tha1 his ac1ioa in filing this c.as1..·
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO

SHARON R. HAMMER and JAMES R.

)

DONOVAL, husband and wife,

)

Plaintiffs,

)

vs.

Case No. 1:13-cv-211-EJL

)

CITY OF SUN VALLEY; NILS RIBI, in his)
individual and official capacity; and)
DEWAYNE BRISCOE, in his individual

)

and official capacity,

)

Defendants.

)

)

DEPOSITION OF NILS A. RIBI

MAY 30, 2014

REPORTED BY:

BBVBRLY A. BENJAMIN, CSR No. 710, RPR
Notary Public
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NilsA.Ribi
MayJ0,2614
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Q. What did she state?
A. She stated -- and this is just to the best of
2
3 my recollection. It was in a phone conversation, that
4 she felt that Sharon Hammer had come to her and told her
s that I had been harassing her and that Sharon Hammer had
6 told her that [ had been harassing Michelle Frostenson.
7 And Michelle Frostenson said something to the effect
that, no, he hadn't been harassing her, and that Sharon
8
9 Hammer tried to bring Michelle Frostenson into that
10 whole thing. And she said that she just blew Sharon off
l l on that and didn't want to be involved.
Q. If I recall correctly, Michelle Frostenson was
12
13 present at the November 11 meeting; correct?
A. Yes.
14
Q. If I understand your testimony correctly, she
1.5
16 phoned you after that meeting to share this information
17 with you; is that right?
18
A. No.
Q. Can you correct my understanding of your
19
20 testimony?
21
A. In what way?
Q. Did you not state that Michelle Frostenson
22
23 phoned you?
A. She did not phone me.
24
Q. How did this conversation transpire?
25
l

l

2
3

4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

12
13
14
15
16

17
18
1.9

20
21
22
23
24
25

Q. Did you discuss it with Sharon Hammer?
A. No.
Q. Did you discuss it with Mayor Willich?
A. No.
Q. Did you discuss it with anyone other than
Michelle Frostenson?
A. Not that I'm aware of.
Q. Did Mayor Willich share with the city council
during that executive session on the 11th why he was not
going to elaborate on the harassment?
A. No.
Q. Did anyone ask?
A. Not that I'm aware of.
MR. SWARTZ: These aren't Bates numbered, but
they have been previously produced. Let's mark this
one.
(Exhibit l marked.)
Q. (BY MR. SWARTZ) Mr. Ribi, you've just been
handed what has been marked as Exhibit 1. This is an
e-mail from Sharon Hammer to you cc'ing Mayor Willich
and attaching a harassment policy. Do you recognize
Exhibit 1?
A. No, I don't.
Q. Do you have any recollection of requesting a
copy of the harassment policy in September of 201 O?
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A. I phoned her.
Q. After the November 11 meeting?
A. Correct.
Q. Why did you phone her after the November 11
4
5 meeting?
6
A. Because during the meeting at the very end
7 Mayor Willich made some very -- I don't know even know
8 the word, just some vague allusion to something about
9 harassment after he had proposed giving Sharon Hammer a
10 three-month severance package. He said the reason he
l l wanted to do that was because there was something about
12 harassment or something like that, and that he thought
13 that would be appropriate.
And everybody questioned him, What is that all
14
lS about? And he said, I'm not going to say anything. And
16 someone, I don't know who, someone said, Who knows
17 anything about this? And Michelle Frostenson said, I
18 do. And then Mayor Willich shut her up. So that is why
19 I called her after the meeting.
Q. Do you know if any other council members
20
21 contacted her about the harassment?
A. I don't know.
22
Q. Did you discuss what you learned from Michelle
23
Frostenson
with any of the council members?
24
A. Not that I'm aware of.
25
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3
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Min-l ·Script®

3

4

s
6
7
8
9

10
ll

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

A. No, I don't.
Q. Do you have any recollection of any
discussions with Mayor Willi ch about your treatment of
Sharon Hammer before November 11, 2011?

A. No.
Q. Have you ever stated to Sharon Hammer that you
believed Mayor Willich didn't know what his job was?
A. Have I ever stated -Q. To Sharon Hammer that you believed Mayor
Willich did not know what his job was?
A. No.
Q. Did you ever indicate anything to that effect
when you would go to Sharon Hammer, ask her to do
something, she would tell you, Hey, l take my directions
from the mayor, and you would respond in any way that
would suggest that you believed the mayor didn't know
what his job was?
A. Could you restate -- could you repeat that
question. (t was a long one.
Q. Yes. Did you ever go to Sharon Hammer while
you were sitting on the city council, ask her to do a
task and her response to you was, I take my direction
from the mayor?
A. No.
Q. That never transpired?

M & M Court Reporting Service, Inc.
(208)345-961l(ph) (800)234-%11 (208)-34S-8800(fax)

(4) Pages 14 - 17
1270
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1ent:
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Cc:
Subject
Attachments:

Sharon Hammer
Thursday, September 30, 2010 3:39 PM
'nils@nilsnbi.com'
Wayne Willich
Harassment policy
Harassment Policy.docx

Nils: per your request see attached.
Sharon R. Hammer
City Administrator

Sun Valley City Hall
P.O. Box416
81 Elkhorn Road

Sun Valley, ID 83353
208.622.4438
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7.5

HARASSMENT POLICY

The purpose of this policy is to set forth the City's position prohibiting harassment by or against any of
its Employees or applicants. The City>s harassment policy is in keeping with the City's commitment to
provide a work environment that is free of discrimination. The City prohibits harassment in any form,
including verbal, physical and visual harassment.
A. Sexual harassmrot includes, but is not limited to, making unsolicited and unwelcome sexual
advances, requests fot sexual favors and/ or other verbal, physical, or visual conduct of a
sexual nature which occurs under the follow-in.g circumstances:
1. Submission to such conduct is explicitly or implicitly made a te,:m or condition of
employment; or
2. Submission to or rejection of such conduct is used as the basis for employment
decisions affecting the Employee or applicant; or
3. Such conduct has the purpose or effect of substantially interfering with the
individual's performance and/ or creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive work
environment.
B. Racial or ethnic harassment includes, but is not limited to, ethnic slurs, jokes or other verbal
or physical conduct relating to an individual's race, national origin, or ancestry where such
conduct:
1. Has the purpose or effect of creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working
environment; or
2. Has the purpose or effect of unreasorui.bly interfering with an individual's work

perfonrutnce; or
3. Othenvi.se adversely affects an individual's employment opportunities.
C. Also similatly prohibited is any form of harassment against a person because of that person's
religious creed, physical handicap, medical condition, sexual orientation, roarit.al status or
age.

Guidelines:
A. .An Employee who believes that he or she has been hru.-assed by a co-worker, Supervisor, any
City official.,, or individual outside of the City organization, should immediately notify his /her
Department Head of the facts of the incident or incidents and the name(s) of the
individual(s) involved.
B. If the complaint is against the Employee's Department Head, the Employee should report it
directly to the City Administrator. If the complaint is against the City Administrator, or a
member of the City Council, the Employee should report the complaint to the Mayor. If the
complaint is against the Mayor, the Employee should report it to the President of the
Council.
C. A Supervisor or Department Head who is notified of a complaint or otherwise becomes
aware of a violation of this policy must immediately notify the City Administrator. Pru.lure to
do so may result in disciplinary action up to and including termination.
D. Once an incident has been brought to the attention of management, an investigation will be
conducted by the City Administrator's office or other person designated by the Ci'cy
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Administrator or che City Council to determine all the facts surrounding the incident
including, but not limited to, the totality of the circumstances, the nature of the conduct, and
the context in which the alleged incident occurred. The City has the right to retain an
independent third party to conduct the investigation.
E. If the complaint is against a patron of City services, the City will take those steps within its
power to investig-a.re and eliminate the problem.
F. If a violation of this policy is found to have occurred, the Employee who is found to have
violated this policy will be subject to discipline, up ro and including termination.
G. Retqljati.on: Retaliation against a person for :fili..11.g a ha...--assmeot charge or making a
harassment complrunt is prohibited. Employees found to be retaliating against another
Employee shall be subject to disciplinary action, up to and including te.rmina.ti.on.
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CITY OF SUN VALLEY
PERSONNEL POLICIES & PROCEDURES MANUAL

Adopted by the Mayor and City Council
Resolution No. 1997-2January 16, 1997
Resolution No. 1997-9 January 16, 1997
Resolution No. 2001-03 May 16, 2001
Resolution No. 2004-08 November 18, 2004
Resolution No. 2007-06 February 15, 2007
Resolution No. 2007-12 March 15, 2007
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3.7

TRANSFERS

An Employee may request a transfer from one department to another, providing the position
that the Employee wishes to transfer to is in the same classification sedes and that the position is
an equal or lower classification in the series than the classification in which the Employee is
currently. In addition, the Employee must meet the minimum q\.ialifications for the position as
set forth in the classification specification documents.
The Employee shall direct his/her request to the City Administrator. The request shall then be
forwarded to the appropriate Department Head. Such requests shall be given consideration
when a suitable vacancy occurs and must be approved by the City Administrator.
This transfer policy is not designed to, nor does it create any contract right, express or implied,
to a transfer, nor does the City's refusal to grant an Employee's request for tJ.'a!lsfer give rise to
any claims against it. The City reserves the right to fill any vacancy by transfer or by other
recruitment means, as deemed appropriate by the City Administrator.

3.8

RESIGNATIONS/DISMISSALS

Upon an Employee's resignation or dismissal, records pertrunmg to the separation of the
Employee shall remain part of the Employee's permanent personnel file.
The City
Administrator shall ensure that separations from employment are handled in a manner that will
not interrupt the orderly operation of City business.

Upon separation from employment, an Employee shall be paid for any wages/ salary due and for
all unused vacation time at the Employee's regular rate of pay within 48 hours of separation
from service. In the event of an Employee's death, the estate of the Employee shall be paid all
of the Employee's accrued salary and vacation leave.

3.9

HOURS OF WORK

The City Administrator shall determine the hours during which City office and depa1tments shall
be open to serve the public. 'The hours of work of individual positions may be proposed by the
respective Department Head and approved by the City Administrator in order to serve the needs

of the City.

~r!N~edul~~omml,-tprovi~e,~k,q~,fu-y, {4{.)),b.o't<lrs.,witltirf·a"seven:day
~d;· from 8:00 a..m. ·,to '5!00,p:fft;iacltiding a'lUfith·p•d,- 0t)lerwork scheciules may. be
119t&btished by the City..Admiois.t~tot..in..o-"1et,to n:i,~. the Q.CCOS .ofspccific,City services.
3.10

ATTENDANCE AND PUNCTUALITY

Employees are expected to be at work on their norn1ally scheduled workdays, unless they have
received appmval for an absence from their immediate Supervisor. An Employee who is abseot
from work for three (3) consecutive working days, without Supetvisory authorization or a
statement of justification f.tom an attending physician, will be considered to have abandoned

3-4
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his/her job as of the last day of active employment, and will be declared to have volunt:a.tily quit,
unless the City subsequently determines that the absence was due to circumstances beyond the
Employee's control. Because of overtime requirements, non-exempt positions should not begin
work befo:te their assigned time nor leave work later than thei:t assigned ending time without the
prior approval of their Supervisor.
Non-exempt Employees who are more than ten (10) minutes late to their assigned place of work
are considered tardy. An Employee who regularly fails to arrive at work on time without a
legitimate reason or who does not notify his/her Supervisor is subject to disciplinary action. The
Supervisor shall determine whether the reason given is legitimate. Employees who cease and/ or
leave work before the end of their assigned work day shall also be subject to disciplinary action.

3.11 WORK SCHEDULES

'iae»..'6.ity,:--A~~~~Jk, wil;l,l~ ,the ,:e>eparttnent·•Hcads· •to establish 'nolm«l · work
Sll!!!dules. ~~!te~--~e8hffi.·o~o~l!!'st?meet,thc neeq.$,,of
0

t~~~c.
3.12

RESIDENT REQUIREMENTS

The Fite Chief, Assistant Fire Chief and Street Superintendent are required to reside within the
incorporated limits of Sun Valley or Ketchum. The Chy may on an annual basis provide a
housing allowance or suitable housing to aid in the additional costs of nearby residency. In
addition, emergency services departments may adopt restrictions on travel time and distance
requirements for Employees or volunteers in order to accomplish Employee response during
emergencies.

3.13

CITYVEHICLES

Drivers of City-owned vehicles or drivers of private vehicles while on City business shall obey all
traffic and speed laws. The use of seat belts is required at all tlmes. Controlled substances shall
never be carried in a City vehicle or a private vehicle on City business, with the exception of
evidence by law enforcement officials.
City-owned vehicles shall never be used for private purposes. When Employees are required to
travel outside the City while on City business, Employees should use a City vehicle unless use of
a private vehicle is approved by the Supervisor.
The Fire Chief is provided City-owned vehicles which may be taken horne and used during any
work period for travel within or out of the City. In the absence of the Fire Chief, the Assistant
Fire Chief may use the City-owned vehicle during any work period for u-avel within or out of the
City.

3.14 TRAVEL EXPENSES REIMBURSEMENT
Reimbursement for expenses incurted when an Employee is traveling on City business shall be

3-5
Page 127 of 526

hire date for purposes of calculating annual benefits, but the date of
promotion will be used for purposes of performance evaluations and
merit consideration.
b.

Voluntary Demotion: An Employee who voluntarily is demoted shall be
placed in the new job position salary range, at a step as close as possible
to his/her previous step and range. However, his/her salary shall not
exceed the maximum rate for the new, lower salary range.

c. Involuntary Demotion: An Employee who is involuntarily demoted as a
result of disciplinary action may be placed in a new job position range
and his/her salary reduced.
d. Transfers: An Employee who transfers laterally to a classification with
the same salary range shall retain his/her present salary placement.
e. Employees who have reached Step 9 of their position's Salary Plan:
Upon receiving an excellent performance evaluation, an employee who
as reached Step 9 of their position's Salary Plan may be eligible for a
2.5% pay increase.

4.7

PAYPERIODS

The City operates on a biweekly pay period which shall commence on Monday and continue through
the following second Sunday (two weeks). Employees shall receive pay for the prior two week pay
period by 5 p.m. the following Thursday. If the Thursday is a holiday, the pay date will be the first
business day preceding the holiday. 1"he manner of distribution of paychecks will be determined by
the City Administrator.

4.8

OVERTIME PAY
A. OVERTIME PAY FOR NON-EXEMPT EMPLOYEES
The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) stipulates that overtime compensation shall be paid
to non-exempt Employees. All overtime must be authorized by the Supervisor in advance.
Overtime pay will be administered as follows:
1. The Police Department work period shall be fourteen (14) days as allowed under
FLSA. Overtime for nonexempt Employees will begin to accrue after eighty
hour of work within the work period. Overtime will be compensated at a rate of
pay equal to one and one-half times the Employee's regular hourly rate of pay.
2. All other nonexempt Employees shall be entitled to overtime pay for work
performed in excess of forty (40) hours per week. Overtime will be compensated
at a rate of pay equal to one and one-half times the Employee's regular hourly
rate of pay.

4-4
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3.

The Employee may request to be granted compensatory time off without pay in
lieu of receiving overtime pay consistent with the applicable FLSA regulations.
This request must be made each time overtime hours are worked. The request
should be directed to the Department Head, who may grant the request if time
off would not pose a disruption of opemtions and the delivery of services.
Compensatory time off will be at the rate of one and one-half hours off for each
hour of overtime worked.

4. Compensatory time accrual will not exceed 40 hours fot any Employee.
B. EXEMPT EMPLOYEE OVERTIME

4-5
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ORIGINAL
CITY ADMJNISTRATOB
EMPLOYMENT AGRUMENT

nus CITY ADMINISTRATORBMPLOYMBNT AGREEMENT hereinafter
"'Agreemenf•,. effective the lat day of June 2008. by and between the CITY OF SUN
VALLEY. State of Idaho, a municipal corporation, hereinafter oallod ·'Bmpioyef",. and
SHARON R. HAMMER hereinafter called "Employee» is made in contemplation of the
following:

:UCIT.ALS
WHEREAS. Employer dmims ID employ the services of said Employee as
City Administrator ofthe City of SUll Valley ("Cityj; and

WBBBBAS. Employee desires to accept employment as City Administrator of
City pursuant to the terms and conditions hereof
··
~
NOW, THRREFORB. in conaideration of the muillal covenanta and promises
herein contained. and the abovo Recitals which aro incorporated herein. the partios agree as
follows:
SECTION 1.

DU'lD8

Employer hereby qrees 1xJ employ Employee as City Administrator ofthe City
of SUD Valley to perfomt the dutiea customarily perfonned by City Administrators and which
Employer. through the Mayor,. shall from time to timo assign. Employee shall perfonn such
duties t&oroos)dy. oompetent{y and wi1it the hipeat level of profusaioaalism as would be
expocled ofa city administratDrwith Employee's baoqround,. qualifications and experience.

SECTION2.
A.
Employee's Employment shall commence June I. 2008. Employee
shall n,port to work no later than June 23,. 2008.
B.
Nothing in thls Agreement shell irevent. limit or otherwise intet1i,re
with tbo riaht of the P.mployer to tenninm the services of Employee under the applicable

provisions ofSeetion 3 below.
C.
Nothing in this Agreement shall prevent> limit or otherwise interfere
with the rigbt of the Employee to resign at any time from her position wi1h Employer. subject
oniy to the notice provision set forth in Section 3. Subsection c. of this Agreement.

CITY ADMINISTRATOR EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT - l

.,~.•.
5/HJ2008 4:01 PM
32084.0101.1:!llSII00.6

'\l'\

HAMMl!R 00051b
1023

Page 130 of 526

~.

HAMME9' 000584

I

determined that such act or omission ofthe Employee was not within "the course and scope of
her employment or included malice or crimins.l intent.
OTHER TDMSAND CONDMONS OF EMPLOYMENT

SECTION 10.

A.
~ . ' . ' l ! l oo.aaoltadon. with tho ~ shall fix suoh otlier
t.w,,and conditions af'<'.'emplo,Jnlent. Jts .be ·may.........,ftom 'tlme··to time to be
~ate. nilating to the ped'onnauce ofEmployee, provided such terms and conditions are
not inconsiste.pt with. or in conflict with the provisions ofthis Agreement
B.
Except as herein specifically provided, all prov.is.ions of the Personnel
Manual and regulations and rules of the Employer relating to vacation and sick leave.
retirement contributions holidays and other benefits which now exist or hereafter may be
amended, also shall apply to Employee as they would to other employees of Employer.
2

NOTICES

SECTl0N11.

Notices pursuant to this Agreement shall be given by deposit in.1he custody r.i
the United States Postal Service, postage prepaid addressed as follows or to such other
address as may be provided by written notice by a party:
2

(1)

:Employer:

Mayor
~ b~
City of Sun Valley
P.O.Box.416
Sun Valley, ID 83353

(2)

Employee:

360 W. lllinois St.

rremporary]

#3F

Chicago, IL 60610

Altematively. notices requiu,d pursuant to this Agroen1ent may be personally
served by hand doliwiy. Notice shall be deemed given.as oftbe date of personal servic~ or as
of tho datD of depoait of such writfDn notice in the course of transmission in the Yni:ted States
Postal Service.
S.ECTION 12.

GENBllAL PBO'Vl8IONS

A.

Tho text herein shall oODStitute the entire agreement between 1he

parties.

Ii~

~4/20GI C01 PM

.,

s:IDl4DIOU21>810D.8

HAMMl!R 000984
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STATE of IDAHO

,JIM J THOMAS

KHAMER .JUDICl.t..l. BUILDING

Prosr,c11ting Allorriey

TIMOTHY K GHAVES
Chie' 01:p11t•,
At-JGEl.A S. 'IEL S0tl

201 2~fl .AVENUE SOUTH
SUITE ioo
li/\lLE'f. IDAHO lt:13'.'d
IU. 1:U81 lf:lB·SS4"',
i=:,i i:::nr;:, ,-1::113<,~,",,:
1::1,:11\ll 1t1i,1n·,·., 'c1,:,i1wi,1lus

Ui:flll'.y'

MAI fHEvV E Flif- '.)BACK
lJq:itl'.v'

BLAINE COUN I Y PROSECUTING ATTOl-~NE:Y

November 21, 2012

Mayor Dewayne Briscoe
Members of the Sun Vnlley City (\iuncil
Sun Valley City Hall
PO Box 416

81 Elkhorn Rood
Sun VaHcy, JD 83353
Criminal Investigation re: Employee Misconduct

RE:

Mayor Briscoe and Members of the Sun Valley City Council:
I.

Scope of lnve.s1igation

1n October of 20 JJ, Sun Valley City Treasurer Michelle Frostenson complained to Sun
Valley Mayor Wayne Willich that certain employees were misusing City property,
committing fraud with City credit cards und foiling t<> accurately document personal
leave/vacation hours. Based upon Frostenson's complaints, the Sun Valley City Council
notified Kirt Naylor of the Idaho Counties Risk Management Program (ICRMP) who in
tum facilitated an ICRMP contrnct with Patricia Ball, Esq. of Management Northwest to

conduct nn investigation into Frostenson's complainl~.
In December of 2011, my Office wns requested by ICRMP attorney Kirtlan Naylor to
initiate an investigation regarding allegations of employee misconduct, which included
misuse of public funds, time card fraud, credit card abuse and illegal use of public
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property. This request was initiated as a result of a conclusion by independent investigator
Patricia Ball that "revealed suspected c;riminal activity". Specifically, the request included
allegations that former City Administrator Sharon Hrunmer misused a City vehicle and
credit card, and failed to accurately account for personal leave/vacation hours. ln addition,
it was alleged that Fire Chief Jeff Carnes had possibly made unauthorized personal and
excessive gasoline purchases using a City credit card, and had engaged in time card fraud
involving his son, part-time firefighter/EMT Nick Carnes.
As the Prosecuting Attorney is generally precluded from conducting their o\.vn
criminal investigations, [ requested investigative assistance from the I<laho Attorney
General's Criminal Investigative Unit and Scott Birch, Criminal Investigative Unit Chief,
opened a criminal investigation into the allegations in January of 2012. On February 9,
2012, Investigator Birch obtained three (3) bankers boxes of documents from Naylor that
included credit card statements from the City of Sun Valley for October of 2010 through

November 2011, payroll and time card records for the Sun Valley Fire Department for
fiscal years 2009-2011, as well as a copy of Patricia Ball's Investigation Report dated

December 20, 2011. A review of this data necessitated additional documentation that was
requested and/or subpoenaed from a number of sources including the City of Sun Valley,
employee cell phone records, independent employment records, court affidavits, and sales
receipts from various retailers from March of2010 up to and including September of 2012.
In addition to the referenced documents, an electronic copy of the HSNO Forensic Audit

and supporting documentation was reviewed and heavily relied during the course of the
investigation.
II.

Standard for Filing Charges in Criminal Cases

In order to charge a person with a crime, my legal and ethical responsibility
requires that there be probable cause supporting the charge. See State v. McGreevey. 17
Idaho 453, 463-64, l 05 P. 1047 1 1050 (1909); Idaho Const. Art. I, § 8; Idaho Code § 19804; Idaho C1im. R. S.l; IRCP 3.S(a). Probable cause results from infonnation that would
lead a person of ordinary care and prndence "to believe or entertain an honest and strong

2
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st.:spicion lhat such person is guilty" of a particular crime. S1at£ y,_Alger, 100 Idaho 675,
677,603 P.2d 1009, 1011 (1979).

Having a strong e110ugh suspil:ion tn believe in a person's guilt does not end the
inquiry. In detennining \Vhcthcr charges should be filed, a prosecutor must also determine

whether there is a likelihood of conviction given the high standard of proof required in a
criminal case. In criminal cases, the burden of proof placed upon the State is to prove its
case heyond a reasonable doubt, which is a far more difficult burden of proof 1han the
pn:ponclenmcc of the evidence standard used in civil cases. ,•:;ee State v. Sheahan, 139
Idaho 267, 273, 77 P.3d 956, 962 (2003) {explaining that lhc meaning nf proof beyond a
reasonable doubt requires "an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the truth of the
charge" in the eyes of a unanimous jury).
Analyzing the likelihood of conviction requires me to look at the strength of the
evidence presented, us well as consider defenses and evidence likely to be raised by the
accused. In the context of govenuncnt employees, the most common of these defenses is
that the employee was given permission, or was authorized, to engage in the particular

act(s) of alleged misconduct. lf tacit or explicit authorization was given, the employee
may lack the requisite criminal intent, as Lhey believed their actions were justified and

pennitted. See LC. 18-2406(3) (providing for a defense to theft when the property is taken
"open and avowedly, and under a claim ofright made in good faith").
In sum, I am compelled to review requests for criminal prosecution very critically.
Besides the important legal and ethical considerations set forth above, I must also review

the human and economic costs of prosecution, and the toll criminal prosecution takes on all
involved. While I am responsible for seeing that those who violate the criminal laws in our
community are brought to justice, I will not initiate criminal prosecution unless I am very
confident that the charges are supported by compelling evidence and will ultimately be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt at trial.

3
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UI.

The Alleg,,tions ngtlinst Sharon Hammer
11.

Misuse of City Properly

I lammer is alleged lo bave used a City vehicle for personal use, above and beyond
her responsibilities as City Administrator, and is also alleged to have used a City credit

card for gas purcha.,;es for the personal use of the vehicle.
ll1ere is a lack of hard evidence supporling criminal charges for these allegations.

Although Hammer used the City vehicle for personal use, there is a lack of documentation
Lo

support criminal charges. As stated in the IISNO report,

Based on our review of the [Hammer fuel! charge5, there is not
adequate information to dctcnnine if the charges were for gasoline
use in a City-owned or a personally-owned vehicle, nor can we
dctcm1it1e how many miles the City-owned car was used for
personal use and City business use. [t does not appear that Ms.
Hammer maintained documentation as to the type of City business
attended to with the City-owned vehicle or the miles used for City
or personal use.
The lack of evidence establishing these alleged crimes with specificity presents a serious
hindrance to filing criminal charges and will ultimately hinder any attempt to prove
charges beyond a reasonable doubt.
More compelling, however, is evidence establishing that the City permitted these

activities. ·Despite-the fact' that use of a City vehicle for personal use is strictly prohibited ,
by City of Sun Valley Policy 3.13, Mayor Wayne Willich expressly authorized Hwnmer t9·

use the City vehicle for business and personal use, citing her standing as an on-call EMT in
I

support of her need to use the veh1cle on a full time basis. , Willich also authorized
Hanuner to use the city credit card for fuel purchases associated with Hammer's use of the

City vehicle. The credit card charges were then submitted and approved during the regular
course of claims, which provides another layer of authorization from Hammer's
supervisors. 1

As noted throughout the HSNO report, standard procedures nnd protocols were routinely disregarded by
City officials entrusted with the oversight of credit card and claim processing. This general willingness to
disregard City policies and procedures is a recurring theme throughout this investigation.

1

4
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Evidence and documentation supporting this alleged misuse of City property is
either lacking or the activity had been approved by City officials. Accordingly, I cannot

find that sufficient evidence exists to file and pmve these allegations beyond a reasonable
doubt.

I,.

J>erso11al Letn>e

Hammer is alJegcd to have failed lo account for personal leave she took while
employed by the City. Specifically, the HS~O Rcpo1t found 352 unexcused hours for
which the City paid I lammer.
As was the case with the use of the City vehicle, Hammer's use of personal leave
was consistent with the apparent approval of her supervisors. In this regard, Willich
allowed Hammer to exercise a "flex time" schedule that did not require Hammer to
account for her actual hours on the job., Although the Persom1cl Manual states that the
nonnal work schedule is 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., Willich expected Hammer, as a senior
executive, to work additional hours beyond her regularly scheduled work day and was
authorized to take time off that corresponded with the extra hours she worked beyond the
regular work day. 2 This lack of a structured schedule and flexible time accounting makes

it highly Jikely that there are considerable hours of Hammer's work time that are
unaccounted for, and these unaccounted hours could significantly decrease, or even erase,
the 352 w1cxcuscd hour deficit set forth in the HSNO Report. Furthermore, there is no

way of establishing an accurate accounting of hours worked without Hammer's own
recollection, and thus, no way of independently establishing when Hammer was working .
or talcing personal time off,.which poses another significant problem in building a criminal

case against her.
For the above stnted reasons, there is insufficient evidence to establish that
Hammer submilte<l false claims or committed theft for unaccounted personal leave, and I

will not file criminal charges for this alleged misconduct.

2

These extra hours included Hammer's attendance at evening meetings, work performed at home, and her
status as a 24/7 EMT.

5
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Attorneys for Defendant Nils Ribi

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
SHARON R. HAMMER,
Case No. CV2015-428
Plaintiff,

DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO
DISMISS UNDER I.R.C.P. 12(c)

vs.
NILS RIBI, in his individual capacity,
Defendant.

Defendant, Nils Ribi, by and through his attorneys of record, Naylor & Hales, P .C., hereby
files this Memorandum in Support of his Motion to Dismiss Under I.R.C.P. 12(c). As shown below,
Hammer's Complaint must be dismissed because it fails to state a claim for relief.

I.
INTRODUCTION
There have been multiple lawsuits regarding the underlying accusations in this case over the

DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS - 1

Page 137 of 526

past four-and-a-half years. 1 The specific allegations in this current suit were originally referenced in
Hammer's first Whistleblower Act lawsuit filed on November 21, 2011, which Hammer later
voluntarily dismissed in January of 2012. (See Blaine Co. Case No. CV-2011-928) However, she
later filed a separate lawsuit in federal court in May of 2013, (Hammer et al. v. Sun Valley et al.,
(U.S. District ofldaho Case No. CV13-21 l-S-EJL)), seeking liability against Ribi individually for
this alleged assault. Discovery regarding the alleged assault was conducted during the federal
lawsuit. All of Hammer's federal claims were dismissed either through a motion to dismiss or
summary judgment, except that the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
Hammer's state claim of civil assault. This allowed Hammer to bring this claim in the current action.
Hammer alleges that Ribi assaulted her in the hallway of City Hall during a break in a City
Council meeting. Hammer cannot prevail on this claim, however, because her Complaint fails to
adequately plead facts showing that an assault occurred and it fails to plead facts overcoming the
statutory immunity. In fact, not only do the allegations fail to adequately plead these things (despite
Hammer having the benefit of years oflitigation and discovery to develop sufficient facts to plead)
the facts in the Complaint affirmatively show that no assault even occurred and that Ribi acted
within the course and scope of his employment and without malice or criminal intent.

1

See Hammer v. Ribi et al (Blaine Co. Case No. CV-2011-928); Hammer v. City
of Valley et al., (Blaine Co. Case No. CV-2012-479); Donoval v. City ofSun Valley, (Blaine Co.
Case No. CV-2011-985); Hammer v. Idaho Counties Risk Management Program et al., (Blaine
Co. Case No. CV-2011-991); Ribi v. Donoval, (Blaine Co. Case No. CV-2011-1040); Hammer v.
Ek, (Blaine Co. Case No. CV-2012-516); Hammer v. Frostenson et al., (Blaine Co. Case No.
CV-2013-308); Hammer et al. v. Sun Valley et al., (United States District Court for the District
ofldaho Case No. CV13-211-S-EJL); Hammer v. King, (Blaine Co. Case No. CV-2013-609);
Hammer v. Sun Valley, (Blaine Co. Case No. CV-2013-637); Hammer v. HSNO, P.C., et al.,
(Ada Co. Case No. CV-OC-2014-15387); HSNO, P.C. v. Hammer, (Ada Co. Case No. CV-OC2015-20144).
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II.

LEGAL STANDARD
Under Rule 12(c) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure a party may, after the pleadings are
closed, move for a judgment on th pleadings under the same standard as a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). In order to state a claim, a complaint must contain "a
short and plain statement ofthe claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief{.]" LR. C.P. 8(a)( 1)
(emphasis added). While the court must accept as true all non-conclusory factual allegations a claim
must be dismissed, even under Idaho's liberal pleading rules, if the allegations could not provide a
basis for relief even when accepting the non-conclusory allegations as true. Young v. City of

Ketchum, 137 Idaho 102, 104 (2002). Thus, mere conclusory statements unsupported by adequate
factual allegations are insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.
The Idaho Supreme Court has not yet expressly adopted the Iqbal-Twombly pleading standard
utilized in federal courts under the analogous federal pleading requirements. However, the court has
stated that Idaho has adopted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and courts are required to
interpret Idaho procedure as uniformly as possible with the federal cases, in order to "establish a
uniform practice and procedure in both the federal and state courts in the State of Idaho." Chacon

v. Sperry Corp., 111 Idaho 270, 275 (1986). Thus, the Idaho and federal pleading requirements
should be read together.
Under federal law, to survive a motion to dismiss, "a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face."' Ashcroft v.

Jq bal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) ).
Under this standard, "the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a
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complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id. Additionally, "only a complaint
that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss." Id.
To be clear, Hammer's Complaint fails under Idaho's liberal pleading standards. However,
Ribi also requests that the Court apply the Iqbal-Twombly standard here to come to the same
conclusion, consistent with the Supreme Court's directive to establish a uniform practice and
procedure in both federal and state courts in Idaho.

III.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In Hammer's own Complaint, she alleges the facts as follows 2 :
36. On or about September 15, 2011, a City Council meeting was
held. During the meeting, discussion was held regarding acceptable
methods for modifying budgeted line items.
37. During a break in the meeting, Ms. Hammer left the Sun Valley
City Council Chamber to make copies of some documents. Defendant
Ribi followed Ms. Hammer to the front area of the Sun Valley City
Hall near the reception ,desk and copy room area.
38. Defendant Ribi began to demand that Ms. Hammer make changes
to certain documents related to the Sun Valley budget. Ms. Hammer
tried to explain to Defendant Ribi the generally accepted accounting
practices and procedures for modifying municipal budgets.
Defendant Ribi became very agitated and continuously interrupted
Ms. Hammer to tell her how he wanted the particular procedure done.
Defendant Ribi's proposed budgeting procedure contravened the
generally accepted accounting practices for municipal governments.

2As the standard in a motion to dismiss is to assume the opposing party's facts are true,
for purposes of this motion only, Ribi will address Hammer's facts as alleged. In fact, the
extensive factual recitation further supports dismissal as the facts alleged by Hammer herself
establish that she has failed to state a claim of an assault sufficient to overcome the statutory
immunity of the ITCA.
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39. Every time Ms. Hammer tried to speak to Defendant Ribi about
the correct budgeting procedures, he would cut her off, raise his arms
in the air and begin waiving his hands, saying angrily: "You don't
understand!" as the conversation continued, Defendant Ribi became
more and more enraged.
40. Eventually, Ms. Hammer told Defendant Ribi that she was going
to discuss the matter with Mayor Willich. At that point Defendant
Ribi raised his arms, turned toward Ms. Hammer, and in a physically
threatening manner yelled: "No! You will not talk to the Mayor!"
41. In reaction to Defendant Ribi's physically and verbally violent
outburst, Ms. Hammer's heart began racing, she became alarmed,
immediately stepped back towards the copy machines and away from
Defendant Ribi, and stated: "Whoa!" As a result of Defendant Ribi's
physical actions and yelling directed at Ms. Hammer, she was fearful
of harmful or offensive contact with her body by Defendant Ribi.
42. Ms. Hammer then turned away from Defendant Ribi and walked
down the hallway of Sun Valley City Hall and back into the Sun
Valley City Council Chamber where Mayor Willich, several City
Council Members and several staff were present. Defendant Ribi
followed Ms. Hammer down the hallway and into the Sun Valley City
Council Chamber, and acted as if nothing had happened.
(Complaint, ,r,r 36-42)

IV.
ARGUMENT
A.

Hammer's Extensive Factual Allegations Preclude a Finding that An
Assault Occurred.

Hammer has not pled facts sufficient to establish that Ribi assaulted her, despite her factually
detailed pleading. Not only that, but in this instance, the very detailed and particularly pled facts of
Hammer's complaint confirm that she has failed to establish that any assault occurred as a matter
oflaw, and as such, her claim fails. The factual narrative that Hammer has alleged does not meet the
legal definition of assault. When reviewing Hammer's factual allegations under the definition of
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"assault" and comparing them to other cases involving assault it is clear that her Complaint falls far
below what is necessary to identify actionable misconduct.
Generally, assault is an "unlawful threat or offer to do bodily harm or injury to another."

Miller v. Idaho State Patrol, 150 Idaho 856, 871 (2011).
To constitute an actionable assault, the display of force must be under
such circumstances as to cause the plaintiff reasonable apprehension
of immediate bodily harm. In other words, assault requires ~
definitive act by one who has the apparent ability to do the harm or
to commit the offensive touching.
6A C.J.S., Assault§ 6 (emphasis added). As pled, Hammer's facts do not state a valid claim for
relief as applied to this standard. With respect to verbal threats to do harm, "words not accompanied
by circumstances inducing a reasonable apprehension of bodily harm, such as movements ofdrawing
back a fist. aiming a blow. or the show of a weapon, do not constitute an assault." Williams v. Port

Authority ofNew York and New Jersey, 880 F.Supp. 980,994 (E.D.N.Y.1995) (emphasis added).
An overt act is required~ "even though the mental discomfort caused by a threat of serious future
harm on the part of one who has the apparent intention and ability to carry out his threat may be far
more emotionally disturbing than many ofthe attempts to inflict bodily contacts which are actionable
as assaults." Steel v. City of San Diego, 726 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1189 (S.D. Cal. 2010) (quoting
Restatement (Second) of Torts§ 31, Comment A (2010)).
Another required element in determining the validity of an alleged civil assault is whether
the facts establish that the plaintiff was subject to immediate bodily harm. Steel, 726 F. Supp. 2d at
1189. For example, inHardinv. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 813 F.Supp.2d 1167, 1178 (E.D. Cal. 2011),
dismissal was warranted because the court there found no threat ofimmediate apprehension of harm
even when an assistant manager flipped off an employee and "said he was going to get him." This

DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS - 6

Page 142 of 526

was because there was "no indication that he was going to attack [p]laintiff at that point." Id. Even
in the face of a threat to do harm, if the threat is not immediate it cannot constitute an assault as a
matter of law.
In an illustrative case with facts more extreme than those pled by Hammer, a New York
court3 failed to find sufficient facts to support an assault claim when the plaintiff alleged that her
supervisor screamed at her during an argument in a meeting, was visibly angry and "red in the face,"
slammed the table with his hand, and advanced at her by wheeling his chair closer and closer to her.

Castro v. Local 1199, 964 F. Supp. 719, 731-32 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). Additionally, the plaintiff asked
if her supervisor was threatening her life and he answered, "[t]ake it any way you want." The
plaintiffthen left the meeting. The court there deemed that these allegations were "forward-looking,"
and therefore the required imminence of the alleged harm did not exist, because the supervisor's
actions were not accompanied by gestures sufficient to cause plaintiff to reasonably believe that she
was in danger of imminent bodily harm.
In the similar case of Williams v. Port Authority ofNew York and New Jersey, 880 F.Supp.
980,994 (E.D.N.Y.1995) the plaintiff was reprimanded by his supervisor, but the plaintiff alleged
that the supervisor "used a racial slur, backed him against the wall, and threatened to 'get him."' Id.
The court held that no assault occurred there because these actions were insufficient to impart an
immediate threat of physical harm, such as raising his fist. Id. The court there held that there was
nothing "to suggest imminent bodily contact," even recognizing that the supervisor allegedly backed
the plaintiff against a wall in an office and verbally threatened him. Hammer's allegations are less

New York defines assault, similar to Idaho, as intentional placing of another person in
apprehension of imminent harmful or offensive contact. See generally, United National Ins., Co.
v. Waterfront New York Realty Corp., 994 F.2d 105, l08 (2d Cir.1993).
3
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severe than these, and as such, a claim of assault is not supported.
As alleged by Hammer, the facts of the incident here do not meet the level of an assault
because Hammer's detailed narrative establishes that there were no definitive acts of a display of
force either from threatening words or threatening movements by Ribi. Primarily, as the entirety of
the alleged discussion between Hammer and Ribi is detailed in the complaint, it is clear that there
were no verbal threats of physical harm to Hammer. Thus, the facts as pled do not establish any
"unlawful threat or offer to do bodily harm or injury to another," and as such, Hammer's claim of
assault regarded to any verbal threat is without merit.
Further, there was no display of force through physical actions which would clearly or
reasonably imply a threat of immediate physical harm. The only physical conduct pied by Hammer
is that Ribi allegedly "raise[d] his arms in the air and beg[an] waiving his hands ... "Simply waiving
hands or arms, when not directed at a person, are best described as "gesticulating while speaking,"
and not as a requisite definitive act for assault, even when done during a heated confrontation. Labs
v. Karteus, 844 N.W.2d469 (Iowa Ct. App. 2014) (no "overt act or conduct from which it could be
inferred" that the defendant intended immediate physical harm through yelling, waiving hands, and
calling the plaintiff names).
Even the context of the alleged incident fails to evidence any display of force to demonstrate
immediate bodily harm. Hammer's description of the "assault" is that it occurred on City property,
during a City Council meeting break, and was related to city budget matters. Hammer's description
only supports an inference that this was a heated argument regarding city business, but there is no
allegation of any definitive act demonstrating a threat of immediate bodily harm.
Hammer's subjective belief that her allegations constitute an assault is not enough to support
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a valid claim. Under Hammer's theory, any time a workplace argument gets a little heated, an assault
occurs. Dismissal is warranted here because assuming all Hammer's facts as pied, there was no legal
assault that occurred.
B.

Ribi is Statutorily Immune.

The Idaho Tort Claims Act ("ITCA") generally authorizes tort claims against cities and their
employees4 for wrongful acts occurring within the course and scope of their employment. J.C. § 6903(1) However, the ITCA specifically exempts employees from liability for assault when the
employee was "acting within the course and scope of their employment and without malice or
criminal intent. ... "LC. § 6-904(3) Further, the ITCA establishes a "rebuttable presumption that any
act or omission of an employee within the time and at the place of his employment is within the
course and scope of his employment and without malice or criminal intent." LC.§ 6-903(5) Thus,
the analysis begins here with the clear statutory presumption that Ribi is immune from suit for the
alleged assault. It is Hammer's burden to establish otherwise. She has failed to do so. In fact, based
on the facts Hammer has pied in her Complaint, it is clear that even assuming her detailed narrative
is accurate, the facts therein affirmatively show Ribi's statutory immunity. Hammer's alleged facts
demonstrate that Ribi was acting within the course and scope of his employment and that he acted
without malice or criminal intent. As such, Ribi is statutorily immune from suit and Hammer's
complaint must therefore be dismissed.
1.

Ribi Was Acting Within the Course and Scope of His Employment.

Under ITCA, the clear presumption is that "any action or omission of an employee within the
time and at the place of his employment is within the course and scope of his employment. ... " J.C.

4

The term "employee" includes elected officials. LC. § 6-902(4).
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§ 6-903(5); Pounds v. Denison, 120 Idaho 425 (1990). Additionally, the Idaho Supreme Court has
explained that "[a]cts that are within the scope of employment are 'those acts which are so closely
connected with what the servant is supposed to do, and so fairly and reasonably incidental to it, that
they may be regarded as methods, even though quite improper ones, of carrying out the objectives
of employment."' Anderson, 137 Idaho at 518 (quoting Richard J. & Esther E. Wooley Trust v.
DeBest Plumbing, Inc., 133 Idaho 180, 184 (1999)) (emphasis added). Further, "an employee's

conduct is within the scope of employment 'if it is of the kind which he [or she] is employed to
perform, occurs substantially within the authorized limits of time and space, and is actuated, at least
in part, by a purpose to serve the master."' Id. (emphasis in Anderson) (bracketed language added).

At worst, Hammer's allegations could be classified as an improper method "of carrying out the
objective of employment," which is simply not sufficient to remove the statutory immunity.
Hammer's allegations regarding Ribi' s conduct place him directly "within the time and place
ofhis employment." She alleges that the incident occurred during a break in a City Council meeting,
in the hallway of City Hall. Not only this, but the content of the alleged confrontation arose directly
out of an alleged argument regarding budget matters that had just been discussed during the City
Council meeting. There is no factual allegation of any statement that does not directly relate in some
way to the business of the city, in fact, all the statements made were in direct relation to an issue
pending before the City Council. She then alleges that they both went back to continue the City
Council meeting directly thereafter. There is nothing from the context or the substance ofthe alleged
interaction that would be considered outside the course and scope ofRibi's official responsibilities
which would rebut the statutory presumption of immunity. Hammer's alleged facts clearly and
unambiguously place Ribi's conduct well within the course and scope of his duties as an elected
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official, and as such, the statutory immunity should apply.

2.

Ribi Did Not Act With Malice Or Criminal Intent.

Hammer's factual allegations also demonstrate that Ribi acted without any malice or criminal
intent toward her. When an employee acts within the course and scope of his employment, it remains
the plaintiffs burden to overcome the statutory presumption that the employee acted without malice
or criminal intent. Miller v. Idaho State Patrol, 150 Idaho 856 (2011 ). "Malice here means 'the
intentional commission of a wrongful or unlawful act, without legal justification or excuse and with
ill will, whether or not injury was intended."' Id. at 870, quoting Beco Constr. Co. v. City ofIdaho

Falls, 124 Idaho 859, 864 (1993) In other words, for purposes of the ITCA, malice requires
animosity and a desire to do harm for harm's sake. See Restatement (Second) of Torts, ch. 29
Introductory Note (2014). This is often referred to as "actual malice," and differs from common
"legal malice" in that it requires the additional element of"ill will." Anderson, 112 Idaho at 182-183.
With respect to the ITCA, "criminal intent" simply "means the intentional commission of what the
person knows to be a crime." James v. City of Boise, 2016 WL 1162984, at *18 (Idaho Mar. 23,
2016) (not yet published in Idaho reporter).
Simply alleging an assault does not remove the presumed statutory immunity because the
statute contemplates that the immunity applies to an assault that occurs within the course and scope
of employment and without malice or criminal intent. Were an allegation alone of assault to be
sufficient to erase the immunity, the Idaho Legislature would not have bothered to create an
exception to liability for assault under the ITCA. See I.C. § 6-904(3). Again, Hammer's factually
detailed complaint fails to state a claim sufficient to show that Ribi acted with malice or criminal
intent.
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Plainly, Hammer's description ofthe "assault" shows that it occurred on City property, during
a City Council meeting break, and was related to city budget matters. Not only does this show it
occurred within the course and scope of employment, there is nothing in the context of her
description which would reasonably support a finding of malice or criminal intent. As shown in
Hammer's Complaint, there were no verbal threats of physical harm or any physical actions which
would show malice or criminal intent.
There is nothing in the facts alleged by Hammer which would rebut the presumption that Ribi
acted without malice or criminal intent. Hammer's factual narrative would, at worst, only support an
inference of an improper method "of carrying out the objective of employment," which is simply not
actionable. Anderson, 13 7 Idaho at 518. Hammer's conclusory statement that she suffered an assault
is not enough to overcome the statutory presumption of immunity. None of her pled facts even
remotely lead to a reasonable inference that Ribi had any malice or criminal intent, and as such,
dismissal is proper.

V.
CONCLUSION
As shown above, Hammer's Complaint fails to show that she is entitled to any relief. Ribi
therefore respectfully requests that the Court dismiss her Complaint with prejudice.
DATED this 25 1h day of April, 2016.
NAYLOR & HALES, P.C.

DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS - 12

Page 148 of 526

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 25th day of April, 2016, I caused to be served, by the
method(s) indicated, a true and correct copy of the foregoing upon:
James R. Donoval
4110 Eaton Ave., Ste. D
Caldwell, ID 83607
Attorney for Plaintiff

U.S. Mail
-/Hand Delivered
-¥ Fax Transmission: 649-1603
_
Email: idonoval@aol.com
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Attorneys at Law
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 610
Boise, ID 83702
Telephone No. (208) 383-9511
Facsimile No. (208) 383-9516
Email: kirt@naylorhales.com; jake@naylorhales.com; tdw@naylorhales.com
Attorneys for Defendant Nils Ribi

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
SHARON R. HAMMER,
Case No. CV2015-428
Plaintiff,
vs.
NILS RIBI, in his individual capacity,

MOTION TO SEAL, MOTION TO
SHORTEN TIME AND NOTICE OF
HEARING

Defendant.

Defendant by and through his attorney hereby moves the Court for an Order placing
Appendix A under seal of the Court, pursuant to Rule 32(i) ofthe Idaho Court Administrative Rules.
Additionally, a hearing is presently set for May 9, 2016, on Plaintiffs Rule 35 motion and
her motion for punitive damages. The motion to seal relates directly to the Rule 35 motion and
therefore Defendant requests that time be shortened so that this issue may be taken up at that hearing.
Notice is accordingly provided herein, subject to leave of the Court, that Defendant will bring on his
Motion to Seal in the above-entitled matter on May 9, 2016, at 2:30 p.m. in conjunction with the
matters already set for hearing on that date.
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The parties to this case entered into a Stipulation for Protective Order for use in the related
cases of Hammer v. City ofSun Valley, United States District Court for the District ofldaho Case
No. 1:13-cv-211-EJL, and Hammer v. City ofSun Valley, Blaine County Case No. CV-2012-479.
That stipulation provided in part that certain documents designated as "CONFIDENTIAL" would
not be disclosed to the public or used for purposes other than "this action." At that time, "this action"
included the assault claim, which was dismissed without prejudice by the federal court and re-refiled
by Plaintiff in the present action. The parties then agreed that all discovery from the related federal
and state cases will be used in this matter. (Stipulation for Scheduling and Planning,§ C.) The Court
adopted that stipulation in its Scheduling Order. (Scheduling Order, § 25.) At this time, the parties
have not stipulated to a protective order for use in the present case.
Appendix A is a letter written by James R. Donoval to Evan Hanson detailing various matters
related to Hanson's therapy treatment of Hammer and Donoval. As such, Plaintiff had it marked as
CONFIDENTIAL in the related state and federal lawsuits pursuant to the protective orders in those
cases. Until such time that this document may be un-marked as CONFIDENTIAL, if at all,
Defendant respectfully requests that the Court maintain the confidentiality of this document and
order it be sealed from public disclosure. This does not prevent the Court from reviewing and relying
on Appendix A for purposes of pending Rule 35 motion.
DATED this 291h day of April, 2016.
NAYLOR & HALES, P.C.

MOTION TO SEAL, MOTION TO SHORTEN TIME AND NOTICE OF HEARING· 2.

Page 153 of 526

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 29th day of April, 2016, I caused to be served, by the
method(s) indicated, a true and correct copy of the foregoing upon:
James R. Donoval
4110 Eaton Ave., Ste. D
Caldwell, ID 83607
Attorney for Plaintiff

; / U.S.Mail
_
_)-land Delivered
_¥ Fax Transmission: 649-1603
_
Email: jdonoval@aol.com

9556_09 Motion to Seal.wpd
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Kirtlan G. Naylor
[ISB No. 3569]
Jacob H. Naylor
[ISB No. 8474]
Tyler D. Williams
[ISB No. 8512]
NAYLOR & HALES, P.C.
Attorneys at Law
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 610
Boise, ID 83702
Telephone No. (208) 383-9511
Facsimile No. (208) 383-9516
Email: kirt@naylorhales.com; jake@naylorhales.com; tdw@naylorhales.com
Attorneys for Defendant Nils Ribi

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
SHARON R. HAMMER,
Case No. CV2015-428
Plaintiff,
vs.
NILS RIBI, in his individual capacity,

DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO
MOTION FOR MENTAL HEALTH
EXAMINATION

Defendant.

Defendant, Nils Ribi, by and through his counsel ofrecord, Naylor & Hales, P.C., hereby
objects to Plaintiff Sharon R. Hammer's Rule 35 motion for a mental health examination ofRibi.
Ribi's mental health is not in controversy and there is no good cause for such an examination.
Hammer's motion is frivolous and serves only to waste the parties' and the Court's time and
resources.
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I.

BACKGROUND
Hammer sued Ribi based on allegations that he assaulted her on September 15, 2011, during
a break of a Sun Valley City Council meeting at town hall. (See Complaint, ,, 36-42.) Her
allegations follow approximately four-and-a-half years of litigation in related lawsuits and, despite
ample opportunity for discovery and the very detailed allegations in her Complaint, she has still
failed to show that the incident was anything more than a heated argument. She has likewise failed
to show that Ribi is not entitled to immunity. These matters are the subject of defendant's pending
motion to dismiss.
Ribi did not file a counterclaim nor has he asserted a defense implicating his mental health.
Likewise, in all of the years of discovery in the related cases, his mental health has not been placed
at issue in any meaningful or relevant manner. And, in fact, Hammer did not ever seek a mental
health examination of Ribi during the related federal lawsuit 1 where her assault claim was first
brought prior to being dismissed and re-filed in state court. Yet, over four years after the alleged
"assault" Hammer now baselessly seeks to compel Ribi to undergo an invasive mental health
examination. Her purported "facts" upon which she bases the motion, however, are nothing but her
and her husband/attorney James Donoval's own subjective and conclusory belief that Ribi suffers
from mental health disorders (antisocial personality disorder, dissocial personality disorder,
narcissistic personality disorder). She also relies on the purported "diagnosis" of Evan Hanson, her
own mental health therapist in Oregon, even though Hanson has never met or treated Ribi, has no
counseling relationship with him, and has not submitted an affidavit or declaration at all, let alone

'The Federal case, Hammer, et al. v. Sun Valley, et al. Case No. 1: 13-cv-00211-EJL was filed
May 3, 2013.
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one stating he has "diagnosed" Ribi. More so, Donoval has himself expressed significant misgivings
about Hanson's competency. (See Appendix A, Donoval September 23, 2011 Letter to Evan Hanson,
filed under seal.)
Based on these groundless accusations, Hammer filed her Rule 3 5 motion on April 13, 2016,
but did not file any supporting affidavits or a memoranda at that time. Instead, her attorney/husband
James Donoval sent a letter to defense counsel, also dated April 13, with copies of the supporting
materials she intended to file by the following Monday (April 18). The letter made clear that the Rule
35 motion (as well as a motion for punitive damages) was being utilized improperly as a tactic to
extort a settlement by threatening to file the materials containing the defamatory information unless
Ribi agreed in writing to settle for $150,000 (or $200,000 with a confidentiality clause) within two
days. (See Appendix B, Donoval April 13, 2016 Letter.)
Defense counsel responded to this threat in a letter, dated April 15 (the date of Donoval's
deadline for Ribi to agree to pay Hammer). (See Appendix C, Naylor April 15, 2016 Letter). The
letter explained to Donoval that it was totally inappropriate to attempt to extort a settlement by
threatening to release false and defamatory information about Ribi. It also explained that the Rule
35 motion was baseless because Ribi's mental health is simply not in controversy in this case and
there is no good cause for a mental health examination. More so, the letter explained it is frivolous
and reckless for Hammer or Donoval to claim that they have obtained a "diagnosis" of Ribi from
Hammer's own therapist, who has never even met or treated Ribi and therefore has no basis
whatsoever to diagnosis him. (Id.) The letter strongly demanded that Hammer not proceed with the
frivolous and defamatory motion. (Id.)
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Donoval responded by letter on Friday, April 15, and stated obtusely that "putting pressure
on opponents to settle matters is a justified tactic in litigation.... "2 (Appendix D, Donoval April 15,
2016 Letter.) Donoval's letter confirms that Hammer's motion is based on the purported "diagnosis"
of Evan Hanson and, because a small percentage of the population suffer from mental health
disorders, Hammer should be able to have Ribi "tested for such." (Id.)
Hammer's attempt to extort a settlement failed and, consequently, she filed her defamatory
memorandum in support of the Rule 3 5 motion on September 22. 3 The memorandum contains
accusations that Ribi has one or more serious mental health disorders that supposedly cause him to
have a propensity for violence and for dishonesty. In "support," the memorandum generally realleges facts from the Complaint and identifies the basic criteria of antisocial personality disorder,
dissocial personality disorder, and narcissistic personality disorder, as found in the DSM-IV-TR. 4

Donoval did not attempt to explain how "putting pressure" on litigants to settle based on
threatening to file documents containing baseless and defamatory accusations is appropriate.
2

3Presumably, Hammer also filed the supporting affidavits and exhibits on that date. However,
defense counsel was not served with copies of those materials. Instead, on April 22, Donoval handdelivered only the briefing, but not the affidavits and exhibits, nor any notice of hearing for his
motions. Thus, defendant only has the draft copies of these materials that Donoval sent with his
April 13 letter, contrary to Rule 5 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Additionally, the materials
that Donoval hand-delivered state: "The undersigned certifies that a true and correct copy of the
attached document was served by facsimile and U.S. mail, proper postage pre-paid to the above
listed recipients on or before 5:00 p.m. on April 19, 2016." This proof of service is false, asDonoval
actually hand-delivered them on April 22. Defense counsel provided Hammer's attorney with an
opportunity to correct these deficiencies and false statements but he has failed to do so. (See
Appendix E, Naylor April 22 Letter.) Instead, on April 25, Donoval simply faxed the first pages of
the motions, memoranda and affidavits, absent proof of service and without the exhibits. Donoval
has now attempted to correct the first false representations to the Court.

The DSM refers to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders published by
the American Psychiatric Association. The manual provides the nomenclature and standard criteria
for the classification of mental disorders. See American Psychiatric Association, discussion of the
4
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Hammer then goes on at length discussing these complex psychological disorders, including their
differences and how they manifest etc., apparently based on her and her attorney's reading of an
outdated version of the DSM and a couple of articles and books. She then concludes that Ribi
probably has one or more of these conditions and she is entitled to have him undergo a mental health
examination to find out.
As shown below, Hammer completely fails to meet her burden showing that Ribi's mental
health is actually in controversy and that there is good cause for an examination. Her accusations
have no basis in fact, and are frivolous and reckless. Ribi's mental health is simply not an issue in
this case, despite Hammer's baseless attempts to unilaterally make it an issue. Hammer's motion is
plainly an improper attempt to extort a settlement and defame Ribi, and she is improperly taking
unfair advantage of the litigation exception to defamation in an attempt to do so. This unethical
conduct by Hammer and her attorney should not be rewarded.

II.
STANDARD FOR RULE 35 MENTAL HEALTH EXAMINATION
Rule 35 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, like its federal counterpart, provides in
part:
When the mental or physical condition ... of a party ... is in controversy, the parties
by stipulation or the court in which the action is pending may order the party to
submit to a physical or mental examination by a physician, or qualified mental health
professional as defined in section 6-1901, Idaho Code, excluding nurses, if the
mental emotional, or psychological condition of a party is at issue .... The order
may be made only on motion for good cause shown and upon notice to the person to
be examined and to all parties and shall specify the time, place, manner, conditions,

DSM, available at https://www.psychiatry.org/psychiatrists/practice/dsm (last visited April 25,
2016). The current DSM in use is the Fifth Edition, not the Fourth Edition cited by Hammer. In any
event, the manual "is intended to be used in all clinical settings by clinicians of different theoretical
orientations." Id (emphasis added).
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and scope of the examination, including any tests or procedures to be performed, and
the person or persons by whom it is to be performed.
I.R.C.P. 35(a) (emphasis added); see also F.R.C.P. 35(a) (setting forth similar standard).
Rule 3 5 is plainly permissive and, therefore, the court has broad discretion to deny a motion
for an examination. See LR. C.P. 3 5(a) (using permissive language of "may"). Such a decision would
be reviewed only for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Sun Valley Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. ldaho Power

Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94 (1991) (stating abuse of discretion standard).
While there is limited case law in Idaho regarding the requirements of "in controversy" and
"good cause" the Court may look to federal case law for guidance. See, e.g., Chacon v. Sperry Corp.,
111 Idaho 270,275 (1986) (stating that courts are required to interpret Idaho procedure as uniformly
as possible with federal cases in order to "establish a uniform practice and procedure in both the
federal and state courts in the State ofldaho. ").
Unlike other discovery devices, Rule 35 requires the party seeking the examination to first
obtain the trial court's permission upon an affirmative showing that the mental health condition at
issue is actually in controversy and there is good cause for the proposed examination. Herrera v.

Lufkin Indus., Inc.,474F.3d675, 689 (10th Cir. 2007) (citingSchlagenhaufv. Holder, 379U.S. 104,
117-118 (1964)).
The "in controversy" and "good cause" requirements are related and often overlap such that
the two prongs may be addressed as one inquiry. The United States Supreme Court has thus
explained:
[Showing "in controversy" and "good cause" is] not met by mere conclusory
allegations of the pleadings-nor by mere relevance to the case-but require an
affirmative showing by the movant that each condition as to which the examination
is sought is really and genuinely in controversy and that good cause exists for
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ordering each particular examination. Obviously, what may be good cause for one
type of examination may not be so for another. The ability of the movant to obtain
the desired information by other means is also relevant.
Rule 35, therefore, requires discriminating application by the trial judge, who must
decide, as an initial matter in every case, whether the party requesting a mental or
physical examination or examinations has adequately demonstrated the existence of
the Rule's requirements of 'in controversy' and 'good cause,' which requirements,
as the Court of Appeals in this case itself recognized, are necessarily related. This
does not, of course, mean that the movant must prove his case on the merits in order
to meet the requirements for a mental or physical examination. Nor does it mean that
an evidentiary hearing is required in all cases. This may be necessary in some cases,
but in other cases the showing could be made by affidavits or other usual methods
short of a hearing. It does mean, though, that the movant must produce sufficient
information, by whatever means. so that the district judge can fulfill his function
mandated by the Rule.
Of course, there are situations where the pleadings alone are sufficient to meet these
requirements. A plaintiff in a negligence action who asserts mental or physical injury,
cf Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., supra, places that mental or physical injury clearly in
controversy and provides the defendant with good cause for an examination to
determine the existence and extent of such asserted injury. This is not only true as to
a plaintiff. but applies equally to a defendant who asserts his mental or physical
condition as a defense to a claim. such as, for example. where insanity is asserted as
a defense to a divorce action. See Richardson v. Richardson, 124 Colo. 240, 236 P .2d
121. See also, Roberts v. Roberts, 198 Md. 299, 82 A.2d 120; Discovery as to Mental
Condition Before Trial, 18 J.Am.Jud.Soc. 47 (1934).

Schlagenhaufv. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 118-119 (1964) (emphasis added); see also, Kador v. City
ofNew Roads, 2010 WL 2133889 (M.D. La. 2010) ("the factors in determining 'good cause' have
often been merged with the requirements necessary to find a plaintiffs physical condition is 'in
controversy'."); Lane v. Pfizer, Inc., 2007 WL 221959 (N.D. Okla. 2007) (recognizing that the two
prongs may be addressed as one inquiry).
One oft-cited federal district court case explains that a mental examination should only be
ordered where the moving party has a cause of action for intentional or negligent infliction of
emotional distress, there are factually supported allegations of a specific mental or psychiatric injury
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or disorder or unusually severe emotional distress upon which a party is seeking damages, a party
offers expert testimony to support a claim of emotional distress, or a party concedes that his or her
mental condition is in controversy within the meaning of Rule 35(a). Turner v. Imperial Stores, 161
F.R.D. 89, 97 (S.D. Cal. 1995). None of these scenarios are present here.

III.
ARGUMENT
To reiterate, it is Hammer's burden to affirmatively show that Ribi's mental health is really
and genuinely in controversy and that there is good cause for an examination. She cannot meet this
burden as she has attempted to do here by merely accusing Ribi in a conclusive manner that he has
some disorder.
For example, in Schlagenhauf v. Holder, supra, several bus passengers sued Schlagenhauf,
their bus driver, for negligence arising from injuries they suffered when their bus collided with a
tractor-trailer. 379 U.S. at 106. The passengers sued Greyhound Corporation (owner of the bus),
Schlagenhauf (the bus driver), Contract Carriers, Inc (owner of the tractor), National Lead Company
(ownerof the trailer), and Joseph McCorkill (driver ofthe tractor). Greyhound cross-claimed against
Contract Carriers and National Lead. After deposing Schlagenhauf, Contract Carriers amended its
answer to state that Schlagenhauf was not mentally or physically capable of driving the bus at the
time of the accident. It then petitioned (along with National Lead) the court to compel Schlagenhauf
to undergo a series of mental and medical examinations. Id. at 107-108. The motion was based on
the assertion that Schlagenhauf s mental and medical conditions were in controversy because those
things had been raised in Contract Carrier's answer to the cross-claim. Contract Carrier's attorney
also asserted in an affidavit, which was based on deposition testimony in the case, that Schlagenhauf
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had seen red lights 10 to 15 seconds before the accident, that another witness had seen the rear lights
of the trailer from a further distance, and that Schlagenhaufhad been involved in a prior accident.

Id. at 108. For Common Carriers, these facts raised the possibility that the bus driver had vision
problems as well as cognitive problems that inhibited his ability to timely stop the bus, and thus
warranting a series of Rule 35 examinations. Id. The Supreme Court disagreed.
In its analysis the Supreme Court made clear that Rule 35 places the burden on the moving
party to show that each condition is really and genuinely in controversy and that there is good cause
for each examination. This is not met by an attorney or party merely asserting that a condition is at
issue or is relevant, though at times it may be met by the pleadings alone. Id. at 118. For example,
the court explained that the standard may be met by a plaintiff in a negligence lawsuit who claims
to have suffered from a mental or physical injury, thereby placing such a condition in controversy
and warranting an examination to determine the existence and extent of such asserted injury. Id
Similarly, the standard may be met where a defendant asserts a defense to a claim, such as insanity
in a divorce proceeding. Id.
However, where a party does not place the condition in controversy, the moving party must
affirmatively present facts demonstrating that the condition is truly in controversy and that good
cause exists. Thus, in Schlagenhauf, the moving party was not entitled to a mental health
examination ofthe bus driver because the moving party only had the assertions ofthe attorney, based
on sparse facts, which was insufficient to show that the bus driver had a mental condition
"warranting wide-ranging psychiatric or neurological examinations." Id at 120-121.5

The Supreme Court stated that on remand a visual examination may be appropriate in light
of the guidelines set forth in the decision.
5
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The Supreme Court concluded:
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should be liberally construed, but they should
not be expanded by disregarding plainly expressed limitations. The "good cause" and
"in controversy" requirements of Rule 35 make it very apparent that sweeping
examinations of a party who has not affirmatively put into issue his own mental or
physical condition are not to be automatically ordered merely because the person has
been involved in an accident - or, as in this case, two accidents - and a general
charge of negligence is lodged. Mental and physical examinations are only to be
ordered upon a discriminating ap,plication by the district judge of the limitation
prescribed by the rule. To hold otherwise would mean that such examinations could
be ordered routinely in automobile accident cases. The plain language of Rule 35
precludes such an untoward result.
379 U.S. at 122 (internal footnote omitted, emphasis added). The same logic certainly applies to an
alleged assault case where the defendant does not place his own mental health at issue.
In this case, Ribi has not filed a counter-claim against Hammer and he therefore has not
asserted any claim for damages based on emotional distress or any type of mental condition.
Likewise, he has not pied any defense that puts his mental health at issue. 6 The only bases of
Hammer's motion is her own conclusory allegations in her Complaint that Ribi historically harassed
and discriminated against her, combined with her defamatory and baseless accusations that he likely
suffers from one or more serious mental health disorders, based on having looked at an outdated
version of the DSM and having read a few articles or books on mental health. Hammer is not a
mental health professional and has no business attempting to use the DSM to profess an amateur and
opinion about Ribi's mental health. More so, it is entirely inappropriate, unethical and reckless for
her and her attorney to assert such things in a public court filing. This impropriety is further

For example, the immunity defense under the Idaho Tort Claims Act contains a state-ofmind component that requires Ribi to have engaged in an assault with criminal intent or with malice.
Ribi has not asserted a defense that he was incapable of forming the requisite state of mind for this
immunity defense due to some mental health condition.
6
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exacerbated by the fact that she is attempting to lend her baseless accusations the air of authority by
representing that Evan Hanson, her personal marriage and family therapist in Oregon, has
"diagnosed" Ribi with mental health disorders.
It is highly likely that Hammer is misrepresenting statements by her therapist to this Court,
as it is impossible for Hanson to have actually diagnosed a person whom he has never met or treated
in any capacity, with whom he has no counseling relationship, and the only information from which
Hanson would have to purportedly offer a "diagnosis" is the jaundiced version of facts provided to
him by Hammer. And, interestingly, Hammer has not submitted an affidavit or declaration from
Hanson. Instead, based on the selection of treatment notes provided by Hammer in support of her
motion, it appears that Hanson merely noted Hammer's own comments about what she believed
about Ribi as part of Hanson's treatment of Hammer. (See Donoval Affidavit, Ex. H.) Nothing in
those records amounts to a "diagnosis" ofRibi.
Even if Hammer is truthful when she represents that Hanson diagnosed Ribi, such a diagnosis
would be highly suspect because it would not be based on anything but Hammer's own
representations to Hanson. There should be no doubt that a mental health professional's assessment
or diagnosis based on such woefully inadequate standards would not be legitimately regarded in the
mental health profession. More so, it is disingenuous for Hammer and her attorney to now rely on
an alleged diagnosis from Hanson because Donoval himself has previously raised significant
misgivings about Hanson's competency and has expressed a desire to have her treated by a more
experienced and qualified counselor than Hanson. Yet, five years later they are relying on Hanson
to obtain a mental health examination of Ribi.
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This court case quickly recognize how disingenuous Mr. Donoval is by signing the pleadings
herein where he purports to rely on Mr. Hanson's supposed "diagnosis" by reading the lengthy and
accusatory letter (App. A)7 to Hanson. For Hammer's attorney/husband to now set Hanson forward
as an expert upon whom this court should rely is a sham on this court.
The timing and context of Hammer's motion makes it apparent that its real motivation is to
attempt to extort a settlement from Ribi. The assault claim has been at issue for years and was one
of Hammer's claims in the dismissed federal lawsuit. Hammer never sought a Rule 35 examination
in that case or any other related case where Ribi was a party. Instead, at the same time of this court's
scheduled conference, she filed the motion only in the present case and only gave Ribi a mere two
days to pay her $150,000 (or $200,00 with a confidentiality provision) or else she would file the
memorandum, affidavits, and exhibits containing the defamatory accusation.
This is just the type of blackmail Justice William 0. Douglas raised as a concern when he
dissented in part from the Schlagenhauf majority opinion:
I do not suppose there is any licensed driver of a car or truck who does not suffer
from some ailment, whether it be ulcers, bad eyesight, abnormal blood pressure,
deafness, liver malfunction, bursitis, rheumatism, or what not. If he or she is turned
over to the plaintiffs doctors and psychoanalysts to discover the cause of the mishap,
the door will be opened for grave miscarriages of justice. When the defendant's
doctors examine plaintiff, they are normally interested only in answering a single
question: did plaintiff in fact sustain the specific injuries claimed? But plaintiff's
doctors will naturally be inclined to go on a fishing expedition in search of anything
which will tend to prove that the defendant was unfit to perform the acts which
resulted in the plaintiffs injury. And a doctor for a fee can easily discover something
wrong with any patient- a condition that in prejudiced medical eyes might have
caused the accident. Opce defendants are turned over to medical or psychiatric clinics
for an analysis of their physical well-being and the condition of their psyche, the
effective trial will be held there and not before the jury. There are no lawyers in those
'Hammer has put her own husband/attorney's attack of Hanson's credentials at issue by
asserting Hanson has diagnosed Mr. Ribi's condition, which is false.
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clinics to stop the doctor from probing this organ or that one, to halt a further inquiry,
to object to a line of questioning. And there is no judge to sit as arbiter. The doctor
or the psychiatrist has a holiday in the privacy of his office. The defendant is at the
doctor's (or psychiatrists's) mercy; and his report may either overawe or confuse the
jury and prevent a fair trial.

Id. at 125. Justice Douglas went on to state that applying Rule 35 to defendants requires safeguards
to protect against "the awful risks of blackmail that exist in a Rule of that breadth." Id. at 127
(emphasis added). These concerns raised by Justice Douglas are particularly relevant to the present
case where Hammer and Donoval are plainly seeking to utilize Rule 35 for an improper purpose.

III.
CONCLUSION

Overall, Hammer has failed to meet her burden to show that Ribi's mental health is really and
genuinely in controversy and that there is good cause for an examination. In fact, not only has she
failed to meet her burden, her motion was brought and pursued frivolously and recklessly. Ribi
respectfully requests that the Court deny Hammer's motion and he requests that this court award
attorney fees and costs in having to defend against her motion. 8
DATED this 291h day of April, 2016.

8 This would not be the first time Hammer has acted inappropriately in her years long
litigation with Sun Valley and Sun Valley officials. In fact, recently, the Idaho Supreme Court
sanctioned her $4,000 under Rule 11 for bringing a frivolous motion on appeal in Hammer v. Sun
Valley, Supreme Court Case No. 43079.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 291h day of April, 2016, I caused to be served, by the
method(s) indicated, a true and correct copy of the foregoing upon:
James R. Donoval
4110 Eaton Ave., Ste. D
Caldwell, ID 83607
Attorney for Plaintiff

V

U.S.Mail
.)land Delivered
_la(' Fax Transmission: 649-1603
_
Email: jdonoval@aol.com
_
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JAMES R. DONOVAL
Attorney At Law
4481 N. Dresden Pl., Suite D
Garden City, ID 83714
Ph: (312) 859-2029
Fax: (208) 649-1603
jdonoval@aol.com

April 13, 2016
Kirtlan Naylor
Naylor & Hales
950 W. Bannock St., Suite 610
Boise, ID 83702
Re:

Hammer v. Ribi, CV-2015-428

Dear Mr. Naylor:
I have enclosed a Motion To RequireAnLRC.P. 35(a) Mental Examination Of Defendant Nils
Ribi and a Motion To Seek Punitive Damages Against Defendant Nils Ribi, which have been filed with
the Blaine County Court Clerk. I have also enclosed copies of Memorandums and Affidavits in support of
both motions, which have not yet been filed.

I have been provided authority to seek to settle the assault claim against Mr. Ribi, separate from
any other claims that are pending in any other matters. Ms. Hammer is seeking $100,000 in settlement of
the assault claim, as well as an additional $50,000 of attorney's fees she has paid to attorney Eric Swartz,
which is a portion of the total she has paid to Eric Swartz in all matters. In addition, Ms. Hammer is
seeking an additional $50,000 if Mr. Ribi expects a confidentiality provision related to this agreement.
Should I not have written confirmation of the settlement of this matter under the proposed tenns
by 5:00 p.m. on Friday, April 15, 2016, l will file the Memorandums and Affidavits enclosed herein on
Monday, April 18, 2016 and ask Judge Elgee to set a hearing date for both motions at the scheduling
Monday, April 18, 2016.

tTlyY~
JA

cc:

E~6N"ok.t)"
S. Hammer
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KIRTLAN G. NAYLOR

Direct Line: 947-2070
E-mail: kirt@naylorhales.com

Of Counsel
Robert G. Hamlin

April 15, 2016

Via U.S. Mail and Facsimile: 649-1603
James R. Donoval
4110 Eaton Ave., Ste. D
Caldwell, ID 83607
Re:

Hammer v. Ribi
Blaine County Case No. CV2015-428

Mr. Donoval:
We received your April 13, 2016, letter demanding that our client agree to settle this
lawsuit within 48 hours or else you will proceed with your recently filed motions for an
"independent" mental health examination and punitive damages. We have also reviewed the
memoranda and affidavits with exhibits you intend to file if we do not agree to settle. This attempt
to extort a settlement based on the threat of filing frivolous motions is totally inappropriate. Our
clients therefore reject your "offer."

It is disturbing that you are still threatening ow· client with a Rule 35 exam, just as
you did two years ago in the Donova/ v. Ribi lawsuit. There is no reasonable basis in law or fact for
such a motion in this case. An IME is only appropriate where a party's mental health is actually "in
controversy" and there is "good cause." As you should know, IME's are generally utilized in
situations where a party places her own mental health "in controversy," for example by alleging that
she suffers from severe emotional distress or a specific mental health disorder due to the opposing
party's alleged misconduct. This may be the plaintiff in her own complaint, or the defendant in a
counter claim. The rule is not, however, designed for a party to obtain an IME merely by accusing
the other party of having a mental health disorder. This is especially so where, as here, you have an
absolutely baseless claimed "diagnosis." It is reckless and unethical of you to include such
accusations in a court filing. You are not a mental health professional and have no basis whatsoever
to make such accusations. To the extent you rely on the "opinion" of Evan Hanson (as you did two
years ago), this is without foundation as you know he has never visited with Mr. Ribi and therefore
has no basis to diagnose him. Any claim by you that Mr. Ribi has a "diagnosis" or a "potential
diagnosis" is frivolous and reckless. This is plainly an attempt to take improper advantage of the
litigation exception to defamation. But it is defamation nonetheless.
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James R. Donoval
April 15, 2016
Page2
As for your motion to amend the complaint to add a claim for punitive damages, this
is likewise baseless. The complaint fails to even state a claim for assault and Mr. Ribi is immune
from suit. These are issues we will shortly be taking up with the Court in a dispositive motion.
Despite having litigated this and related matters for years now, you have failed to develop sufficient
evidence to support an adequate pleading of assault. Yet, you now contend that your client should
be entitled to claim for punitive damages. As you know, obtaining punitive damages is a very high
and difficult standard to meet. The facts here simply do not support such a frivolous motion.
Based on these things, we strongly demand that you withdraw your motions before
irreparable injury is caused.
Sincerely,

KGN:tjw
cc: Client
9SS6 Donowl 02.wpd
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JAMES R. DONOVAL
Attorney At Law
4481 N, Dresden Pl,, Suite D
Garden City, ID 83714
Ph: (912) 859-2029
Fax: (208) 649-1603

jdonovalctaol.com
April IS, 2016
Kirtlan Naylor
Naylor & Hales
9SO W. Bannock St., Suite 610
Boise, ID 83702

Re:

Hammer v. Ribi, CV-201S-428

Dear Mr. Naylor:
I am in receipt of your letter of earlier today. The fact that Mr. Ribi refuses to settle any matters,
under any tenns, is not unexpected. Such conduct is inherent in individuals who suffer from APD/DPD or
NPD, and thus is expected of Mr. Ribi.
I believe that putting pre§ure on opponents to settle matters is a justified tactic in litigation even if it requires immediate attention. Had you written back seeking some time to negotiate a settlement
- I certainly would have granted that request. Unfortunately, Mr. Ribi's (and your) tactic in all of this
litigation has been to use a scorched earth, insurance company paid for, defense strategy. Knowing you
now for over four years, I would expect no less of you.
As to the psychiatric exam, you should note that I never actually filed a motion seeking a
psychiatric exam in the Ribi v. Donoval case because Mr. Ribi's and his wife's claims against me were
dismissed at summary judgment. Mr. Ribi also filed his own summary judgment claim against me (which
was granted) which was required to be litigated before the psychiatric exam motion could be tiled or
scheduled. I had fully expected to move forward with the psychiatric exam request in the Ribi v. Donoval
matter if my summary judgment requests had been denied, and summary judgment had not been granted
related to my claims against Mr. Ribi. You should also note that Mr. Ribi asked for a psychiatric exam of
me in the Rib/ v. Donoval case, which was never briefed by Mr. Ribi, and never set for hearings before
the case was dismissed. It is a bit contrarian to assert that I have no right to raise the issue related to him.

Whether Mr. Ribi admits his misconduct or not, this case involves an assault on a public
employee by an elected official. Punitive damages are certainly warranted ifhe is found to have
committed the assault.

1
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However, there is extensive discovery that has been produced that disclosed the extensive
harassment complaints against Mr. Ribi, and that several Sun Valley related individuals, and Ms.
Hammer's professional counselor and medical professiona~ were concerned about Mr. Ribi's mental
health well before the September 2011 assault incident. Based on the extensive evidence submitted in
support of the motion for a psycbia1ric exam, including Mr. Hanson's diagnosis, Ms. Hammer certainly
has the right to raise her concerns about Mr. Ribi's mental health, his proclivity towards violence, and his
inability to be honest, whether it be out of court or in court. Contrary to your assertions, Rule 3S does not
require that the defendant places his own mental health into controversy, it just requires that the
defendant's mental health "is in controversy". Based on the U.S. Supreme Court's findings in
Schagenhmifv. Holder, 379 U.S. 104 (U.S. Sup.Ct 1964), and several cases thereafter. one litigant may
put the opposing party's mental health "in controversy". The issue then becomes one of whether the
evidence submitted supports the need for a mental examination. In this case, it isn't just Ms. Hammer, but
several other Sun Valley related parties, and medicaJ professionals, that have put Mr. Ribi's mental health
"in controversy".
The research into the mental health disorders indicates that up to 6% of the general population
suffers from either APD/DPD or NPD. Mr. Ribi certainly can fall within that category. He should be
tested for such.

/'
/
I

Trf,y Yours/)#-/>

p·
1/.
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cc:

S. Hammer
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G. NAYLOR

Direct Line: 947-2070
E-mail: kirt@naylorhales.com

Of Counsel
Robert G. Hamlin

April 22, 2016
Via Facsimile a11d U.S. Mail: 649-1603
James R. Donoval
4110 Eaton Ave., Ste. D
Caldwell, ID 83607

Re:

Hammer v. Ribi, Blaine County Case No. CV2015-428

Dear Mr. Donoval:
Today, I received hand-delivered copies of memoranda in support of punitive damages and Rule
35 examination.
However, the copies I received today, which I presume were filed with the court on April 191h
have a signed proof of service signed by you stating, "The undersigned certifies that a true and correct
copy of the attached document was served by facsimile and U.S. mail, proper postage pre-paid to the
above listed recipients on or before 5:00 p.m. on April 19, 2016." That proofofservice is false. You
did not serve those documents to me by facsimile or U.S. mail, but by hand delivery, on April 22"d.
Further, the affidavits in suppo1t and exhibits have NOT been properly served. You sent me
draft copies last week, but those are not the actual ones you filed on April 19th.
Unless you provide to us copies of the actual documents you filed with the court, together with

a notice of hearing so we receive them fourteen days before the hearing, we will object to those matters
being heard on May 16111 as untimely. Additionally, file with the court an errata proof of service
indicating what was actually served to this firm and how it was actually served (as to all pleadings), or
we will feel compelled to inform the court as to your false proofs of service.

KGN:tjw
cc: Client
9SS6 Dono\'11104.wpd
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James R. Donoval, ISB #8142

4481 N. Dresden Pl., Suite D
Garden City, ID 83714
Telephone: (312) 859-2029
Facsimile: (208) 649-1603
Email: jdonoval@aol.com
Attorney for Plaintiff Sharon R. Hammer

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

SHARON R. HAMMER,
Case No. CV-2015-428
Plaintiff,
MOTION TO AMEND
COMPLAINT

vs.

NILS RJBI, in his individual capacity,
Defendant.

COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Sharon R. Hammer ("Ms. Hammer"), by and through her

counsel of record, James R. Donoval, and prays that, should this Court grant any portion of
Defendant Nils Ribi's ("Defendant Ribi") pending Motion To Dismiss Under IR.C.P. 12(c), that
this Court allow Ms. Hammer to amend her Complaint to add additional factual allegations
related to a) Ms. Hammer's assault claim against Defendant Ribi, b) Ms. Hammer's claims that
Defendant Ribi was acting outside his scope of duties as a Sun Valley City Council member
when he assaulted Ms. Hammer, and, c) Ms. Hammer's claims that Defendant Ribi acted with
malice when he assaulted Ms. Hammer, and in support of her request to amend her Complaint
states as follows:
1) On August 14, 2016, Ms. Hammer filed her Complaint asserting that on September 15,
2011, Defendant Ribi, who at the time was a Sun Valley City Council member, assaulted Ms.
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Hammer near the front reception/copy area of SW1 Valley City Hall, when Ms. Hammer would
not make changes to the SW1 Valley budget that Defendant Ribi demanded.
2) In her Complaint, Ms. Hammer asserted that Defendant Ribi' s conduct in assaulting
Ms. Hammer because she would not Wlilaterally change the Sun Valley budget was a) outside
the scope of his duties as a Sllil Valley City Council member, and b) done in malice, and
therefore, was outside the scope of protections from claims against municipal officers under

Idaho Code§ 6-904.
3) On April 19, 2016, this Court entered its Scheduling Order in the matter. The
Scheduling Order did not set a final date for the filing of any pleadings in the matter (i.e. "close"
the right to file pleadings).
4) On April 25, 2016, Defendant Ribi filed his Motion To Dismiss Under lR.C.P. 12(c)
seeking to dismiss the Complaint for various reasons, including asserting that a) Ms. Hammer
had not adequately plead the assault claim against Defendant Ribi, b) Ms. Hammer had not
adequately plead that Defendant Ribi had acted outside the scope of his duties as a Sun Valley
City Council member when he assaulted Ms. Hammer, and, c) that Defendant Ribi had not acted
with malice when he assaulted Ms. Hammer.
5) Contrary to Defendant Ribi's assertion that he was filing a motion to dismiss under

lR.C.P. l 2(c), because this Court has not "closed" pleadings, Defendant Ribi's request to
dismiss is, in reality, a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action under lR.C.P.
12(b)(6).

6) Ms. Hammer has filed her Objection/Response To Defendant's Motion To Dismiss
Under lR.C.P. 12(c), asserting that she has adequately plead that a) Defendant Ribi assaulted
Ms. Hammer on September 15, 2011, b) Defendant Ribi's conduct in assaulting Ms. Hammer
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'
was outside
the scope of the duties of a Sun Valley City Council member and thus not covered
by the immunities described in Idaho Code § 6-904, and, c) Defendant Ribi's conduct in
assaulting Ms. Hammer was done with malice and thus not covered by the immunities described
in Idaho Code § 6-904.
7) Although Ms. Hammer asserts that the Complaint sufficiently alleges that Defendant
Ribi assaulted Ms. Hammer on September 15, 2011, that Defendant Ribi's conduct in assaulting
Ms. Hammer was outside the scope of the duties of a Sun Valley City Council member, and, that
Defendant Ribi's conduct in assaulting Ms. Hammer was done with malice, and thus should
survive a motion to dismiss, Ms. Hammer asserts that she should be allowed to amend her
Complaint to add additional allegations to support any one of those assertions that the Court
determines has not been adequately plead in the Complaint.
8) The Idaho Supreme Court has directed that rather than dismissing a complaint with
prejudice at the pleading stage (which is in essence what Defendant Ribi is seeking), that "great
liberality should be exercised in permitting amendments to pleadings in furtherance of justice
between the parties", Markstaller v. Markstaller, 80 Idaho 129, 134, 326 P.2d 994 (Id. Sup.Ct.
1958); Herrera v. Conner, 111 Idaho 1012, 1017-1018, 729 P.2d 1075 (Id. App.Ct. 1986),
especially where the complaint is capable of being amended to state facts sufficient to constitute
a cause of action, Marks taller v. Markstaller, @ 134; also Clark v. Olsen, 110 Idaho 323, 326,
715 P.2d 993 (Id. Sup.Ct. 1986) (as opposed to asserting new claims, Hererra v. Conner,@
1018).
9) The Idaho Supreme Court has confirmed that where the refusal to grant permission to
amend the complaint would deprive the plaintiff of a substantial right, the district court should
allow the plaintiff to amend the complaint, Marks taller v. Markstaller, @ 135.
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10) As the trial in the matter is not set until February of 2017, and as Ms. Hammer is not
seeking to plead a new cause of action, but to add additional facts to support the already plead
assault claim, and that Defendant Ribi's conduct fell outside the scope of Idaho Code§ 6-904,
Defendant Ribi is not prejudiced by allowing Ms. Hammer to add additional facts necessary to
support her assault claims, and her claims that Defendant Ribi's conduct fell outside the scope of
Idaho Code § 6-904.

WHEREFORE, Ms. Hammer prays that, should this Court grant Defendant Ribi's Motion To
Dismiss Under LR. C.P. 12(c) for any reason, that Ms. Hammer be allowed to amend her
Complaint to rectify any pleading failures related to either a) Ms. Hammer's assault claim
against Defendant Ribi, b) Ms. Hammer's claims that Defendant Ribi was acting outside the
scope of duties of a Sun Valley City Council member when he assaulted Ms. Hammer, or, c) Ms.
Hammer's claims that Defendant Ribi acted with malice when he assaulted Ms. Hammer.
DATED this

4µP
c.,,,- day of May, 2016.
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PROOF OF SERVICE

The undersigned certifies that a true and correct copy of the attached document was served by
facsimile and U.S mail, proper postage pre-paid to the above listed recipients on or before 5:00
p.m. on May 42016.
To:

Kirtlan Naylor
Naylor & Hales
950 W. Bannock St., Suite 610
Boise, ID 83702
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James R. Donoval, ISB #8142
4481 N. Dresden Pl., Suite D
Garden City, ID 83714
Telephone: (312) 859-2029
Facsimile: (208) 649-1603
Email: jdonoval@aol.com

MAY - 2 2016
Jolynn Drage, Clerk. District
Court Slalne Coun ; Mtmo

Attorney for Plaintiff Sharon R. Hammer

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
SHARON R. HAMMER,
Case No. CV-2015-428
Plaintiff,
OBJECTION/RESPONSE TO
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
DISMISS VNDERLR.C.P. 12(c)

vs.
NILS RIBI, in his individual capacity,
Defendant.

COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Sharon R. Hammer ("Ms. Hammer"), by and through her

counsel of record, James R. Donoval, and in Response to Defendant Nils Ribi's ("Defendant
Ribi") Motion To Dismiss Under I.R. C.P. 12(c) states as follows.
Introduction 1

Ms. Hammer asserts that Defendant Ribi, a then sitting Sun Valley City Council member,
assaulted Ms. Hammer on September 15, 2011 during a break in a Sun Valley City Council
meeting. Ms. Hammer asserts that when Ms. Hammer during the recess in the Sun Valley City
Council meeting she left the Sun Valley City Council chamber to copy some information being
1 In the Memorandum In Support Of Motion To Dismiss, including in Footnote I, Defendant Ribi lists numerous
cases that have been litigated between Ms. Hammer, Mr. Donoval, Sun Valley and various Sun Valley officials and
agents related to Ms. Hammer's former employment with Sun Valley, in an obvious attempt to somehow try to
persuade this Court that Ms. Hammer's claims against any or all of the parties were unfounded, or that Ms.
Hammer's claims against Defendant Ribi are unfounded. In reality, all but one case listed (Hammer v. ICRMP, an
insurance coverage declaratory judgment matter) were either resolved in Ms. Hammer's or Mr. Donoval's/avor
(i.e. voluntarily dismissed pursuant to settlement agreement or court orders entered favoring Ms. Hammer or Mr.
Donoval), or are still pending.
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discussed at the Sun Valley City Council meeting, Defendant Ribi followed Ms. Hammer away
from the Sun Valley City Council chamber to a separate comer of Sun Valley City Hall where
the copy area is located2, and physically threatened Ms. Hammer because she would not modify
the Sun Valley budget at his unilateral urgings. Defendant Ribi claims his discussions with Ms.
Hammer was a "workplace argument" which simply got a "little heated". In fact, it was not an
"argument" at all. Ms. Hammer wanted nothing to do with Defendant Ribi3, and could not get a
word in edgewise during the supposed "argument"4 . Instead, the "argument", was a one sided
verbal, hostile, "heated" and then threatened physical, assault of Ms. Hammer.
Generally, a municipal officer is immune from tort claims, including assault claims,
under Idaho Code §' 6-904. However, Idaho Code §' 6-904 does not extend immunity for tort
claims when the municipal official is acting outside the scope of his/her duties or authority or
where the municipal officer has acted with malice. In Defendant Ribi's case, Ms. Hammer has
plead in her Complaint that Defendant Ribi was acting outside the scope of his limited duties as a
Sun Valley City Council member when Defendant Ribi left the confines of the Sun Valley City
Council chamber, followed Ms. Hammer to the Sun Valley City Hall copy area, and threatened
Ms. Hammer with physical contact when she would not accede to his unilateral and illegitimate
demands to change the Sun Valley budget, and that he did so with malice. As Ms. Hammer has
properly asserted in her pleadings that Defendant Ribi acted outside the scope of his limited
duties as a Sun Valley City Council member and with malice when Defendant Ribi assaulted Ms.

2

Although Ms. Hammer has not measured the distance from the Sun Valley City Council chamber to the copy area
of Sun Valley City Hall, it required Defendant Ribi to travel approximately 150 to 200 feet to confront Ms. Hammer
(i.e. he was required leave the Sun Valley City Council table and walk to the back of the Sun Valley City Council
chamber, past the coffee and kitchen area, past five (5) offices and two bathrooms, past the front door, past the
reception desk, and into the copy room area).
3 In fact, because of the numerous prior incidents of harassment and hostility by Defendant Ribi, and Defendant
Ribi's instability, Ms. Hammer wanted no one-on-one communications with Defendant Ribi, which Defendant Ribi
was aware of.
4 Complaint, Para. 39.
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Hammer, Ms. Hammer has properly plead elements of an assault claim, outside the scope of
Idaho Code § 6-904, to avoid the entry of an LR. C.P. 12(c) motion to dismiss.

LR. CP. 12(c) Motions
An I.R. C.P. 12(c) motion to dismiss is treated, for all pract cal purposes, as a motion for
summary judgment, Trimble v. Engelking, 130 Idaho 300,302, 93 P.2d 1379 (Id. Sup.Ct. 1997).
Thus, a dismissal of a claim under LR. C.P. J2(c) should only be a lowed where there are no
issues of disputed fact, Trimble v. Engelking, @ 302.
As is the case under a summary judgment request, a claim hould be dismissed under
IR.C.P. 12(c) only where there are no genuine issues of material

ct and the moving party is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law, G & M Farms v. Funkirri ation, Co., 119 Idaho 514,
516-517, 808 P.2d 851 (Id. Sup.Ct. 1990). For purposes of a moti n for judgment on the
pleadings, the moving party admits all the allegations of the oppo ·ng party's pleadings, State v.
Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471,474, 163 P.3d 471 (Id. Sup.Ct. 2007).

11 reasonable inferences which

can be made from the record shall be made in favor of the party re isting the motion, G & M
Farms v. Funk Irrigation, @ 517. The burden at all times is upon he moving party to prove the

absence of genuine issues of material fact, G & MFarms v. Funk rrigation, @ 517. If the record
before the court contains conflicting inferences or reasonable min s might reach different
ed, G & M Farms v. Funk

conclusions, a motion to dismiss under I.R. C.P. 12(c) must be d

Irrigation, @ 51 7. In determining whether an IR. C. P. 12 (d) motiqn should be granted, all doubts

are to be resolved against the moving party, G & M Farms v. Fun~ Irrigation, @517. As the
Idaho Supreme Court directed in Cedarholm v. State Farm Ins.

1., 81 Idaho 136,141,338 P.2d

c

93 (Id. Sup.Ct. 1959), "The motion for judgment on the pleadings is not favored by the courts;
I

pleadings alleged to state no cause of action or defense will be liberally construed in favor of the
I
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pleader".
Federal courts have defined whether a complaint has adeq ately stated a cause of action
by describing that the plaintiff has properly plead their claim whe e there is "facial plausibility"
to the plaintiffs claims and a "reasonable inference that the defen
misconduct alleged", Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (U.S. S p.Ct. 2009) citing Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 500 U.S. 544, 566, (U.S. Sup.Ct. 2007 .

As to the assault itself, for I.R. C.P. 12(c) purposes, this C

rt must accept all facts plead

by Ms. Hammer to be true, and liberally construe Ms. Hammer's ersion of events related to the
September 15, 2011 incident. Even if there are disputes as to facts between Ms. Hammer's
version of events related to the assault verse Defendant Ribi's clai s as to what happened, Ms.
Hammer's alleged facts must be accepted as true for purposes oft emotion, and therefore
Defendant Ribi's request for dismissal under I.R.C.P. 12(c) must e denied.
As to whether Defendant Ribi's conduct on September 15, 2011 was outside the scope of
his delegated duties as a Sun Valley City Council member or whe er his conduct in assaulting
Ms. Hammer was done with malice, this Court must also deny De endant Ribi's request for
dismissal under I.R.C.P. 12(c), as, all reasonable inferences must e given to Ms. Hammer's
assertions that Defendant Ribi's conduct related to the assault wer outside the scope of
Defendant Ribi's limited role or duties as a Sun Valley City Coun il member or that Defendant
Ribi's conduct towards Ms. Hammer was done with malice. Thus, the determination of both the
assertion that Defendant Ribi's conduct was outside the scope of hat is expected or allowed of
an elected city council member, and whether Defendant Ribi acte with malice in assaulting Ms.
Hammer, must be left to a jury.
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The Pre-Assault Malicious Conduct Of Defendant Ribi
The Court should recognize that prior to the September 15, 2011 incident, there had
already been a long history of Ms. Hammer making numerous complaints to Sun Valley officials
of Defendant Ribi's harassment and hostility towards Ms. Hammer, and that Ms. Hammer was
becoming more and more afraid that Defendant Ribi would act in a physically violent manner
towards Ms. Hammer5 • Ms. Hammer's allegations related to Defendant Ribi's harassment
alleged in the Complaint must be held as true ("for purposes of a motion for judgment on the
pleadings, the moving party admits all the allegations of the opposing party's pleadings", State v.

Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471,474), and fact allegations contained in opposition to a motion for
summary judgment (i.e. motion for judgment on the pleadings) must be accepted as true
(emphasis added), Sutton v. Brown, 85 Idaho 104, 109, 375 P.2d 990 (Id. Sup.Ct. 1962). The
allegations against Defendant Ribi, include:
•

It was a violation of the Sun Valley Ant-Harassment Policy for Defendant Ribi to
harass Ms. Hammer in any form, including that Defendant Ribi was prohibited from
verbally, physically or visually harassing Ms. Hammer6 •

•

Ms. Hammer reported Defendant Ribi's numerous acts of harassment, physical and
emotional intimidation, and verbal abuse, and her fears of her personal safety related
to Defendant Ribi, to former Sun Valley Mayor Wayne Willich ("Former Mayor
Willich"), former Sun Valley City Attorney Adam King ("Fonner City Attorney
King") and former Sun Valley Police Chief Cam Daggett ("Fonner ChiefDaggett")7.

•

On several occasions Fonner Mayor Willich directed Defendant Ribi to stop
harassing, intimidating and being hostile towards Ms. Hammer and provided
Defendant Ribi a copy of the Sun Valley Anti-Harassment Policy because of the
harassment allegations Ms. Hammer had made against him 8 .

•

Former Sun Valley City Council member Joan Lamb was aware of the harassment

5 Ms. Hammer has submitted her Motion For I.R.C.P. Rule 35(a) Examination Of Defendant Ribi and Motion For
Punitive Damages Against Defendant Ribi to the Court, which includes affidavits, exhibits and depositions from
various law suits between Ms. Hammer and Sun Valley, and which extensively verify the facts asserted herein.
6 Complaint, Para, 14-16.
7 Complaint, Para. 17-18, 21, 25, 32.
8 Complaint, Para. 20-21.
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Ms. Hammer suffered at Defendant Ribi' s hands and advised Defendant Ribi that he
was to cease such harassment9•
•

Former Sun Valley City Council President DeWayne Briscoe 10 was aware of Ms.
Hammer's harassment allegations against Defendant Ribi but did nothing about it
because he did not think it was his job to do so 11 •

•

Defendant Ribi's harassment of Ms. Hammer was so serious that former City
Attorney King had to contact the Idaho Attorney General's office to seek guidance
about what to do about it. However, Former City Attorney King advised Former
Mayor Willich that nothing could be done to discipline Defendant Ribi because he
was an elected official and that any disclosure of Defendant Ribi' s harassment of Ms.
Hammer would be considered as "political" 12 .

•

In or about August of 2011, immediately before the assault incident, both Former
Mayor Willich and City Attorney King discussed Defendant Ribi's harassment of Ms.
Hammer with Defendant Ribi and that the harassment of Ms. Hammer by Defendant
Ribi was going to be publicly disclosed after the November of2011 election 13•

•

Former Chief Daggett advised Ms. Hammer that Defendant Ribi's harassment and
hostility towards Ms. Hammer was so serious that the Sun Valley Police Department
would be on notice when Defendant Ribi was in Sun Valley City Hall and that Ms.
Hammer should lock her Sun Valley City Hall office door when Defendant Ribi was
present in Sun Valley City Hall 14 .
The Assault Allegations

As is extensively detailed in Ms. Hammer's Complaint 15, the basis for Ms. Hammer's
assault claims against Former Council Ribi relate to an incident which occurred on September
15, 2011 during a break in a Sun Valley City Council meeting. As is the case with the allegations
of the harassment of Ms. Hammer by Defendant Ribi, for purposes of the facts related to the
assault incident, Ms. Hammer's allegations must be held as true, State v. Yzaguirre, @474;
Sutton v. Brown, @ 109.
9

Complaint, Para. 22-23.
DeWayne Briscoe was elected Mayor of Sun Valley in November of 2011, and served in that position until the
first week of January in 2016.
11 Complaint, Para. 24.
12 Complaint, 26-28.
13 Complaint, Para. 30-32.
14 Compliant, Para. 32.
15 Complaint, Para. 34-47.
10
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Prior to the September 15, 2011, incident, based on all of the harassment incidents related
to Defendant Ribi, and discussions with various Sun Valley officials, Ms. Hammer held a
heightened sense of concern over Defendant Ribi's potential for physical violence towards Ms.
Hammer 16 . Prior to September 15, 2011, Defendant Ribi was on notice of all of the harassment
allegations Ms. Hammer had made against him, and that Ms. Hammer considered Defendant
Ribi to be potentially physically dangerous to her 17 .
During a break in the September 15, 2011 Sun Valley City Council meeting, Defendant
Ribi followed Ms. Hammer out of the Sun Valley City Council chamber to the front area of Sun
Valley City Hall, well away from the Sun Valley City Council chamber18 , near the reception
desk and copy room area 19• Defendant Ribi began to demand that Ms. Hammer make changes to
certain documents related to the Sun Valley budget he unilaterally wanted, but which were
improper according to accepted financial practices20 . On several instances, Defendant Ribi cut
Ms. Hammer off, raised his arms in the air and began waiving his hands angrily, and became
ever more enraged21 .
When Ms. Hammer told Defendant Ribi that she would not make the changes to the
budget Defendant Ribi demanded and was going to discuss the matter with Mayor Willich,
Defendant Ribi raised his arms, turned toward Ms. Hammer, and in a physically threatening
manner yelled: "No! You will not talk to the Mayor!" 22 . In reaction to Defendant Ribi's

16

Complaint, Para. 34.
Complaint, Para. 35.
18 As has been described, contrary to Defendant Ribi' s statements, the assault did not occur in the hallway of Sun
Valley City Hall, or anywhere near the Sun Valley City Council chamber. It occurred in, what is probably, the
furthest comer of Sun Valley City Hall away from the Sun Valley City Council chamber. Defendant Ribi's conduct
in following Ms. Hammer through Sun Valley City Hall was more akin to "stalking" rather than simply running into
her in the hall of Sun Valley City Hall.
19 Complaint, Para. 37.
2 Complaint, Para. 38.
21 Complaint, Para. 39.
22 Complaint, Para. 40.
17

°
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physically and verbally violent outburst, Ms. Hammer's heart began racing, she became alarmed,
immediately stepped back towards the copy machines and away from Defendant Ribi, and stated:
"Whoa!',23. Because of Defendant Ribi's physical and verbal outburst, Ms. Hammer was fearful of
immediate harmful or offensive contact with her body by Defendant Ribi24 . The assault of Ms.
Hammer was witnessed by former Sun Valley Administrative Assistant David Blampied25 .
Fortunately, Ms. Hammer was somehow able to escape from Defendant Ribi's presence and
return to the safety of the Sun Valley City Council chamber26 .
Immediately following the Sun Valley City Council meeting, Ms. Hammer reported the
assault to Former Mayor Willich, Former City Attorney King, and Former Police Chief
Daggett27 .
Civil Assault Under Idaho Law
The elements of civil assault under Idaho law are that a) the defendant acted intending to
cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person of the plaintiff, or an immediate fear of such
contact; and, b) as a result, the plaintiff feared that such contact was imminent, Pollitt v. CSN
International, 2007 WL 294249, 5 (U.S. Idaho 2007); also Idaho Civil Jury Instruction 4.30.

Ms. Hammer has clearly and adequately plead that she was in fear of imminent harmful
contact from Defendant Ribi when he raised his arms, turned towards her and began yelling.
Even if Defendant Ribi asserts that he did not intend to harm Ms. Hammer, that argument is

23

Complaint, Para. 41.
Complaint, Para. 41.
25 Complaint, Para. 43. As is described in the affidavits, exhibits and depositions submitted in support of the Motion
For LR.C.P. Rule 35(a) Examination Of Defendant Ribi and Motion For Punitive Damages Against Defendant Ribi
submitted to the Court, Former Mayor Willich discussed the matter with former Sun Valley Administrative
Assistant David Blampied who acknowledged that Defendant Ribi had assaulted Ms. Hammer.
26 Complaint, Para. 42. As is described in the affidavits, exhibits and depositions submitted in support of the Motion
For LR.C.P. Rule 35(a) Examination Of Defendant Ribi and Motion For Punitive Damages Against Defendant Ribi
submitted to the Court, Former Mayor Willich acknowledged that Ms. Hammer was visibly distraught and upset
when she returned to the Sun Valley City Council chamber after the assault.
27 Complaint, Para. 44.
24
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irrelevant at the motion to dismiss stage. The only relevant issue related to Defendant Ribi's
conduct is whether Ms. Hammer properly alleged that Defendant Ribi moved towards her, lifted
his arms, and raised his voice, and that Defendant Ribi's conduct caused her to fear for her
immediate safety- which she clearly has. Defendant Ribi's assertion that the incident was
nothing more than a ''workplace argument" that got "a little heated"28, far from acknowledges
that it is not Defendant Ribi' s attempts to minimize his rage filled conduct towards Ms. Hammer
that matters at the pleading stage, but that it is only Ms. Hammer's perception of the incident that
counts.
Tort Liability And Immunity Generally
Idaho Code §' 6-904, states in relevant part:
6-904. EXCEPTIONS TO GOVERMENTAL LIABILITY. A governmental entity and its
employees while acting within the course and scope of their employment and without
malice or criminal intent shall not be liable for any claim which:
3. Arises out of assault ...
Government officials are not afforded an exemption from liability for their own actions
under Idaho Code§' 6-904 if either (emphasis added) they acted outside the "scope of their
employment", or they acted with "malice or criminal intent"29, Moore v. Peck, 2008 WL
508425, 9 (U.S. Idaho 2008) (employees acting in course of employment, but alleged to have
acted with malice); Dunn v. Nance, 2009 WL 1956429, 8 (U.S. Idaho 2009) (employees acting in
course of employment, but alleged to have acted with malice); Curtis v, Gooding, 844 F.Supp.2d
1101, 1108 (U.S. Idaho 2012) (employee not immunized from liability if "either (1) was not

28 Defendant Ribi's admissions that he was in an "argument" and that he was in a "heated" state when he demanded
changes to the Sun Valley budget are evidence of how oblivious he was that he was acting well outside the norms of
professional or personal interactions.
29 As to the second prong of the test, in Hoffer v. City Of Boise, 151 Idaho 400, 403, 257 P.3d 1226 (Id. Sup.Ct.
2011) the Idaho Supreme Court confirmed that a municipal official is only immune from tort claims under Idaho
Code § 6-904 "if there is no allegation of malice and/or criminal intent."
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acting within the scope of his employment ... , or (emphasis added) (2) was acting with malice").
Although Ms. Hammer has plead that Defendant Ribi was both acting outside of the scope of his
limited duties as a Sun Valley City Council member and with malice when he assaulted her on
September 15, 2011, at the motion to dismiss stage, Ms. Hammer is merely required to
adequately plead that Defendant Ribi either acted outside of the scope of his limited duties as a
Sun Valley City Council member or with malice when he assaulted her on September 15, 2011,
to avoid dismissal of her claims.
Recently, in Grabicki v. City OfLewiston, 154 Idaho 686, 691-692, 302 P.3d 26 (Idaho
Sup.Ct. 2013), in reversing the district court's improper entry of summary judgment based on
immunity under Idaho Code § 6-904, in discussing whether an exemption under Idaho Code § 6-

904 should be invoked, the Idaho Supreme Court stated:
"This Court has explained that the ITCA was enacted to 'provide much needed relief to
those suffering injury from the negligence of governmental employees' (citations
omitted). To accomplish that purpose, the ITCA 'is to be construed liberally' and
'liability is the rule and immunity the exception' (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
Further, we have held that the expressly stated exceptions 'must be closely construed'
(citations omitted). Thus, we construe the statute to favor liability and to limit
exceptions (emphasis added)".
Likewise, in Teurlings v. Larson, 156 Idaho 65, 320 P.3d 1224, 1229 (Id. Sup.Ct. 2014),
again in reversing the improper entry of summary judgment based on the immunity provisions of

Idaho Code§ 6-904, the Idaho Supreme Court confirmed that Idaho courts should uphold the
liberal nature of the exemptions to immunity under Idaho Code§ 6-904 by finding that immunity
does not exist under Idaho Code§ 6-904 (citing Grabicki v. Lewiston).
There is no question that the Idaho Supreme Court has been moving in the direction of
ensuring that claims against government actors are allowed to proceed rather than being
dismissed under Idaho Code § 6-904 at preliminary stages, as is sought by Defendant Ribi.
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Based on the language of Grabicki v. Lewiston that Idaho Code § 6-904 should be liberally
construed to allow employees to pursue civil actions, Ms. Hammer asserts that a) she has
adequately plead that Defendant Ribi was acting outside the scope of what the duties of a Sun
Valley City Council member were when he assaulted Ms. Hammer, and, b) she has adequately
plead that Defendant Ribi was acting with malice when he assaulted her. Defendant Ribi's
motion to dismiss should therefore be denied.
Defendant Ribi Acted Outside The Scope Of Duties Of A Sun Valley City Council Member
When He Assaulted Ms. Hammer
In Teurlings v. Larson(@ 1233), the Idaho Supreme Court stated that in determining
whether an employee was acting within the scope of employment under Idaho Code

f 6-904, that

courts must look to the definition of scope of employment defined in respondeat superior cases,
namely, 1) what is the kind of duties the employee is employed to perform, 2) did the conduct
occur substantially within the authorized limits of the employees' duties, and, 3) was the conduct
actuated in order to serve the master.
Defendant Ribi asserts that simply because he is a Sun Valley City Council member and
was at a Sun Valley City Council meeting in Sun Valley City Hall on September 15, 2011 that
any and all actions he took that day are covered by an immunity under Idaho Code § 6-904.
However, contrary to Defendant Ribi's claims, Ms. Hammer has adequately plead that
Defendant Ribi's conduct associated with the assault incident was not part of his duties as a Sun
Valley City Council member. There are several reason for denying Defendant Ribi's claims that
any and all of his conduct, regardless of what it was, is considered to be within the scope of
duties of a Sun Valley City Council member.
First, Ms. Hammer asserts that she worked exclusively for Former Mayor Willich, and
did not report to Defendant Ribi. Idaho Code€ 50-602 (Exhibit A) specifically provides that, as
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Mayor of Sun Valley, Former Mayor Willich had the superintending control of all the officers of
Sun Valley, including Ms. Hammer. In addition, both Section 3.2 of the Sun Valley Personnel
Policies (Exhibit B) and the Sun Valley City Administrator Job Description (Exhibit C)
specifically provide that, as the Sun Valley City Administrator, Ms. Hammer reported directly to,
and only to, Former Mayor Willich. The Sun Valley City Council And Mayor Powers And
Authorities (Exhibit D) describes the limited role of the Sun Valley City Council to "establish
policy and function in a legislative capacity" and "adopt, revise, codify, or compile all
ordinances, rules and regulations". Nothing in the Sun Valley City Council And Mayor Powers
And Authorities provides for any authority of an individual Sun Valley City Council member to
direct any Sun Valley employee, including the Sun Valley Administrator, to do anything. Nor
does any Idaho statute, rule or regulation provide any authority of an Idaho city council member
to provide any direction to any municipal employee. Therefore any individual demands that
Defendant Ribi made to Ms. Hammer to change the Sun Valley budget, which were part and
parcel of the assault, were outside the scope of his limited authority as a Sun Valley City Council
member, as he had no individual authority or right to be directing Ms. Hammer's conduct30 .
Second, the assault occurred during a break in the Sun Valley City Council meeting, and
outside the parameters of a Sun Valley City Council meeting itself, during a period when Ms.
Hammer had no duties towards any of the four (4) Sun Valley City Council members, including
Defendant Ribi.

30

The extensive harassment, hostility and bullying Ms. Hammer suffered at Defendant Ribi's hands during 2009
through 2011, were in large part because Defendant Ribi refused to accept his limited role as a Sun Valley City
Council member, and continually, and in a hostile manner, demanded that Ms. Hammer and other Sun Valley
employees follow his directions, many of which were in direct contradiction to Former Mayor Willich's legitimate
directions. On numerous occasions Defendant Ribi was told by Ms. Hammer, Fonner Mayor Willich and Former
City Attorney King that he needed to stop trying to direct Ms. Hammer or other Sun Valley employees, and to not be
so nasty about it. Black's Law Dictionary defines "harassment" as "Repeated conduct that is not wanted and is
known to all parties as offensive", which describes Defendant Ribi's incessant, unwanted and hostile conduct
towards Ms. Hammer.
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Third, Defendant Ribi 's physical area of responsibility was limited to the Sun Valley City
Council chamber itself, and thus Defendant Ribi's following of Ms. Hammer to the Sun Valley
receptionist/copy area of Sun Valley City Hall, well away from the Sun Valley City Council
chamber, was outside the scope of his physical area of responsibility as a Sun Valley City
Council member.
Fourth, as Ms. Hammer tried to explain to Defendant Ribi, his attempts to coerce Ms.
Hammer into making changes to Sun Valley budgets and budget documents were outside the
purview of his limited responsibilities or authority as a singular member of the four (4) member
Sun Valley City Council to discuss matters among themselves, during public meetings, within
the confines of the Sun Valley City Council chamber, and make group decisions.
Ms. Hammer has adequately plead that Defendant Ribi's conduct in assaulting Ms.
Hammer was outside the scope of his limited duties as a Sun Valley City Council member to
avoid a dismissal of her claims. At a minimum, there are genuine issues of material fact as to
whether any of Defendant Ribi's conduct in a) following Ms. Hammer outside of the Sun Valley
City Council chamber, and, b) in unilaterally demanding that changes to the Sun Valley budget
and budget documents be made, when Ms. Hammer did not report to Defendant Ribi, were
outside his individual scope of duties as one member of the four (4) member Sun Valley City
Council. A jury could, and should, determine whether the entire encounter with Ms. Hammer
which resulted in the assault, was outside the limited scope of Defendant Ribi's duties as a Sun
Valley City Council member, not the Court at the judgment on the pleadings stage.
However, more pertinent is that, even if Defendant Ribi was somehow within his rights
as a Sun Valley City Council member to follow Ms. Hammer to a remote section of Sun Valley
City Hall and make demands that she make the unilateral changes to the Sun Valley budget and

Objection/Response To Motion To Dismiss Under I.R. C.P 12 (c) - 13

Page 193 of 526

budget documents he sought, it was certainly outside the scope of Defendant Ribi's duties as a
Sun Valley City Council member to physically threaten Ms. Hammer if she did not. Using
physical threats to force Ms. Hammer to comply with his demands seeking to unilaterally change
the Sun Valley budget, was certainly beyond the pale of the rights and responsibilities of a Sun
Valley City Council member.
Taking Defendant Ribi's assertions one step further, if Defendant Ribi had picked up a
stapler and hit Ms. Hammer over the head with it when she refused to make the changes to the
Sun Valley budget he was demanding of her, would he be able to avoid liability because the
stapler was owned by Sun Valley or his conduct was performed in Sun Valley City Hall? None
of Defendant Ribi's co-Sun Valley City Council members, no other elected official, and most
importantly no jury member, would ever consider a physical threat by an elected official against
a Sun Valley employee to fall within the scope of the duties of an elected official. Therefore,
there is certainly substantial questions of whether any of Defendant Ribi's actions related to the
assault allegations fell within his legitimate duties as a Sun Valley City Council member to
require that the motion to dismiss be denied.
As was the case in Teurlings v. Larson(@ 1233), it is simply improper to dismiss a case
on the pleadings or at summary judgment based on the Idaho Code § 6-904 immunity provisions,
when the plaintiff asserts that the defendant acted outside the scope of his/her duties, as Ms.
Hammer asserts in regards to Defendant Ribi's conduct. Such is the case herein.
Defendant Ribi Acted With Malice When He Assaulted Ms. Hammer

In Miller v. Idaho State Patrol, 150 Idaho 856,870,252 P.3d 1274 (Idaho Sup.Ct. 2011),
the Idaho Supreme Court defined malice for Idaho Code § 6-904 purposes as being "the
intentional commission of a wrongful or unlawful act, without legal justification or excuse and
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with ill will, whether or not injury was intended".
Ms. Hammer asserts that there is sufficient, if not substantial, allegations in the pleadings
and herein that Defendant Ribi acted maliciously towards Ms. Hammer when he assaulted her.
As is described above, and which must be taken as true for purposes of the motion to dismiss,
Ms. Hammer had made numerous complaints of harassment and hostility towards Defendant
Ribi, and was in fear of physical harm from Defendant Ribi 31 , which were known by multiple
Sun Valley officials and employees, including Defendant Ribi himself. Ms. Hammer has alleged
that Former Mayor Willich and Former City Attorney King discussed his harassment and
hostility towards Ms. Hammer with Defendant Ribi on numerous occasions and directed him to
cease his hostile conduct towards Ms. Hammer, which Defendant Ribi refused to comply with.
There is no question that Council Member Ribi held ill will towards Ms. Hammer for some
undefined reason, which resulted in numerous other abusive encounters with Ms. Hammer even
before the September 15, 2011 assault.
In addition, Ms. Hammer's refusal to accede to Defendant Ribi's unilateral demands to
change the Sun Valley budget and budget documents, and her telling Defendant Ribi that that she
instead was going to discuss Defendant Ribi's demands and conduct with Former Mayor Willich,
and Defendant Ribi's admitted "heated" response to her refusal to comply with his unwarranted
demands, itself, provides the "ill will" necessary related to why the assault occurred to withstand
a summary judgment finding.
Finally, an assault, by its very nature, is a malicious act. Nobody accidently assaults
As has been described in Ms. Hammer's Motion For I.R. C.P. Rule 35(a) Examination Of Defendant Ribi and
Motion For Punitive Damages Against Defendant Ribi submitted to the Court, which includes affidavits, exhibits
and depositions from various law suits between Ms. Hammer, Sun Valley and its officials, Ms. Hammer met several
times with a personal counselor (Evan Hanson) and her medical professional (Nannette Ford) in early 2011
regarding her concerns about Defendant Ribi's hostile nature and her safety around Defendant Ribi. Mr. Hanson
advised Ms. Hammer that he believed Defendant Ribi had a mental illness and suffered from narcissistic personality
disorder, and that Defendant Ribi was potentially dangerous to Ms. Hammer.
31
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someone, as it requires the combination of purposeful conduct and ability to cause physical
harm.
As was previously described in Moore v. Peck (@9) and Dunn v. Nance (@8), dismissal
of a matter under Idaho Code § 6-904 where the plaintiff asserts that the defendant was
malicious in his/her conduct, as Ms. Hammer asserts in regards to Defendant Ribi's conduct, is
improper at the pleading stage or at summary judgment. Such is the case herein.

Even If The Court Finds That Ms. Hammer Has Not Plead Sufficient Facts To Support
Either The "Outside The Scope Of Duty" Assertion Or The "Malice" Assertion, Ms.
Hammer Should Be Granted Leave To Amend Her Complaint To Add Additional Facts
Contrary to Defendant Ribi's claim, this Court has not "closed" the pleadings, as is
required for an IR.C.P. l 2(c) motion to dismiss. Nothing in this Court's Scheduling Order of
April 19, 2016 prohibits Ms. Hammer from seeking to amend her Complaint. The Motion To
Dismiss is really more in the form of an IR. C.P. l 2(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted, than an IR. C.P. l 2(c) motion to dismiss. Rather than
seeking to strike the Motion To Dismiss, Ms. Hammer has chosen to respond to the allegations in
the Motion To Dismiss so that the matter can move beyond the Idaho Code § 6-904 issues.
Defendant Ribi 's claims seeking IR. C.P. 12 {c) dismissal of Ms. Hammer's assault claim
is, essentially, seeking judgment on an affirmative defense to Ms. Hammer's assault claim. At
the pleading stage, Ms. Hammer was not required to put factual allegations in her Complaint to
counter any possible affirmative defenses Defendant Ribi might have ("complaints need not
anticipate affirmative defenses and attempt to defeat them", In re DBSL Inc., 2013 WL 1498365,
10) as on a IR. C.P. 12(c) motion to dismiss the "the flaw must be found in the complaint, and
not by reason of affirmative defenses that a defendant might raise, In re DBSL Inc., @4;

McCalden v. Cal. Library Ass 'n., 955 F.2d 1214, 1219 (U.S. App.9 1h 1990). If the Court finds
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that Ms. Hammer has not plead sufficient facts related to Defendant Ribi's affirmative defenses,
as opposed to her own claims, Ms. Hammer should be provided the opportunity to do so, because
(at least under federal case law) inadequacies in a complaint should allowed to be cured by
amendment, even where the complaint does not satisfy the "plausibility" and "reasonable
inference ... of misconduct" standards of Bell Atlantic v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

Feltmann v. Petco Animal Supplies, Inc., 2012 WL 1189913, 4, (U.S. Idaho 2012). Leave to
amend is warranted if "the deficiencies can be cured with additional allegations that are
consistent with the challenged pleading and do not contradict the allegations in the original
complaint, US. v. Corinthian Colleges, 655 F.3d 984, 995 (U.S. App.9th 2011).
Rather than dismissing a complaint with prejudice at the pleading stage (which is in
essence what Defendant Ribi is seeking), the Idaho Supreme Court has directed that "great
liberality should be exercised in permitting amendments to pleadings in furtherance of justice
between the parties", Markstaller v. Markstaller, 80 Idaho 129, 134, 326 P.2d 994 (Id. Sup.Ct.
1958); Herrera v. Conner, 111 Idaho 1012, 1017-1018, 729 P.2d 1075 (Id. App.Ct. 1986),
especially where the complaint is capable of being amended to state facts sufficient to constitute
a cause of action, Markstaller v. Markstaller, @ 134; also Clark v. Olsen, 110 Idaho 323, 326,
715 P.2d 993 (Id. Sup.Ct. 1986) (as opposed to asserting new claims, Hererra v. Conner,@
1018). Where the refusal to grant permission to amend the complaint would deprive the plaintiff
of a substantial right, the district court should allow the plaintiff to amend the complaint,

Markstaller v. Markstaller, @ 135.
Even if this Court determines that Ms. Hammer has not plead sufficient facts to support
either the assertion that Defendant Ribi assaulted Ms. Hammer, that Defendant Ribi's conduct
was outside the scope of his duties as a Sun Valley City Council member, or that Defendant
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Ribi's assault of Ms. Hammer was done with malice, the Court should allow Ms. Hammer leave
to amend the Complaint to add additional facts further detailing the assault, that Defendant
Ribi's conduct was outside the duties of a Sun Valley City Council member, or why his conduct
was malicious. Ms. Hammer is not seeking to add new claims. And the trial in the matter is set
for February of 2017, almost ten (10) months from now. Defendant Ribi is certainly not
prejudiced in any way by the Court allowing Ms. Hammer to add additional facts in her pleading
to support the assault claim, the claim that Defendant Ribi acted outside the scope of his limited
duties as a Sun Valley City Council member in physically threatening Ms. Hammer, and that he
did so with malice.
Ms. Hammer has filed her Motion To Amend Complaint contemporaneously with this
Response, to add additional facts related to a) the assault claim, b) the claim that Defendant Ribi
acted outside the scope of his limited duties as a Sun Valley City Council member in physically
threatening Ms. Hammer because she would not make charges to the Sun Valley budget, and, c)
that he did so with malice - if the Court determines that such is required. However, Ms. Hammer
asserts she has adequately plead such in her Complaint.

Conclusion
Defendant Ribi's sole role as a Sun Valley City Council member was to sit at the Sun
Valley City Council table, in the confines of the Sun Valley City Council chamber, and publicly
discuss matters with other Sun Valley City Council members. No Sun Valley employee, and in
particular Ms. Hammer, reported to Defendant Ribi. During Ms. Hammer's tenure as the Sun
Valley City Administrator, Defendant Ribi simply refused to accept his limited authority as one
of four (4) members of the Sun Valley City Council, and in particular that he had no line, or
direct, authority over any Sun Valley employees. Defendant Ribi's assertion that he was allowed
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by his position as a Sun Valley City Council to act in any way he chose related to any employee
of Sun Valley, including a) stalking Ms. Hammer to a far corner of Sun Valley City Hall, b)
entering into an unwanted, one sided, "heated" diatribe seeking to unilaterally change the Sun
Valley budget, and, c) then physically threatening Ms. Hammer because she did not comply with
his illegitimate orders - is untenable. Acting out physically as part of his emotional and hostile
outburst towards Ms. Hammer is the classic definition of assault. He should be held accountable
for his misconduct.
The exemption of "assault" as a cause of action under Idaho Code § 6-904 was meant to
insulate government employees who may be required to come in physical contact with the public
(i.e. fire fighters, police officers, EMTs, public works officials) from being charged with a tort
for making contact with an individual as part of their important service to the communities they
serve. It was not meant to protect a hostile and angry elected official from abusing government
employees by threatening them if they do not follow his illegitimate directions. In a continuation
of Defendant Ribi's on-going harassment and bullying of Ms. Hammer, he was, and continues to
be, oblivious to that concept.
Whether it be under Idaho liberal pleading standards, or the federal "plausibility"
standards of Bell Atlantic v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, Ms. Hammer has adequately plead
that Defendant Ribi assaulted Ms. Hammer when she refused to change items in the Sun Valley
budget at his directions on September 15, 2011, that his conduct in doing so was not in the
course of his duties as a Sun Valley City Council member, and that he did so with malice, to
avoid dismissal of the Complaint.

WHEREFORE, Ms. Hammer prays that this Court deny Defendant Ribi's request to dismiss the
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Complaint based on IR. C.P. 12 (c). In the alternative, Ms. Hammer seeks that the Court grant
Ms. Hammer the right to amend her Complaint to add necessary additional facts to support her
claims that Defendant Ribi, assaulted Ms. Hammer, acted outside the scope of his employment
by assaulting Ms. Hammer, or that he did so with malice.

DATED this

~1
t,

·-tA day of April, 2016.

tf

SHARON R. HAMMER

By

(l/?P~
i

JAMES R. DONOVAL

.MS. HAMMER'S ATTORNEY
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PROOF OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that a true and correct copy of the attached document was served by
facsimile a~ U.S mail, proper postage pre-paid to the above listed recipients on or before 5:00
p.m. on ~I IY
Z.
, 2016.
To:

Kirtlan Naylor
Naylor & Hales
950 W. Bannock St., Suite 610
Boise, ID 83702

J am~s;R. Donoval
/

/
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Idaho Statutes
TITLE 50
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
CHAPTER 6
MAYOR

50-602. MAYOR, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICIAL. The mayor, except as provided in
sections
50-80~
through
50-812[,
Idaho Code),
shall be the
chief
administrative official of the city, preside over the meetings of the city
council and determine the order of business subject to such rules as the
council may prescribe, have a vote only when the council is equally divided,
have the superintending control of all the officers and affairs of the city,
preserve order, and take care that the ordinances of the city and provisions
of this act are complied with and enforced.
The Idaho Code is made available on the Internet by the Idaho Legislature as a public sen-ice. 'This Internet venion of the Idaho Code may not be
used for commercial purposes, nor may this database be published or repackaged for commercial sale without express written permission.

The Idaho Code is the property of the state of Idaho, and is copyrighted by Idaho law, JC. § 9-352.

According to Idaho law, any person who reproduces or distributes the Idaho Code for commercial
purposes in violation of the provisions of this statute shall be deemed to be an infringer of the state
of Idaho's copyright.
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CITY OF SUN VALLEY
PERSONNEL POLICIES & PROCEDURES MANUAL

Adopted by the Mayor and City Council
Resolution No. 1997-2 Januaiy 16, 1997
Resolution No. 1997-9 Januaiy 16, 1997
Resolution No. 2001-03 May 16, 2001
Resolution No. 2004-08 November 18, 2004
Resolution No. 2007-06 February 15, 2007
Resolution No. 2007-12 March 15, 2007
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3.2

ADMINISTRATION AUTHORITY

The City Administrator and City Attorney shall be directly supervised and evaluated by the
Mayor. All other personnel, including the City Clerk and City Treasurer, shall be directly
supervised and evaluated by the City Administrator.

, 3.3

PERSONNEL RECORDS

Complete and permanent records of the employment history of each current and former
Employee of the City shall be maintained by the City Administrator's office. These files shall
contain all documents permitted by Federal and State law. No document shall be placed in an
Employee's file without his/her knowledge and receipt of a copy of same.
Personnel records are confidential documents and are only to be reviewed by those staff on a
need to know basis. Such review is restricted to the Employee, the Employee's Supervisory
chain, the City Administrator and the Mayor.
The City Administrator is responsible for assuring that the following information and
documents are included in each Employee's Personnel File:

1. The original employment application and resume;
2 A copy of the offer letter;
3. Copies of all personnel action forms, such as c4~g~ of name or address, salary
and wage adjustments, promotion or demotions,'sepirations, disciplinary actions,
or records of leaves of absences;
4. Copies of performance appraisals;
5. Copies of all licenses and certificates peninent to the job requirements;
6. The Employee's signed statement of having received, read and understood the
City of Sun Valley's Personnel Policies & Procedures Manual; and
7. A copy of the Employee's background investigation and verification of references.

---

The City Administrator's Office will maintain separate Employee records as the Employee's
Payroll Record File, which will include the following:
1. A copy of the Employee's W-2 form;
2. A copy of the Employee's Employment Eligibility Verifieation Form (FormI-9),
required for all Employees by the U.S. Department ofJustice, Immigration and
Naturalization Service;
3. A copy of the Employee's PERSI application and authorization for salary
deduction to provide for benefits;
4. A copy of any authorization for salary deduction for benefits;
5. Copies of the Employee's selection of benefits;
6. Time and attendance records;
7. Payroll records;
8. Wage garnishments.
7

As adopted by the City,
Council 11/18/04
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CITY ADMINISTRATOR

GENERAL STATEMENT OF DUTIES:
The City Administrator, under direction from the Mayor, performs high level administrative,
technical and professional work in directing and supervising the administration of city
government.

DISTINGUISHING FEATURES OF THE CLASS:
Exercises general supervision over the business affairs of the city. Manages and supervises all
departments within the city to achieve goals within available resources. Reviews progress and
directs changes as needed.
Provides leadership and direction in the development of short and long range plans.
Communicates official plans, policies and procedures to staff and the general public.
Subject to the approval of the Mayor, prepares, maintains, implements and supervises a
comprehensive program for all personnel matters of the city, including a Job Classification and
Pay Plan, a Salary Schedule, and a Personnel Policies and Procedures Manual. The City
Administrator will structure, supervise and evaluate employee performance according to these
documents.

EXAMPLES OF DUTIES:
Assures that assigned areas of responsibility are performed within budget; performs cost control
activities; monitors revenues and expenditures in assigned areas to assure sound fiscal control;
pursuant to the city's Fiscal Policy. Prepares annual budget requests; assures effective and
efficient use of budgeted funds, personnel, materials, etc.
Prepares a preliminary budget and submits an annual budget to the Council.
A.ssist auditors in the preparation of the annual financial audit of municipal fiscal procedures and
file said audit with the Secrelary of State of Idaho and the Idaho Tax Commission and the
designated bond paying agenl of the City.
Monitor and supervise all construction projects, including City contracts, private development,
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Provides a financial statement to the Mayor and Council on a monthly basis.
Receive and resolve citizen complaints and requests for services and information expeditiously
and efficiently.
Attends all meetings of the Council at which attendance may be required by the Mayor.

DESIRABLE QUALIFICATIONS:
Graduation from an accredited four-year college or university with a degree in public
administration, political science, business management of a closely related field and five years of
experience as a municipal administrator.
Considerable knowledge of modem policies and practices of public administration; working
knowledge of municipal finance, human resources, public works, public safety and community
development.
Skill in preparing and administering municipal budgets; skill in planning, directing and
administering municipal programs; skill in operating the listed tools and equipment.
Ability to prepare and analyze comprehensive reports; ability to carry out assigned projects to
their completion; ability to communicate effectively verbally and in writing; ability to establish
and maintain effective working relationships with employees, city officials and the public; ability
to efficiently and effectively administer a municipal government.

TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT USED:
Requires frequent use of personal computer, including word process1ng and spreadsheet
programs, calculator, telephone, copy machine and fax machine.

OTHER:
The duties listed above are intended only as illustrations of the various types of work that may be
performed. The omission of specific statements of duties does not exclude them from the
position if the work is similar, related or a logical assignment to the position.
The job description does not constitute an employment agreement between the employer and
employee and is subject to change by the employer as the needs of the employer and
requirements of the job change.

6W
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CITY OF SUN VALLEY
MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT
CITY COUNCIL AND MAYOR POWERS AND AUTHORITIES

CORPORATE POWERS
Idaho cities derive their police powers from the Idaho Constitution. Other governmental and
proprietary powers are established by state laws enacted by the Idaho Legislature. The
essential corporate powers of municipalities are defined in Idaho Code § 50-301:
50-301. CORPORATE & LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT POWERS.
Cities governed by this act shall be bodies corporate and politic; may sue and be sued;
contract and be contracted with; accept grants-in-aid and gifts of property, both real and
personal, in the name of the city; acquire, hold, lease, and convey property, real and
personal; have a common seal, which they may change and alter at pleasure; may erect
buildings or structures of any kind, needful for the uses or purposes of the city; and
exercise all powers and perform all functions of local self-government in city affairs as are
not specifically prohibited by or in conflict with the general laws or the constitution of the
state of Idaho.

MAYOR-COUNCIL FORM OF GOVERNMENT
The City of Sun Valley operates under the mayor-council form of government. The mayorcouncil form is the most common form of government in Idaho. In the mayor-council form of
government, the executive branch of the city, headed by the mayor is responsible for the
day-to-day administration of city affairs. The council is comp9 r~~le to the state Legislature
in that the council has the legislative or policymaking powers in the city.
SEPARATION OF POWERS
City council's role is analogous to that of the State Legislature in establishing local public
policy. The mayor, as the chief administrative officer, heads the executive branch. Idaho
city government structure reflects the philosophy known as the "separation of powers
doctrine." Under the doctrine, each of the branches exercise certain defined powers, free
from unreasonable interference by other branches; yet all branches interact with and upon
each other as a part of a check and balance system.
COMPOSITION OF THE ELECTED BODY
The Sun Valley elected body consists of the Mayor and four Council members elected at
large from the City.

I

THE OFFICE OF MAYOR
The Mayor is elected at-large on a non-partisan basis for a four-year term. The Mayor is the
chief administrative officer of the City and is granted power pursuant to Idaho Code Title 50
Chapter 6.

1
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Mayoral duties include but are not limited to:
• Preside over and determining the order of business for all City Council meetings.
• Administer oaths and signing contracts on behalf of the City
• Call a special meeting of the Council, with or without Council consent
• Appoint and remove members of the Planning and Zoning Commission, and a variety of
committees and boards as set forth in Exhibit A attached hereto with Council consent as
indicated
• Fill vacancies on the Council with Council consent
• Appoint the-necessary City officers: the City Clerk, Treasurer, and Attorney with Council
consent
• Require accounts and reports pertaining to a City official's office to be submitted to the
Council
• Cast a tie-breaking vote when the Council is equally divided. However, ordinances or
actions that require an affirmative vote of a majority (one-half plus one) of the full
Council limit the tie-breaking authority of the Mayor. Examples of ordinances that
require such majorities are: franchise ordinances, Council confirmation of Mayor's
appointment, removal of an appointed officer, and suspension of rules on reading
ordinances
• Veto City ordinances approved by City Council. The Mayor must submit his "veto
message" at the next regular meeting of the Council. If such written objections are not
delivered, the ordinance becomes law without the Mayor's signature. A veto can be
overridden by a majority of the full Council
• Provide police powers to preserve the peace, protect public health and safety, and
regulate various types of functions (public places, zoniA.Q, businesses, etc.)
• Perform marriage ceremonies

THE CITY COUNCIL
The powers of the City Council are set forth in Idaho Code Title 50 Chapter 7. The term of
office of Council members is four (4) years except as otherwise provided by statute. The
Council is the legislative arm of the City, setting policy for the Mayor to administer.
The Council is composed of four members. In order to provide for continuity in Council
membership, Council terms are staggered so that only half of the members' term expires in any
given general election.
The Council's duties are primarily to establish policy and function in a legislative capacity. The
Council may adopt, revise, codify, or compile all ordinances, rules and regulations necessary to
implement the powers and duties conferred by state law and to maintain the welfare of the City.
The Council confirms all appointments made by the Mayor that require Council consent,
defines the duties and authority of the appointed officers by ordinance and approves or
disapproves, by a majority of the full Council, any appointed officer the Mayor desires to
remove. In addition, an appointed officer can be removed by unanimous vote by the Council
itself.

2
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Council duties include but are not limited to:
• Examines the accounts of officers who are responsible for managing the monies,
property or business of the City on a quarterly basis
• Passes the annual appropriation ordinance
• Sets compensation for the Mayor and Council no less than sixty (60) days before a
general City election
• Approves all claims against the City prior to payment
• Determines all contributions for City fringe benefits
• Orders payments of final judgments against the City
• Establishes a single purchasing agent for all City departments
• Certifies property taxes within the City for general revenue or special purposes
• Transfers the surplus in one fund to the credit of another fund
• Utilizes short-term borrowing in anticipation of federal or state grants
• Promotes the general health, safety and welfare of the community by enacting
ordinances and regulations and prescribing penalties
• Designates, by ordinance, an official newspaper for the City
• Passes any ordinance and regulation necessary to preserve and maintain the public
health, safety and welfare

Election of Council President
Pursuant to Idaho Code 50-702 following a general City election at the first meeting in January
a Council President shall be elected. The Council President shall serve until the next general
City election or until a vacancy occurs in the position.
Pursuant to Idaho Code §50-608 in case of a temporary vacancy in the office of Mayor due to
absence or disability, the President of the Council shall exercise the office of Mayor during
such disability or temporary absence, until the Mayor shall return.
Additional Council President Responsibilities include meeting with the Mayor to set regular
Council meeting agendas.

REGULAR & SPECIAL MEETINGS
In January regular meeting dates and times for the coming year are established by resolution.
Special meetings may be held at any time for a specific legal purpose. One half (1/2) plus (1) of
the members of the full Council shall have the power to call special meetings of the City
Council pursuant to Idaho Code § 50-706. The object of the special meeting must be submitted
to the Council members in writing. The Mayor may also call a special meeting without the
consent of the Council. All meetings will have Mayor, Council and public comment on the
agenda.

3

Page 213 of 526

5/5/.2016 :::32 PM

FROM:

Fax

TO: 1-208-788-':)!:,:7

PAGE:

00.2

(if

008

Kirtlan G. Naylor
[ISB No. 3569]
Jacob H. Naylor
[ISB No. 8474)
TylerD. Williams
[ISB No. 8512]
MAY - 5 2016
NAYLOR & HALES, P.C.
JoLynn Drage, Clerk District
Attorneys at Law
Court Blaine fountv,__ ldah,,
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 610
Boise, ID 83 702
Telephone No. (208) 383-9511
Facsimile No. (208) 383-9516
Email: kirtr@naylorhales.com: jaker@naylorhales.com: tdw@naylorhales.com
Attorneys for Defendant Nils Ribi

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
SHARON R. HAMMER,
Case No. CV2015-428
Plaintiff,
vs.
NILS RlBI, in his individual capacity,

REPLY MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER
I.R.C.P. 12(c)

Defendant.

Defendant, Nils Ribi, by and through his attorneys of record, Naylor & Hales, P.C., hereby
files this Reply Memorandum in Support of his Motion to Dismiss Under I.R.C.P. l 2(c). 1 As shown

1Hammer

attempts a tortured interpretation ofl.R.C.P. 12(c) in order to make the ultimately
needless distinction between it and a motion to dismiss under I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6). There is no such
order of the Court to "close" the pleadings, as such is automatic when a defendant files an answer
as contemplated under the pleadings allowed in I.R.C.P. 7(a). "Thus, the pleadings are closed for the
purposes of Rule 12(c) once a complaint and answer have been filed, assuming, as is the case here,
that no counterclaim or cross-claim is made." Doe v. United States, 419 F.3d 1058, 1061 (9th Cir.
2005) Again, this is a needless exercise as motions to dismiss raised under either rule share an
identical legal standard.
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throughout Ribi's briefing, Hammer has failed to plead facts sufficient to support her claims, and
therefore, her Complaint should be dismissed.

I.
ARGUMENT
A.

Hammer's Extensive Factual Allegations Do Not Establish Any Threats of
Physical Harm.
Hammer's argument against dismissal avoids Ribi's legal arguments as to why her

allegations do not meet the standard sufficient to support the allegation that an assault occurred. 2
Instead, she attempts to apply her own subjective characterization of what would determine an
assault-unsupported by any valid legal analysis-in order to avoid dismissal. At no time, through her
Complaint or in her memorandum, can she point to any clear. specific. definitive act which would
evidence a threat of physical haim. Instead, she inaccurately uses the terms harassment, intimidation,
and hostility to avoid the fact that there has never been any threat of physical harm posed by Ribi,
as shown by Hammer's own pleadings. Then, without any alleged overt act to establish any physical
risk, Hammer tries to simply claim that, because she subjectively believed she was at risk of physical
ham1, this is sufficient to defeat Ribi's Motion to Dismiss. As the cases previously cited by Ribi
indicate, however, Hammer's conclusory allegations are not sufficient. In those cases, courts have

2It

is worth noting that Hammer wrongly refers to Ribi 's argument as "claiming," "asserting,"
"admitting," or "conceding" portions of her allegations regarding her facts as pied in the Complaint.
(See Opposition Memorandum, pp. 2, 8-9, 15, footnotes 18 and 28) This is entirely inaccurate. Ribi
does not concede or admit that any of the facts occurred in the way Hammer has posited them, as
detailed through his Answer filed in this action. However, as this is a motion to dismiss, he addresses
the facts of Hammer's allegations in order to establish as a matter of law that her allegations are
insufficient to support a claim. This was clearly noted in his opening memorandum.
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not found a valid assault without an overt act sufficient to indicate a threat of physical harm.

(Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, pp. 5-9)
There is no factual basis pied in her Complaint for Hammer to repeatedly-and
inaccurately-represent to this Court that Ribi ever threatened anyone with physical violence at any
time. In fact, it is telling that, for as many times that Hammer asserts that Ribi threatened her with
physical violence, the actual factual allegations that she cites to support those allegations are vague,
without date or time, and are based wholly on opinion and conjecture of others instead of actual fact.
(Complaint, ,i,i 17-18, 21, 25, 32) 3 Even her allegation of the so-called "assault" is devoid of any
actual threats of physical ham1. For example, in her Complaint she simply states that Ribi "turned
toward" Hammer with his am1s raised. (Complaint, iiiI 38-42)
The most negative legal inference that can be drawn from the actual facts in Hammer's
Complaint is that Ribi may have acted unprofessionally by raising his voice and treating employees
dismissively. Hammer's characterization of these facts as egregious is a blatant attempt to fabricate
a physical assault when the actual allegations pied by Hammer herself supports nothing of the kind.
When stripped of her own subjective characterization, nothing remains which would support a claim
for assault.

B.

Ribi is Presumed Statutorily Immune Under J.C.§ 6-904 Because Hammer has
Provided No Fact or Legal Analysis to Overcome the Presumption.
Hammer's legal arguments against application of the statutory immunity found in LC. § 6-

904 are inapplicable as she ignores the statutory presumption of I.C. § 6-903(5) that Ribi acted

3Additionally, Hammer's reliance on her filings accompanying her defamatory and improper
Motion for I.R.C.P. 35 Examination are irrelevant to this Motion to Dismiss, and should not be
considered by this Court as they are outside the pleadings.
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within the course and scope of his employment and without malice or criminal intent. In support of
her arguments, she cites to two Idaho Supreme Court cases which are entirely distinguishable
because the issues of law raised therein are specifically tailored to separate immunities under the
ITCA, neither of which share a parallel statutory presumption to I.C. § 6-903(5). Thus, while those
cases may support the general idea that "liability is the rule and immunity the exception," this does
not negate the specific statutory presumption of immunity under I.C. § 6-903(5).
For example, in Grabicki v. City of Lewiston, l 54 Idaho 686 (2013), the legal issue there
hinged upon the application of two separate immunities: the discretionary function exemption and
the design exception. See l.C. § 6-904(1), (7). There are no corresponding statutory presumptions
that apply to either of these exceptions. The city was accused of negligent design in its decision and
plan to replace a storm-water drain system. Grabicki, 154 Idaho at 693. The city's defense was that
it was immune under the discretionary function exemption for deciding to replace the system and
also under the design exception in executing that replacement. Id. The court noted that the
discretionary function allows immunity for the actions of governmental entities in deciding whether
or not to make a plan or design for repair, but that once that decision is made, the discretionary
function exemption no longer applies. Grabicki, 154 Idaho at 692. Further, there was an issue of
material fact with respect to the design exemption as there was evidence showing that the city's
design may not have applied proper engineering standards or was approved by the proper authority,
which are both statutory prerequisites for that immunity to apply. Id. at 693. It was reasonable for
the court there to narrowly construe those immunities when there were no accompanying statutory
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presumptions to support immunity, and there were issues of fact as to the general applicability of
those immunities.
In like manner, Teurlings v. Larson, 156 Idaho 65 (2014), also dealt with a separate immunity
without an accompanying presumption against liability. The immunity at issue there applied to
members of the Idaho National Guard "when engaged in training or duty." I.C. § 9-604(4) Unlike
the presumption that Ribi acted within the course and scope of his employment, and without malice
or criminal intent, there is no statutory presumption that National Guard officers are automatically
engaged in training or on duty. In that case, a National Guard officer was involved in a car accident
while traveling from training exercises, and the question of negligence was raised. Teurlings, l 56
Idaho at 70. The court determined that there was a material issue of fact regarding whether the
plaintiff there was acting upon orders of her superior officer to transport a fellow guardsman, and
thus, whether she was "engaged in training or duty." Id at 72-73. Because this case does not involve
a statutory presumption of immunity, it has no bearing on Ribi's motion to dismiss.
Just as Hammer's legal analysis discussed above is flawed, so is her reliance on the
allegations in her Complaint to show that Ribi supposedly acted outside the scope of his employment
because the incident occurred outside the physical space of the City Council Chambers and not
during an in-session and active city council meeting. This is a hyper-technical and absurd reading
of the "time and place" requirement ofl.C. § 6-903(5) that is not justified under the statute, any case
law, or common sense. (See, e.g.,

Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, pp. 9-10

(discussing related case law))
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Again, Hammer's own allegations state that Ribi was referring to city business when talking
to Hammer, during a break in a city council meeting. Based on her own characterization of the
conversation, nothing was discussed outside the business of the city. And, although she characterizes
the publically accessible reception area as "remote," the fact that it occurred at City Hall only further
suppmts that it happened within the course and scope of Ribi's employment. It is clear, based on
Hammer's allegations, that Ribi was acting within the course and scope of his employment when the
alleged incident occurred.
Lastly, Hammer argues that Ribi acted with malice because assaults are "malicious," thus
malice always accompanies assaults. ( Opposition Memorandum, pp. 15-16) This is meaningless
circular reasoning. As used in the ITCA, "malice" holds a legal meaning beyond the simple
characterization Hammer attempts to apply. As argued previously, there is no factual basis to
establish that Ribi acted with any ill will (e.g., desire to do harm for harm's sake) towards Hammer,
or that he made these alleged comments with the intent to do her hann. (Memorandum in Support

ofMotion to Dismiss, pp. 11-12) If anything, the statutory presumption that he acted without malice
is supported by Hammer's alleged facts, because she can cite to nothing Ribi allegedly said or did
on September 15 that was outside his alleged intent to correct the city budget. Even in her alleged
interactions with Ribi through multiple years, there are no facts alJeged showing that he ever
confronted or discussed anything with Hammer which was outside his responsibilities as a city
council member. 4

Hammer filed a document entitled "Motion to Amend," which apparently seeks to amend
the Complaint to fix its deficiencies if the Court rules against her. As such, she is not actually asking
the Court to presently take any action, and the motion is accordingly premature. Hammer also has
not noticed the motion for a hearing, and has not provided a copy of the proposed complaint.
4
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II.
CONCLUSION
As shown above and in Ribi's opening brief, Hammer's allegations are insufficient to support
a claim for assault, and Ribi is statutorily immune. Therefore, the Court must dismiss Hammer's
Complaint in full.
DATED this 5th day of May, 2016.

NAYLOR & HALES, P.C.

By_ _ _-+---....----------Kirtl

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 5th day of May, 2016, I caused to be served, by the
method(s) indicated, a true and correct copy of the foregoing upon:
James R. Donoval
4110 Eaton Ave., Ste. D
Caldwell, ID 83607

Attorney for Plaintiff

X

U.S. Mail

Hand Delivered

_)4._

Fax Transmission: 649-1603
Email: jdonoval@aol.com

9556_,12 DcfMTD Reply final (5-S-16).wpd

REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER I.R.C.P.12(c)- 7.

Page 220 of 526

FILED ~·~· ;c,1

James R. Donoval, ISB #8142
4481 N. Dresden Pl., Suite D
Garden City, ID 83714
Telephone: (312) 859-2029
Facsimile: (208) 649-1603
Email: jdonoval@aol.com

[ MAY O5 2016

J

,v

Jolynn Drage, Clerk District
Court Blaine Coun , Idaho

Attorney for Plaintiff Sharon R. Hammer

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

SHARON R. HAMMER,
Case No. CV-2015-428
Plaintiff,
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO REQUIRE AN
LR.CP. 35{a) MENTAL
EXAMINATION OF
DEFENDANT NILS RIBI

vs.
NILS RIBI, in his individual capacity,
Defendant.

COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Sharon R. Hammer ("Ms. Hammer"), by and through her

counsel of record, James R. Donoval, and in Reply in support of her Motion To Seek An I.R.C.P.
35(a) Mental Examination Of Defendant Nils Ribi states as follows:
Introduction

As is described in Defendant Ribi's Response, there has been extensive litigation
between Ms. Hammer, Mr. Donoval, Sun Valley and Defendant Ribi since November of 2011 1•

1 In Defendant Ribi's Response (as Defendant Ribi and Sun Valley have done in every one of the numerous cases
between Ms. Hammer, Mr. Donoval, Defendant Ribi, and Sun Valley), Defendant Ribi claims that Ms. Hammer's
conduct in seeking the lR.C.P. 35(a) examination of Defendant Ribi is "frivolous" and a "a waste of the parties' and
the court's time and resources". It should be noted, that in almost every case between the parties before Idaho
district courts, Defendant Ribi and Sun Valley have sought attorney's fees and sanctions against either Ms. Hammer
or Mr. Donoval, and have been denied on each and every request. It continues to be frivolous and a waste of the
Court's time and resources for Defendant Ribi and Sun Valley to continue to claim that any matters raised by Ms.
Hammer (or Mr. Donoval) are frivolous. It is also a sign of Defendant Ribi' s suffering from APD/DPD or NPD that
Defendant Ribi does not take the allegations of his harassment of Ms. Hammer or his own mental health issues
seriously.

Reply In Support Of Motion To Require IR. C.P. 35(a) Mental Health Examination Of Defendant Nils Ribi - 1
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However, that litigation has also produced extensive discovery confirming Defendant Ribi's
harassment of Ms. Hammer and Defendant Ribi' s retaliation towards Ms. Hammer for
complaining about his harassment. But for that extensive litigation, Ms. Hammer would not have
obtained the extensive evidence she has presented to the Court regarding numerous Sun Valley
officials who have admitted that either Defendant Ribi was harassing Ms. Hammer over an
extensive period between 2009 and 2011, or at a minimum, that Ms. Hammer had made
numerous complaints about Defendant Ribi's harassment and abusive conduct to Sun Valley
officials, which Defendant Ribi was made aware 0£ Instead of dealing with the problem, Sun
Valley officials such as former Sun Valley Mayor DeWayne Briscoe (who was the Sun Valley
City Council president at the time) did nothing about it because it was not his job to do so, or
failed to do anything about it because of the legal advice of former Sun Valley City Attorney
Adam King ("Former City Attorney King") that nothing could be done to discipline Defendant
Ribi because he was an elected official. Instead, Ms. Hammer was advised that she should lock
her Sun Valley City Hall office door when Defendant Ribi was in Sun Valley City Hall, and that
Ms. Hammer would be required to wait until Defendant Ribi did something "criminal" before
she could take any real action against Defendant Ribi2 • The extensive discovery has negated
Defendant Ribi's initial assertion in November of 2011, under oath, and arguably perjured
testimony, that Ms. Hammer never made complaints about Defendant Ribi's harassment of her
or that he was unaware of the complaints against him.

It should be noted that Ms. Hanuner sued Former City Attorney King for legal malpractice for the advice he
provided her that nothing could be done to Defendant Ribi until he actually committed a crime against her (Hammer
v. King, CV-2013-609, Blaine County). In May of 2015, Judge Michael Crabtree dismissed Ms. Hammer's legal
malpractice claim against Former City Attorney King finding that the legal advice Former City Attorney King was
providing Ms. Hammer was in her position as the Sun Valley City Administrator, and not personal advice.
Thereafter, Former City Attorney King entered into a settlement agreement with Ms. Hammer in which she agreed
to not pursue her legal malpractice claims against Former City Attorney King on appeal.
3 As is provided in Exhibit K of the Affidavit Of Counsel, in November of 2011 Defendant Ribi submitted an
2

Reply In Support Of Motion To Require I.R. C.P. 35 (a) Mental Health Examination Of Defendant Nils Ribi - 2
Page 222 of 526

Under The U.S. Supreme Court Findings In Sclagenhauf, It Does Not Matter Who Raises
The Mental Health Of A Party, As The Sole Question Is Whether The Mental Health Of
The Party Is "In Controversy"
In the Response, Defendant Ribi spends an extensive amount of space describing that
Defendant Ribi should not be required to undergo a mental health examination because in

Shlagenhaufthe driver of the automobile at issue in that case was, ultimately, determined to not
be required to undergo a F.R. C.P. 35(a) mental examination. However, Defendant Ribi refuses
to focus on the two principal points at issue in Shlagenhauf
First, in Shlagenhauf, @239-240, the U.S. Supreme Court confirmed that a defendant
{such as Defendant Ribi) is just as subject to a F.R. C.P. 35(a) examination as is the plaintiff
{"Rule 35 on its face applies to all 'parties', which under any normal reading would include a
defendant ... We therefore agree with the Court of Appeals that the District Court had power to
apply Rule 35 to a party defendant in an appropriate case").
Second, the ShlagenhaufCourt, @243, confirmed that the party against whom the
F.R.C.P. 35(a) examination is being sought {i.e. Defendant Ribi in this case) does not have to

raise the issue of his/her mental health himself/herself, but that, instead, it can be raised by the
opposing party {i.e. Ms. Hammer in this case) {The movant does not need to prove his/her case
on the merits in order to meet the requirements for a mental examination ... The movant must
only produce sufficient information, by whatever means ... and the movant must only make "an
affirmative showing" that the opposing party's mental health "was in controversy and that there
was good cause for the examinations requested").
The facts of Shlagenhauf are vastly different than the facts associated with this case. In

Affidavit in the matter of Hammer v. Ribi, et al., CV-2011-928 (Blaine County) (the "Original IPPEA Law Suit")
falsely asserting that "he never threatened" Ms. Hammer and that he was unaware of any complaints of his
threatening or improper behavior towards Ms. Hammer until November of 2011.
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Shlagenhauf, there was no evidence alleged, whatsoever, that the defendant driver in that case
was suffering from any form of mental health issues. Instead, in Shlagenhauf, the plaintiff
merely claimed that the defendant driver's "eyes and vision were impaired" @244. Ms. Hammer
agrees that in Shlagenhauf, the plaintiff in that case neither plead, nor provided, "sufficient
evidence" to require the driver to proceed through a mental health examination. However, simply
because in Shlagenhaufthe driver in that case was not required to submit to a mental
examination does not vitiate the U.S. Supreme Court's directions that defendants are just as
subject to an F.R. C.P. 35(a) mental health examination and that the defendant himself/herself
does not have to raise their own mental health as an issue for the mental health of the defendant
to be "in controversy".
As was extensively described in Ms. Hammer's Memorandum In Support of IR. C.P.
35(a) Mental Examination Of Defendant Nils Ribi (the "Memorandum In Support"), and as is

further described herein, there is extensive evidence that (separate from Ms. Hammer's or Mr.
Donoval's claims related to Defendant Ribi), multiple Sun Valley officials and other individuals
that were made aware of Defendant Ribi's abusive and hostile conduct towards Ms. Hammer
questioned Defendant Ribi's stability and Ms. Hammer's safety around Defendant Ribi. The
allegations related to Defendant Ribi's mental health provided to this Court are much more
substantial and relevant than the mere issue of the driver's "eyes and vision" being impaired in

Shlagenhauf This Court cannot take lightly what the U.S Supreme Court stated is the obligation
of district court judges to "fulfill his function mandated by the Rule" (Shlagenhauf, @ 243) in
determining whether Defendant Ribi must proceed through a mental health examination.
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Defendant Ribi's Mental Health Was In Controversy During the Entire Period In Which
Multiple Sun Valley Officials Were Aware Of His Harassment And Abusive Conduct
Towards Ms. Hammer

As is detailed in the Memorandum In Support and the Affidavits of Ms. Hammer and
Counsel, multiple Sun Valley officials questioned Defendant Ribi's hostile and abusive conduct
towards Ms. Hammer, as well as Defendant Ribi's emotional stability.
•

Former Mayor Willich outright ruled, as he was authorized to, that Defendant Ribi
had violated the Sun Valley Personnel Policy on "Harassment" in any form 4 . In fact,
Former Mayor Willich made clear to Defendant Ribi's attorney herein Kirtlan Naylor,
under oath, that a) Ms. Hammer had made numerous complaints of Defendant Ribi's
harassment of her, b) Former Mayor Willich spoke to Defendant Ribi on numerous
occasions about his harassment of Ms. Hammer and told Defendant Ribi his hostile
conduct towards Ms. Hammer must cease, and, c) Defendant Ribi's conduct towards
Ms. Hammer was so problematic that "something needed to be done to protect [Ms.
Hammer] from [Defendant Ribi]" 5 .

•

Former City Attorney King believed that Defendant Ribi's conduct towards Ms.
Hammer was unacceptable, and contacted the Idaho Attorney General's office about
what to do about Defendant Ribi's harassment of Ms. Hammer.

•

Former Mayor Briscoe was aware of the harassment complaints against Defendant
Ribi as far back as early 2011 and did nothing about it because "it was not his job".

•

Former City Council Member Lamb agreed that Defendant Ribi's conduct towards

See Affidavit Of Counsel, Exhibit J (the "Anti Harassment Policy") in which "the City prohibits harassment in any
form" and requires that if there is a complaint of harassment against a Sun Valley City Council member it must be
made to the Mayor of Sun Valley, which Ms. Hammer did in regards to Defendant Ribi. Also see Affidavit of
Counsel, Exhibit, Willich. Supp. Aff., Para. 12, in which Former Mayor Willich confirms that he found Defendant
Ribi guilty of violating the Anti Harassment Policy related to Ms. Hammer, as he was authorized to do pursuant to
Section 7.5 of the Sun Valley Personnel Policies (also Affidavit Of Counsel, Exhibit J).
5 Supplemental Affidavit Of Counsel, Exhibit P.
4
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Ms. Hammer was hostile and unacceptable and told Defendant Ribi that it needed to
stop.
•

Former Police Chief Daggett advised Ms. Hammer that the Sun Valley Police
Department would be on notice when Defendant Ribi was present in Sun Valley City
Hall, that Ms. Hammer should lock her Sun Valley City Hall office door when
Defendant Ribi was present in Sun Valley City Hall, and that Ms. Hammer should
record all telephone conversations with Defendant Ribi.

In addition, both Ms. Hammer's professional counselor (Evan Hanson) and medical

professional (Nanette Ford) took notes of their treatment of Ms. Hammer, which confirms that as
far back as early 2011 Ms. Hammer was suffering physically and emotionally from how
Defendant Ribi was mistreating her and that Defendant Ribi was a danger to Ms. Hammer.
Curiously, Defendant Ribi has not responded to what the purpose was of providing him
with the Sun Valley Anti-Harassment Policy in September of 2010, if it wasn't to confirm that he
was harassing Ms. Hammer, and that as a Sun Valley City Council member he was subject to the
provision prohibiting "harassment in any form", other than, "Gee, I don't remember receiving
it"6.

There has been sufficient, if not overwhelming, evidence presented to the Court that
Defendant Ribi's hostility, anger, inability to accept that his conduct was unacceptable, and that
he was potentially dangerous to Ms. Hammer, was (and continues to be) a serious issue, to
provide this Court with a basis for ordering that Defendant Ribi be required to attend an I.R. C.P.
35(a) mental health examination.

6

See Affidavit Of Counsel, Exhibit L.
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The September 23, 2011 Letter From Mr. Donoval To Licensed Marriage And Family
Counselor Evan Hanson Does Not Question Mr. Hanson's Ability To Make Judgment's
About Defendant Ribi's Mental Health, But Instead Asks For Advice About What To Do
About Defendant Ribi's Abusive Conduct Towards Ms. Hammer
Defendant Ribi has sought to enter into the record, under seal, herein, a confidential letter
submitted by Mr. Donoval to Ms. Hammer's professional counselor, Evan Hanson ("Mr.
Hanson"), in September of 2011 (the "Hanson Letter"), which was issued about the same time as
the assault incident occurred. Ms. Hammer has agreed to release certain portions of the Hanson
Letter in order to reply to the issues raised in the Response 7.
Contrary to Defendant Ribi's claims that Mr. Donoval was questioning the competence
of Mr. Hanson, in the Hanson Letter, Mr. Donoval was actually asking Mr. Hanson (whose
medical records from as far back as January of 2011 reflect that Defendant Ribi was "disruptive
and manipulative" towards Ms. Hammer and that Defendant Ribi was on the "attack" in very
narcissistic ways8) for advice on what to do about Defendant Ribi. In Question 17 of the Hanson

Letter, in regards to the strain Ms. Hammer was suffering at work because of Defendant Ribi's
harassment, and the strain it was causing on Mr. Donoval's and Ms. Hammer's relationship, Mr.
Donoval states:
"Can you please provide advice on what Sharon should do about the Nils Ribi situation
and the advice that you have provided Sharon and me about how the Nils Ribi situation is
affecting our marriage?
Nothing about that request questions Mr. Hanson's competence or ability to diagnose
someone with a personality disorder or a mental illness, and instead requests advice about how to
deal with someone like Defendant Ribi who has a personality disorder or mental illness.
What Mr. Donoval questioned, in regards to Mr. Hanson's advice, was whether Mr.

7

8

See Supplemental Affidavit Of Counsel, Exhibit R.
See Affidavit Of Counsel, Exhibit H.
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Hanson's background in treating Mormon families and young boys, provided him with the
necessary background to provide advice to married couples. In the last two paragraphs of the
Hanson Letter, Mr. Donoval states:
"Although I respect your Christian based treatment philosophy, you can
understand why I may have doubts about your ability to fully treat Sharon's [redacted]
problems and the "liberation" treatment plan that you have obviously developed for
Sharon. And you can understand that based on how [redacted] and [redacted] have
responded to your treatment (both have had no success at having successful relationships
in their lives and are far from being capable of doing so), it makes me question your
ability to succeed in regards to Sharon and what your goals are in regards to Sharon.
Based on my long, loving and caring history with Sharon, and my detailed knowledge of
her prior medical and family histories, I believe that Sharon's issues require a much more
experienced and qualified counselor than you, one who has experience and the necessary
qualifications to treat a woman [redacted] and hope that you acknowledge such, and refer
Sharon to a better qualified psychiatrist or therapist here in Idaho.
However, if you do not believe that Sharon needs a different treatment plan, I
look forward to your responses [redacted]."
Mr. Donoval's concerns about Mr. Hanson's abilities were in regards to Mr. Hanson's
treatment experience and methodology related to females and marital counseling, not in regards
to his abilities to diagnose someone with either personality disorders or a mental illness.
In the Response, Defendant Ribi asserts that Ms. Hammer is seeking that this Court rely
on Mr. Hanson's assertions that Defendant Ribi is narcissistic (i.e. suffers from NPD). That is
not the case9• What Ms. Hammer asserts is that Mr. Hanson's written confirmation that
Defendant Ribi could suffer from NPD, is one of many pieces of information, which justifies a
true mental health professional (i.e. Dr. Eliason) to perform an examination which would
confirm Defendant Ribi's mental health issues, if any. As stated in Shlagenhauf, @243, Ms.
Hammer is merely required to produce sufficient information, by whatever means, and make an

9 Although Mr. Hanson was treating several other Sun Valley employees who disclosed Defendant Ribi's hostility
and mental health issues to Mr. Hanson. And, Mr. Hanson was hired by Sun Valley itself to discuss dealing with
"difficult people" (i.e. Defendant Ribi) with Sun Valley employees. So, Mr. Hanson had plenty of information upon
which to base his opinion that Defendant Ribi could suffer from NPD.
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affirmative showing that Defendant Ribi's mental health is in controversy and that there is good
cause for the examination requested. Mr. Hanson's opinion of Defendant Ribi's mental health is
one, of numerous, pieces of information which requires that Defendant Ribi be required to
proceed through anlR.C.P. 35(a) mental health examination.
The September 23, 2011 Letter From Mr. Donoval To Mr. Hanson Confirms That
Defendant Ribi's Abusive Conduct Towards Ms. Hammer And Bis Mental Health Were A
Serious Concern Before, And At The Same Time, As The Assault Of Ms. Hammer On
September 15, 2011

The submission to the Court of the Hanson Letter, actually further supports Ms.
Hammer's assertion that Defendant Ribi' s mental health was in controversy long before the
assault incident in September of 2011. In Question 17 of the Hanson Letter, Mr. Donoval makes
clear that Defendant Ribi' s abusive conduct towards Ms. Hammer was a serious issue for a
period of time. In the Hanson Letter, Mr. Donoval states:
"Sharon has developed a stressful relationship with one of the elected officials she works
for named Nils Ribi. The relationship is so stressful that she has stated that she wishes he
were dead 10• Her wishes regarding harm to Nils Ribi are serious and disturbing. I have
discussed Nils Ribi with you and have described the stress that her problems with Nils is
having on Sharon's and my relationship."
The Hanson letter itself confirms that Defendant Ribi's abusive conduct, and his
mistreatment of Ms. Hammer, were a serious issue well before the assault incident in September
of 2011.
Defendant Ribi's Affidavit Filed In Bis Defamation Law Suit Against Mr. Donoval Raised
Defendant Ribi's Own Mental Health As An Issue

In one of the several law suits between Ms. Hammer, Mr. Donoval, Sun Valley and
Defendant Ribi, in November of 2011 (Ribi v. Donoval, CV-2011-1040 (Blaine County) (the

10 It should be noted that most victims of abuse wish that the person causing the abuse would simply die and end the
suffering that the victim is going through. Such was the case with Ms. Hammer, who wished that Defendant Ribi
would simply "go away", even ifhe died.
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"Ribi Defamation Law Suit")), filed even before Ms. Hammer was terminated as the Sun Valley
City Administrator, Defendant Ribi sued Mr. Donoval for defamation, claiming that statements
Mr. Donoval made about Defendant Ribi in pre-litigation letters were defamatory. Judge
Jonathon Brody entered summary judgment almost immediately after the Ribi Defamation Law
Suit was filed finding that Mr. Donoval was protected from any defamation claims based on
attorney litigation protections.
However, in defense of Mr. Donoval's summary judgment request in the Ribi
Defamation Law Suit, Defendant Ribi filed an Affidavit raising his own mental stability.
Defendant Ribi's Affidavit, in relevant part, states:
"2. I have never been diagnosed with a mental illness or sought treatment
therefore.
3. I have never suffered or been diagnosed with having an emotional illness.
4. I have never received counseling or any treatment for mental or emotional
illnesses and have never charged the City of Sun Valley for any such services.
6. I have never been incapacitated by mental health and emotional illnesses.
7. I am not violent and no one has ever accused me of being violent until now.
8. I am not a violent threat to the City of Sun Valley employees or the public at
large and no one has ever accused me of this before now.
11. I have never endangered the safety of others."
The Court should recognize what the Affidavit states, and what it fails to acknowledge.
The Affidavit makes clear that Defendant Ribi has "never sought treatment". If he has never
been tested or diagnosed for a mental illness or personality disorder, then how can he possibly
assert that he does not suffer from any emotional illness or personality disorder? Just as
Defendant Ribi had no educational or professional background from which he could possibly
make criminal claims against Ms. Hammer, Defendant Ribi has no experience in mental health
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issues by which he could self diagnose himself. Defendant Ribi's bizarre assertion that he is
qualified to self diagnose himself for mental illnesses or personality disorders places him well
within the definition of someone suffering with APD/DPD or NPD.
In addition, Defendant Ribi's conclusions in the Affidavit that he is not violent or that he
does not endanger the safety of others cannot be founded on Defendant Ribi's internal opinions,
especially if he does suffer from some form of mental or emotional illness, but can only be
assessed from the perspective of independent, third parties. The record provided to the Court
herein affirms that numerous Sun Valley related officials were seriously concerned about
Defendant Ribi's mental stability and his potential for physical violence, especially related to
Ms. Hammer.
Summary

Defendant Ribi's assertion that it was proper for him, as an elected official, to get into a
"heated workplace argument" 11 with a Sun Valley employee that neither works for him or wants
any contact with him, about an issue that he had no unilateral right to raise, outside the confines
of a Sun Valley City Council meeting and the Sun Valley City Council chamber which were the
limits of his authority - itself, provides a basis for why Defendant Ribi potentially suffers from
either APD/DPD or NPD.
Defendant Ribi was advised on numerous occasions that he was harassing Ms. Hammer
and that his hostile conduct towards her needed to cease. What possibly did he not understand
about that ? - unless he suffers from a mental illness or a personality disorder such as APD/DPD
or NPD. Albert Einstein defined the word "insanity" as "doing the same thing over and over
again and expecting a different result". Insanity, in some ways, describes Defendant Ribi's
11 In Defendant Ribi's Memorandum In Support Of Motion To Dismiss Under I.R.C.P. 12(c), Defendant Ribi asserts
that the assault of Ms. Hammer was nothing more than a "workplace argument' that go "a little heated".
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refusal to acknowledge the numerous times he was told that his conduct towards Ms. Hammer
was harassment and that he had no right to direct her activities or to act in a hostile manner
towards her. That refusal provides sufficient evidence to the Court that Defendant Ribi suffers
from either APD/DPD or NPD, as is extensively described in Ms. Hammer's Memorandum In
Support, or some other form of mental illness or personality disorder.
As was stated in Ms. Hammer's Memorandum, upwards of six percent (6%) of the
general population suffers from some form of personality disorder such as APD/DPD or NPD.
Defendant Ribi's mere election with about 200 votes to the Sun Valley City Council does not
make him immune from those statistics.
Mr. Ribi's assertion that he is capable of self diagnosis is itself a symptom of his
potential personality disorders and mental illness. Any individual suffering from APD/DPD or
NPD would do the same thing that Defendant Ribi has done, deny that he/she has done anything
wrong, deny that he/she has an illness of any sort, deny that he/she could possibly be physically
violent, and, most importantly, lie under oath. Such is the case with Defendant Ribi.
Because of the extensive litigation between Ms. Hammer, Mr. Donoval, Sun Valley and
Defendant Ribi, there is also extensive evidence that Defendant Ribi has hostility and anger
issues, and potentially suffers from some form of personality disorder. If Defendant Ribi does
suffer from some form of personality disorder, then his ability to have recognized right from
wrong related to the assault of Ms. Hammer or that there are lines that an individual does not
cross in social and professional settings, is at issue in this case. Defendant Ribi's potential mental
illness does not absolve him from civil liability for his actions. But it does explain why
Defendant Ribi would believe that he was not being threatening towards Ms. Hammer, or have
any concern for Ms. Hammer's well being, when he assaulted her.
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Ms. Hammer has sufficiently provided the Court with evidence, under the parameters
described in Shlagenhauf, that Defendant Ribi' s mental health is "in controversy" to require an
IR.C.P. 35(a) mental health examination 12 .

DATED this_'

tjth

day of May, 2016.

SHARON R. HAMMER

12 Curiously, if Defendant Ribi proceeds through an l.R. C.P. 35(a) mental health examination, and comes through
with a clean bill of mental health, then his conduct in assaulting Ms. Hammer can only be based on his purposeful
and "malicious" intent.
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PROOF OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that a true and correct copy of the attached document was served by
facsimile and U.S mail, proper postage pre-paid to the above listed recipients on or before 5:00
p.m. on May '5{17 2016.
To:

Kirtlan Naylor
Naylor & Hales
950 W. Bannock St., Suite 610
Boise, ID 83 702
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James R. Donoval, ISB #8142
4481 N. Dresden Pl., Suite D
Garden City, ID 83714
Telephone: (312) 859-2029
Facsimile: (208) 649-1603
Email: jdonoval@aol.com

Jolynn Orag

c

Court Blaine\ ~erk District
vOtJn ,

Idaho

Attorney for Plaintiff Sharon R. Hammer
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

SHARON R. HAMMER,
Case No. CV-2015-428
Plaintiff,
SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT
OF COUNSEL IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO REQUIRE AN
I.R.C.P. 35(a) MENTAL
EXAMINATION OF
DEFENDANT NILS RIBI AND
MOTION TO SEEK PUNITIVE
DAMAGES

vs.

NILS RIBI, in his individual capacity,
Defendant.

I, James R. Donoval, being first duly sworn upon oath, depose and state as
follows:
1.

I have personal knowledge of the facts contained herein and if called upon

to testify about the same, I could do so competently.
2.

I am counsel to Ms. Hammer in the matter herein.

3.

Attached as Exhibit P is a relevant portion of an Affidavit of Wayne

Willich filed on November 4, 2013 in the matter of Hammer v. Sun Valley, et al., CV2012-479 (Blaine County, Idaho).
4.

Attached as Exhibit Q is relevant portions of an Affidavit of Defendant

herein Nils Ribi filed in February of 2012 in the matter of Ribi v. Donoval, CV-20111
SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES R. DONOVAL
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1040 (Blaine County), which was a defamation law suit filed by Defendant Ribi against
me, which was dismissed at summary judgment.

5.

Attached as Exhibit R is redacted portions of a letter I sent to Evan

Hanson in September of 2011, which both I and Ms. Hammer agree to release and
publish herein in its redacted form.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

"i ~ day of May, 2016.

~ ~lie for Idaho
My Commission expires

2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

_Sj_JL_

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
day of May, 2016, a true and correct
copy of the foregoing document was served on the following individual(s) by the method
indicated:
Kirtlan Naylor
NAYLOR & HALES
950 W. Bannock St., Suite 610
Boise, ID 83 702

[X] U.S. Mail

[X] Fax:
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Email:

3
SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES R. DONOVAL
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Erie B. Swam, ISB #6396
Joy M. Vega, ISB #7887
JONL'i & SWARTZ PLLC
1673 W. Shoreline Drive, Suite 200 (83702]
P.O. Box 7808
Boise. ID 83707-7808
Telephone: (208) 489-8989
Facsilnile: (208)489-8988
Email: eric@jonesandswartzlaw.com

.joy@jonesandswartzlaw.com

Attorneys for Plaintiff Sharon R. Hammer
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF nm FIFm JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR nm COUNTY OF BLAINE
SHARON R. HAMMER,
Case No. CV-2012-479
Plaintiff,
vs.

CITY OF SUN VALLEY;
NILS RIB4 in his individual and official capacity;
DeWAYNE BRISCO~ in his individual and official
capacity;

Defendants.

AFFIDAVIT OF WAYNE WILLICK
FORMER MAYOR OF THE CITY OF SUN VALLEY
INSUPPORTOFMOTIONTOCOMPEL
I, WAYNE WILLICH, first duly sworn on oath, depose and state as follows:

1) My name is Wayne Willich; _and from the first week of January of2008 to January 3,
;

2012, I was the duly elected Mayor of the City Of Sun Valley, Idaho ("Sun Valley"), and that I
am competent to testify as to the matters herein. I certify pursuant to Rule 11 of the Idaho Code
Of Civil Procedure, that the facts alleged herein are true and accurate and are made with personal
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76) At the December 16, 2011 meeting with Attorney Naylor, I told Attorney Naylor that
I sti11 had concerns about the misconduct of Former Treac;urer Frostenson which I had discovered

during the Hammer Disciplinary Investigation. However, I told Attorney Naylor that the issues
related to Fonner Treasurer Frostenson were not his concern as part of his defense of the
Hammer Retaliation Law Suit.

77) A1 the December 16, 2011 meeting with Attorney Naylor, lprovided Attorney Naylor
with an oral history of the multitude of comp1aints that Former Administrator Hammer had made

about Council Member Ribi's harassment of Fonner Administrator Hammer and the-several
times I notified C01mci1 Member Ribi that his hostile conduct towards Former Administrator

Hammer needed to cease. I told Attorney Naylor that I did not believe that the Sun Valley
investigation r e g ~ whether Council Member·Ribi had violated the Sun Valley Personnel

Policies And Procedures related to the harassment of Former Administrator Hammer, as
Investigator Ball did not adequately interview Former Administrator Hammer or myself. In
addition, Investigator Ball had been given direct orders to interview both Former Council

Member Lamb-and Council Member Youngman related to Council Member Ribi's harassment of
Former Administrator Hammer, and simply refused to do so. I told Attorney Naylor that he was
not the attorney related to the investigation of Council Member Ribi's harassment of Former
Administrator Hammer either. I told Attorney Naylor that I was considering hiring a new
investigator to perform a new, internal, ~un Valley investigation of Former Administrator
Hammer's harassment co.owlaints against Council Member Ribi; because of Attorney Naylor's
improper influence over Investigator B~l's previous investigation, but that I may not have
enough time before the end of my tenn as Mayor of Sun Valley to do so. I told Attorney Naylor

that·I had concerns that something poteimally needed to be done to protect Former Administrator
Hammer from Council Member Ribi.

78) At the December 16, 2011 meeting, I told Attorney Naylor that I recognized that he

was trying to defend Council Member Rihi against the Hammer Retaliation Law Suit that
ICRMP would have to pay for,.but that I had a separate obligation to protect Fonner
Administrator Hammer before I left office as Mayor of Sun Valley on January 3, 2012, which
19
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R. KEITH ROARK, ISBN 2230
The Roark Law Firm, LLP
409 North Main Street
Hailey, Idaho 83333
TEL: 208/788-2427
FAX: 208/788-3918

4

Attorneys for Plaintiffs Nils Ribi and Patricia Brolin-Ribi
5

6

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

7

8
9

10

NILS RIBI and PATRICIA BROLIN-RIBI, )
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
vs.
)

)
)
)
)
)

11

12
JAMES R. DONOVAL,
13

Case No. CV-2011-1040

AFFIDAVIT OF NILS RIBI
IN OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANT'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

)
)
)

Defendant.
14

15
STATE OF IDAHO

)

County of BLAINE

)ss
)

16

17
NILS RIBI being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as his own personal
18
knowledge as follows:
19
1.

I am the Plaintiff and Counter-Defendant in the above-entitled cause of action

20
and make this Affidavit based on my own personal knowledge.
21

2.

I have never been diagnosed with a mental illness or sought treatment

22
therefore.
23

.,... .

I have never suffered or been diagnosed with having any emotional illness .

24
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1
2

3
4

5
6
7

8
9
10

11

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

20
21

4.

I have never received counseling or any ~eatment for mental or emotional

illnesses and have never charged the City of Sun Valley for any such services.

5.

I have been in public office for six years and in the second election, the voters

of Sun Valley determined that I was stable emotionally and competent to continue to serve in
public office.
6.

I have never been incapacitated by mental and emotional illnesses.

7.

I am not violent and no one has ever accused me of being violent until now.

8.

I am not a violent threat to the City of Sun Valley employees or the public at

large and no one has ever accused me of this before now.

9.

I have never committed willful and/or corrupt misconduct in public office and

have never been accused of so doing until now.
10.

I am not a pedophile and am not like Jerry Sandusky in any respect.

11.

I have never endangered the safety of others.

12.

I was not dismissed from my father's company.

13.

I have never disrobed publicly in front of anyone including my former next-

door neighbors.
14.

I have never committed a felony crime including but not limited to the fact

that I have never violated Idaho Code § 18-7901.
15.

I was in no way responsible for the departure of Virginia Egger, former City

Administrator for the City of Sun Valley.

22

24
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THE ROARK LAW FIRl\1. LLI'
409 :'io11ll \-lain Street

1

16.

Many persons, other than those to whom the letters were addressed to, saw

2

Donoval's letters dated November 12 and November 16, 2011 and Draft Complaint prior to

3

the initiation of any actual litigation in Court.

4

17.

Donoval's defamatory, vile and heinous statements about me have had the

5

effect of subjecting me to public hatred, contempt, and ridicule and have caused me to be

6

shunned and avoided by certain of my former friends and associates.

7

FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH NOT

8

DATED THIS

f/'(l day of February, 2012.

JA

9

10
11

NILSRIBI

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me ~tf}day of February 2012.

12
13

14
15
16
17

18
19

20
21

22

24
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DONOVAL 000001

JAMES R. DONOVAL
Attorney/CPA
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sun. Valley,.IOM353
(312} 859-3029; (208) 7.21-1383
ldlJtlOW!tpaol,com

Ewn Hanson WFT

sot SE Uberty Dr.
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CONFIDENTIAL - SUBJECT TO PROTECTIVE ORDERS

OONOVAL 000005

ll.t11stlon 17) Sharon has developed a very ffl'e5$lul relatlol'\ship with one cf thtt elected offk:lals she
worb for named Nib Ribi. Therel;ltiomhlp & so svessful that she has~ tliaulic IIMhes he were
dead. K•r wishes reprding harm to Nils RlbT are serious amt dlsturbrng. lhave dlswuecl Nils W Wftlt
you and have desi;rlbed ttt. ltresi tj\at ni:f probl.ms 'Mith Nils Ribt Is havln& Qn Sharon's and my
relatlonJhlp, and thus hr you have provided no guidance as how to dQl with the NIis Ribl situation.
can you pie:~ ~de ai+.ibon what Sharon shllul.t itcubout the Nils Rlbl sftuatlon &nd the advke
tltatyou have provided to So.iron and me about how the l'ills Rfbi sltuatllm ls affi!d:lhi our marrJatte1

RfD~T£D·

\
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\
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Although f respect your Christian based treatM1mt philosophy, you can urukrmnd why I may
have doubtubout your abll)ty to fully trl.!a~ SluirO!ti
probk!rar, and the
"t~tation" natrnent plan th~ Y9" .haviit obviously developed for SJ!ilfon. Apd. you ~n unde!'fflli\d
tnat based ori how
anci
haw re$J)Oilde<I toyourt,-a~m•ni {both hcive ~ J)I)
succi!ss at hwlrc six:cessful r~latlomhlps; In their lives and a,e far from bl'!!og ~~ble of d(!ina; $OJ, it
maw me qu.estlon y~r ablllty tosua:eed In reprih to Sharf.)n ;ind what your g~b are In reprds:to
Sharon. 8a$W pn my long,.&,iirncand.c.arln& lttstotyWlt&Sharon, and my de~lled knowledae of her
prior medical and family histories, lbtiReve that $hllr<,n's isso,es require a much more experienced .Ind
qualified c:oUIUl!ilor tha1l you, 1:11\e who n;as !!XJ)erlence and the necesnry qwillftC;Jtlons to treat a

o,di,Pre

wcmari

that youacknowledJe such, and referSh1.1to1"1 ~ a better qwillfied psychi.itrfst or thvraplsttier• In
ldal\o.

However,lf you liq not beUeve that Sharon need$ a tilfremit treatrriw,t plan, t look forward to
your respoMe$,: _
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FILED~~
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
SHARON R. HAMMER,
Case No. CV2015-428
Plaintiff,
vs.

ORDER SEALING DOCUMENT

NILS RIBI, in his individual capacity,
Defendant.

The Motion to Seal filed by the Defendant for an order sealing Appendix A, having come
before this Court, and good and sufficient cause appearing therefore, the Court hereby finds that at
this time it appears that the interest of Plaintiffs privacy predominates over the presumption of
public disclosure as to Appendix A because it contains matters related to her mental health.
Appendix A has also been designated as "CONFIDENTIAL" in the related state and federal lawsuits
of Hammer v. City ofSun Valley, United States District Court for the District ofldaho Case No.
1:13-cv-211-EJL, and Hammer v. City ofSun Valley, Blaine County Case No. CV-2012-479 and is
subject to the protective orders in those cases.
The Court also finds that one or more of the following bases to seal Appendix A is present:

K

That the documents or materials contain highly intimate facts or statements, the
publication of which would be highly objectionable to a reasonable person;
That the documents or materials contain facts or statements that the court finds might
be libelous;

ORDER SEALING DOCUMENT - 1.
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I
I

That the documents or materials contain facts or statements, the dissemination or
publication of which may compromise the financial security of, or could reasonably
result in economic or financial loss or harm to a person having an interest in the
documents or materials, or compromise the security of personnel, records or public
property of or used by the judicial department;
That the documents or materials contain facts or statements that might threaten or
endanger the life or safety of individuals;
That it is necessary to temporarily seal or redact the documents or materials to
preserve the right to a fair trial;

\l......

That the documents contain personal data identifiers that should have been redacted
pursuant to Rule 3(c) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, in which case the court
shall order that the documents be redacted in a manner consistent with the provisions
of that rule.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appendix A is sealed. This Order does not prevent any party
from seeking to unseal Appendix A at a later date.

~*
Elge

Robert J.
District Judge

ORDER SEALING DOCUMENT - 2.
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

/v\.a~

,

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the _}f)_ day of
2016, I caused to be
served, by the method(s) indicated, a true and correct copy ofth;~going upon:
James R. Donoval
4110 Eaton Ave., Ste. D
Caldwell, ID 83607
Attorney for Plaintiff

_l,.

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Fax Transmission: 649-1603
Email: jdonoval@aol.com

Kirtlan G. Naylor
Jacob H. Naylor
Tyler D. Williams
NAYLOR & HALES, P.C.
Attorneys at Law
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 610
Boise, ID 83702
Attorneys for Defendant

_1

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Fax Transmission:3 83-9516
Email: ki1i@naylorhales.com:
iake@naylorhales.com;
tdw@naylorhales.com

Clerk
9556_10 Order Sealing Document.wpd

ORDER SEALING DOCUMENT - 3.

Page 251 of 526

····;;;-;;--;;;;;;-;.;;;::-:--::-:-th-I~~

I FILED ~~--·

l
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. ..

MAY 12 2016
~ 0.0,. a. Dlfllrlct
81alrlt'I CotMtv, Idaho

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

.

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
SHARON R. HAMMER,
Case No. CV2015-428
Plaintiff,
vs.
NILS RIBI, in his individual capacity,

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS AND
GRANTING PLAINTIFF LEAVE TO
AMEND THE COMPLAINT

Defendant.

The Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, having come before this Court for a hearing held on
May 9, 2016, is granted for the reasons stated on the record. Plaintiff is granted leave to amend
her complaint, which must be filed no later than May 24, 2016, at 5:00 p.m. If no amended
complaint is filed by that date and time the case will be dismissed.
DATED this_[_(_ day of May, 2016.

District Judge

ORDER- 1.
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the __lL day of May, 2016, I caused to be served, by the
method(s) indicated, a true and correct copy of the foregoing upon:
James R. Donoval
4110 Eaton Ave., Ste. D
Caldwell, ID 83607
Attorney for Plaintiff
Kirtlan G. Naylor
Jacob H. Naylor
Tyler D. Williams
NAYLOR & HALES, P.C.
Attorneys at Law
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 610
Boise, ID 83 702
Attorneys for Defendant

_{

_f_

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Fax Transmission: 649-1603
Email: jdonoval(maol.com
U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Fax Transmission:383-9516
Email: kirt@navlorhales.com:
jake(aJ.naylorhales.com;
tdw@naylorhales.com

~

Clerk~
9556_13 Order re MTD.wpd
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MAt 1 2 2016
J9l.¥M ~ a.,_.,,
CmJrt ~ Ca(mtv, Idaho

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
SHARON R. HAMMER,
Case No. CV2015-428
Plaintiff,
vs.
NILS RIBI, in his individual capacity,

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR A RULE 35 MENTAL
EXAMINATION OF DEFENDANT

Defendant.

The Plaintiffs Motion for a Rule 35 Mental Examination of Defendant, having come
before this Court for a hearing held on May 9, 2016, is denied for the reasons stated on the
record.
DATED this

_Jj_ day of May, 2016.

Robert J. Elgee
District Judge

ORDER- 1.
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the _jL_ day of May, 2016, I caused to be served, by the
method(s) indicated, a true and correct copy of the foregoing upon:
James R. Donoval
4110 Eaton Ave., Ste. D
Caldwell, ID 83607
Attorney for Plaintiff
Kirtlan G. Naylor
Jacob H. Naylor
Tyler D. Williams
NAYLOR & HALES, P.C.
Attorneys at Law
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 610
Boise, ID 83 702
Attorneys for Defendant

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Fax Transmission: 649-1603
Email: jdonoval(a)aol.com

I
-----A.

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Fax Transmission:383-9516
Email: kirt(a)naylorhales.com:
jake(a)naylorhales.com;
tdw(a),naylorhales.com

Clerk

~

'(

9556_15 Order re Rule 35 examination.wpd
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11-09-2016

James R. Donoval, ISB #8142

4481 N. Dresden Pl., Suite D
Garden City, ID 83714
Telephone: (312) 859-2029
Facsimile: (208) 649-1603
Email: jdonoval@aol.com

MAY 16 2016
Jolynn Drage, Clerk District
Court 8lal11e CotJnh Idaho

Attorney for Plaintiff Sharon R. Hammer

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
SHARON R. HAMMER,
Case No. CV-2015-428
Plaintiff,
vs.

NILS RIBI, in his individual capacity,

MOTION TO RECONSIDER
DENIAL OF MOTION TO
REQUIRE AN LR.C.P. 35(a)
MENTAL EXAMINATION OF
DEFENDANT NILS RIBI

Defendant.

COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Sharon R. Hammer ("Ms. Hammer"), by and through her

counsel of record, James R. Donoval, and in support of her request for this Court to reconsider
the denial of Ms. Hammer's Motion To Require An LR.C.P. 35(a) Mental Examination Of
Defendant Nils Ribi states as follows:

1)

On May 9, 2016, this Court entered it oral ruling denying Ms. Hammer's Motion

To Require An LR.C.P. 35(a) Mental Examination Of Defendant Ribi.
2)

On May 11, 2016, this Court entered its written Order confirming its previous oral

denial of Ms. Hammer's Motion To Require An lR.C.P. 35(a) Mental Examination Of
Defendant Ribi.
3)

As part of its oral findings denying Ms. Hammer's request for a mental

Motion To Reconsider The Denial Of Motion To Require I.R.C.P. 35(a) Mental Examination - 1
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examination of Defendant Ribi, the Court sua sponte asserted that prior acts of aggression,
hostility, harassment and misconduct of Defendant Ribi towards Ms. Hammer are irrelevant and
inadmissible in regards to the assault claim of Ms. Hammer. Those assertions and findings of the
Court directly contradict the Idaho Supreme Court's findings in State v. Muguerza, 46 Idaho 456,
268 P. 1, 2 (Id. Sup.Ct. 1928) and State v. Marlar, 94 Idaho 803,809,498 P.2d 1276 (Id. Sup.Ct.
1972), in which the Idaho Supreme Court specifically found that prior acts of aggression or
misconduct by an accused against the victim of an assault are relevant and admissible at trial.
4)

As part ofits oral findings denying Ms. Hammer's request for a mental

examination, in part because of the Court's refusal to consider the prior conduct of Defendant
Ribi towards Ms. Hammer as part of its analysis in determining whether a mental health
examination of Defendant Ribi was warranted, the Court failed to acknowledge numerous
findings of various courts around the U.S. which confirm that the same type of historic conduct
alleged by Ms. Hammer against Defendant Ribi justifies that a party (i.e. Defendant Ribi) be
subject to a mental examination.
5)

As part of its oral findings denying Ms. Hammer's request for a mental

examination, the Court sua sponte asserted that Defendant Ribi's potential mental health
problems and his ability or inability to truthfully testify at trial cannot be raised at trial, and
therefore was not an issue related to the request for a mental examination. However, that finding
contradicts LR.E. 404(b), LR.E. 405 and LR.E. 608(b) which specifically allows a party to raise
the issue of the character traits of a witness to be untruthful, and to provide evidence of specific
acts of misconduct against a witness or party to challenge the credibility of a witness.
6)

As part of the findings denying Ms. Hammer's request for a mental examination,

the Court ignored evidence that Defendant Ribi has raised the issue of his mental health himself,

Motion To Reconsider The Denial Of Motion To Require J.R.C.P. 35(a) Mental Examination - 2
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including that in the matter of Ribi v. Donoval, CV-2011-1040 (Blaine County) (dismissed at
summary judgment) Defendant Ribi sued Mr. Donoval for defamation specifically asserting that
Defendant Ribi did not suffer from any mental illnesses or mental problems.
7)

Ms. Hammer intends to file a memorandum and affidavits in support of this

motion within fourteen (14) days of hearings to be scheduled in the matter.

WHEREFORE, Ms. Hammer prays that this Court enter an Order, reversing its findings denying
Ms. Hammer's request that Defendant Ribi be subject to a mental health examination pursuant to
LR.C.P. 35(a), and instead granting Ms. Hammer's request that Defendant Ribi be subject to a

mental examination by Dr. Scott Eliason pursuant to terms and conditions which are acceptable
to the Court.

Ms. Hammer seeks a hearing on the matters described herein.

DATED this

/p-fl/ day of May, 2016.
SHARON R. HAMMER

'AMES R. DONOVAL
MS. HAMMER'S ATIORNEY

Motion To Reconsider The Denial OfMotion To Require J.R.C.P. 35(a) Mental Examination-3
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PROOF OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that a true and correct copy of the attached document was served by
facsimile#k' U.S m,ajl, proper postage pre-paid to the above listed recipients on or before 5:00
p.m. on
(/ /d;
, 2016.
/

To:

Kirtlan Naylor
Naylor & Hales
950 W. Bannock St., Suite 610
Boise, ID 83 702
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James R. Donoval, ISB #8142
4481 N. Dresden Pl., Suite D
Garden City, ID 83714
Telephone: (312) 859-2029
Facsimile: (208) 649-1603
Email: jdonova1@aol.com

MAY f 6 2016

Attorney for Plaintiff Sharon R. Hammer

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
SHARON R. HAMMER,
Case No. CV-2015-428
Plaintiff,
MOTION TO RECONSIDER
DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT

vs.
NILS RIBI, in his individual capacity,
Defendant.

COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Sharon R. Hammer ("Ms. Hammer"), by and through her

counsel of record, James R. Donoval, and in support of her request for this Court to reconsider
the entry of its Order dismissing the Complaint herein states as follows:

1)

On May 9, 2016, this Court entered its oral ruling dismissing Ms. Hammer's

Complaint herein, but granting Ms. Hammer until May 24, 2016 to file an Amended Complaint.
2)

On May 11, 2016, this Court entered its written Order confinning its previous oral

dismissal of Ms. Hammer's Complaint and allowing Ms. Hammer the right to file an Amended
Complaint by May 24, 2016.
3)

As part of its oral findings dismissing Ms. Hammer's Complaint, the Court sua

sponte asserted that prior acts of aggression, hostility, harassment and misconduct of Defendant
Motion To Reconsider Dismissal Of Complain -1
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Ribi towards Ms. Hammer are irrelevant and inadmissible in regards to the assault claim of Ms.
Hammer. Those assertions and findings of the Court directly contradict the Idaho Supreme
Court's findings in State v. Muguerza, 46 Idaho 456,268 P. l, 2 (Id. Sup.Ct. 1928) and State v.

Marlar, 94 Idaho 803,809,498 P.2d 1276 (Id. Sup.Ct. 1972), in which the Idaho Supreme Court
specifically found that prior acts of aggression or misconduct by an accused against the victim of
an assault are relevant and admissible at trial.
4)

In dismissing Ms. Hammer's Complaint, in determining whether Ms. Hammer

had properly plead her cause of action for civil assault, the Court failed to take into consideration
the prior harassment and abusive conduct of Defendant Ribi towards Ms. Hammer as evidence of
the mental state of Defendant Ribi when he assaulted Ms. Hammer.
5)

In its oral findings dismissing the Complaint, the Court failed to acknowledge that

the Idaho Supreme Court has accepted "notice" pleadings as opposed to "fact" pleadings in
determining whether the plaintiff has adequately plead a cause of action (see Mortensen v.

Stewart Title Co., 149 Idaho 437, 443, 235 P.3d 387 (Id. Sup.Ct. 2010) and Brown v. City Of
Pocatello, 148 Idaho 802, 809, 229 P.3d 1164 (Id. Sup.Ct. 2010)), and instead the Court
thoroughly reviewed the Complaint paragraph by paragraph to determine whether Ms. Hammer
had failed to plead particular facts which the Court found were required to put Defendant Ribi on
"notice" that he was facing an assault claim.
6)

In its oral findings dismissing the Complaint, the Court failed to acknowledge that

Defendant Ribi had already filed an Answer herein denying that he had assaulted Ms. Hammer,
making it clear that Defendant Ribi was clearly "on notice" of the assault claims brought against
him by Ms. Hammer.

Motion To Reconsider Dismissal Of Complain - 2
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In its oral findings dismissing the Complaint, the Court indicated that the proper

elements of civil assault which it was considering are those found in the criminal assault statute
(i.e. Idaho Code § 18-901) as opposed to what the Idaho Supreme Court has indicated are the
proper elements of civil assault as is described in Idaho Civil Jury Instruction Section 4.30
adopted by the Idaho Supreme Court. The Court's failure to verify what the proper elements of
civil assault are in Idaho had an impact on the Court's interpretation of whether Ms. Hammer
placed Defendant Ribi on proper notice in the Complaint that Defendant Ribi was facing a claim
for civil assault under Idaho law, as opposed to an assault claim under the Idaho Criminal Code
(Idaho Code § 18-901).

8)

Ms. Hammer intends to file a memorandum and affidavits in support of this

motion within fourteen (14) days of hearings to be scheduled in the matter.

Motion To Reconsider Dismissal Of Complain - 3
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WHEREFORE, Ms. Hammer prays that this Court enter an Order, reversing its findings
dismissing Ms. Hammer's Complaint, and confirming that the Complaint filed by Ms. Hammer
herein, which Defendant Ribi had already answered, adequately put Defendant Ribi on "notice"
that Defendant Ribi was facing a civil assault claim under Idaho law for an incident that occurred
at Sun Valley City Hall between Defendant Ribi and Ms. Hammer during a break in a Sun
Valley City Council meeting on September 15, 2011.

Ms. Hammer seeks a hearing on the matters described herein.
DATED t h i s ~ day of May, 2016.

Motion To Reconsider Dismissal Of Complain - 4
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PROOF OF SERVICE

m

The undersigned certifies that a true and correct copy of the attached document was served by
facsimile
u.s ,~· proper postage pre-paid to the above listed recipients on or before 5:00
p.m. on . ,
d.Y
, 2016.
To:

Kirtlan Naylor
Naylor & Hales
950 W. Bannock St., Suite 610
Boise, ID 83702

Motion To Reconsider Dismissal Of Complain - 5
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James R. Donoval, ISB #8142
4481 N. Dresden Pl., Suite D
Garden City, ID 83714
Telephone: (312) 859-2029
Facsimile: (208) 649-1603
Email: jdonoval@aol.com

Ff LEO t«~i.:;..•'L..._
MAY 2 0 2016

Attorney for Plaintiff Sharon R. Hammer

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

SHARON R. HAMMER,
CaseNo.

CV-2Dl5-t.-/Z?J

Plaintiff,
vs.
NILS RIBI, in his individual capacity,

AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR
CIVIL ASSAULT AND DEMAND
FOR JURY TRIAL

Defendant.

COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Sharon R. Hammer ("Ms. Hammer"), by and through her

counsel of record, James R. Donoval, and for her Amended Complaint against Defendant Nils
Ribi ("Defendant Ribi"), complains and alleges as follows:
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

1.

Plaintiff Sharon R. Hammer seeks damages in this civil action against Defendant

Ribi for committing civil assault against Ms. Hammer under Idaho law during an altercation
which occurred on September 15, 2011, which is more thoroughly detailed herein.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE

2.

This action was originally brought in the U.S. District Court For Idaho on May 3,

2013 in the matter of Hammer v. Sun Valley, et al., 1:13-cv-211-EJL (the "Federal Case"), as a
pendant and supplemental claim to multiple other federal claims raised by Ms. Hammer in the

AMENDED COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 1
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Federal Case.
3.

In entering summary judgment on Ms. Hammer's final pending Federal claim in

the Federal Case on July 28, 2015, Hon. Judge Edward Lodge decided not to continue to assert
supplemental jurisdiction over the civil assault claim, and dismissed the assault claim pursuant
to 28 US. Code 1367(c).
4.

Pursuant to 28 US. Code 1367(d), Ms. Hammer was allowed to file the civil

assault claim herein within thirty (30) days of the entry of Judge Lodge's July 28, 2015 Order
regardless of whether the statute of limitations of a civil assault claim in Idaho has tolled
pursuant to Idaho Statute 5-219(5), which she has.
5.

Venue is proper in this judicial district as Defendant Ribi resides in Blaine

County, Idaho.
PARTIES

6.

At all times relevant hereto, Ms. Hammer resided in Blaine County, State of

Idaho. Ms. Hammer served as the City Administrator of the City of Sun Valley, Idaho ("Sun
Valley"), from June 1, 2008 until January 19, 2012. Ms. Hammer also worked as a paid-on-call
firefighter and EMT for Sun Valley during that time.
7.

At all times relevant hereto, Defendant Ribi was an elected Sun Valley City

Council Member. Defendant Ribi's first term on the Sun Valley City Council began in or about
January 2006 through January 2010. Defendant Ribi's final term on the Sun Valley City Council
expired in January 2014.
8.

The alleged acts engaged in by Defendant Ribi associated with his assault of Ms.

Hammer on September 15, 2011, were done outside of the course and scope of his role as a
member of the Sun Valley City Council and with malice or reckless disregard for Ms. Hammer's

AMENDED COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 2
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protected rights.
Other Relevant Sun Valley Actors

9.

At all times relevant hereto, but ending on January 3, 2012, Wayne Willich

("Mayor Willich") acted as the elected Mayor of Sun Valley. Mayor Willich's term as Mayor of
Sun Valley ended on or about January 3, 2012.
10.

At all times relevant hereto, but ending on January 3, 2012 when he was sworn in

as the Mayor Of Sun Valley, DeWayne Briscoe ("Council President Briscoe") acted as the
President of the Sun Valley City Council.
11.

At all times relevant hereto, but ending on January 3, 2012, Joan Lamb

("Councilwoman Lamb") acted as an elected Sun Valley City Council Member. Councilwoman
Lamb's term as a Sun Valley City Council Member ended on or about January 3, 2012.
12.

At all times relevant hereto, Adam King ("City Attorney King") was employed by

Sun Valley as the City Attorney.
13.

At all times relevant hereto, Cam Daggett ("Police Chief Daggett") was employed

by Sun Valley as the Sun Valley Police Chief.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
The Sun Valley Anti-Harassment Policy

14.

Prior to commencement of Ms. Hammer's tenure as the Sun Valley City

Administrator, the Sun Valley City Council formally adopted a Sun Valley Personnel Policies
And Procedure Manual (the "Personnel Manual"). The Personnel Manual remained in effect
during Ms. Hammer's tenure as the Sun Valley City Administrator.
15.

Within Section 7.5 of the Personnel Manual, Sun Valley expressly adopted a

harassment policy that prohibited "harassment in any form, including verbal, physical and visual
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harassment" either "by or against any of its Employees." (the "Anti-Harassment Policy").
Although not specifically defined in the Anti-Harassment Policy, the general definition of
"harassment" in Black's Law Dictionary is "repeated conduct that is not wanted and is known to
all parties as offensive".
16.

Pursuant to the Anti-Harassment Policy, when a Sun Valley employee believes

that he or she has been harassed "by a co-worker, Supervisor, any City official, or individual
outside of the City organization," the Anti-Harassment Policy guidelines instruct the employee to
"immediately notify his/her Department Head of the facts of the incident or incidents and the
name(s) of the individual(s) involved." Further, pursuant to the Anti-Harassment Policy, if the
harassment complaint is against "a member of the City Council, the Employee should report the
complaint to the Mayor."
Ms. Hammer's Complaints Against Defendant Ribi For Harassment Under Sun Valley's
Anti-Harassment Policy

17.

Throughout her employment with Sun Valley, Ms. Hammer was repeatedly and

continuously harassed, physically and emotionally intimidated, and verbally abused by
Defendant Ribi.
18.

Ms. Hammer repeatedly reported such incidents of harassment, intimidation, and

abuse by Defendant Ribi, as well as her fears regarding her personal safety related to Defendant
Ribi, to Mayor Willich, as was required by the Anti-Harassment Policy.
19.

On several occasions Mayor Willich directed Ms. Hammer not to confront

Defendant Ribi directly, because of Defendant Ribi's tenuous emotional state and because Ms.
Hammer was a female, but to instead report all harassment and other misconduct on the part of
Defendant Ribi to Mayor Willich, and that Mayor Willich would instead confront Defendant
Ribi about Defendant Ribi's harassment and abusive conduct towards Ms. Hammer.
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20.

On multiple occasions, Mayor Willich met with Defendant Ribi in which Mayor

Willich described Ms. Hammer's fears related to Defendant Ribi and directed Defendant Ribi
that he was to cease any further form of harassment, intimidation or hostility toward Ms.
Hammer.
21.

In September of 2010, Defendant Ribi was provided a copy of the Anti-

Harassment Policy specifically because of the allegations Ms. Hammer was making of
harassment, intimidation and hostility against Defendant Ribi.
22.

During 2010 and 2011, Mayor Willich held multiple discussions with

Councilwoman Lamb in which both agreed that Defendant Ribi's conduct towards Ms. Hammer
was disturbing and that Defendant Ribi should be made aware that his conduct of harassment and
hostility towards Ms. Hammer must cease.
23.

During several Sun Valley City Council meetings during 2010 and 2011,

Councilwoman Lamb advised Defendant Ribi that his conduct towards Ms. Hammer was
improper.
24.

During the early months of 2011, Mayor Willi ch and Council President Briscoe

held meetings in which Council President Briscoe was made aware of the harassment allegations
of Ms. Hammer against Defendant Ribi. Council President Briscoe refused to take any actions
against Defendant Ribi or to make public the allegations of Defendant Ribi's violation of the
Anti-Harassment Policy because Council President Briscoe did not believe that doing so was part
of his job as the Sun Valley City Council President. On information and belief, Council President
Briscoe thereafter held private conversations with Defendant Ribi regarding Ms. Hammer's
harassment allegations against Defendant Ribi.
25.

On multiple occasions Ms. Hammer met with City Attorney King and described
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in detail the harassment and intimidation she had been subject to from Defendant Ribi.
26.

In May of 2011, Ms. Hammer held a meeting with City Attorney King in which

the predominant topic was the continued harassment and hostility that Ms. Hammer was being
subjected to from Defendant Ribi.
27.

At some time during 2011, City Attorney King contacted the Idaho Attorney

General's office to obtain advice about what Sun Valley, Mayor Willi ch and Ms. Hammer
should to do about Defendant Ribi's violation of the Anti-Harassment Policy.
28.

In August of 2011, Mayor Willich met with City Attorney King during which the

predominant topic was Defendant Ribi's harassment and abusive conduct towards Ms. Hammer,
and what Sun Valley, Mayor Willich and Ms. Hammer should do about Defendant Ribi's
violation of the Anti-Harassment Policy.
29.

At the August of 2011 meeting, City Attorney King told Mayor Willich that,

based on advice City Attorney King had received from the Idaho Attorney General's office,
because Defendant Ribi was an elected official that there was really nothing that could be done
to Defendant Ribi, other than to inform Defendant Ribi that his harassment of Ms. Hammer
needed to cease. At the time, City Attorney King advised Mayor Willich that any disclosure of
Defendant Ribi's harassment of Ms. Hammer would be considered "political", especially
considering that a municipal election was coming up in November of 2011.
30.

At the August of 2011 meeting, Mayor Willich told City Attorney King that after

the November 2011 municipal election that he was going to publicly disclose Defendant Ribi's
harassment of Ms. Hammer and other improper conduct.
31.

On information and belief, City Attorney King thereafter held discussions with

Defendant Ribi in which City Attorney King told Defendant Ribi of Ms. Hammer's fears of
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Defendant Ribi and advised Defendant Ribi of the concerns of Ms. Hammer and Mayor Willich
of Defendant Ribi's harassment of Ms. Hammer in violation of the Anti-Harassment Policy, and
that Mayor Willich was going to disclose Defendant Ribi's harassment of Ms. Hammer publicly
after the November 2011 municipal election.
32.

After the August meeting with City Attorney King, but before September 15,

2011, Mayor Willich also held discussions directly with Defendant Ribi in which Mayor Willich
again told Defendant Ribi that Ms. Hammer was fearful of Defendant Ribi and that Defendant
Ribi must cease any hostile conduct towards Ms. Hammer.
33.

During 2011, Ms. Hammer held meetings with Police Chief Daggett in which Ms.

Hammer discussed Defendant Ribi's harassment and hostility towards her and in which Police
Chief Daggett acknowledged that Defendant Ribi was a bully towards Ms. Hammer. Police
Chief Daggett advised Ms. Hammer that the Sun Valley Police Department would be on notice
when Defendant Ribi was in Sun Valley City Hall and that Ms. Hammer should lock her Sun
Valley City Hall office door when Defendant Ribi was in Sun Valley City Hall.
34.

Mayor Willich has confirmed, under oath, that the conduct of Defendant Ribi

towards Ms. Hammer, prior to September 15, 2011, was "harassment, by anyone's definition of
harassment."
35.

Prior to the end of his tenure as Mayor of Sun Valley, Mayor Willich formally

found Defendant Ribi to be in violation of the Anti-Harassment Policy, as he was authorized to
do pursuant to Section 8.7 of the Personnel Manual.
36.

Mayor Willich's findings that Defendant Ribi had violated the Anti-Harassment

Policy in his conduct towards Ms. Hammer was a "final and binding" decision of the City Of
Sun Valley pursuant to Section 8.7 of the Personnel Manual.
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The Detailed Assault Allegations

37.

Prior to September 15, 2011, based on all of the prior incidents of harassment,

hostility and abuse Ms. Hammer had previously suffered at the hands of Defendant Ribi, and
because of all of the discussions Ms. Hammer held with Mayor Willich, City Attorney King and
Police Chief Daggett regarding Ms. Hammer's fears of Defendant Ribi, Ms. Hammer held a
heightened sense of concern over Defendant Ribi's potential for physical violence towards Ms.
Hammer and his intent to harm Ms. Hammer.
38.

Prior to September 15, 2011, based on all of the prior discussions that Defendant

Ribi had been part of with Mayor Willich, Councilwoman Lamb, Council President Briscoe and
City Attorney King, and that Defendant Ribi had been provided a copy of the Anti-Harassment
Policy specifically because of Ms. Hammer's numerous harassment complaints against
Defendant Ribi, Defendant Ribi was on notice that Ms. Hammer considered Defendant Ribi to be
potentially physically dangerous to Ms. Hammer.
39.

On or about September 15, 2011, a Sun Valley City Council meeting was held.

During the meeting, discussion was held regarding acceptable methods for modifying budgeted
line items.
40.

During a break in the meeting, Ms. Hammer left the Sun Valley City Council

Chamber to make copies of some documents. Unbeknownst to Ms. Hammer, Defendant Ribi
followed Ms. Hammer to the front area of Sun Valley City Hall, near the reception desk and
copy room, approximately one hundred and fifty feet (150) from the Sun Valley Council
Chamber table where Defendant Ribi had previously been seated.
41.

When Ms. Hammer came out of the copy room with copies, Defendant Ribi was

standing at the counter of the Sun Valley City Hall reception desk approximately five (5) feet
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from the door to the copy room.
42.

When Defendant Ribi saw Ms. Hammer come out of the copy room, Defendant

Ribi began speaking to Ms. Hammer.
43.

Ms. Hammer stopped approximately two to three feet away from Defendant Ribi,

to listen to what Defendant Ribi was saying. At that point, Defendant Ribi's left side of his body
was closest to Ms. Hammer, with Defendant Ribi facing towards the reception area counter top.
44.

Defendant Ribi told Ms. Hammer he wanted certain changes made to the Sun

Valley budget and certain documents related to the Sun Valley budget that Defendant Ribi had
placed on top of the reception area counter top.
45.

As one member of the Sun Valley City Council, Defendant Ribi had no authority

in any area of Sun Valley City Hall outside the limited scope of his activities in the Sun Valley
City Council Chamber during Sun Valley City Council meetings. Therefore, by contacting Ms.
Hammer and discussing Sun Valley budget matters with Ms. Hammer outside of the confines of
the Sun Valley City Council Chamber, Defendant Ribi was acting outside the limited scope of
his duties as a Sun Valley City Council member.
46.

As a Sun Valley City Council member Defendant Ribi held no individual

authority to unilaterally require that changes be made to the Sun Valley budget or Sun Valley
budget documents. Therefore, by demanding that Ms. Hammer make changes to the Sun Valley
budget and budget documents that Defendant Ribi individually wanted made, Defendant Ribi
was acting outside the limited scope of his duties as a Sun Valley City Council member.
47.

As a Sun Valley City Council member Defendant Ribi held no individual

authority to direct Ms. Hammer to perform any acts at his individual direction, as Ms. Hammer
reported directly and solely to Mayor Willich. Therefore, by directing that Ms. Hammer make
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changes to the Sun Valley budget and budget documents that Defendant Ribi individually
wanted made, Defendant Ribi was acting outside the limited scope of his duties as a Sun Valley
City Council member.
48.

Ms. Hammer tried to explain to Defendant Ribi the generally accepted accounting

practices and procedures for modifying municipal budgets. Defendant Ribi became very agitated
and continuously interrupted Ms. Hammer to tell her that he wanted particular changes made to
the Sun Valley budget documents which contravened the generally accepted accounting practices
for municipal governments, and which the other Sun Valley City Council members had not
approved.
49.

Every time Ms. Hammer tried to speak to Defendant Ribi about the correct

budgeting procedures or that the modifications he sought were not approved by the other Sun
Valley City Council members, Defendant Ribi cut her off, raised his arms in the air and began
waiving his hands, saying angrily: "You don't understand!"
50.

As the encounter with Defendant Ribi proceeded, Defendant Ribi's demeanor,

facial expressions, hand gestures, tone of voice, and overall body posture and body language
became hostile and threatening to Ms. Hammer.
51.

Ms. Hammer tried to defuse the tension, by speaking calmly and m a low

volume, but as the confrontation continued, Defendant Ribi became more and more enraged.
52.

Eventually, Ms. Hammer told Defendant Ribi that she was going to discuss the

matter with Mayor Willich.
53.

Upon Ms. Hammer telling Defendant Ribi that she was going to speak with

Mayor Willich, Defendant Ribi raised his arms to approximately shoulder height, pivoted
towards Ms. Hammer so that Defendant Ribi was directly facing Ms. Hammer, and took at least
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one step towards Ms. Hammer with his hands outstretched at Ms. Hammer's shoulder level.
54.

The conduct of Defendant Ribi in moving towards Ms. Hammer was what can

best be described as a thrust or a lunge.
55.

At the same time that Defendant Ribi took a step, thrust or lunge towards Ms.

Hammer with his hands outstretched at shoulder height, Defendant Ribi yelled: "No! You will
not talk to the Mayor!"
56.

At the moment that Defendant Ribi stepped, thrust or lunged towards Ms.

Hammer, Ms. Hammer believed, based on Defendant Ribi's yelling "You will not talk to the
Mayor, that Defendant Ribi was about to grab Ms. Hammer around the shoulder to physically
prevent her from moving towards the Sun Valley City Council Chamber, or that Defendant Ribi
was going to push or otherwise make physical contact with Ms. Hammer.
57.

During Defendant Ribi's thrust or lunge towards Ms. Hammer, at the closest

point, Defendant Ribi's outstretched arms came within six inches of Ms. Hammer's shoulders.
58.

As a result of Defendant Ribi's physical actions and yelling directed at

Ms. Hammer, she was fearful of immediate harmful or offensive contact with her body by
Defendant Ribi.
59.

In reaction to Defendant Ribi's physical movements towards Ms. Hammer and his

verbal outburst, Ms. Hammer's heart began racing, she became alarmed, and, just before
Defendant Ribi's hands made physical contact with Ms. Hammer's shoulders, Ms. Hammer
stepped back away from Defendant Ribi, and stated: "Whoa!"
60.

The assault of Ms. Hammer was witnessed by former Sun Valley Administrative

Assistant David Blampied who was sitting at the desk immediately behind the reception desk
upon which Defendant Ribi had placed the Sun Valley budget related papers, which was
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approximately five (5) feet from where the assault occurred.
61.

Upon information and belief, several other Sun Valley employees either

witnessed Defendant Ribi's assault of Ms. Hammer or heard some or all of the altercation.
62.

Ms. Hammer then turned away from Defendant Ribi and walked down the

hallway of Sun Valley City Hall and back into the Sun Valley City Council Chamber where
Mayor Willich, several Sun Valley City Council members and several Sun Valley staff members
were present.
63.

Mayor Willich has confirmed, under oath, that upon entering the Sun Valley City

Council Chamber after the assault by Defendant Ribi, Ms. Hammer was visibly upset and shaken
by her confrontation with Defendant Ribi.
64.

Defendant Ribi followed Ms. Hammer down the hallway and into the Sun Valley

City Council Chamber, and thereafter acted as if nothing had happened.
65.

Immediately following the Sun Valley City Council meeting of September 15,

2011, Ms. Hammer held separate meetings with Mayor Willich, City Attorney King, and Police
Chief Daggett. During each meeting, Ms. Hammer described the physical altercation by
Defendant Ribi. Ms. Hammer also expressed her concern over Defendant Ribi's increasingly
agitated, erratic and threatening behavior, which now had become clearly physically threatening,
and sought advice on how to respond to Defendant Ribi.
66.

Mayor Willich advised Ms. Hammer that, in response to the assault of Ms.

Hammer, he would order Defendant Ribi to have no further direct contact with Ms. Hammer.
67.

Mayor Willich has confirmed, under oath, that he thereafter held a discussion with

David Blampied in which David Blampied confirmed that he had witnessed Defendant Ribi's
assault of Ms. Hammer.

AMENDED COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 12
Page 276 of 526

68.

Upon information and belief, thereafter Mayor Willich spoke with Defendant Ribi

about the assault incident and directed Defendant Ribi to not directly contact Ms. Hammer any
further and instead come to Mayor Willich with any issues that Defendant Ribi would have
otherwise sought to discuss with Ms. Hammer or any other Sun Valley employee.
CIVIL ASSAULT AGAINST MS. HAMMER
(Against Defendant Ribi, Outside The Scope Of His Role As A Sun Valley City Council
Member)

69.

On September 15, 2011, Defendant Ribi, in both conduct and words, acted

intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person of Ms. Hammer, or intending to
cause an immediate fear of such contact.
70.

As a result of Defendant Ribi's actions, Ms. Hammer feared that such harmful or

offensive contact with her person was imminent.
71.

As a result of Defendant Ribi's actions, Ms. Hammer was injured and is entitled

to damages as may be awarded at the trial in this matter.
72.

The alleged acts engaged in by Defendant Ribi of assaulting Ms. Hammer were

done outside of the course and scope of his limited role as a member of the Sun Valley City
Council and with malice or reckless disregard for Ms. Hammer's protected rights.
73.

Ms. Hammer reserves the right to file a petition and seek a ruling of the Court

allowing her to seek punitive damages against Defendant Ribi.

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Plaintiff demands a trial by jury in this action on all issues and all claims herein.
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PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Sharon R. Hammer respectfully requests judgment against
Defendant Nils Ribi, as follows:
1.

For nominal, special and general damages that fully and fairly compensate Ms.

Hammer for Defendant Ribi's wrongful acts complained of herein;
2.

That, upon filing a petition seeking punitive damages, that Ms. Hammer be

granted an Order allowing for punitive damages against Defendant Ribi for assaulting Ms.
Hammer in bad faith and with improper motives, and for his willful, reckless, wanton and callous
indifference to Ms. Hammer's protected rights, especially considering Defendant Ribi's role as
an elected public official;
3.

For Ms. Hammer's attorneys fees, cost of suit, and disbursement herein;

4.

For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and equitable.

DATED this

/?th day of May, 2016.

'

J~:;;tl)~J
ey For Plaintiff
onR. Hammer
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PROOF OF SERVICE

The undersigned certifies that a true and correct copy of the attached document was served by
facsimile and U.S mail, proper postage pre-paid to the above listed recipients on or before 5:00
p.m. on May Ji_2016.
To:

Kirtlan Naylor
Naylor & Hales
950 W. Bannock St., Suite 610
Boise, ID 83702
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Kirtlan G. Naylor
[ISB No. 3569]
Jacob H. Naylor
[TSB No. 8474]
Tyler D. Williams
[ISB No . 8512]
NAYLOR & HALES, P.C.
Attorneys at Law
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 610
Boise, ID 83702
Telephone No . (208) 383-9511
Facsimile No. (208) 383-9516
Email: ki1t(q),naylorhales.com: jake@naylorhales.com: tdw@naylorhales.com

Ff LEOl.~~,...,..~MAY 2 7 2016
Jolyn,,Dtwo-, CM-.0..tict
r.f\tl"ff:fl"'l""'r'.nimtv.Jci.ho

Attorneys for Defendant Nils Ribi

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
SHARON R. HAMMER,

Case No. CV2015-428

DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
DISMISS AMENDED COMPLAINT

Plaintiff,
vs.
NILS RIBI, in his individual capacity,
Defendant.

Defendant Nils Ribi, by and through his attorneys of record, Naylor & Hales , P.C., hereby
moves to dismiss Plaintiffs Amended Complaint under I.R.C.P . 12(b)(6). The new complaint fails
to state a claim for assault and Ribi is immune under the Idaho Tort Claims Act. Defendant will file
a MemorandW11 in Support within fourteen (14) days pursuant to I.R.C.P. 7(b)(3).

DATED this 2Th day of May, 2016.
NAYLOR & HALES , P.C.

----;-/;

By

/ilvt.-

-

'

/J. tvtd.---

fir{.· trtlan G. Naylor, Of the Firm
J\.ttorneys for Defendant
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FROM : Fax

TO: 1-208-788-55 27
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 27 111 day of May, 2016, I caused to be served, by the
method(s) indicated, a true and correct copy of the foregoing upon:
James R. Do nova!
4110 Eaton Ave., Ste. D
Caldwell, ID 83607
Attorney for Plaintiff

~U.S.Mail
Hand Delivered
~ Pax Transmission : 649-1603
Email : jdonoval@,aol.com

F G. Naylor
9556_ 17 MTD Amended Complain t.wpd
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James R. Donoval, ISB #8142
4481 N. Dresden Pl., Suite D
Garden City, ID 83714
Telephone: (312) 859-2029
Facsimile: (208) 649-1603
Email: jdonoval@aol.com

03-06-2016

-FfCT:1> ~~-. . . . . .
J~;"J - 3 2016

Attorney for Plaintiff Sharon R. Hammer

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

SHARON R. HAMMER,
Case No. CV-2015-428
Plaintiff,

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

vs.

1 /3

NILS RIB!, in his individual capacity,
Defendant.

COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Sharon R. Hammer ("Ms. Hammer"), by and through her
counsel of record, James R. Donoval, and prays that this Honorable Court enter partial summary
judgment as to four (4) particular issues in the matter, as follows.

1) Ms. Hammer seeks that this Court enter an Order confirming that the proper elements
of civil assault under Idaho law at issue in this case which will be presented to the jury at trial are
those described in Idaho Civil Jury Instruction 4.30.
2) Ms. Hammer seeks a definitive ruling by the Court that pursuant to Idaho case law
precedent that the prior hostile conduct of Defendant Ribi towards Ms. Hammer prior to the
September 15, 2011 assault incident are both relevant and admissible at trial.
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3) Ms. Hammer seeks a definitive ruling by the Court that Ms. Hammer is entitled to
question Defendant Ribi about his mental health at trial, and provide expert testimony as to the
effect that Defendant Ribi's mental health condition(s) may have on his credibility at trial.
4) Ms. Hammer seeks a definitive ruling by the Court that the question of whether the
conduct of Defendant Ribi prior to the assault incident on September 15, 2011 in a) leaving the
Sun Valley City Council Chamber and travelling approximately 150 feet to confront Ms.
Hammer; b) in unilaterally seeking that Ms. Hammer make changes to the Sun Valley budget
and budget documents; and, c) in directing that Ms. Hammer make changes to the Sun Valley
budget and budget documents when Ms. Hammer did not report to Defendant Ribi - were
outside the scope of Defendant Ribi's limited duties as a Sun Valley City Council member - are
findings which must be made by the jury at trial, and not by the Court.

·?,_.T}
DATED this ?

day of June, 2016.

MS. HAMMER'S ATIORNEY
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PROOF OF SERVICE

The undersigned certifies that a true and correct copy of the attached document was served by
facsimile and U.S mail, proper postage pre-paid to the above listed recipients on or before 5:00
p.m. on Jvll-t
?
, 2016.
To:

Kirtlan Naylor
Naylor & Hales
950 W. Bannock St., Suite 610
Boise, ID 83 702
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James R. Donoval, ISB #8142
4481 N. Dresden Pl., Suite D
Garden City, ID 83714
Telephone: (312) 859-2029
Facsimile: (208) 649-1603
Email: jdonoval@aol.com

, 17

03-06-2016

FtLED~:-......:
JUN -3 2013

1

j

Attomey for Plaintiff Sharon R. Hammer

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAJNE

SHARON R. HAMMER,
Case No. CV-2015-428
Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION TO RECONSIDER
DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT

vs.

NILS RIBI, in his individual capacity,
Defendant.

COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Sharon R. Hammer ("Ms. Hammer"), by and through her
counsel of record, James R. Donoval, and in support of her request for this Court to reconsider
the entry of its Order dismissing the Complaint herein states as follows:
Introduction
On April 25, 2016, after he had already filed an Answer, Defendant Ribi filed a Motion
To Dismiss asserting that the Complaint herein, asserting that Defendant Ribi assaulted Ms.
Hammer on September 15, 2011, did not adequately state a cause of action for civil assault.
On May 9, 2016, this Court entered its oral order dismissing the Complaint, finding that
the Complaint did not specify adequate facts to support a claim for assault, but allowing Ms.
Hammer until May 24, 2016 to file an Amended Complaint or the case would automatically be
dismissed. On May 12, 2016, this Court entered its Order Granting Defendant's Motion To
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Dismiss And Granting Plaintiff Leave To Amend The Complaint, confirming such, based on
"reasons stated in the record".
Under threat that the case would be dismissed if Ms. Hammer did not file an Amended
Complaint by May 24, 2016, Ms. Hammer has done so. However, Ms. Hammer asserts that the
Court erred in dismissing the original Complaint, in particular because the Court found, without
any Idaho legal precedent, that, unlike other civil claims which require "notice" pleadings, that
an Idaho civil assault claim requires much more detailed "fact" pleading. In addition, Ms.
Hammer asserts that because Defendant Ribi had already filed an Answer in the case, that he was
clearly on "notice" of the claims that he was required to defend himself against
ISSUE I
As Idaho Is A Notice Pleading State, The Court Should Not Have Found That A Civil
Assault Claim Requires Fact Pleading
The proper elements of civil assault under Idaho law are found in Idaho Civil Jury
Instruction 4.30 which was adopted by the Idaho Supreme Court 1, namely:

"I) The defendant acted intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the
person of the plaintiff or a third person, or an immediate fear of such contact; and
2) As a result, the plaintiff feared such contact was imminent."
The relevant detailed allegations in the Complaint which were plead by Ms. Hammer to
support the civil assault claim against Defendant Ribi were:
36. On or about September 15, 2011, a Sun Valley City Council meeting was held.
During the meeting, discussion was held regarding acceptable methods for modifying
1 It should be noted that in the May 9, 2016 hearing, the Court misunderstood the proper elements of a civil assault
claim in Idaho, by instead referring to a) a 2011 Idaho Supreme Court forced catheter case named Miller v. Idaho
State Patrol, 150 Idaho 856,871,252 P.3d 1274 (Id. Sup.Ct. 2011) in which the Idaho Supreme Court referred to
the Corpus Juris Secondum definition of assault as being "an unlawful threat or offer to do bodily harm or injury to
another" (Transcript, Pg. 77), and, b) the Idaho Criminal Code (i.e. Idaho Code§ 18-901) definition of criminal
assault as being "(a) an unlawful attempt, coupled with apparent ability, to commit a violent injury on the person of
another; or (b) An intentional, unlawful threat by word or act to do violence to the person of another, coupled with
an apparent ability to do so, and doing some act which creates a wen-founded fear in such other person that such
violence is imminent." (Transcript, Pg. 77-78) The only definition of civil "assault" that is relevant in this matter is
the definition provided for in Idaho Civil Jury Instruction 4.30.
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budgeted line items.
37. During a break in the meeting, Ms. Hammer left the Sun Valley City Council
Chamber to make copies of some documents. Defendant Ribi followed Ms. Hammer to
the front area of Sun Valley City Hall near the reception desk and copy room area.
38. Defendant Ribi began to demand that Ms. Hammer make changes to certain
documents related to the Sun Valley budget. Ms. Hammer tried to explain to Defendant
Ribi the generally accepted accounting practices and procedures for modifying municipal
budgets. Defendant Ribi became very agitated and continuously interrupted Ms. Hammer
to tell her how he wanted the particular procedure done. Defendant Ribi's proposed
budgeting procedure contravened the generally accepted accounting practices for
municipal governments.
39. Every time Ms. Hammer tried to speak to Defendant Ribi about the correct budgeting
procedures, he would cut her off, raise his arms in the air and begin waiving his hands,
saying angrily: "You don't understand!" As the conversation continued, Defendant Ribi
became more and more enraged.
40. Eventually, Ms. Hammer told Defendant Ribi that she was going to discuss the matter
with Mayor Willich. At that point, Defendant Ribi raised his arms, turned toward
Ms. Hammer, and in a physically threatening manner yelled: "No! You will not talk to
the Mayor!"
41. In reaction to Defendant Ribi's physically and verbally violent outburst,

Ms. Hammer's heart began racing, she became alarmed, immediately stepped back
towards the copy machines and away from Defendant Ribi, and stated: "Whoa!" As a
result of Defendant Ribi's physical actions and yelling directed at Ms. Hammer, she was
fearful of immediate harmful or offensive contact with her body by Defendant Ribi.
42. Ms. Hammer then turned away from Defendant Ribi and walked past Defendant Ribi,
down the hallway of Sun Valley City Hall and back into the Sun Valley City Council
Chamber where Former Mayor Willich, several Sun Valley City Council Members and
several Sun Valley staff members were present. Defendant Ribi followed Ms. Hammer
down the hallway and into the Sun Valley City Council Chamber, and acted as if nothing
had happened.
44. The assault of Ms. Hammer was witnessed by former Sun Valley Administrative
Assistant David Blampied. Upon information and belief, several other Sun Valley
employees either witnessed Defendant Ribi's assault of Ms. Hammer or heard some or all
of the altercation.
46. On September 15, 2011, Defendant Ribi acted intending to cause a harmful or
offensive contact with the person of Ms. Hammer, or intending to cause an immediate
fear of such contact.
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47. As a result of Defendant Ribi's act, Ms. Hammer feared that such harmful or
offensive contact with her person was imminent.
The Idaho Supreme Court has confirmed on numerous occasions that Idaho civil
procedure requires only that a defendant be put on ''notice" of what he/she is being required to
defend against. There is no question that, as plead in the Complaint, Defendant Ribi was put on
"notice" that he was being charged with civil assault which occurred on September 15, 2011 as is
defined in Idaho Civil Jury Instruction 4.30.
In Cook v. Skyline Corp., 135 Idaho 26, 33, 13 P.3d 857 (Id. Sup.Ct. 2000) the Idaho
Supreme Court confirmed. that the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure established. a system of notice
pleading (citing to Straley v. Idaho Nuclear Corp., 94 Idaho 917, 921, 500 P .2d 218, 222 (Id.
Sup.Ct. 1972). In such a system, a pleading "which sets forth a claim for relief ... need only
contain 'a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' in
addition to alleging jurisdiction of the court and a demand for judgment ...." (citing to Archer v.
Shields Lumber Co., 91 Idaho 861,866,434 P.2d 79, 84 (Id. Sup.Ct. 1967) (quoting LR.C.P.
"8(a)). In Cook v. Skyline Corp., @33, the Idaho Supreme Court confirmed that notice pleading

frees the parties from pleading particular issues or theories, and allows parties to get through the
courthouse door by merely stating claims upon which relief can be granted."
Multiple Idaho Supreme Court cases since Cook v. Skyline Corp. have confirmed that
there is no need for "slavishly" providing factual minutia to support a cause of action and instead
a plaintiff must simply state "claims" upon which relief can be granted (see Brown v. City Of
Pocatello, 148 Idaho 802,807,229 P.3d 1164 (Id. Sup.Ct. 2010). In fact, in Mortensen v.
Stewart Title Co., 149 Idaho 437,443,235 P.3d 387 (Id. Sup.Ct. 2010) the Idaho Supreme Court

confirmed that all the complaint must do is allege facts which could (emphasis added) put the
defendant on notice of the claim against him/her (citing Seiniger Law Office, P.A. v. N Pac. Ins.
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Co., 145 Idaho 241,247, 178 P.3d 606,612 (Id. Sup.Ct. 2008) and Vendelin v. Costco Wholesale
Corp., 140 Idaho 416, 427-28, 95 P.3d 34, 45-46 (Id. Sup.Ct. 2004)). In Mortensen v. Stewart

Title, @443, the Idaho Supreme Court went on to state that a complaint satisfies the "notice"
pleading requirements "so long as the factual allegations themselves could fairly put the
opposing party on notice of the claim against it."
At the hearing of May 9, 2016, this Court asserted that somehow an assault cause of
action merits a change from the "notice" pleading established by Idaho Supreme Court to a much
more stringent form of "fact" pleading, when it stated:
"You have to plead facts. This is not a notice pleading issue." (Transcript, Pg. 74).
"You have to plead facts, facts, facts, which allow the Court to conclude that a case is - a
prima facie case is alleged. So whether this gives the defendant notice of what they're
defending isn't the issue here. This isn't a question of notice pleading." (Transcript, Pg.
75)
The Court's conduct in asserting that "notice" pleading was not the proper pleading
standard related to an assault claim, contradicts a long line of Idaho cases which confirms that all
civil claims under Idaho law are based on ''notice", and not "fact" pleading. There is no
justification for the Court to have required Ms. Hammer to "slavishly" detail every particular
minutia of facts associated with the purported assault on September 11, 2015. Ms. Hammer
alleged that Defendant Ribi yelled at her that he was not going to allow her to go back to the Sun
Valley City Council Chamber to speak to former Sun Valley Mayor Wayne Willich in a
threatening manner and at the same time moved towards her in what she believed was to be an
imminent touching. That was sufficient under Idaho ''notice" pleading requirements that
Defendant Ribi was in violation of the requirements defined in Idaho Civil Jury Instruction 4.30.
The Court's dismissal of a properly plead Complaint for civil assault under Idaho Civil Jury
Instruction 4.30 was unwarranted by Idaho case law, and should be reversed.
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Ms. Hammer see.ks a hearing on the matters described herein.
DATED this

~~TJ
,

:Jvttf

day of.'May, 2016.

SHARON R. HAMMER
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PROOF OF SERVICE

The undersigned certifies that a true and correct copy of the attached docwnent was served by
facsimile and u.s mai~rerer postage pre-paid to the above listed recipients on or before 5:00
p.m. on $If.~
ft.I
, 2016.
To:

Kirtlan Naylor
Naylor & Hales
950 W. Bannock St., Suite 610
Boise, ID 83 702
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James R. Donoval, ISB #8142
4481 N. Dresden Pl., Suite D
Garden City, ID 83714
Telephone: (312) 859-2029
Facsimile: (208) 649-1603
Email: jdonoval@aol.com
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Attorney for Plaintiff Sharon R. Hammer

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

SHARON R. HAMMER,
Case No. CV-2015-428
Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

vs.
NILS RIBI, in his individual capacity,
Defendant.

COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Sharon R. Hammer ("Ms. Hammer"), by and through her

counsel of record, James R. Donoval, and in support of her Motion For Partial Summary
Judgment as to four (4) particular issues in the matter, states as follows:
Introduction

On May 9, 2016, this Court held hearings on several pending motions, including a) the
Defendant's Motion To Dismiss; b) the Plaintiffs Motion To Require An IR.C.P. 35(a) Mental
Examination Of Defendant Nils Ribi; and, c) the Plaintiffs Motion To Amend The Complaint
To Add A Claim For Punitive Damages. During those hearings the Court sua sponte raised
several issues which, although relevant to the case, were not specifically raised in any of the
motions and which were not fully briefed. Ms. Hammer asserts that the Court's discussions of
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those issues raises several matters, assertions and findings by the Court which were erroneous, or
at least questionable, and which should be resolved well in advance of trial in this matter.

ISSUE I
The Elements Of Civil Assault Under Idaho Law
The elements of a civil assault established by the Idaho Supreme Court in Idaho Civil

Jury Instruction 4.30 are:
"1) The defendant acted intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the
person of the plaintiff or a third person, or an immediate fear of such contact; and
2) As a result, the plaintiff feared such contact was imminent."
Although no Idaho cases have directly described that the elements of civil assault
described in Idaho Civil Jury Instruction 4.30 are the correct elements in an Idaho civil assault
case, in Pollitt v. CSN International, 2007 WL 294249, 5 (U.S. Idaho 2007) the U.S. District
Court for Idaho confirmed that under Idaho law the elements of civil assault are those described
in Idaho Civil Jury Instruction 4.30.
At the May 9, 2016 hearing the Court discussed what it believed the elements of civil
assault in Idaho are, ignoring what the Idaho Supreme Court has approved as the proper elements
of civil assault under Idaho Civil Jury Instruction 4.30. Instead, the Court stated:
"I looked at the Miller v. Idaho Patrol case. It doesn't say much about what
constitutes an assault. I do not think that the Supreme Court, if push comes to shove, is
going to use a different definition - they didn't really elaborate on this, but I don't think
they're going to use a different definition in Idaho as to what constitutes an assault, and
that's set forth in Idaho Code § 18-901 1•
I do not know why they would have a different definition for civil assault. I think
if you're claiming assault, it's common-law or it's a statutory definition of assault. I don't
know that you get one definition of civil assault and another definition of criminal
assault. I think that's the essence of assault is that you're committing an unlawful
intentional act. So, at least arguably, I would suggest that the Supreme Court would use
the definition in the statute, Idaho Code § 18-901, and there's certain things that have to
1 Contrary

to the Court's claim, in Miller v. Idaho State Patrol the Idaho Supreme Court did not refer to Idaho Code

§ 18-901.
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have alleged or should be in order to constitute assault. I'm not making that ruling as a
matter oflaw, that the Idaho Supreme Court would use that definition, but it's a pretty
good one and I don't know why they wouldn't."
Ms. Hammer asserts that the Court erred by looking to language in either Miller v. Idaho
State Patrol, 150 Idaho 856,871,252 P.3d 1274 (Id. Sup.Ct. 2011) or to Idaho Code€ 18-901
for guidance as to what the proper definition of civil assault is in Idaho when the Idaho Supreme
Court has formally adopted Idaho Civil Jury Instruction 4.30 as the definition of civil assault in
Idaho2 •
In Miller v. Idaho State Patrol, @ 871, in a blood catheterization case, the Idaho Supreme
Court noted the definition of civil assault in 6A Corpus Juris Secundum Assault €6 (2010) as
being "an unlawful threat or offer to do bodily harm or injury to another". However, the Idaho
Supreme Court went no further in analyzing whether that definition is the final definition of civil
assault under Idaho law (as opposed to the definition under Idaho Civil Jury Instruction 4.30)
because the Idaho Supreme Court found that the officer in that case was immune from
prosecution for civil assault (regardless of the definition) because there was a statutory right for
the officer to obtain a blood sample from the plaintiff in that case.
The Idaho Code

€ 18-901 definition of criminal assault, which the Court asserted at the

May 9, 2016 hearing as being the proper definition of civil assault as well, is much different than
the definition of civil assault under Idaho Civil Jury Instruction 4.30, contrary to the Court's
assertion ta the May 9, 2016 hearing. Under Idaho Code€ 18-901, criminal assault is defined as
being "(a) an unlawful attempt, coupled with apparent ability, to commit a violent (emphasis
added) injury on the person of another; or (b) An intentional, unlawful threat by word or act to
do violence (emphasis added) to the person of another, coupled with an apparent ability to do so,
2

It should be noted that Ms. Hammer had extensively cited to Idaho Civil Jury Instruction 4.30 in her briefs but the
Court made no reference to Idaho Civil Jury Instruction 4.30 in its discussions at the May 9, 2016 hearing.
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and doing some act which creates a well-founded fear in such other person that such violence
(emphasis added) is imminent." The criminal definition of assault in Idaho Code § 18-901
makes clear that there is a "violence" factor associated with criminal assault which is nowhere
found in the civil assault definition under Idaho Civil Jury Instruction 4.30. Under Idaho Civil
Jury Instruction 4.30 all the plaintiff needs show is that the accused intended to cause "harmful
or offensive contact" with plaintiff, not that the defendant was going to be violent.
At the May 9, 2016 hearing, the Court totally ignored the definition of civil assault
adopted by the Idaho Supreme Court in Idaho Civil Jury Instruction 4.30. The only definition of
civil assault that is relevant in this matter is the definition provided for in Idaho Civil Jury
Instruction 4.30. Ms. Hammer is entitled to a definitive ruling by the Court that the elements of
civil assault at issue in this case are those found in Idaho Civil Jury Instruction 4.30, and not the
irrelevant definitions of assault in either Miller v. Idaho State Patrol (the Corpus Juris Secundum
version) or Idaho Code§ 18-901 which the Court described at the May 9, 2016 hearing.
ISSUE II
The Admission Of Evidence Of Prior Harassment And Hostility Of Defendant Ribi Against
Ms. Hammer At Trial

At the May 9, 2016 hearing, the Court extensively described that none of the prior history
of Defendant Ribi's harassment and hostility towards Ms. Hammer would be allowed into
evidence at trial in the matter.
First, the Court stated:
"If what you've plead is an assault that takes place in 15 minutes, 20 minutes, maybe
there's a half an hour of events that lead up to it, how - maybe Mr. Ribi harassed her
every day for years. How is that getting into evidence?" (Transcript, Pg. 22)

Second, the Court stated:
"What you're proving is a course of conduct of harassment which led to an assault. And,
No. 1, I'm not sure that would ever get into evidence on a- the motive for an assault I

Memorandum In Support OfMotion For Partial Summary Judgment - 4
Page 295 of 526

don't think matters. I don't know that there's relevant or a jury would ever hear it."
(Transcript, Pg. 26)
Third, the Court stated:
"Whether he was harassing or belligerent or hostile on other occasions won't prove or
disprove an assault case. That would probably be, frankly, evidence excluded by the rules
of evidence as prior bad acts and they don't prove or disprove the fact in issue, which is
whether he acted voluntarily and intended contact in order to perhaps commit or
commence an assault." (Transcript, Pg. 32)
Fourth, the Court stated:
"Whatever Mr. Ribi did or did not do prior to the time he's alleged to have committed an
assault are immaterial." (Transcript, Pg. 53)
Finally, at the end of the hearing, the Court confirmed to Mr. Donoval that, from the
Court's perspective:
"All the harassment and other stuff are irrelevant." (Transcript, Pg. 64)
However, the Court's assertions that evidence of Defendant Ribi's prior hostile conduct
towards Ms. Hammer is neither relevant nor admissible contradicts Idaho rules of evidence and
Idaho case law on the issue.
Two separate Idaho Rules Of Evidence ("I.R.E.") provide for the admissibility of
testimony related to the type of historical conduct of Defendant Ribi towards Ms. Hammer prior
to the assault.

I.R.E. 404(b) provides, in relevant part, that "Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts ...
may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident".

lR.E. 405(b) provides "In cases in which character or a trait of character of a person is an
essential element of a charge, claim, or defense, proof may also be made of specific instances of
the person's conduct".
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In two separate cases, the Idaho Supreme Court has affirmed that the prior hostility and
threatening behavior of a defendant in an assault case is both relevant and admissible related to
an assault claim.
In State v. Muguerza, 46 Idaho 456, 268 P. 1, 2 (Id. Sup.Ct. 1928), a case in which the
defendant was charged with assault, the district court allowed testimony of previous
conversations between the defendant and the assault victim in which the defendant made threats
to the victim. In State v. Muguerza, the Idaho Supreme Court stated:
"Prior threats of the accused or evidence of previous trouble are always relevant
(emphasis added) to illustrate mental attitude of the accused towards the prosecuting
witness at the time of the assault".
Likewise, in State v. Marlar, 94 Idaho 803,498 P.2d 1276 (id. Sup.Ct. 1972)3, an
assault case in which the accused was asserted to have made a threatening telephone call to the
victim, the Idaho Supreme Court discussed the relevancy and admissibility of hostility and
threats made by the accused to the victim of an assault previous to the assault. In State v. Marlar,
@ 809, the Idaho Supreme Court confirmed the findings in State v. Maguerza that the prior
threats of the accused are always relevant to an assault claim. In State v. Marlar, @ 810, the
Idaho Supreme Court went on to state:
"Prior threats may comprise part of the mosaic of the criminal event in that they may tend
to establish an accused's attitude toward the victim or an intent to inflict harm upon him."
The Idaho Supreme Court has made clear that, in an assault case, the prior history of
hostility and threatening conduct of the defendant towards the victim is always relevant and
admissible related to the accused's mental attitude and state of mind towards the victim at the
time of the assault.

3

It should be noted that in State v. Marlar, the statement of"I'll put you in the morgue" was determined not to be
relevant or admissible because it was made during a telephone call made after the alleged assault, and there was no
confirmation that it was actually made by the accused.
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There is no question that the Court misunderstood and misapplied the Idaho Supreme
Court's directions that all of the harassment and abusive conduct Ms. Hammer suffered at
Defendant Ribi's hands is always both relevant and admissible to illustrate the mental attitude,
state of mind and intent of Defendant Ribi towards Ms. Hammer at the time of the alleged
assault. Ms. Hammer is entitled to a definitive ruling by the Court that all of Defendant Ribi's
prior hostility and harassment towards Ms. Hammer is relevant and admissible at trial.
ISSUE III
The Admission Of Evidence Of Defendant Ribi's Mental Health At Trial

At the May 9, 2016 hearing, the Court ruled out any right by Ms. Hammer to question the
credibility of Defendant Ribi based on his potential mental illness or personality disorders. The
Court stated:
"It doesn't matter what's in his head, whether he can distinguish right from wrong,

whether he can - at least as far as the plaintiffs case is concerned- whether he is awhether he has some mental disease or defect that affects his ability to tell the truth. That
doesn't matter ... His mental health is not in issue ... Whether Mr. Ribi had any sort of a
personality disorder, that wouldn't matter." (Transcript, Pg. 30)
"I don't find that his mental health is at issue - Mr. Ribi's mental health is in issue at all.
I don't find that his mental health would relate to credibility." (Transcript, Pg. 31)
"Whether he understands his ... conduct or what causes his conduct or whether he
understands his conduct is wrong ... I find to be irrelevant". (Transcript, Pg. 32)
However, in making such findings, the Court ignored contradictory Idaho rules of
evidence and case law on the issue.
I.R.E. 608(a) states "the credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported by

evidence in the form of opinion or reputation, but subject to these limitations: (1) the evidence
may refer only to character for truthfulness or untruthfulness". J.R.E. 608(b) goes on to state that
specific instances of conduct of a witness is admissible at trial if character of the witness for
truthfulness or untruthfulness is at issue.
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In regards to the comparable F.R.E 608, in Wright & Gold, Federal Practice &
Procedures, § 6097, the authors conclude "evidence of mental illness may be offered for the
purpose ofraising questions not only about a witness' 'capacity' but also the 'witness' character
for truthfulness or untruthfulness' ".
In the famous case of US. v. Hiss, 88 F.Supp. 559 (U.S. S.D.N.Y. 1950) the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York allowed expert testimony as to the mental health of
a witness specifically to discuss the witness' credibility. The US. v. Hiss (@559) Court stated
that "the existence of insanity or mental derangement is admissible for the purpose of
discrediting a witness. Evidence of insanity is not merely for the judge on the preliminary
question of competency, but goes to the jury to affect credibility". As was also stated in US. v.
Lindstrom, 698 F .2d 1154 (U.S. App.11th 1983) "Mental illness may tend to produce bias in a
witness' testimony. A psychotic's veracity may be impaired by lack of capacity to observe,
correlate or recollect actual events."
In civil cases, courts have also found that "a party may make use of the witness' mental
condition to challenge his credibility", Revels v. Vincenz, 382 F.3d 870, 877 (U.S. App.8th 2004).
In several civil cases, the question of a party's mental health, and in particular in regards to the
type of personality disorders such as narcissistic personality disorder ("NPD"), antisocial
personality disorder ("APD") or dissocial personality disorder ("DPD") which Defendant Ribi is
asserted to suffer from, was ruled to be relevant and admissible in regards to the party's
credibility. In Lanni v. Jersey, 177 F.R.D. 295, 302-303 (U.S. NJ. 1998) a forensic psychiatrist
was allowed to testify as to the party's narcissistic personality disorder, in particular to discredit
the party's credibility. In Frazier v. Topeka Metal Specialties, 2001 WL 138893, 10 (U.S. Kan.
2001), a psychiatrist was allowed to testify as to the party's antisocial personality disorder, which
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the U.S. District Court for Kansas determined was a "credibility issue to be determined by the
jury". And in Sudtelgte v. Reno, 1994 WL 3406 (U.S. W.D.Missouri 1994) the U.S. District
Court for the Western District Of Missouri determined that the party was "narcissistic and that
her testimony ... was unreliable and not credible".
At the May 9, 2016 hearing, the Court sua sponte refused to recognize that Defendant
Ribi's mental health and potential personality disorders do have relevancy to Defendant Ribi's
credibility and ability to tell the truth, and are at issue herein. The Court refused to recognize that
under l.R.E. 608(a) and I.R.E. 608(b), and relevant case law, that Ms. Hammer will have the
right to challenge the mental health of Defendant Ribi as it goes to his credibility. Ms. Hammer
is entitled to a definitive ruling on that issue.
ISSUE IV
The Jury, Not The Court, Must Determine Whether Defendant Ribi's Conduct Related To
The Assault Was Outside The Scope Of His Duties As A Sun Valley City Council Member
Or Outrageous For Punitive Damages Purposes

As part of Defendant Ribi's Motion To Dismiss, Defendant Ribi asserted that he was
immune from civil liability under the Idaho Code § 6-904 (general immunity) and Idaho Code §
6-918 (immunity from punitive damages) because all of his conduct on September 15, 2011 was
within the scope of his duties as a Sun Valley City Council member. At the May 9, 2016 hearing,
the Court concluded that if Defendant Ribi did assault Ms. Hammer, that the assault was outside
the scope of his duties as a Sun Valley City Council member under Idaho Code§ 6-9044 . The
Court also withheld its determination of whether Ms. Hammer would be allowed to add a
punitive damages claim to the Complaint. However, the Court concluded, over Ms. Hammer's
objection, that all of the conduct of Defendant Ribi up until the point in time that he is asserted to

4

At the May 9, 2016 hearing the Court concluded that "Ifhe commits an assault, that's outside the scope of
employment, period ... Ifhe committed an assault, that is outside the course and scope of his employment."
(Transcript, Pg. 50)
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actually have assaulted Ms. Hammer was within the scope of duties of a Sun Valley City Council
member. The Court stated:
"One of the major arguments that Mr. Donoval is making here is questioning Mr. Ribi's
authority to order Ms. Hammer around or tell her what to do. This case is not going to
tum ... on the vagaries or niceties of employment law and who has authority, whether
Mr. Ribi has authority to tell ... Ms. Hammer what to do or where those lines of authority
start and stop. That's not what the case is about. Mr. Ribi's authority to tell her what to
do or not to do is not an issue." (Transcript, Pg. 46)
"I'll assume that he told her, you're not going to go see the mayor. Whether that's within
the course and scope of employment, that's my point about this case is not going to tum
on that. This is not an employment law issue." (Transcript, Pg. 49)
"I am going to rule that he is within the course and scope of his duties as an elected
official unless he committed an assault." (Transcript, Pg. 51)
"Whatever Mr. Ribi did or did not do prior to the time he's alleged to have committed an
assault are immaterial." (Transcript, Pg. 53)
The Court's decision that all of the conduct of Defendant Ribi prior to the alleged assault
is not relevant, factored into both the Court's analysis of whether any or all of Defendant Ribi's
conduct was outside the scope of employment for purposes of immunity under Idaho Code § 6904 and whether Defendant Ribi's conduct (other than the assault itself) was "outrageous" for

purposes of whether punitive damages should be allowed to be sought.
Issues Under Idaho Code § 6-904
In Teurlings v. Larson, 156 Idaho 686, 691-692, 302 P.3d 26 (Id. Sup.Ct. 2013), the
Idaho Supreme Court stated that in determining whether an employee was acting within the
scope of employment under Idaho Code § 6-904, that courts must look to the definition of scope
of employment defined in respondeat superior cases, namely, 1) what is the kind of duties the
employee is employed to perform, 2) did the conduct occur substantially within the authorized
limits of the employees' duties, and, 3) was the conduct actuated to serve the master. In
Teurlings v. Larson, the Idaho Supreme Court confirmed that where there is any issue as to

Memorandum In Support Of Motion For Partial Summary Judgment- JO
Page 301 of 526

whether the conduct of the individual is within or outside the scope of employment, that
question must be left to the jury.
Separate from the assault itself, Ms. Hammer asserts that Defendant Ribi's conduct
associated with the assault incident was not part of his duties as a Sun Valley City Council
member.
First, Ms. Hammer asserts that she worked exclusively for Former Mayor Willich, and
did not report to Defendant Ribi. Jdaho Code§ 50-602 (Exhibit A, Response To Motion To
Dismiss) specifically provides that, as Mayor of Sun Valley, Former Mayor Willich had the
superintending control of all the officers of Sun Valley, including Ms. Hammer. In addition, both
Section 3.2 of the Sun Valley Personnel Policies (Exhibit B, Response To Motion To Dismiss)
and the Sun Valley City Administrator Job Description (Exhibit C, Response To Motion To
Dismiss) specifically provide that, as the Sun Valley City Administrator, Ms. Hammer reported
directly to, and only to, Former Mayor Willich. The Sun Valley City Council And Mayor Powers
And Authorities (Exhibit D, Response To Motion Dismiss) describes the limited role of the Sun
Valley City Council to "establish policy and function in a legislative capacity" and "adopt,
revise, codify, or compile all ordinances, rules and regulations". Nothing in the Sun Valley City
Council And Mayor Powers And Authorities provides for any authority of an individual Sun
Valley City Council member to direct any Sun Valley employee, including the Sun Valley
Administrator, to do anything. Nor does any Idaho statute, rule or regulation provide any
authority of an Idaho city council member to provide any direction to any municipal employee.
Therefore any individual demands that Defendant Ribi made to Ms. Hammer to change the Sun
Valley budget, which were part and parcel of the assault, were outside the scope of his limited
authority as a Sun Valley City Council member, as he had no individual authority or right to be

Memorandum In Support OfMotion For Partial Summary Judgment- 11
Page 302 of 526

directing Ms. Hammer's conduct.
Second, the assault occurred during a break in the Sun Valley City Council meeting, and
outside the parameters of a Sun Valley City Council meeting itself, during a period when Ms.
Hammer had no duties towards any of the four (4) Sun Valley City Council members, including
Defendant Ribi.
Third, Defendant Ribi's physical area of responsibility was limited to the Sun Valley City
Council chamber itself, and thus Defendant Ribi's following of Ms. Hammer to the Sun Valley
receptionist/copy area of Sun Valley City Hall, well away from the Sun Valley City Council
chamber, was outside the scope of his physical area ofresponsibility as a Sun Valley City
Council member.
Fourth, as Ms. Hammer tried to explain to Defendant Ribi, his attempts to coerce Ms.
Hammer into making changes to Sun Valley budgets and budget documents were outside the
purview of his limited responsibilities or authority as a singular member of the four (4) member
Sun Valley City Council to discuss matters among themselves, during public meetings, within
the confines of the Sun Valley City Council chamber, and make group decisions.
As was the case in Teurlings v. Larson(@ 1233), and contrary to the Court's assertions, a
jury has the right to find that all of Defendant Ribi's conduct prior to the assault was outside the
scope ofhis duties as a Sun Valley City Council member, not just the assault itself. Ms. Hammer
is entitled to a finding that the question of whether Defendant Ribi's pre-assault conduct towards
Ms. Hammer was outside the scope of his duties as a Sun Valley City Council member is a
question left to the jury in this matter.
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The Punitive Damages Issues
At the May 9, 2016 hearing, the Court determined that none of the conduct of Defendant
Ribi prior to the assault itself is relevant to whether Defendant Ribi's conduct in assaulting Ms.
Hammer was "outrageous", thus warranting that punitive damages be allowed to be sought.
However, as was the case with the issue of whether Defendant Ribi's pre-assault conduct was
outside the scope of his duties as a Sun Valley City Council member for immunity purposes, the
question of whether Defendant Ribi's pre-assault conduct was also "outrageous" is one that must
be left to a jury.
The Court simply does not have the perspective of an average juror who works within an
organization as to whether Defendant Ribi's conduct towards Ms. Hammer, even before the
assault, was "outrageous". Ms. Hammer is entitled to have a jury, filled with average people who
work within organizations and are subject to the same type of abusive conduct that Defendant
Ribi showed towards Ms. Hammer, make a determination of whether Defendant Ribi's conduct,
even before the assault, was "outrageous", warranting the entry of punitive damages.

·?P..Tl

DATED this 7

day of June, 2016.
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PROOF OF SERVICE

The undersigned certifies that a true and correct copy of the attached document was served by
facsimile and U.S mail, pr'?per postage pre-paid to the above listed recipients on or before 5:00
p.m. on {/y11,e
:; ~ , 2016.
To:

Kirtlan Naylor
Naylor & Hales
950 W. Bannock St., Suite 610
Boise, ID 83 702
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James R. Donoval, ISB #8142
4481 N. Dresden Pl., Suite D
Garden City, ID 83714
Telephone: (312) 859-2029
Facsimile: (208) 649-1603
Email: jdonoval@aol.com
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JUN - 6 2016
Jolynn Drage,

. District

Court e.1ain9 Gcurty, !tfaho

Attorney for Plaintiff Sharon R. Hammer

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

SHARON R. HAMMER,
Case No. CV-2015-428
Plaintiff,
vs.
NILS RIBI, in his individual capacity,
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION TO RECONSIDER
DENIAL OF MOTION TO
REQUIRE AN LR.C.P. 35(a)
MENTAL EXAMINATION OF
DEFENDANT NILS RIBI

COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Sharon R. Hammer ("Ms. Hammer"), by and through her
counsel of record, James R. Donoval, and in support of her request for this Court to reconsider
the denial of Ms. Hammer's Motion To Require An IR.C.P. 35(a) Mental Examination Of
Defendant Nils Ribi states as follows:

INTRODUCTION
Ms. Hammer's Complaint asserts that during her employment as the Sun Valley City
Administrator, after she had made numerous, confirmed complaints of hostility and harassment
against former Sun Valley City Council member Nils Ribi ("Defendant Ribi") 1 to numerous Sun

1 Defendant Ribi chose not to run for re-election as a Sun Valley City Council member in November of2013 after
the numerous harassment complaints and the assault complaint of Ms. Hammer against Defendant Ribi were made
public.
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Valley officials, on September 15, 2011, Defendant Ribi assaulted Ms. Hammer during a break
in a Sun Valley City Council meeting.
Because of the extensive history of hostility and abusive conduct by Defendant Ribi
towards Ms. Hammer before the assault, Ms. Hammer sought that Defendant Ribi be required to
proceed through a mental health examination pursuant to LR.C.P. 35(a). The matter was briefed
and arguments were heard before the Court on May 9, 2016. At the May 9, 2016, the Court
entered its oral order denying the request for an LR.C.P. 35(a) mental health examination of
Defendant Ribi instanter. On May 12, 2016, the Court entered its Order Denying Plaintiffs
Motion For A Rule 35 Mental Examination Of Defendant basing such a denial on "the reasons
stated on the record."
Ms. Hammer seeks reconsideration of several related decisions made by the Court sua
sponte at the May 9, 2016 hearing, which Ms. Hammer was not previously provided the

opportunity to brief.
First, the Court asserted at the May 9, 2016 hearing that neither the conduct of Defendant
Ribi nor the particular incidents of harassment and hostility of Defendant Ribi towards Ms.
Hammer prior to the assault are relevant or admissible in an assault case. That determination by
the Court is in direct contradiction to rulings of the Idaho Supreme Court that confirms that the
prior history of the accused being hostile towards the plaintiff in an assault case is both relevant
and admissible to show the mental state of the accused at the time of the assault.
Second, the Court's assertion that the prior hostility and questions of mental stability of a
party to a law suit is not sufficient to support a request for a mental health examination, is in
contradiction to case law precedent that confirms that the prior history of anger, hostility and
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abusive conduct towards the plaintiff is sufficient basis for requiring a mental health examination
of the defendant.
Third, the Court failed to recognize that because intent is at issue in an assault case - so is
the accused's mental health.
Fourth, the Court refused to accept that the mental health of a party and/or witness may
be raised in regards to the party's and/or witness' credibility.
Finally, the Court ignored that Defendant Ribi has made his own mental health an issue
in other litigation related to Ms. Hammer.
Multiple Sun Valley Officials Confirmed Defendant Ribi's Harassment And Abusive
Conduct Towards Ms. Hammer, And His Instability, For An Extensive Period Prior To
The Assault

As is detailed in the briefs and the Affidavits of Ms. Hammer and Counsel, multiple Sun
Valley officials questioned Defendant Ribi's hostile and abusive conduct towards Ms. Hammer,
as well as Defendant Ribi's emotional stability, for an extensive period prior to the assault.
•

Former Mayor Wayne Willich ("Former Mayor Willich") outright ruled, as he was
authorized to, that Defendant Ribi had violated the Sun Valley Personnel Policy on
"Harassment" in any form?. In fact, Former Mayor Willich made clear to Defendant
Ribi's attorney herein Kirtlan Naylor, under oath, that a) Ms. Hammer had made
numerous complaints of Defendant Ribi's harassment of her, b) Former Mayor
Willich spoke to Defendant Ribi on numerous occasions about his harassment of Ms.
Hammer and told Defendant Ribi his hostile conduct towards Ms. Hammer must

See Affidavit Of Counsel, Exhibit J (the "Anti Harassment Policy") in which ''the City prohibits harassment in any
form" and requires that if there is a complaint of harassment against a Sun Valley City Council member it must be
made to the Mayor of Sun Valley, which Ms. Hammer did in regards to Defendant Ribi. Also see Affidavit of
Counsel, Exhibit C, Willich. Supp. Aff., Para. 12, in which Former Mayor Willich confirms that he found Defendant
Ribi guilty of violating the Anti Harassment Policy related to Ms. Hammer, as he was authorized to do pursuant to
Section 7.5 of the Sun Valley Personnel Policies (also Affidavit Of Counsel, Exhibit J).

2
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cease, and, c) Defendant Ribi's conduct towards Ms. Hammer was so problematic
that "something needed to be done to protect [Ms. Hammer] from [Defendant Ribi]"3•
•

Former City Attorney Adam King believed that Defendant Ribi's conduct towards
Ms. Hammer was unacceptable4, and contacted the Idaho Attorney General's office
about what to do about Defendant Ribi' s harassment of Ms. Hammer5 •

•

Former Mayor DeWayne Briscoe was aware of the harassment complaints against
Defendant Ribi as far back as early 2011, when he was the President of the Sun
Valley City Council, and did nothing about it because "it was not his job"6•

•

Former City Council Member Joan Lamb agreed that Defendant Ribi's conduct
towards Ms. Hammer was hostile and unacceptable and told Defendant Ribi that it
needed to stop 7 •

•

Former Police Chief Cam Daggett advised Ms. Hammer that the Sun Valley Police
Department would be on notice when Defendant Ribi was present in Sun Valley City
Hall, that Ms. Hammer should lock her Sun Valley City Hall office door when
Defendant Ribi was present in Sun Valley City Hall, and that Ms. Hammer should
record all telephone conversations with Defendant Ribi8.

•

Both Ms. Hammer's professional counselor (Evan Hanson)9 and medical professional
(Nanette Ford) 10 took notes of their treatment of Ms. Hammer, which confirms that as
far back as early 2011 Ms. Hammer was suffering physically and emotionally from

Supplemental Affidavit Of Counsel, Exhibit P.
Affidavit Of Counsel, Exhibit B, Willich Aff., Para. 13; and Exhibit D, Willich Aff., Para. 11.
5 Affidavit Of Counsel, Exhibit G.
6 Affidavit Of Counsel, Exhibit F.
7 Affidavit Of Counsel, Exhibit E; Affidavit Of Counsel, Exhibit B, Willich Aff., Para. 9 and Exhibit D, Willi ch
Aff., Para. 9; Affidavit Of Counsel, Exhibit A, Willich Dep., Pg. 33.
8 Hammer Affidavit, Para. 6, 7, and 8.
9 Affidavit Of Counsel, Exhibit H.
10 Affidavit Of Counsel, Exhibit I.
3

4
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how Defendant Ribi was mistreating her and that Defendant Ribi was a danger to Ms.
Hammer.
Defendant Ribi failed to respond in his briefings to what the purpose was of providing
him with the Sun Valley Anti-Harassment Policy in September of 2010, if it wasn't to confirm
that he was harassing Ms. Hammer, and that as a Sun Valley City Council member he was
subject to the provision prohibiting "harassment in any form", other than, "Gee, I don't
remember receiving it" 11 •
There has been sufficient, if not overwhelming, evidence presented to the Court that
Defendant Ribi's hostility, anger, inability to accept that his conduct was unacceptable, and that
he was potentially dangerous to Ms. Hammer, was (and continues to be) a serious issue, to
provide this Court with a basis for ordering that Defendant Ribi be required to attend an IR.C.P.

35(a) mental health examination.
The Basis For The I.R.C.P. 35(a) Examinations

IR.C.P. 35(a) states in relevant part as follows:
"Physical and Mental Examination of Persons. When the mental or physical condition
... of a party ... is in controversy ... the court in which the action is pending may order
the party to submit to a physical or mental examination by a physician, or a qualified
mental health professional as defined in Section 6-1901, Idaho Code, excluding nurses, if
the mental health, emotional, or psychological condition of a party is at issue ... The
order may be made only on motion for good cause shown and upon notice to the person
to be examined and to all parties and shall specify the time, place, manner, conditions,
and scope of the examination, including any tests and procedures to be performed, and
the person or persons by whom it is to be performed. Upon giving of reasonable notice to
the other parties, the party being examined or the person having custody or legal control
of the person being examined, shall have the right to have a representative of his or her
choice present."

Schlagenhauf And Its Progeny

Most of the arguments of both Ms. Hammer and Defendant Ribi related to the
11

See Affidavit Of Counsel, Exhibit L.

Memorandum In Support Of Motion To Reconsider Denial Ofl.R.C.P. 35(a) Mental Examination - 5
Page 310 of 526

appropriateness of a mental health examination of Defendant Ribi involved the interpretation and
application of a U.S. Supreme Court case named Schlagenhaufv. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 112. 119, 85 S.Ct. 234 (U.S. Sup.Ct. 1964) where the U.S. Supreme Court discussed the parameters
under which any party, including a defendant, may be required to undergo a mental health
examination. In Shlagenhauf @239-240, the U.S. Supreme Court confirmed that a defendant
(such as Defendant Ribi) is just as subject to a FR.C.P. 35(a) examination as is the plaintiff in a
case ("Rule 35 on its face applies to all 'parties', which under any normal reading would include
a defendant ... We therefore agree with the Court of Appeals that the District Court had power to
apply Rule 35 to a party defendant in an appropriate case"). The Shlagenhauf Court, @ 243, also
confirmed that the party against whom the FR.C.P. 35(a) examination is being sought (i.e.
Defendant Ribi in this case) does not have to raise the issue of his/her mental health
himself/herself, but that, instead, it can be raised by the opposing party (i.e. Ms. Hammer in this
case) (The movant does not need to prove his/her case on the merits in order to meet the
requirements for a mental examination ... The movant must only produce sufficient information,
by whatever means ... and the movant must only make "an affirmative showing" that the
opposing party's mental health '"was in controversy and that there was good cause for the
examinations requested"). As the Illinois Supreme Court confirmed in In Re: Stevenson's Estate,
44 Ill.2d 525, 530, 256 M.E.2d 766 (Ill. Sup.Ct. 1970) a party will be subject to a mental
examination when the party's mental health is in issue "irrespective of who raised the issue" of
the party's mental condition. Also, in In Re: Levitin, 48 Misc.3d 908,917, 14 N.Y.S.3d 619
(N.Y. Surr.Ct. 2015), the New York Surrogate Court confirmed that even if the party has not
affirmatively placed his/her mental condition at issue, the Court is obligated to determine
whether the party's mental health is in controversy when presented with facts related to that
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issue.
As part of its briefing, Ms. Hammer provided a case named Goodman v. Harris County,
571 F.3d 388, 399-400 (U.S. App.5th 2009) where the U.S. Fifth District Appellate Court
affirmed the requirement made by the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas that
a defendant government deputy constable be subject to a FR.C.P. 35(a) mental examination
related to his use of force against the plaintiff in that case.
ISSUE I
Contrary To The Court's Assertions, The Prior Hostility And Abusive Conduct Of A
Defendant Towards The Plaintiff In An Assault Case Is Relevant And Admissible

Two separate Idaho Rules Of Evidence ("I.R.E. ") provide for the admissibility of
testimony related to the type of historical conduct of Defendant Ribi towards Ms. Hammer prior
to the assault.

IR.E. 404(b) provides, in relevant part, that "Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts ...
may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident".

IR.E. 405(b) provides "In cases in which character or a trait of character of a person is an
essential element of a charge, claim, or defense, proof may also be made of specific instances of
the person's conduct".
In two separate cases, the Idaho Supreme Court has affirmed that the prior hostility and
threatening behavior of a defendant in an assault case is both relevant and admissible related to
an assault claim.
In State v. Muguerza, 46 Idaho 456, 268 P. 1, 2 (Id. Sup.Ct. 1928), a case in which the
defendant was charged with assault, the district court allowed testimony of previous
conversations between the defendant and the assault victim in which the defendant made threats
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to the victim. In State v. Muguerza, the Idaho Supreme Court stated:
"Prior threats of the accused or evidence of previous trouble are always relevant
(emphasis added) to illustrate mental attitude of the accused towards the prosecuting
witness at the time of the assault".
Likewise, in State v. Marlar, 94 Idaho 803, 498 P.2d 1276 (id. Sup.Ct. 1972) 12, an
assault case in which the accused was asserted to have made a threatening telephone call to the
victim, the Idaho Supreme Court discussed the relevancy and admissibility of hostility and
threats made by the accused to the victim of an assault not at the same moment of the assault. In

State v. Marlar, @ 809, the Idaho Supreme Court confirmed the findings in State v. Maguerza
that the prior threats of the accused are always relevant to an assault claim. In State v. Marlar, @
810, the Idaho Supreme Court went on to state:
"Prior threats may comprise part of the mosaic of the criminal event in that they may tend
to establish an accused's attitude toward the victim or an intent to inflict harm upon him."
There is no question that the Idaho Supreme Court has made clear that, in an assault case,
the prior history of hostility and threatening conduct of the defendant towards the victim is
always relevant and admissible related to the accused's mental attitude and state of mind towards

the victim at the time of the assault.
At several points in the Court's sua sponte oral ruling related to the admissibility of
Defendant Ribi's prior conduct towards Ms. Hammer, in denying the request for an IR.C.P.

35(a) mental examination of Defendant Ribi, the Court rejected the Idaho Supreme Court's
mandate that prior conduct of a defendant in an assault case is relevant and admissible.
First, the Court stated:

"If what you've plead is an assault that talces place in 15 minutes, 20 minutes, maybe
12 It should be noted that in State v. Marlar, the statement of"I'll put you in the morgue" was determined not to be
relevant or admissible because it was made during a telephone call made after the alleged assault, and there was no
confirmation that it was actually made by the accused.
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there's a half an hour of events that lead up to it, how- maybe Mr. Ribi harassed her
every day for years. How is that getting into evidence?" (Transcript, Pg. 22)
Second, the Court stated:
"What you're proving is a course of conduct of harassment which led to an assault. And,
No. 1, I'm not sure that would ever get into evidence on a-the motive for an assault I
don't think matters. I don't know that there's relevant or a jury would ever hear it."
(Transcript, Pg. 26)
Third, the Court stated:
"Whether he was harassing or belligerent or hostile on other occasions won't prove or
disprove an assault case. That would probably be, frankly, evidence excluded by the rules
of evidence as prior bad acts and they don't prove or disprove the fact in issue, which is
whether he acted voluntarily and intended contact in order to perhaps commit or
commence an assault." (Transcript, Pg. 32)
Fourth, the Court stated:
"Whatever Mr. Ribi did or did not do prior to the time he's alleged to have committed an
assault are immaterial." (Transcript, Pg. 53)
Finally, at the end of the hearing, the Court confirmed to Mr. Donoval that, from the
Court's perspective:
"All the harassment and other stuff are irrelevant." (Transcript, Pg. 64)
There is no question that the Court misunderstood and misapplied the Idaho Supreme
Court's directions that all of the harassment and abusive conduct Ms. Hammer suffered at
Defendant Ribi's hands is always both relevant and admissible to illustrate the mental attitude,
state of mind and intent of Defendant Ribi towards Ms. Hammer at the time of the alleged
assault. The Court's refusal to acknowledge the admissibility of Defendant Ribi's historic
conduct towards Ms. Hammer polluted the Court's subsequent analysis and findings related to
the issue of whether Defendant Ribi should be required to be subject to a mental health
examination under IR.C.P. 35(a).
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ISSUE II
Contrary To The Court's Presumptions, Prior Hostile Conduct By The Party For Which A
Mental Examination Is Sought Towards The Opposing Party, Is Sufficient To Establish
Good Cause For The Requested Mental Examination
Because the Court improperly found that Defendant Ribi' s prior conduct towards Ms.
Hammer is not at issue in the case, the Court also improperly ignored Defendant Ribi's prior
hostile and abusive conduct towards Ms. Hammer as being relevant and sufficient to support the
ordering of an IR.C.P. 35(a) mental health examination of Defendant Ribi. There have been
numerous cases in which courts have required that a respondent be subjected to a mental
examination when the respondent's history of conduct towards the petitioner shows hostility and
abusive conduct.
In Odom v. Odom, 2001 WL 1543476, 6 (Tenn. App. 2001)13, citing Schlagenhauf, the
Tennessee Appellate Court first confirmed that "a party may place another party's physical or
mental condition 'in controversy' even if the party him or herself has not". In Odom v. Odom,@
8, the Tennessee Appellate Court found that the mental condition of the respondent was "in
controversy" because the "record contains objective evidence that could call into question
(emphasis added) [respondent's] mental condition". The Tennessee Appellate Court found the
respondent's mental health was placed "in controversy", in part, because there was evidence that
the respondent had "emotional outbursts", as has been alleged related to Defendant Ribi, both
prior to and at the time of the assault. In a footnote(@ 8), the Tennessee Appellate Court
confirmed that "Past behavior is illustrative and relevant with regard to a person's current
psychological condition".
In Gentile v. Gentile, 2010 WL 2812627, 3 (Tenn. App.Ct. 2010), in citing its previous
13 In Odom v. Odom, (a child custody case), although fmding that the respondent's mental health was "in
controversy", the Tennessee Appellate Court affrrmed the district court's findings that the petitioner had waited too
long to seek the mental health examination, although the district court retained jurisdiction to subsequently do so
after the trial on child custody was completed.
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ruling in Odom v. Odom that a party may call into question the mental health of the opposing
party, the Tennessee Appellate Court ordered a mental health examination of the respondent
where the respondent showed "repeated displays of hostility and rage towards [the party
opponent]". In Odom v. Odom (@3), the Tennessee Appellate Court confirmed that hostility and
abusive conduct towards the party opponent is sufficient to establish that ''the mental, or
psychological condition of the parties was in controversy."
Numerous other state courts have required a mental examination of a party for the same
type of historic abusive and hostile conduct that Defendant Ribi showed towards Ms. Hammer,
including:

•

In Re Marriage Of Gore, 117 Ariz. 324, 326 (Ariz. App. 1977) - Numerous
individuals who knew the party at issue asserted the party was "mentally disturbed".

•

Barth v. Barth, 74 A.D.2d 1002, 427 N.Y.S.2d 98 (N.Y. Sup.Ct. 1980)-there was
evidence presented of the party's "emotional problems" and there was a question of
the party's "emotional stability".

•

Boyles v. Mid-Florida Television Corp., 431 So.2d 627 (Fla. App. 1983)- a mental
examination may be warranted to evaluate the "mental malice" of one party towards
the other.

•

Kees v. Med. Bd. Of California, 7 Cal.App.4th 1801, 1815 (Cal App. 1992)-the party
was asserted to have "extraordinary difficulty in dealing with people".

•

Alyssa B. v. State OfAlaska, 123 P.3d 646, 651 (Alaska Sup.Ct. 2005)- the party at
issue's conduct was asserted to have been ''threatening, abusive, hostile, and
inappropriate".

•

In Re: B.C., 194 Vt. 391,402, 81 A.3d 1152 (Vermont Sup.Ct. 2013)-the party
showed "increased aggression and violence".

•

In Re: Levitin, 48 Misc.3d 908, 917, 14 N.Y.S.3d 619 (N.Y. Surr.Ct. 2015)- the
party's conduct was described as "inappropriate, erratic and bizarre".

The allegations of Defendant Ribi' s conduct towards Ms. Hammer are no less serious
than the allegations described in the cases above that the party at issue in each case was
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"mentally disturbed", had "emotional problems" or was "emotionally unstable", showed "mental
malice", had "extraordinary difficulty in dealing with people", acted in a "threatening, abusive,
hostile and inappropriate" manner, showed "increased aggression and violence", or acted in an
"inappropriate, erratic and bizarre" manner. The extensive facts presented to the Court provided
no less of a basis for requiring a mental examination of Defendant Ribi than the cases described
above.
ISSUE III
The "Mental Attitude" And State Of Mind Of A Defendant Is At Issue In An Assault Case,
Thus Inherently Placing Defendant Ribi's Mental Health At Issue In This Case
The elements of a civil assault established by the Idaho Supreme Court in Idaho Civil
Jury Instruction 4.30 are 14 :

"1) The defendant acted intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the
person of the plaintiff or a hird person, or an immediate fear of such contact; and
2) As a result, the plaintiff feared such contact was imminent."
As is described in both State v. Muguerza and State v. Marlar, the "mental attitude" of
Defendant Ribi towards Ms. Hammer, both up to, and at the time of, the assault, are at issue in
this case. Defendant Ribi' s state of mind, in general, and towards Ms. Hammer in particular, is
relevant as to whether he intended to cause harm to Ms. Hammer. Therefore, the mental health of
Defendant Ribi is inherently at issue in an assault case.
In several statements at the May 9, 2016 hearing, the Court refused to recognize that

14 It should be noted that in the May 9, 2016 hearing, the Court misunderstood the proper elements ofa civil assault
claim in Idaho, by instead referring to a) a 2011 Idaho Supreme Court forced catheter case named Miller v. Idaho
State Patrol, 150 Idaho 856,871,252 P.3d 1274 (Id. Sup.Ct. 2011) in which the Idaho Supreme Court referred to
the Corpus Juris Secondum definition of assault as being "an unlawful threat or offer to do bodily harm or injury to
another", and, b) the Idaho Criminal Code (i.e. Idaho Code§ 18-901) definition of criminal assault as being "(a) an
unlawful attempt, coupled with apparent ability, to commit a violent injury on the person of another; or (b) An
intentional, unlawful threat by word or act to do violence to the person of another, coupled with an apparent ability
to do so, and doing some act which creates a well-founded fear in such other person that such violence is imminent."
The only definition of civil "assault" that is relevant in this matter is the definition provided for in Idaho Civil Jury

Instruction 4.30.
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Defendant Ribi' s mental state, both prior to, and at the time of, the assault are inherent issues in
an assault claim. In contradiction to the findings of both State v. Muguerza and State v. Marlar
recognizing that the mental state of Defendant Ribi is at issue herein, the Court stated:
"An assault isn't a state of mind. You don't have to prove a particular state of mind to
prove an assault ... mental condition isn't going to prove or disprove assault."
(Transcript, Pg. 22)
"It doesn't matter what's in his head, whether he can distinguish right from wrong ...
whether he has some mental disease or defect." (Transcript, Pg. 30)
"His mental health is not an issue ... Whether Mr. Ribi has any sort of personality
disorder, that wouldn't matter. Even if he has some sort of diagnosable mental disorder
... I don't know how that would get into evidence to prove an assault case." (Transcript,
Pg. 30)
"I don't find his mental health is in issue." (Transcript, Pg. 31
"Whether he understands his ... conduct or what causes his conduct or whether he
understands his conduct is wrong ... I find to be irrelevant." (Transcript, Pg. 32)
"Malice is not an element of any claim that plaintiff has to make." (Transcript, Pg. 33)
Contrary to the Court's perception that Defendant Ribi's mental state before, and at the
time of, the assault, is not relevant and inadmissible, as is described in both State v. Muguerza
and State v. Marlar, and in Idaho Civil Jury Instruction 4.30 by describing that the defendant's
intent is at issue in an assault case, Defendant Ribi' s mental state of mind is relevant as to his
intent in the actions he took towards Ms. Hammer at the moment of the assault, and thus may be
presented to the jury at trial.
As Mr. Donoval tried to explain to the Court at the May 9, 2016 hearing when this issue
came up sua sponte:
"The intent of the defendant is at issue. That means his mindset. His ability to think, his
ability understand right from wrong is at issue in an assault claim." (Transcript, Pg. 28)
"And if Mr. Ribi has some type of mental- either a personality defect or a mental illness
that does not let him understand correctly what his intent is or whether it's right or wrong
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or whether it's not right or wrong or whether [he's] intending to cause physical harmthat should be something that the jury should understand about Mr. Ribi at trial, because
it's the intent of the defendant, it's what is in his head. And if what's in his head is
questionable, then his mental state should be at issue and we should be able to ask for a
mental exam." (Transcript, Pg. 28-29)
As the Court failed to acknowledge that Defendant Ribi' s mental state is at issue in as
assault case, and as there is sufficient evidence presented that Defendant Ribi potentially suffers
from several forms of mental illness or personality disorders that affect his mental state and
mental thinking, the Court should not have denied Ms. Hammer's request for the IR.C.P. 35(a)
mental health examination.

ISSUE IV
Contrary To The Court's Assertions, Defendant Ribi's Mental Illness Or Personality
Disorders As An Indication Of His Inability To Tell The Truth At Trial Is Relevant And
Admissible

IR.E. 608(a) states ''the credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported by
evidence in the form of opinion or reputation, but subject to these limitations: (1) the evidence
may refer only to character for truthfulness or untruthfulness". IR.£. 608(b) goes on to state that
specific instances of conduct of a witness is admissible at trial if character of the witness for
truthfulness or untruthfulness is at issue.
In regards to FR.E 608, in Wright & Gold, Federal Practice & Procedures, § 6097, the
authors conclude "evidence of mental illness may be offered for the purpose of raising questions
not only about a witness' 'capacity' but also the 'witness' character for truthfulness or
untruthfulness' ".
In the famous case of US. v. Hiss, 88 F.Supp. 559 (U.S. S.D.N.Y. 1950) the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York allowed expert testimony as to the mental health of
a witness specifically to discuss the witness' credibility. The US. v. Hiss (@559) Court stated
that ''the existence of insanity or mental derangement is admissible for the purpose of
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discrediting a witness. Evidence of insanity is not merely for the judge on the preliminary
question of competency, but goes to the jury to affect credibility". As was also stated in US. v.
Lindstrom, 698 F.2d 1154 (U.S. App.11th 1983) "Mental illness may tend to produce bias in a
witness' testimony. A psychotic's veracity may be impaired by lack of capacity to observe,
correlate or recollect actual events."
In civil cases, courts have also found that "a party may make use of the witness' mental
condition to challenge his credibility", Revels v. Vincenz, 382 F.3d 870, 877 (U.S. App.8th 2004).
In several civil cases, the question of a party's mental health, and in particular in regards to the
type of personality disorders such as narcissistic personality disorder ("NPD"), antisocial
personality disorder ("APD") or dissocial personality disorder ("DPD") which Defendant Ribi is
asserted to suffer from, was ruled to be relevant and admissible in regards to the party's
credibility. In Lanni v. Jersey, 177 F.R.D. 295, 302-303 (U.S. N.J. 1998) a forensic psychiatrist
was allowed to testify as to the party's narcissistic personality disorder, in particular to discredit
the party's credibility. In Frazier v. Topeka Metal Specialties, 2001 WL 138893, 10 (U.S. Kan.
2001), a psychiatrist was allowed to testify as to the party's antisocial personality disorder, which
the U.S. District Court for Kansas determined was a "credibility issue to be determined by the
jury". And in Sudtelgte v. Reno, 1994 WL 3406 (U.S. W.D.Missouri 1994) the U.S. District
Court for the Western District Of Missouri determined that the party was "narcissistic and that
her testimony ... was unreliable and not credible".
In the May 9, 2016 hearing, the Court ruled out any right by Ms. Hammer to question the
credibility of Defendant Ribi based on his potential mental illness or personality disorders. The
Court stated:
"It doesn't matter what's in his head, whether he can distinguish right from wrong,
whether he can - at least as far as the plaintiff's case is concerned - whether he is a -
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whether he has some mental disease or defect that affects his ability to tell the truth. That
doesn't matter ... His mental health is not in issue ... Whether Mr. Ribi had any sort of a
personality disorder, that wouldn't matter." (Transcript, Pg. 30)
"I don't find that his mental health is at issue - Mr. Ribi's mental health is in issue at all.
I don't find that his mental health would relate to credibility." (Transcript, Pg. 31)
"Whether he understands his ... conduct or what causes his conduct or whether he
understands his conduct is wrong ... I find to be irrelevant". (Transcript, Pg. 32)
The Court refused to recognize that Defendant Ribi' s mental health and potential
personality disorders do have relevancy to Defendant Ribi's credibility and ability to tell the
truth, and are at issue herein. The Court's refused to recognize that under LR.E. 608(a) and LR.E.
608(b), and relevant case law, that Ms. Hammer has the right to challenge the mental health of
Defendant Ribi as it goes to his credibility. The Court's refusal to recognize that right of Ms.
Hammer was a substantive factor in the Court's refusal to allow the requestedlR.C.P. 35(a)
mental health examination.

ISSUE V
The Court Ignored That Defendant Ribi Has Put His Own Mental Health In Controversy
By Previously, And Unsuccessfully, Suing Mr. Donoval For Defamation Asserting That
Defendant Ribi Does Not Have A Mental Illness
In Ms. Hammer's original briefing, Ms. Hammer argued that Defendant Ribi has already
raised the issue of his mental health in matters related to the litigation between Ms. Hammer and
Defendant Ribi and Sun Valley. Ms. Hammer provided the Court an Affidavit filed by Defendant
Ribi in the matter of Ribi v. Donova/, CV-2011-1040 (Blaine County) (the "Defamation Case")
in which Defendant Ribi asserted in pleadings in that case that he did not suffer from any sort of
mental condition. The Court failed to acknowledge or discuss Defendant Ribi's own efforts to
make his mental condition an issue in matters related to Ms. Hammer. The Court had an
obligation to at least discuss and rule on whether the filing of pleadings in the Defamation Case
constituted Defendant Ribi placing his own mental condition in controversy.
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On December 31, 2011, Defendant Ribi sued Mr. Donoval for defamation 15, claiming
that letters Mr. Donoval had sent as Ms. Hammer's legal counsel to the Sun Valley City Council
in November of2011 asserting that Defendant Ribi had mental health issues and was potentially
dangerous to Ms. Hammer had defamed Defendant Ribi 16• In the Complaint, Defendant Ribi
asserted that he did not suffer from any mental illness, as Mr. Donoval had asserted in the two
letters. Except for the fact that the Defamation Case was dismissed at summary judgment 17, there
was no question that Defendant Ribi intended to litigate the issue of his mental health at trial in
the Defamation Case, and thus had placed his own mental health "in controversy".
In response to Mr. Donoval's Motion For Summary Judgment seeking to dismiss the
defamation claims based on attorney litigation privileges, Defendant Ribi submitted an
Affidavit 18 raising his own mental stability. Defendant Ribi's Affidavit, in relevant part, states:
"2. I have never been diagnosed with a mental illness or sought treatment
therefore.
3. I have never suffered or been diagnosed with having an emotional illness.
4. I have never received counseling or any treatment for mental or emotional
illnesses and have never charged the City of Sun Valley for any such services.
6. I have never been incapacitated by mental health and emotional illnesses.
7. I am not violent and no one has ever accused me of being violent until now.
8. I am not a violent threat to the City of Sun Valley employees or the public at
large and no one has ever accused me of this before now.
11. I have never endangered the safety of others."
On June 25, 2012, within six months of Defendant Ribi filing suit, Judge Jonathan Brody
entered summary judgment against Defendant Ribi in the Defamation Case finding that Mr.
Supplemental Affidavit Of Counsel, Exhibit S.
See 2nd Supplemental Affidavit Of Counsel, Exhibit A and B.
17 2nd Supplemental Affidavit Of Counsel, Exhibit T.
18 Supplemental Affidavit Of Counsel, Exhibit Q.
15 2nd

16
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Donoval possessed attorney client protections for statements he made in representing Ms.
Hammer in regards to claims against Sun Valley and Defendant Ribi, including in regards to the
statements that Defendant Ribi possessed some form of mental illness 19 •
There is no question that in filing a law suit against Mr. Donoval asserting that Defendant
Ribi had no mental illness, after Mr. Donoval asserted Defendant Ribi did have a mental illness
and personality disorder which Ms. Hammer needed protection from, Defendant Ribi made his
own mental health an issue in regards to his relationship and conduct towards Ms. Hammer. The
Court failed to recognize or address that issue in Ms. Hammer's previous briefs.

CONCLUSION
In its oral rulings of May 9, 2016, the Court detoured widely from the parameters of what
should have been the scope of the request that Defendant Ribi be required to go through a mental
health examination.
The Court's error in asserting that the prior conduct of Defendant Ribi towards Ms.
Hammer was irrelevant and inadmissible in an assault case, in contradiction to Idaho case law on
the issue (State v. Maguerza and State v. Marlar) obviously swayed the Court in not taking into
consideration the well documented history of hostility and misconduct of Defendant Ribi
towards Ms. Hammer as part of the analysis of whether Defendant Ribi' s history provided a
sufficient basis for requiring a mental health examination. Ms. Hammer has provided numerous
cases in which the historical conduct of the person for which the mental health examination is
being sought was the basis for requiring a mental health examination.
In addition, the Court erred by not recognizing that in an assault case, where the intent
and mental thought processes of the accused is at issue - so is their mental health.

19

2°d Supplemental Affidavit Of Counsel, Exhibit T.
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In addition, the Court's outright rejection that the mental health of a party or witness
cannot be challenged in regards to the witness' ability to recognize or tell the truth at trial, has
itself been rejected by numerous courts which have found that a jury is entitled to know the
witness' mental health issues as it relates to their ability to credibly testify. In particular such has
been the case when the witness suffers from a personality disorder such as NPD, APD or DPD as
it is asserted Defendant Ribi suffers from.
Finally, the Court failed to recognize that Defendant Ribi raised his own mental health as
an issue in the Defamation Case.

WHEREFORE, Ms. Hammer prays that this Court enter an Order, reversing its prior finding
denying Ms. Hammer's request that Defendant Ribi proceed through an IR. C.P. 35(a) mental
examination, and require such mental health examination by Dr. Eliason under such terms and
conditions as it finds to be just, equitable and proper.

DATED this

;ri.n

~

day ofj.My, 2016.
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PROOF OF SERVICE

The undersigned certifies that a true and correct copy of the attached document was served by
facsimile and U.S mail, proper postage pre-paid to the above listed recipients on or before 5:00
p.m. on
'2016.

ilille

To:

2

Kirtlan Naylor
Naylor & Hales
950 W. Bannock St., Suite 610
Boise, ID 83702
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FILED~~:

,0~

JUN - 6 2016
James R. Donoval, ISB #8142
4481 N. Dresden Pl., Suite D
Garden City, ID 83714
Telephone: (312) 859-2029
Facsimile: (208) 649-1603
Email: jdonoval@aol.com
Attorney for Plaintiff Sharon R. Hammer

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

SHARON R. HAMMER,
Case No. CV-2015-428
Plaintiff,
SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO
REQUIRE AN LR.C.P. 35(a)
MENTAL EXAMINATION OF
DEFENDANT NILS RIBI

vs.
NILS RIBI, in his individual capacity,
Defendant.

I, James R. Donoval, being first duly sworn upon oath, depose and state as
follows:
1.

I have personal knowledge of the facts contained herein and if called upon

to testify about the same, I could do so competently.
2.

I am counsel to Ms. Hammer in the matter herein.

3.

Attached as Exhibit S is the Complaint filed by Defendant Ribi in the

matter of Ribi v. Donoval, CV-2011-1040 (Blaine County), including Exhibit A and B.
4.

Attached as Exhibit T is the Order of the Court in the matter of Ribi v.

Donoval, CV-2011-1040 (Blaine County) dismissing Defendant Ribi's claims in that
matter at summary judgment.

1
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

Jttf?

'1vxe

day of)aa'f,'2016.

~tarfp

lie for Idaho
My Commission expires

2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
day o ~ 2016, a true and correct
copy of the foregoing document was served on the following individual(s) by the method
indicated:

[X] U.S. Mail

Kirtlan Naylor
NAYLOR&HALES
950 W. Bannock St., Suite 610
Boise, ID 83 702

[X] Fax:
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Email:

3
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R. KEITH ROARK, ISBN 2230
The Roark Law Firm, LLP
409 North Main Street
Hailey, Idaho 83333
TEL: 208/788-2427
FAX; 208/788-3918

1
2

3

, Ir DEC 3 0 2011 II
I

Jolynn Drage. Clerk District
L.__'2!!.!!!_Blaine County, Idaho

4

Attorneys for Plaintiffs Nils Ribi and Patricia Brolin-Ribi
5

6

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH mDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

7
8

NILS RIBI and PATRICIA BROLIN-RIBI, )
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
vs.
)
)
)
JAMES R. DONOVAL,
)
)
Defendant.
)
)

9
10

11
12
13

Case No.

CV µ;/-I ot./O

COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES

ROBERT J. ·ELGEE

14

COME NOW the PLAINTIFFS, NILS RIBI and PATRICIA BROLIN-RlBI, who,

15

for cause of action against the above named Defendant, JAMES R. DONOVAL, complain

16

and state as follows:

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

17

18

1.

19

husband of Plaintiff Patricia Brolin-Ribi.

20

2.

21

the wife of Plaintiff Nils Ribi.

Plaintiff Nils Ribi is a resident of the State of Idaho, County of Blaine and the

Plaintiff Patricia Brolin-Ribi is a resident of the State ofldaho, County of Blaine and

22

24

I COMPLAINT FOR DAl\1AGES-

1
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.

1

.)

2

reputation as hardworking, honest and forthright. He is currently serving his second full term

3

as an elected member of the City Council of the City of Sun Valley, Idaho.

4

4.

5

State ofldaho and is a respected leader of a charitable organization.

6

5.

Defendant James R. Donoval is a resident of the State of Idaho, County of Blaine.

7

6.

Damages claimed herein will be proved at trial but are more than $10,000.00.

8

7.

This Court has jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter pursuant Idaho

9

Constitution Art. V, §20 and LC. §1-705.

10

8.

Plaintiff Nils Ribi is a respected businessman and public office holder who enjoys a

Plaintiff Patricia Brolin-Ribi is a respected attorney licensed to practice law in the

Venue is proper in Blaine County, Idaho pursuant to I.C. §5-401.

COUNT I

11

(Defamation)
12

9.

On or about the 12th day of November, 2011, the Defendant composed, signed and

13
caused to be published to a number of people, including the mayor, present city council
14
members and newly elected city council members, a letter containing statements that
15
defamed the Plaintiff Nils Ribi. The Defendant knew or had reason to know that other
16
persons, including the city attorney, city clerk, city treasurer and other city employees would
17
read or otherwise be exposed to the defamatory statements made by the Defendant about the
18
Plaintiff.
19
Attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated by referenced herein as if fully set

20

10.

21

forth in its entirety is an exact copy of the letter refen-ed in paragraph 9 above.

22

11.

Among the defamatory statements contained in Exhibit "A" were the following:

,., .,
_.,
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1

a. That Mr. Ribi had a long history of misconduct and emotional and mental

2

illness.

3

b. That Mr. Ribi had received treatment for vanous forms of emotional,
4

psychological and physiological illnesses that had been treated at the expense
5

of the City of Sun Valley, Idaho.
6

c. That Mr. Ribi was abusive, unstable and emotionally incompetent.

7

8

12.

9

and implicitly declaring that Mr. Ribi suffered from a serious mental disease and was a threat

10

In publishing the statements contained in Exhibit "A", the Defendant was explicitly

to the public as a result of such disease.

11

13.

Subsequent to the making of the statements contained in Exhibit "A", an independent

12
investigator retained by the City of Sun Valley to look into the substance of these statements
13

determined that there was "insufficient evidence" to support such allegations.
14

15
16

14.

The defamatory statements contained in Exhibit "A" are false and were made

knowingly and deliberately or in reckless disregard of the truth.

17

15.

18

subjecting Plaintiff Nils Ribi to public hatred, contempt, and ridicule and causing him to be

19

shum1ed and avoided by certain of his former foends and associates.

The statements contained in Exhibit "A" were intended to and have had the effect of

20
16.

As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's behavior in publishing the false and

21

-

defamatorv
. statements against him.. Plaintiff has suffered and \:vill continue to suffer from

")..,

.:..)

24

C0'.\1PLAI~T FOR DA:'.\1AGES - 3

THE ROAlU~ LA\\ FIR.'vI
'da'n Street
H.:til-:"y_ ida~10 .~:33 33

-l)l, ~P:1i1

\ :2, ,,:

I

/.,:\

:~=- F2·:

331 of 526
'21 Page
I~~ J "°;,'>, ~;-.:::<.., l ~.

1

public hatred, contempt, and ridicule and causing him to be shunned and avoided by certain

2

of his former friends and associates and loss of professional reputation and good will.

3
4

5

COUNT II
(Defamation)

6
7

8
9

17.

Plaintiff Nils Ribi re-alleges paragraphs 1-16 above.

18.

On or about the 16th day of November, 2011, the Defendant composed, signed and

caused to be published to a number of people, including the mayor, present city council

10

members and newly elected city council members, a second letter containing statements that

11

defamed the Plaintiff Nils Ribi. The Defendant knew or had reason to know that other

12

persons, including the city attorney, city clerk, city treasurer and other city employees would

13

read or otherwise he exposed to the defamatory statements made by the Defendant about the

14

Plaintiff.

15

19.

Attached hereto as Exhibit "B" and incorporated by referenced herein as if fully set

16
forth in its entirety is an exaci copy of the letter referred in paragraph 16 above.

17
20.

18
19

Among the defamatory statements contained in Exhibit "B" were the following:
a. That Mr. Ribi was incapacitated by emotional and mental illness.

20
b. That Mr. Ribi' s mental illness made him a violent threat to the safety of Sun

21

Valley City employees and the public at large.

22

..,.,,
__
.24
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1

c. By clear implication and inference, that Mr. Ribi was similar in character and

2

temperament to Jerry Sandusky, the former Penn State University defensive

3

coordinator charged with multiple counts of child sex abuse in a case that has

4

received and continues to receive the widest possible public attention

5

throughout the United States.

6

d. That Mr. Ribi had engaged in acts of willful and/or corrupt misconduct in his

7

public office.

8

e. That Mr. Ribi possessed an abusive and violent nature.

9
10

21.

11

Exhibit "B" was a "draft" complaint the Defendant threatened to file and disseminate through

12

local and daily newspapers for the clear purpose of further exposing Plaintiff Nils Ribi to

13

public hatred, contempt, and ridicule and shunning by friends. associates and members of the

14

public at large.

Attached to the Defendant's letter of November 16, 2011, incorporated herein as

15
22.

The "draft" complaint, attached hereto as Exhibit "C" and incorporated by reference

16
herein as if set forth in its entirety, contained further defamatory statements about Mr. Ribi,

17
including the following:
18
a.

19

That Mr. Ribi suffered from severe emotional, psychological and physiologic
illnesses which have been treated over an extensive period of time by

20

medication and therapy paid for by the City of Sun Valley.

21

22

b. That :Mr. Ribi suffered from severe mental illness and possessed a violent

.., ...

.:..:)

nature.

~4
J

I
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1

c. That Mr. Ribi was unstable and Sun Valley police were sufficiently concerned

2

about his behavior to order that police be "on alert" whenever Mr. Ribi was at

3

Sun Valley City Hall.

4

d. That Mr. Ribi has committed a criminal act in violation of LC. § 18-2318.
5
6
7

8
9

23.

In publishing the statements contained in Exhibits "B" and "C", the Defendant was

explicitly and implicitly declaring that Mr. Ribi suffered from a serious mental disease and
was a threat to Sun Valley employees and the public as a result of such disease and had
engaged in criminal behavior and was comparable to Jerry Sandusky.

10

24.

11

made knowingly and deliberately and/or in reckless disregard of the truth.

The defamatory statements contained in Exhibits "B" and "C" are false and were

12
25.

The statements contained in Exhibits ''B" and "C" were intended to and have had the

13
effect of subjecting Plaintiff Nils Ribi to public hatred, contempt, and ridicule and causing
14
him to be shunned and avoided by certain of his former friends and associates.

15
16
17
18
19
20

26.

As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's behavior in publishing the false and

defamatory statements against him, Piaintiff has suffered and will continue to suffer from
public hatred, contempt, and ridicule and causing him to be shunned and avoided by certain
of his former friends and associates and loss of professional reputation and good will.

DEMAND FOR RETR.~CTION :MADE A...~D REJECTED

21
Plaintiff Nils Ribi, by and through his attorney, R. Keith Roark, did, on the 20th day

22

.., ...

of November, via email transmission. make a demand for retraction of the defamatory

_:,

24
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1

statements upon Defendant James R. Donoval. Said Defendant has acknowledged that he

2

read the demand but refused to retract his defamatory statements. Attached hereto as Exhibit

3

"D" and incorporated by reference herein as if set forth in its entirety is a true and correct

4

copy of the demand for retraction.

5

6
7

COUNTIIl
(Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress)

8

9

27.

On or about the 16th day of November, 2011, the Defendant composed, signed and

10

caused to be published to Plaintiff Patricia L Brolin-Ribi, Plaintiff Nils Ribi's wife, a third

11

letter that defamed Plaintiff Nils Ribi.

12
13

28.

Attached hereto as Exhibit "E" and incorporated by referenced herein as if fully set

forth in its entirety is an exact copy of the letter referred in paragraph 27 above.

14

29.

Among the defamatory statements contained in Exhibit "E" were the following:

15
16
17
18

19
20

a. By clear implication and inference, that Mr. Ribi had been discharged
from his father's company for misconduct.
b. By clear implication and inference, that J•v1r. Ribi was suffering from
mental illness that rendered him a violent threat to Sm1 Valley City
employees.

21

22

24
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30.

2

"C" to this Complaint. All of the defamatory statements contained in Exhibit "C" to this

3

complaint were, therefore, published to Ms. Brolin-Ribi.

4

31.
5

6

7

Attached to Exhibit "E" was a copy of the same "draft" complaint which is Exhibit

In his undated letter to Plaintiff Patricia Brolin-Ribi, Defendant threatened to expose

her husband and herself to public hatred, contempt, and ridicule by filing his defamatory
statements in the form of a lawsuit and causing wide dissemination of defamatory statements
through the public press.

8

9
10

11

32.

The Defendant also threatened to subject Plaintiff Nils Ribi to a humiliating

"psychiatric examination" and to use the litigation discovery process to embarrass and
humiliate Plaintiff Patricia Brolin-Ribi and her husband.

..,..,

12

.J.J.

13

to Plaintiff Patricia Brolin-Ribi was intentional or reckless.

The conduct of the Defendant in publishing the letter and attached "draft complaint"

14
34.

The conduct of the Defendant in publishing the letter and attached "draft complaint"

15
to Plaintiff Patricia Brolin-Ribi was extreme and outrageous.
16
17
18
19

35.

As a direct and proximate result of the extreme and outrageous conduct of the

Defendant, Plaintiff Patricia Brolin-Ribi has suffered severe emotional distress.

CLAIM FOR ATTORNEYS FEES

20
As a result of the actions of the Defendant in this matter, it has become necessary for
21

the Plaintiffs herein to retain the services of R. Keith Roark of The Roark Law Firm, LLP

22

..,..,

.:..:,
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1

and to incur the fees and costs thereof which costs and fees the Plaintiffs are entitled to

2

recover from the Defendant pursuant to applicable statutory and case law of this jurisdiction.

3

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
Plaintiffs demand a trial by jury on all issues, causes of action and claims for relief to

4

5

which they are so entitled.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF
6
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiffs pray for relief from this Court as follows:
7
l.

8
9

For money damages against the Defendant in an amount to be determined at trial but

in no event less than the amount which gives this Court jurisdiction over the subject matter of
this case.

10

2.

11

defamatory statements about or concerning the Plaintiffs.

12

3.

For permanent injunction restraining the Defendant from making other false and/or

For such other and further relief as the Court may deem appropriate and just.

13
14

,z/):C::-

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED t h i s ~ day ofDecember, 2011.

15
16
17
Attorney for Plaintiffs Nils Ribi
18

( Patricia Brolin-Ribi

19
20
21

22
23
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1

VERIFICATION

2

STATEOFIDAHO,

3

County of Blaine.

4

5

)
) ss.
)

Nils Ribi, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as follows:

knows the contents thereat; and that the same
6
7
8

ar°Z

That he is a Plaintiff in the foregoing Complaint; that he has read the same and

~ a s he verily believes.

Nils Ribi, Plaintiff
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this ~day of, December, 2011.
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VERIFICATION

2

STATEOFIDAHO,

3

County of Blaine.

4

5

)
) ss.
)

Patricia Brolin-Ribi, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as
follows:
That she is a Plaintiff in the foregoing Complaint; that she has read the same and

6

knows the contents thereof, and that the same are true and correct as she verily believes.

7

')?ro,..,.,,.~~

8

9

Patricia Brolin-Ribi, Plaintiff

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this :::3:'.'.::J day of, December, 2011.
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JAM.ES :R. DON OVAL
Attorney
4325 Fairway Nine Condos
PO B0x·1499

Sun Valley, ID 83353
(312) 859-2029; (208) 7Z:L"7383

Jdonoval@ao!.com
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
Not For Public Distributjon
Ir; Contemplation Of Litigation

November 12, 2011

Hon. Wayne Will.ich
Sun Valley City Hall
Sun Valley, ID 83353
Re:

Shar011 R. Hammer- Swi Valley City Administrator

lvlayor Willicb.:

Be advised that I represent Ms. Hammer related to tbe oral allegations of .improprhrty
forw.a.roed to Nis.:Hammer·1ate·m fhe ~Yon'Ffiiifl:y,'Novep:iher n;2011, by yourself antl "511n
Vall.:,y City Attorney Ad.am King. These allegations had been cliscussed by yourself m:i.d lv.tr.
King with Sun Valley City Council members Nils P.Jbi, Bob Ymmgman and DeWayne Briscoe
during a Sun V al1ey City Council Executive Session earlie: in the day. Pursuant io both Idaho
Sta1e Statutes and the City Of Sun.Valley Policies And Procedures, the Sun Valley City Council
has no independent authority to take clisciplinaryr action or to termi:mrte Ms. Hammer. Only the
Mayor Of Sun Valley can authorize ib.e tern:rirurti.on or disciplinary action of a City Of Sun
Val1ey empioyee, and iu particular the Sun Valley City Adrrrinistrator (name!J, 1vis. B.ann:D.e:!.-).
Thus the termination payme11.t offered to Ms. Fiammer as described by yourself and Ml:. King 2.s
being made- on be:half of h'.b:. Ribi, lv'JI. Youngman and Mr. Briscoe, is un.a.ufn.orized uncier lclab.o
law and the City Of Sun Valley policies, mid is therefore. a nullity. Therefore. no response to Mr.
Rfoi's, M:r. Yowgman•s and Mr. Briscoe's request will be forthcon..img.

Bot.rt you and lv.f:r. lGng a.eSt.1:ibed alle.gatiom that were dis:mssed at fue Exectr.:ve
f,ession o:c F!·tday. Ho·wever, no V,'l'itle!:! corroboration o:;· w.ritter. :btaiJ of .such allegations v,'::l·::'·
j::roYided tc11\-~. Ham...111er ch.rrin.g her cEs~u2sic1ns v. it'n you and ]L1J.r. I:U.1g . ..;Li.:..itl1ot1gb you :b.U:n:~~ t!.'~
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Ms. Hammer Was Granted Flexible Personal Time And Was Authorized To Use A Cm• Of
Sun Vallev Vehicle

Although Ms. Hammer :refuses to respond in detail to any allegations until such are
detailed in a formal written charging document, it should be noted that Section 10 ofthe existing
City Administrator Employment Agreement between the City Of Sun Valley and Ms. Hammer
provides that ''th.e Mayor, in consultation witb the Employee, shall fix such other terms mid
conditions of employment, as he may detemrine from time to time to be appropriate." Ms.
Hamm.er discussed a flexible work schedule w.i:th -you in wbioh you agreed 1hat hours worked
outside of anomal 8 a.m. to 5 p.m. workday could be taken off without the use of vacation time.
Additionally, Ms. Hammel· requested and you approved her use of the City Of Sun Valley
automobile at issue. Should the City Of Sun Valley, and in particular Mayor-Elect Briscoe, wish
to change the cm.."entpolicies you implmnentedrelated to both :flexible time off and the use of
the City Of S'UD. Valley owned mitomobile, Ms. ·Hamm.er will comply "v.ith those ilirectives,
However, for the City Of S'Wl Valley to retroactively modify either policy as a basis for
disciplinary action or for termination oflyls. Hru:nmcr J:ias no support in law, logic or basic
faimess,·and ·will be challenged and litigated-to the-fullest extent, if reqmred.
Mr. Ribi Is SeekingRetribntion For Ms. Hammer's·Renorting.OiHis·Own Abusive
Behavior And Harassment

On. multiple occasions, Ms. Hammer has been verbally and mentally abused by 8un
Valley Council Member Nils Ribi, and on. at least one occasion was physically i:hrea:tened by Mr.
R.1"bi. These mcidents were witnessed ~Y ofhers and reported to you, lv!r. King and Sun Valley
Police Chief Cam Daggett. It is my understanding tb.atyou have also notified ]Vb:. Rloi of his
inap;pro;i:iriate conduct towards 'Ms.rfarorner: Ms. riammer hmf regnired -medical. and -personal
counseling due to 1he harassment inflicted by Mr. P-..ibi, and Mr. Ribi' s .actions and tb.e results of
his actions have been documem.ed.

To date, lvJS. Tunmn.er has refrained from prosecuting }Jr. Ribi and the City Of Sun
Valley for harassment, as would be her ri3I1t pursuant to the clearly establis~d S'Uii. Valley
policies and :procedures on b.a::assm.eni of employees. However, it is now clear to lY.LS. Rammer
that due to ib.e TillJ)ending change of ad.n:rinistrati.oJJ., tha:t by seeti:lg ber dismissal tha!. Mi·. J,J.bi is
seeking reu:ibution against Ms. Hammer for Ms. Hammer's previous ~orting oflv.Ir. Ribi' s
mapprop::iaie action against 1\1.s. Hanu;J.er to you:self and oilier Sun Valley officials. Thus,
shoulC: the- City Of 81.,n Valley, and in pm'tbulru: Mr. Ribi, continue to make allegations of
:i.mpropri~ty ag:ai.nsi. Ms. Hammer, she ,:,,111! 1)rosecute Mr. PJbi arid the City Of Sun Valley f::JJ
h.a-::,~ssment.for defa:natiou of cha.racier mid for reLaliatorv. discharge.
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Valley's obligation to tnlce all necessazy precautions related to Mr, Ribi•s potential for abuse of
City Of Sun Valley employees.Should me allegations and proceedings .against Ms. Hammer proceed any further, Ms.
Hamm.er will Jll.'eSerrt multiple public offi~. Sun Valley employees, and private individualswho have all disclosed to Ms. Hamme:· fua.fbmt~\:lj$)B.Ji~!'M.llil.J:!g~~i.w,1~~~(}:i.~g.ti~
ruWi:rress;ciffiw.en\utlJ)y.;ajp.m;l\¥iMl!&~~~is.fflUilst(bJ~~1anoitlslmcmtilikeilD1.anati0mtll~GGIII_l!letent."to
l~Rmm,~the.n}l).t1.blic'.Flesiti~::m~tw.~~l?f~..fil!§esseaa0tiany..tpuhli.c;q1J©-Si1lim1Sahe~seeks:."iii:1fu:eiflitruo?e.
Ultimately. the issues will become a nra:tter of comparing Ms. Hammer•s unquestionable ethics ·
against Mr. Ribi's unstable emotional state and his vindictiveness towards Ms. Ham.mer. Ms.
Hammer is ready and willing to :fight that battle.

81111 Vallev City Attornev Adam I(ill!! Should Be Barred From Further Participation In
The lv.Iatter
We are seeking that Sun Valley City Attorney Adam King be barred :from any further
:involvement in. any matters related to Ms.Bammer .. Mr. King has been notified by botb._you and
Ms. Hammer of multiple issues mla'ted-to the personnel problems-associated v.ritb::Mr. -R±bi. And,
M:r. King has disclosed to Ms. Hammer his own personal opinion of Mr. Ribi's emotional
problems andmerrtal state and Mr. Ribi's inappropriate acts as a Sun Valley City Comcil
·member. Shou1d1his ma:tter go to tri.a4 lvl:r. King will certainly be a witness associated with his
statements and knowledge about Mr. Ribi's mental health. issues andlVrr. PJ.bi' s danger to the
operation oftb.e City Of Sun Valley and to City Of Sun Valley employees, all of which were
made outside offne scope of any a:ttomey-client privilege.
The. City Of Sun Valle,· Has A Well Established Poii~· On Emnfovee. Discmline

The Ci.iy Of Sun Valley has established progressive discipline policies related to all
employees, which includes Ms. Hammer, and has established policies requiring that employees
agamst whom disci:pJ.in.ary a,.,'iions are taken are to be provided witb the right to due JJIOceBS to
defend any and 1'111 a11ega:tions of misconduct.
Ms. Hammer has never been notified of any prior acts of misconduct, and she has been
given exceptional reviews by yourself since she became fue S1.1;:;. Valley City Administra:tm- m
2088. Ms. Hammer has been credentialed by the. Intemational City/County M:anager' s
Assciciation during, her tenure witb the- City Of SUll \'alley, v;;;rifym.g l~ dedication to the
hlghe[( slaudardf: of etbicru management, and bas ;-ece1vea the highest accolades f.·om the
Government Fimmce Officer's As!lo~ia-ti.on fol' botb the City Of Sun Valley 2011 Budget and tbe
,... IJI
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standards of fi.nruida1 re.porting, i~. direct contracli:mor, to the c.1a:ims esaerted against her as to b.e:
jJLu·1,o:r1:~a finen:ria1 mi.s:::nc.nagerr:::nL C~nsider.ing 1''1s. Z"l6.!nm.e:r=-s exe1nplary 1-1e:fo1'!llcl11oe s.::.1d
the· fcilu:~e of tbe (~jt); (·1f Sun \.7z.11!::.- i.:::: :)::ing a.ny p1·e;. ]o~s a11egn:ions o::' 11·ilsmr'JJagen.1ent a.gs."!:~
lvis. H.::;.m=.1.~~·:· ~..!-re is c:=:·tz.in!y n: b~si,:. fo1· a a~swissaJ of 1"\1s. j~l:1n11ner :for ca:.1se i,aned O:i)
1

1

Page 343 of 526

(-)

. Reauest-For A Special Sun Valle,• Citv Cotmcil Executive Session

We are seeking-that you call a Special Meeting and Executive Session of the Sun Valley
City Co1JD.cil forW~esday, November 16, 2011, and-that-yo-u allowmyse~ Ms. Hamme~;anc)

recently elected Sun Valley City Council members Franz Suhadolnik and Michelle Griffith to
attend such Executive Session. Based on the above described issues, we request that.Mr. King be
barred from a:tteQ,ding suchExecutive Session (although we have no-objection to another.
Hl:torney being present to represent yourself l:1D.d the City Of Sun Valley). By the end of the day
Tuesday, November 15, 2011, we demand that we be provided with fonnal written charges of
any-wrongdoing that Ms. 1-Iammer is being charged with and that we be provided with any and
all documents associated wi-th 1he allegations against Ms. Hammer for use in such Executive
Session. At the November 16, 2011 Executive Session we expect to fully discuss any assertions
made agamst Ms. Hammer and the allegations being asserted herein against Mr. RI"bi, and we
will be CA.'Jlect:i.ng that any and all assertions of wrongdoing against Ms. Hammer be dismissed at
that time, with prejudice. Should the City Of Sllll Valley choose to either not hold the Executive
Session described above or to fully dismiss all allegations of mis-management 01· other wrong
doing l:l,ga:inst Ms._ Hammer~ with_prajudice, by Friday, November 18, 2011 - on Monday,
November 2-1, 20-H, -we-wlll-file-tbf:-aforementioned-harassment claims agajnstMr. -Ribi-ancLtb.e
Crty Of Sun Valley in the Blaine Collllty Court and let the .liti.gation process, and the :inevitable
negative publicity to the City Of S-un Valley that will ensue, take its course. Any further
clisciplinary action taken by the City Of Sun Valley against Ms. Hammer thereafter will result :in
the addition of damage to :reputation and retaliatory discharge claims against Mr. Ribi and the
City Of Sun Valley.

Obviously, this is not the stable transfer of adarinistra.tions and tb.e retaining of the quality
professional employees th.at both you and l\-1aym-Elect Briscoe have publicly promised., nor can

Meyor:::ElecfBriscoe ,poss1b.1-y'be· satjsfied 'thaflfu: new admmjstration-will'cammence ·"'711:b. ·such
a...."l'.imony. However, should l\f.rr. Rt"bi's vindictive mtentioIIB against lv'.is. Hammer be tbe
controlling focus of the Sun Valfoy City Collllc:il, inevitably the next few IDDntbs, or years, will
be dominated by attention being paid to lV.t:r. P.Jbi's emotional illness and corrti:n.u.ed abuse of City
Of Sun Valley employees nrtb.er thar. all of the bigh quality improvements tba.t Ms. Ha:r::imer and
the other highly skilled City Of S1.m Valley employees have brought and v,rill continue to bring to
the City Of Sun Valley.
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llAMES R.. :DONOV.Al
.¢l;fJ1J(!lfJD.'e-J'
'4325:F.airway·Nine~Contios
'P..D:Box :1"499

:Sun·v~lley,;tD~SBEB
:(BI?);S55h2~;:(2D~) :T.21-7383
jdonoval@aril.com
.5TRIOTLV'CONF1D.ENTIAL
'Not F.or'Public:Distr.lbution .
Ip ;Contemplationff.otltigation

November 16, 201.1
Bon. \V~yne 'W:illicn
Sun V.all.e.)1 ·CityE.ail
Sun V.a1.ley, ID -83353

,,.,_,..
J.\.:,....

Sharon .R. 1-lamm.er-:City 0f·Sun V.an~, - Nils Ribi: Barassment.Settlenrent
0

M~yoT Wiliich:
.As you .are .a:ware, .on November 13. 2011, T:served :upon yourself .and al1 current .and
.about to be seated ·Sun Va11e.y-,City-Conncn members .a'letter seeking that-you call ..a 8pecia1 Sun
Valley .City Council mee~g .and.Executive Session for Nov.ember 16_, 20J J to discuss the-issues
detailed .in the Jetter Te1ateo lo ·Mr.Rib.i's on-go.ing .hm:aill,'ID..,'"III: cifMs. Bammer. i~ l stated., Ms.
Hammer bad chosen.not to previously proceed agai:nst':tv.lr. Rihi for:violation efthe City·OfSun
ValleJ' llarassrnent_policies because of your personal -promise tbat you had dis~ussed the :rrurtt.er
wit11.:M:r. J.libJ ·and :beca.use"Ofyour;perscmal JJ.l,0mise tha:tih.e,faJ]y-OfSun :Valle;y wou1d .take
a~t.ions to protect Ms. Hammer from any furtbe; :inappropriate behavior on foe part of1vlr. Ribi.
lt is apparent that due to the Tecem change of administration, JV1r. IGbi now considers hlmseif to

be free to continue his prior history of abuse and harassment of Ms. Hammer.

lt is my understanding tbat for undisclosed reasons discussed in a Sun Val1ej' City
Coun~il Ex.ecrrrive Session on Monday, November 14, 2011, that the City Of Sun Valley will not
cal) the Special Meeting and Executive Sess-ioo j requested 10 confront M.r. Ribj Teg.ard:ing his
r,z:-assment o:f M.s. Hammer, .nor is there any suggestion that the City Of Sun Valley intends 10
Lake action a!!ai..,st
made arrainsl
- M.r. P.Jbi or enter into unv... resoiulion w fat rille!mtions
- Jv.lr. Ribi
ln the prevjuu5 Jette:-: 1 c1tari;· described that .if 2-ll rru~.tters rela1ed 1{> Jvir. tUbts
'!1~~ssmen1 of1v'!.s. r]aTI1'.i~1er v.1e.re not fillly resri1\'~d b:.- Fr1tl2y=- ]~,:.,ve.m.Der- 18=- 20] J_ tha1] \,vouid
b~· £:iirtg r ~::.:-~ssn1~n~ L~.r,1'· 5Dii a;:::insi J;1r. f:jj~ a.nd th~ CiTy C>f Sun \;alley on l"-irr\;emher 21 ~
2(, '. i. h·: ,.L:1.::ii~iur1. c~: -\l~/2:, ~i~d.: \=e;y c}~ilr :n i"r:e Js-:J_~:-. t":1e Jiil;;.re 1:c, c:c.L the S:pecia1 t..{!::!:~i"J.f 2-nd
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.Executi-vei>ession -:teguested:alone w.oulii:resu1tnrtbe.fi.fuw of :the aforementioned:harassment
law .suit.~ainst:NII. llibi .and :the;G'.rtyD.f S.un "!i.1a11~y.
J had.:p.,;eviousb' ,~e8·:to you to ::in~.esf;igate fueial~gaticms ·against Mr. funi 1:e._gar:di~_g
.Mt. Ribi ~ ,vidlat:ions.of~f:b.e ·Section 3.2,:SectiOD 7 A.:an.d .8ection .7.::5 .-0f"fh.c Sun :-Vall~y :Pelioies
And:P.mcedures (1:elateii :to ·Mr..:R:!.oi':s ~prqper:direofu~es:to:war.ds Ms. Bmmner·arra.Sun ¥:alley
:Clllpl.Qy.ees~ !MI.. 'al:ibi~ :See'ldn.g.and rribtairiu;ig.of:confidentia] :sun Valley anfl.::8'1ln ·';V,alle.y
.e.n:gil.Qy.eeinformation.mrd :Mr. luoP-sJ:uµ.·assm:m:tof:Ms. Bmmner). 'Y:ou.nnd:fhe B:un ~-a1l~y.,City .
·.Caunc.i:1 ·sbotild :take. notet1mt:Mr.1tilii WJtS ::the.only ·.menibe:r ·aHhe ·Sun V.ali{!y Clifyr:Cauncil

I
I

·1

0

I

votin,g ·:againstyouneguest for an :indepe.ndent.in:v.estigation at±he 'MondB31, Nov.emb.er 111,,2011
·Bun Walley,:Oity :CeunciJ.:meetin,g, .evidencmg Mt:. :llibi~,; .intent :to .avoid,havin.J;.'to face these ..
.-serious1allegation.c::1:f;gm:amg.h:is:ow.n:coniiuct..Now,.mnceibntmee~g,,we.1Jave!b.een mfomied
fhat Mt Rloi :aantinues to .comact"Snn 'Valley lm:J.plqy.ei,s seek.mg .confuiential information
.w_garcling ·matL""tll related to Ms. E.ammer, .in direct"'Violation. of both 'Section 3..2 :anrl :Section 7..4
,ofihe ·Btm V.W.lf?)' -Rolicies AndProcedure~~ .and,c:v.e:n :fhOl!,gh :you .dir.ected fbat:&1 ::in.dft.pendent
·mv.estigatiOI1.of.w.1.mmte-rs:i£ going ::to :he performed.

We 'RJ!Plaud y.0ur'conducfu!g o:f :an.intemai :inv:estjgation.:However. due .t~,the .se.rions
.namre of:the baressm:ent .claims bein_g.made~y .Ms. Hammer:, .and to disolose Mr. ,.Ribi':s
.aoh.cs.rreJlt -oonduct.ancLseek to:prote.ct not oruy·Ms. ·Bammer but. Sun Valley ernplq,yees anci ihe
.general '.l)Ublic from :Mr. llibi, 1.stil1 fulb• intend ;to :file.-the:ID.entioneclharassme.n:t..suit .Oll behalf
:ofMs. Rammer .on.Mondey.,:No:vember21, ::wn .llSJlreVlom;ly.filsnussea. As yem :are aware. :that
1aw·suitv.fil1 be .a.completely public :procee~g and all .allegations against Mr. filbj and ihe Ci1;)r
Of Sun Valley and any .;and atl .actionsJmd ·:findings Telatet:1 to :Mr. Rlbi and .the cm• :0:f"S:un
Valley after :the filing .of::s.udh law snit -;will be JJUb1ic Tecord.OOeasel~~-~at?mi'l'b'l!lml;f~:
~.ffilmmrrm\'l!tliatmiifu:o:ersw;ia.voiibsucmmimf;~:aneae:fffem);gftb:dfoltw.mig.tterans::Gifil,lf"

$etfJemwt"'l:e1mea11t©~'Eillta11egaams~neilfrJ~;~iV(i\~,~g~~~:~01~mffi:tfiie:c"Cityt00sun
V.alle.y~m,"0Teert!:0':PJ:e'lterttrtoe~,t>fihe·iff6reinerrtfo±tetl':lmrassnieri.fia¥iismt;
.a) Ml!i~"'Jtlbis.wiJlre~gn-fr@mlfh:e;;StlIJ W:alley ~~·~QErt~n.~iJ;i:9(:tper,samfureason:s.,'
effi:ctjv.etherda1V•:~1Manier~.E.e.e1,wl!IB00.e-us$W.ar.I1,inms~·ir."1{0J;,Q}f~:.w:rl11.~';~
..
:;i,Y&l:U,,...
...
will allow M~y.or-Eleo[ Br.iscoe~to.:nairu:,.W.rr,.tlli.bts~place:m~nt;
b) Ihe.Ci.~•..Of.S1111.Vall~1 ·,v.';i1lJ)~'J.,lis.:Hammer,tb.e:sum-of on~-·bundr.ed
fhousar1d.doliars.($100,QOO:OO) ·.in :settlem~t of aU Jurrassment.clanns :!vis. Hammer may
have against JYh:. Ribi andior the 'C-ity OfSun ·v.aUey;
c) h1.:·. R1'bi will B.hTJ"ec to never contact Ms. Bam..'Jler n, any form. M.r. Ribi will
clso agret That sboula he ever comae; ]vis. Hmnm:::r agai.r, that M.s. :Hammer ·wili "tie
emitled to further pmceed against hi.m p!.-rsoi:mlly for liquidated a-nd purutive damag~s in
the su:n of an aclditiona1 one bund,ed thnusand dollars (S:'l (l(l.000.00) for further
h::irn::smen.: a:1d b.reac:h of hi:; no-~oma:;t agre~ment.

V,'e wouJd ;:;iii] he willing, K, :;h w:th -::be Sun \ 1allcy Cir.:~ C.ou.ncil in fa:.ec:utive :Session..
:n(:1~1:.iin_g. ,,~·.itb z-et~ently e}e:.ted Sun \·~1.l]c: [j:y c~.r:w'1::il rne1r1h~iS i·,1:i:he11~ 13riffi:h a:-1d F:-lli"1Z
.~~ubt:.d.:>Ln:i: ~!:1d dis:!.!~;5. the r;·,~:~::i. t1::,·,r.r~-,·:!r. !fric,~:1-~: n(Yl b~· pr;Jvid-:::·j ,1.-r!tten con:fi.r;:~::1t~c,111ha1
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.all .terms .tlescrlbea·bercin ha:v.e "becn-ac.~pted !t:!Y the!~· Of:Sun -V,al.1~ -ana 'Mr. Jtibj i?J' '1.:2:00
p.tnt. -(no.orj) ~ridqv.:Nov.ember i:_~, ~1)11, .orihat:.some-other amicable -settlement .has .been
.aru:~teful?,y.:Ms..!Bmnmer.m is:nemgm~gotia:ted- -.on.i'id.Qn~y·N.ov.c;m.i;ber.:,i.,l.,,J'Oll., qp'.peb~-of
Ms. :£mmn.erJ19,illl ·filein1he·lBlaine;Dounty ·Gomit:i:b.duu:assment:~d.:in:tentlo.na1 infl.icti.o:o.-.of
ernofiomil.i1.ist1:ess~Baffi~Ji?.~lY... ~~~!~.~-:~BE!'!'~~-~-J.fip.i_1m~Ul"!~tCrJ;y-;Qf:8.un Val~y. The
1

}aw BUi:t°Wi:Jlfi'tffu1rffi;'ifll~Efs--0:~'R'.ffij~ili~mss$.g'~'S;'!Effurini"et;:1n:ll~ai:f'{i)fisetl;;Gn:ftv.ix~.,,-

i(liW,$~B.l;YatlUwei11fnff{ntf!t)'s_uf{~1itJ1~w1:nc'Ji.'1m,v.e"$~!ifl."fle~UBte'.lk5DWJ1lf:.V.f©J:IB1\Y"ltfmCleSOO.
ffmi'fhffi'{¥.®:f~imW,iflil~i. H1ave:attaobed ·.a..cpurtesj, .dmft.·coJw nf '.fbe V.er.i:fied 1Complaint :that
we-p:mpose -'Will be iiled-.,on 1v.1onda.y., 'Noven:iber:Zl.201.1, ·so :that you. mf!)' 'Uilderstanil -the
serious .:rurture,.ofthe.-claims being'.!Ilade ~Y M.s. Rammer-against .Mr. "Rim ,and-ib.e··.Ci1;y-J)f-Son
Valley.
''iri@r.e:J§;m~~~~irucm~.w.i;gJ!:~·.At~r*-;~Euh,.~~n'1!!i!!:U,•~~mQm~~~iha.til¢:t~mi~s
·~..fili?l!§(1<Jl~~'~fil:.W.ii19.~!ttmill~Jg~§S:~.filQ.@~~~~~~tM§.1t~mm~- An~ :there is.no
question fuat·ha.Ei~ ,otber e~plqyee of:tbe City'!J[Sun V.a1ley"_Perf.ormed thev.mious-0.C.ts .of
verbal, ·mentEiLana 1breatenet3~ysica1 :abuse.thaf.MI.llibi ·has ..done.overtb.e,course .of.m'least
the]astfuree (3) y.cars that:sucb en:yiloyee woiild.lla:v.e;been.sev.e:ceJ;Y,disciplinea,or:termmatea
:from:fheir t:.!!1p1oymentposition. Mr. -Rihi:sh.ould be=treateel no.differenf!,1..A:slias ·been
.evidenced]?y re.cent -all~gations.Tegar.din_g~t~>.Urii»~~~tjbli~tC\i.aj~~!il~~p,l.@'."~O.s
!.(bl:).;,zeaanrnt1l!lesti.0111a~1JW!:i!Pe._si1h~!llBHSB;fa~Sel~@Je_gatmm:.re1mea~~1tcsrr.·
ff:ffioifil~ri8-emrenfurQg ·
@9-i~@.~ancl~'t~iSeekfunmefilllt:oo:emoval;df'Suorf
0,ifrofiit~.m:1aire)m~·
·citite~fili-amilie's.@~~~aRiliniIB<©hvi011s'$tlltemf, .,.•.
~1!1~ciiic1fi.~'1~ti's"'lilf". , ,r''jiciti(@r..mJB1'mJ.eIDtleF.(offlh:e~urr!Al.ialley:Clli;i18mmcil
..~~~"'1h~initlrem:tt:ureiM:r.,llli,i~11..no.1Aenter:~S:onNalleytB:ft,j•~"anil.JJefform.·stime:sctfof
··¥.iliilerm.e? lf you carr'i-_yau.are ob4guted to -take .actions-to protect Gii;y-·Of-Sun V.alley
employees.and members ofth.e public from ·Mr. Rib1 and his.abn.~ive .and potentially-violent
.nature. Should Mr. Rihi not Iesign as .suggested, -and subsequently perl'om:i any further acts .of
impropriety or injnlj 10,City Gf Sun ValleJ' employees, and in particular to Ms. .Hammer, :based
on your knowledge nfMr. Ribi's st.ate of mind, it is.certainly now tbe Ctty Of .Sun Valley and
tbe indiv.ir.inal. membe.rs ofthe Sun ·v:alley C'i!Y .Council w.h.o will be helc! re~ponsib1e.
1

'[be:S't!D W-at1ey Gi1y ·Cmmcil ihas,.rm :-a:uthoritJ'to force 'lvl:r. Rini 1s resi_gnation. }low~:v.er.,
l?$.Q. ,?.~~;,SP:1:~t'::.J~;:i\JOJ.J?!O.Y.i~es:~ior ,t11exem1.;:va1 ofa:public,offiaer,.nfter .trial 'byihe:1eca:l
counu• ,prosecuto~ .for,acti@ns ,Of"".',;viUfu1 m:ii:scmndum...£ho:ultl :I\~ Jcrbi-:reiuse :to :-resi~·in1ord~f'to
;proteel Cii;y Of Sun Valley :employees, '.in-partioular:1'fi..s. Rammer_, .and the public.m ,gen..oral, l,.
and 1v1s. Hammer., believe fuai ':)'Ol.!, .and :the·:remaini.ng Sun Valley City Coun.ci] members mre
obligated .to for.v.;ard ::m.Blmne,County P.rosecuwr Jim J. Thomas .a :request· to seek TeDJOVa1 of
Mr. PJbi from his pos.i:tion as·.& ·Sun ·valley City Council member for a.:.ts of willful m:iscondnct
related to foe haras:m1en1 o:;'Ms. Hammer-in ·vbla:ticm of-Sectio11 7.5 oftbe Sun VaJley .Pol-icie.s
A.:nd :P.rncedures.1n add.ition. as ·is detailed in tfo:. ·venfied ComplainL. M.r. F3bi's muh.ipk
v.iobtions of hofr1 Section 3.2 (relaled 10 au:h-xi,y 10 din:cl Sun Va1iey emp1oye::!5) and Section
7.4 (re1altd to disclo~!u~·e of Gon-fid=::ntia1 Sun 1/ c.!iey and Surj -Valley employee irJ07ma1jotl) of
tht SJr, \·a;Jcy Poli~j~.s .L~nd P7'nc~:d-uret~ shr1ul.d a1sc, su~ie~"i J\1r. Ribi tn rerr1ova! from office
p;.i:-s~a~1! 10 } dt.hG Sta1u1.e J 9~ i 01 E)r Zldd! Llonal and ~eplli::.1e ·v.:iiifu; ruts~onduci b_y l\ir. PJDi.
0
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=
.lf.:th.e-.ci1=3' Of-Sun-W.allf:Y and.the :;incUvidua1.:member.s .of:the .Stm Valley City-.CounoiJ .do
nGl-!Cith.er-:obtain;MI. '.Ri.b1'.s.:resignation.o~-e~1~~§~~~~JN:t~~R~~~.Q.:b
_please b~:enmliltice :that::the~Cr© :0f.flun ';"\l.liJ.le!-); .:antl.;fhe:indhfulua:l "illll}lllber-s ~f:fhe ~S:UIJ 'V.alley
Ccy,Gonnci.l :willl>ean:espensibil~1 for !II\1' fu.tm:e-acfions .of.inwro]lrie1a' .or,lillBconduct u~ the

I

1

par.t, of~. 'Ribi :and-at:JY ·;p~ysical . or tJ~otiona1 ,.i.Iiiury:Mr. Rilii :subsequ:mtly causes.. -

P1eaaell0te :that 1.JPCID the:fil:ing of:the ".hw:assment:Jaw-sm:t::<&ga:inst.tbe,:Ch;}, ,of:Bun V.alley ·
and Mr. Jlibi, ·the 'Vm:ified s/:;ernJllaint:and ihis Jetter,wm ·he,filsc1C:lsed to·:the:public, .including..fhat
both wlll ·be-pr.0¥.ided:to fue'ldaho :Mountain E~"J)tess,.tbe 'f:imos-N.ew.s,aml fhelrlah.o Statesman
f.orpublicafum, in:.a:n,effort'forthe.public1o-take notice.of Mr. iRim':s potential .d.a:ngerto Ms.
Bammer~ ;Ci.1,y·.Of Sun Va1ley .emJilqy.ees,-anB :the ~e.m:.ral public, :and to ·disclose the failure .oftbe
Cicy ·of:Sun 1lall~y to mke.mJy:acfions to proiem·such :individuals fram ..flil"thcrpotentiaJ
harassmen~;tbreats .and .Jfr!ysical .h:ann:from Mr. Ribl.

-On a personal note, Ms. Eammer w.isbesito thank·yon for ,:a:11.of your effons.-in :Seelci~g1o
ensure.that Ms. Rmmne:rilias been. J)I'Otected ·from Mr. .llibi ancl bis :insul~,,abuser:;_. m:isaondoct
mill attaoks:during:yourter.m as M!fyor. As bas "been.mated, .Ms. Hammer has,'.tefr.ained :from
seeking·fbe:leo~-recomse :sh:: :is.ce~iy ·entitled.to ·against Mr. J.libi ~basea m 1a.:ge part on ym.tr
personal promises-and ~gdcy. llow.ev.er, witb :the impe~_g. .cb.an_ge .of ad:rni.nisn:a:tion ·and :that
MI. Rlm ·has·now made .ol.earfhat somehow he :is'''.in,charge" ·and""~gs will be done
differentl:t\ ',M.s.1:lmmner.has no.otherrecomse·to :protec11i.er&e1f ;aDd-other 'Sun. Valley
emplo.Y9'f but.to bring the .harassm..ant action, unless Mr. -Ribi:res1gns.
,, I
<""I
! ,'
I' J

,~r,)

V1·~07:_J.'.~~~/
JAMES
R.DONOV.k..L
A.tto:rnev
At Law
l ~
cc:

.

\

.S. Hammer
J.1..amb
D• .Brisco::
R. 'f oungman
F. Suhado1nik
M. Griffith
KRibi
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19-4101_. !IRESENTA'l:J:ON O:' ACC:USM!IDN • .An accusation :in .w.x:itin.9 .a-ga:i.nst any
c:r ·Jllllnici;pai :off;i;oe~, 'fo:: wilful or corDupt
.misconduct :i3l of:fice, lllilY be presented -.by ·the ,g:i:and jur_y o:f ''the .col.DltY !for
or ill ·Which :the .o:ffi-c:er .accused is ,el.acted .or flJ;IPDi-nted.
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c1mamu. ;PRQCEDURE
CHA~!\ <.l
REMOv:lll, 01' crvn. OFITCERS

l!l-411'2. .JIJDSMi!N'l' OF :llEMOVAl.. Upon ,B -conv.ic:tion, ·the court ll1llSt, .a.t such
·ti111e a., :it -ma_y .f!:Ppoint, p:conounae a judgment that. -i:he de£endan:t be :rremovad
'.from o%:tiae.; belt, to wa=ant .a 'X'.81110val, the judgment~~; :he -enteued -upon

the .minutes, anti the Cl!lWles of J:emoval

llll1S1: ·J:>e

assigned therein.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

Nils Ribi and Patricia Brolin-Ribi,
Plaintiffs,
V.

James R. Donoval,
Defendant.

)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV2011-1040

----------)

MEMORANDUM DECISION GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

In this matter th~ defendant moved for summary judgment on counts I and II of the
plaintiffs' three-count complaint. Both counts I and II allege that the defendant defamed plaintiff
Nils Ribi. The alleged defamatory statements occurred in a pair of letters and a draft complaint
MEMORANDUM DECISION CV-2011-1040
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distributed by defendant to various individuals prior to a lawsuit filed on behalf of Sharon R.
Hammer. The defendant moved for summary judgment for three reasons: that the defendant is
entitled to an absolute litigation privilege which renders him immune from a defamation action
concerning the content of the pre-litigation letters; that plaintiff Nils Ribi is a public figure and
defendant's statements were not made with actual malice; and that even if the defamation claim
can survive summary judgment, available damages

should be limited in scope to only those

directly resulting from the recipients of t4_~ lt:;tters, Thi~_~urt finds that because the litigation
privilege is extremely broad, the defendant's pre-litigation communications fall within that
privilege, thus the defendant's motion for summary judgment as to counts I and II is granted.
PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL HISTORY

There are two letters at issue in this current motion for partial summary judgment. The
first is a letter dated November 12, 2011. The second letter is dated November 16, 2011. Both
letters were written and sent by defendant James Donoval to a group of individuals. The group
receiving the letters comprised the mayor of Sun Valley, Sun Valley City Council members, as
well as newly-elected City Council members who had yet to begin their terms. The letter was
addressed to the then mayor of Sun Valley, Wayne Willich.
In the letters, Mr. Donoval writes that he represents Sharon R Hammer as her attorney.

Ms. Hammer was, at the time, the Sun Valley City Administrator. Mr. Donoval goes on in the
letters to argue that Nils Ribi, who was and is a Sun Valley City Council member, was seeking
retribution against Ms. Hammer by seeking her removal from her position of employment with
the city. In both letters Mr. Donoval makes numerous statements either suggesting or explicitly
stating that Mr. Ribi has serious emotional, psychological, and physiological illnesses which
make him a danger to Ms. Hammer and other Sun Valley city employees. It is these statements

MEMORANDUM DECISION CV-2011-1040
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that are the basis of counts I and II. The statements are mentioned herein to the minimum extent
necessary.
Both letters contain a number of demands. Included among those demands are that Mr.
Ribi resign from his City Council position, that the City of Sun Valley pay Ms. Hammer
$100,000, and that Mr. Ribi refrain from contact with Ms. Hammer. Mr. Donoval also explicitly
states in the letters that failure to acquiesce to the demands will result in the filing of a
''harassment" lawsuit against Mr. Ribi aild_th~ City of Sun Valley. Attached to the letter of
November 16 is a draft complaint written by Mr. Donoval, which claims "harassment" and
intentional infliction of emotional distress against Mr. Ribi and the City of Sun Valley. This draft
complaint also serves as a basis for count II of the plaintiffs' complaint, as it repeats some of~e
suggestions and explicit statements contained in the letters regarding Mr. Ribi's alleged
conditions.
On November 21, 2011, Mr. Donoval filed a complaint iii Blaine County on behalf of

Ms. Hammer against Mr. Ribi and the City of Sun Valley, as well as against Adam King, an

attorney for the City. The complaint differs considerably from the draft complaint of November
16, 2011 in that it does not retain the harassment and intentional infliction of emotional distress
claims, instead substituting a claim for a violation of the Idaho Protection of Public Employees
Act. See I.C. § 6-2101 et seq. The November 21 complaint does aver that Mr. Ribi harassed and
assaulted Ms. Hammer, and that Mr. Ribi has an "abusive nature", but does not repeat the
language contained the draft complaint concerning Mr. Ribi's supposed conditions.
On December 30, 2011,the present action was filed in Blaine County against Mr.
Donoval by plaintiffs Nils Ribi and Patricia Brolin-Ribi, alleging in counts I and II that the
letters of November 12 and 16, and the draft complaint of November 16, defamed Nils Ribi. On

MEMORANDUM DECISION CV-2011-1040
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January 17, 2012, Mr. Donoval filed a motion for summary judgment as to counts I and II. That
motion is the subject of this decision.

ANALYSIS

A. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter_oflaw." I.R.C.P. 56(c); Scona, Inc. v.

Green Willow Trust, 133 Idaho 283 (1999). The court must liberally construe all disputed facts
in favor of the non-moving party, and draw all reasonable inferences and conclusions supported
by the record in favor of the party opposing the motion. Bonz v. Sudweeks, 119 Idaho 539, 54 !

(1999). If conflicting inferences are possible, summary judgment should be denied. Only if
there is no genuine issue of material fact after the affidavits, pleadings, and depositions have
been construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party should summary judgment be
awarded. Loomis v. City ofHailey, 119 Idaho 434 (1991). Because this court does not reach the
issue of defamation against a public official, it is not necessary to import the additional summary
judgment requirements set out in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).

B. The Litigation Privilege Immunizes the Defendant's Pre-litigation Communications
The defendant argues that his pre-litigation letters and draft complaint in this case are
protected by the litigation privilege. This court agrees. The pre-litigation communications are

reasonably related to the cause of action, the presumption that Mr. Donoval was not acting solely
for his own interest is not overcome, and there is no genuine issue of fact concerning whether the
pre-litigation communications were related to a cause of action that was contemplated in good
faith and under serious consideration.

MEMORANDUM DECISION CV-2011-1040
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a. Whether the Litigation Privilege Applies to a Particular Pre-litigation
Communication is a Question for the Court

The public policy supporting the broad litigation privilege is to free attorneys to zealously
advocate for their clients without fear of subsequent litigation for that zealous advocacy. For this
reason the privilege not only aims to protect attorneys from having to fear civil liability, but also
protects attorneys from the fear of unsuccessful civil actions. Marsh v. HoI/ander, 339 F.Supp.2d
1, 7 (D. D.C. 2004). This militates in favor of deciding questions of the applicability of the
privilege at an early stage. Therefore, the applicability of the privilege should be decided by the
court when possible.
The relevancy of the pre-litigation communication to the cause of action is a question of
law to be determined by the court, and doubts should be resolved in favor of finding relevance.

Jensen v. Olson, 141 N.W.2d 488,490 (Minn. 1966). Taken together, the proposition that courts
should decide questions of the litigation privilege early in litigation has strong support. Idaho has
not formulated a definitive statement on this, but it is implicit in the cases that early dismissal is
appropriate if the privilege applies. In Taylor v. McNichols, the Court affirmed a motion to
dismiss, in part because the claims brought by the plaintiff were barred by the litigation
privilege. Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826,849 (2010). Likewise, in the seminal Idaho case
on the litigation privilege, Richeson v. Kessler, the Court affirmed a dismissal (pursuant to a
general demurrer in pre-Rule 12 days) where the district court found the litigation privilege to
apply to an action for libel. Richeson v. Kessler, 73 Idaho 548, 552 (1953). Here, there are
factual issues which make analysis under the summary judgment standard appropriate; matters
beyond the pleadings must be considered.
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Though policy and precedent favor deciding questions of the litigation privilege early,
there is persuasive authority suggesting that when the communication is pre-litigation whether
the related cause of action is ''contemplated in good faith and under serious consideration" is an
issue of fact. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 586, cmt e (1977); Action Apartment Assn. v City
ofSanta Monica, 41 Cal. 4th 1232, 1251 (Cal. 2007) ("Whether a prelitigation communication

relates to litigation that is contemplated in good faith and under serious consideration is an issue
of fact"). Accordingly, this court finds it necessary to decide whether there is a genuine issue of
fact concerning whether litigation was conteIJiPlated in good faith and under serious
consideration. This will be taken up in due course.
b. There is Evidence Indicating Defendant Did Not Act Solely for His Own Interests

Idaho recognizes an absolute litigation privilege, which applies only when "an attorney is
acting within the scope of his employment, and not solely for his personal interests." Taylor v.
McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 841 (2010). The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that there is a

presumption that an attorney who is communicating on behalf of a client is also acting on behalf
of that client Id. Since this is merely a presumption, it can be rebutted by evidence indicating
that the communication(s) are not on behalf of the client Specifically, the presumption can be

rebutted by showing that the attorney "engaged in acts [or communications] outside the scope of
his representation of his client's interests, or has acted solely for his own interests and not his
client's." Id.
Mr. Donoval indicated in his letters that he was representing his client, Ms. Hammer, and
that the letters were written on her behalf. Roark Aff. Ex. 1 at 1-2. The letters are at least
nominally in response to allegations of "impropriety'' levied against Ms. Hammer that threatened
her job security. Id Ex. I at I. Furthermore, the letters made demands, which if acquiesced to,
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would benefit Ms. Hammer. Roark Aff. Ex. 1 at 5; Roark Aff. Ex. 2 at 2. Ms. Hammer has
supplied an affi.davit which sets forth her direct knowledge of Mr. Ribi's behavior, and her
conversations with Mr. Donoval about this behavior. Hammer A.ff. ff 5-12. This information
was the basis asserted for some of the statements, and indicates Mr. Donoval was not acting
solely for his own benefit Therefore, the presumption that Mr. Donoval was communicating on
behalf of his client is established.
The plaintiffs argue and produce evidence that Mr. Donoval resented the Ribis for
endorsing Mr. Donoval's opponent in an Idaho State Senate election. See Roak Aff. Ex. 5.
Moreover, since Mr. Donoval is Ms. Hammer's spouse, any money that she would receive from
a settlement would personally benefit Mr. Donoval. Plaintiffs also argue that Mr. Donoval's
motivation in sending the letters is a significant issue of fact precluding summary judgment
However, as noted above, whether the privilege applies is a question for the court. Here, there is
sufficient evidence indicating that Mr. Donoval was not acting solely for his personal interests.

Mr. Donoval was, if nothing else, attempting to safeguard his client's position of employment
Even if Mr. Donoval would personally benefit from satisfaction of every demand made in the
letters, and even ifhe was mainly driven by a desire to humiliate Mr. Ribi, the letter's demands,
if satisfied, would also benefit his client There is not sufficient evidence to show independent
acts outside the scope of representation or that Mr. Donoval was acting solely for his own
interests. On the contrary, there is evidence that the letters and statements in them were made in
attempt to advance Ms. Hammer's interests. Therefore, the presumption that Mr. Donoval was
acting on behalf of his client is not rebutted.
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c. The Statements Were Related to a Cause of Action Made in the Course of a
Judicial Proceeding and Had Some Reasonable Relation to the Cause of Action

Though this court finds that the presumption that Mr. Donoval was not acting on behalf
of his client is not rebutted, this is not enough, by itself, to find that the litigation privilege
applies. For the privilege to apply, the defamatory statements must be made in the course of a
judicial proceeding and have some reasonable relation to the cause of action. Weitz v. Green, 148
Idaho 851, 862 (2010). This court finds that the statements at issue were made in the course of a
judicial proceeding and did have some reasonable relation to the cause of action.
The communications at issue were sent and received prior to the filing of a complaint.

However, this does not mean that the communications were not made in the course of a judicial
proceeding for purposes of the rule. The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that letters sent .
outside of the strict confines of the formal beginning and end of a case can be covered by the
litigation privilege. See Malmin v. Engler, 124 Idaho 733, 736 (1993) (letter sent after default
judgment was made in the course of a judicial proceeding). The rule utilized in Malmin is
derived from The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 586, which states, "An attorney at law is
absolutely privileged to publish defamatory matter concerning another in communications

preliminary to a proposed judicial proceeding... " Restatement (Second) of Torts § 586 (1977);
see also Malmin, 124 Idaho at 737 (highlighting the ~'pre)jmjnary to" language and quoting
favorably). Numerous courts have followed the language of§ 586 in extending the litigation
privilege to pre-litigation communications. Rubin v. Green, 4 Cal. 4th 1187, 1194 (Cal. 1993) en
bane; see e.g., Hagendorf v. Brown, 699 F.2d 478,480 (9th Cir. 1983); Provencher v. Buzzell-

Plourde Associates, 711 A.2d 251,256 (N.H. 1998) (extending the privilege to pre-litigation
witness statements); Walker v. Majors, 496 So.2d 726, 728-30 (Ala. 1986).
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Idaho courts have held that an absolute litigation privilege applies during the course of a
judicial proceeding if the allegedly defamatory statements have "some reasonable relation to the
cause" of action. Richeson v. Kessler, 73 Idaho 548, 551-52 (1953); see also Malmin, 124 Idaho
at 736 (quoting the language of the Richeson court favorably). The communications at issue here

meet this standard.
The complaint filed in Blaine County District Court by Mr. Donoval on November 21,
2011 against the City of Sun Valley, Nils Ribi, and Adam King related to harassment and assault

allegations Ms. Hammer made against Mr. Ribi. Mr. Ribi's emotional and mental well-being, as
well as the City's knowledge of any treatment of any connected mental illness, are reasonably
related to both the draft complaint, which alleged "harassment" against Mr. Ribi, and the filed·
complaint, which alleged retaliation for Ms. Hammer's reporting of Mr. Rloi's harassment.
Ostensibly, Mr. Donoval was making the City aware of the issue, and the potential for Mr. Ribi
to continue the alleged harassing course of conduct in the future against Ms. Hammer and other

employees. It is not uncommon for an attorney to ask a potential litigant to voluntarily assume a
course of conduct to avoid future problems. If Mr. Rloi did indeed have emotional and mental
illness which made him prone to violence, it would not be improper for an attorney to ask that
others take action to avoid violence, even if the ultimate cause of action is related to retaliation
for complaining about the violent tendencies. Whether Mr. Ribi had the problems asserted in Mr.
Donoval' s letters and draft complaint is related to whether Mr. Ribi is prone to harassment or
perhaps even retaliation. The relationship required "is not a technical legal relevancy, such as
would, necessarily,justify insertion of the matter in a pleading or its admission into evidence, but
rather a general frame of reference and relationship to the ~bject matter of the action." Hawkins

v. Harris, 661 A.2d 284, 290 (N.J. 1995) quoting Henning v. S.G. Holding Corp., 135 A.2d 346,
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350 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1957). The alleged defamatory statements, though not polite, nor
necessary to the cause of action, do rise to the level of a "general frame of reference and
relationship to the subject matter of the action", thus they are reasonably related to the cause of
action. Id.
This court recognizes that there is a tremendous ethical difference between knowingly
and truthfully disclosing a past history of mental illness, and simply fabricating such a history or
stating that a history exists with little factual basis for such a statement. However, the litigation

privilege does not put any weight on the "motives, morals, ethics, or intent" of the attorney
making the allegedly defamatory statements. Silberg v. Anderson, 50 Cal.3d 205, 220 (Cal.
1990) en bane. The litigation privilege provides absolute protection for the publication of
defamatory statements as long as the statements fall within the broad confines of the litigation
privilege. Richeson, 73 Idaho 552 (1953) ("defamatory matter published in the due course of a
judicial proceeding, having some reasonable relation to the cause, is absolutely privileged and
will not support a civil action for defamation although made maliciously and with knowledge of
its falsity.").

d. The Statements Were Related to an Action Contemplated in Good Faith and
Under Serious Consideration
In addition to having a reasonable relation to the cause of action, the Restatement § 586
requires that pre-litigation communications to be related to a cause of action that is

"contemplated in good faith and under serious consideration." Restatement (Second) of Torts§
586, cmt. e (1977). A few courts have examined the factors to be considered when determining
whether the cause of action is contemplated in "good faith." The primary factors include:
whether the litigation was subsequently filed; the proximity in time between the statement and
the filing of the lawsuit; whether the litigation was proposed in order to gain access to the courts
MEMORANDUM DECISION CV-2011-1040
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for the purpose of resolving the dispute. Centex Real Estate Corp, 53 Cal. App. 4th at 35-36;

Laffer v. Levinson, Miller, Jacobs & Phillips, 34 Cal. App. 4th 117, 124 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
There is no genuine issue of fact in this case on the question of whether litigation was
contemplated in good faith and under serious consideration. Both of Mr. Donoval's letters
mentioned that litigation would be filed on November 21, 2011 if the demands in the letters were
not met. Roark Aff. Ex. 1-2. Though the substance of the filed claim differed from those
proposed in the November 16 draft complaint, Mr. Donoval did indeed file a lawsuit as promised
on November 21. The litigation was filed, it was filed a mere nine days after the first letter was
sent. The subsequent filing of the November 21 lawsuit supports a finding that litigation was not
proposed merely for improper purposes. See Centex Real Estate Corp, 53 Cal. App. 4th at 36 .
("[the litigation privilege does not attach] when a threat of litigation is made merely as a means
of obtaining a settlement.").

Because the pre-litigation statements were reasonably related to the cause of action, the
presumption that Mr. Donoval was not acting solely for his own interest is not rebutted, and
because there is no genuine issue of fact as to whether the litigation was contemplated in good
faith and under serious consideration, this court holds that the litigation privilege immunizes Mr.
Donoval concerning the allegedly defamatory statements at issue. For the foregoing reasons, the
remaining issues need not be addressed.
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CONCLUSION
Defendant's motion for partial summary judgment is GRANIBD for the reasons stated in
this decision.

IT IS SO ORDERED
·· · Dated:-

,&fir~
I
l
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Jol.ynn Drage, Clerk District

NAYLOR & HALES, P.C.

Coult Blaine Countv. Idaho

Attorneys at Law
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 610
Boise, ID 83702
Telephone No. (208) 383-9511
Facsimile No. (208) 383-9516
Email: kirt@naylorhales.com; jake@naylorhales.com; tdw@naylorhales.com
Attorneys for Defendant Nils Ribi

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
SHARON R. HAMMER,
Case No. CV2015-428
Plaintiff:
vs.
NILS RIBI, in his individual capacity,

DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO
DISMISS AMENDED COMPLAINT

Defendant

Defendant, Nils Ribi, by and through his attorneys of record, Naylor & Hales, P .C., hereby
submits this Memorandum in Support of his Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint
under I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6). As shown below, Plaintiff Sharon R. Hammer's Amended Complaint must

be dismissed because it fails to state a claim for relief.
I.
INTRODUCTION

The Court dismissed Hammer's original complaint from the bench during a hearing on May
9, 2016, followed by an order on May 12th, because Hammer failed to allege facts showing an assault
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and instead only alleged a "loud argument." Significantly, Hammer's deficient pleading came after
several years of litigation in several other lawsuits, including a federal lawsuit where the identical
allegations of assault were made. (See Def's April 25, 2016 Rule 12(c) Motion Memorandum at 1-2.)
Yet, despite having the benefit of years of discovery prior to filing the original complaint Hammer
still failed to plead facts showing an assault.
Under Idaho's liberal amendment rules, the Court granted Hammer leave to file an amended
complaint, which Hammer had previously asked for, 1 though without submitting a proposed
amended complaint. In granting leave, however, the Court observed:
I get the feeling that it's going to be difficult for you to improve on this pleading
because I think you know where the line is and I think you're careful about what you
can say happened and what Ms. Hammer - I think she's careful about what she can
say happened. And there may be some additional facts that you want to allege, but
it's got to be facts and you've got to allege them sufficient to constitute assault.
My feeling-the only reason I'm saying this is because my feeling is that if you had
those. you might have said them already. You didn't. Maybe you do have a couple of
additional more facts, I don't know. I'm going to give you a chance to show me. So
I'm going to let you amend your complaint. Like I say, it would have been preferable
to see the amended complaint prior to now.
(Appendix A, May 9, 2016 Hearing at 80-81) (emphasis added). Significantly, during the hearing
Hammer's own attorney stated:
So even if you find that we have not added one or two minor phrases that would
allege what we've told you Ms. Hammer is alleging happened in this incident, we
should be able to add a couple more facts, to place in a couple other facts to satisfy
you.

(Id. at 66) (emphasis added).
'Hammer filed a Motion to Amend Complaint on May 2, 2016, before the hearing on the
motion to dismiss. She did not notice that motion for a hearing and did not submit a proposed
complaint.
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Hammer filed her unverified Am.ended Complaint shortly thereafter, on May 15th. Having
not previously submitted a proposed amended complaint, as would be typically expected, she had
the benefit of Ribi's arguments and the Court's ruling and for each point of deficiency discussed
during the hearing, Hammer's Amended Complaint attempts to remedy the problem. The result is
a surprisingly disingenuous and detailed set of new allegations that have not appeared in any prior
related litigation and which are plainly tailored to Ribi's previously successful arguments and the
Court's ruling.
Moreover, the Amended Complaint contains far more than "a couple more facts," despite
Hammer's attorney's representation during the May 9th hearing. The Amended Complaint now
contains numerous additional allegations about supposed "formal" findings of Willich that Ribi
violated the city's Anti-Harassment policy (Ti 35-36),2 allegations about the purported scope ofRibi's
"authority" as a city council member (iii! 45-47), and very detailed new allegations about the incident
itself (iii! 40-44, 48-51, 53-60, 63-64, 66-68). (See Appendix B, Annotated Amended Complaint).
Nevertheless, even with Hammer's extensive new allegations, she still fails to adequately
plead a cause of action for assault. Even if the newest complaint alleges an assault, Ribi is still
entitled to immunity under the Idaho Tort Claims Act. Consequently, the Amended Complaint must

be dismissed.

During the May 9 hearing, in response to the Court's inquiry about the allegations of prior
harassment, Hammer's attorney acknowledged "it is strictly an assault case, Your Honor.II The Court
then said: 0 All right. 'Strictly an assault case.' I'm going to take you at your word there because your
pleadings sort of frame a preliminary harassment, it goes into that realm, and then it look is like what
you're trying to plead is an assault case. So I'm going to take this as pleading of an assault case
because you're telling me it's not a harassment case." (Appendix A, May 9, 2016 Hearing at 14-15.)
2
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II.
LEGAL STANDARD
In order to state a claim for relief, a complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of

the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief[.]" I.R.C.P. 8(a)(1) (emphasis added). While
the court must accept as true all non--conclusory factual allegations, a claim must be dismissed under
Rule 12(b)(6), even under Idaho's liberal pleading rules, if the allegations could not provide a basis
for relief even when accepting the non-conclusory allegations as true. Youngv. City ofKetchum, 13 7
Idaho 102, 104 (2002). Thus, mere conclusory statements unsupported by adequate factual
allegations are insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.
Theldaho Supreme Court has not yet expressly adopted the Iqbal-Twombly pleading standard
utilized in federal courts under the analogous federal pleading requirements. However, the court has
stated that Idaho has adopted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and courts are required to interpret
Idaho procedure as uniformly as possible with the federal cases, in order to "establish a uniform
practice and procedure in both the federal and state courts in the State ofldaho." Chacon v. Sperry
Corp., 111 Idaho 270,275 (1986). Thus, the Idaho and federal pleading requirements should be read

uniformly.3
Under federal law, to survive a motion to dismiss, "a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face."' Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,570 (2007)).
Under this standard, "the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a

3 Plaintiffs attorney accepted this pleading standard in connection with the prior motion to
dismiss. (Plfs May 2, 2016 "Objection/Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Under I.R.C.P.
12(c)" at 4, 17 (relying on Iqbal and Twombly pleading standard))
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complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conculsory statements, do not suffice." Id Additionally, "only a complaint
that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss." Id.
To be clear, Hammer's Amended Complaint, like her original Complaint, fails under Idaho's
liberal pleading standards because, even accepting her non-conclusory allegations as true, it still does
not show that she is entitled to any relief. However, Ribi also requests that the Court apply the IqbalTwombly standard here to come to the same conclusion, consistent with the Supreme Court's
directive to establish a uniform practice and procedure in both federal and state courts in Idaho.

Ill.
ARGUMENT
Hammer cannot proceed in this litigation because her Amended Complaint containing new
details, as specific as they are, still simply do not amount to an assault. Even if, for the sake of
argument, the Court finds that Hammer has adequately pled an assault, Ribi is still entitled to
statutory immunity.

A.

Hammer's Amended Complaint Fails to Plead an Assault Claim
In order to maintain her lawsuit Hammer must allege sufficient facts showing an assault. The

model Idaho Jury Instructions lists the elements of common law assault as: (1) the defendant acted
intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the plaintiff, or an immediate fear of such
contact; (2) as a result, the plaintiff feared that such contact was imminent. IDJI 4.30. Phrased
slightly differently, an assault is an "unlawful threat or offer to do bodily harm or injury to another."
Miller v. Idaho State Patrol, 150 Idaho 856, 871 (2011). As previously briefed:

DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
TO DISMISS AMENDED COMPLAINT - 5.

Page 368 of 526

-'

To constitute an actionable assault, the display of force must be under such
circumstances as to cause the plaintiff reasonable apprehension of immediate bodily
harm. In other words, assault requires a definitive act by one who has the apparent
ability to do the harm or to commit the offensive touching.
6A C.J.S., Assault§ 6 (emphasis added).
Further, "words not accompanied by circumstances inducing a reasonable apprehension of
bodily harm, such as movements of drawing a fist, aiming a blow. or the show of a weapon, do not
constitute an assault." Williams v. Port Auth. ofNew York and New Jersey, 880 F.Supp. 980,994
(E.D.N.Y 1995) (emphasis added). An adequately severe overt act is required, not just some overt
act, "even though the mental discomfort caused by a threat of serious future harm on the part of one
who has the apparent intention and ability to carry out his threat may be far more emotionally
disturbing than many ofthe attempts to inflict bodily contacts which are actionable as assaults." Steel

v. City ofSan Diego, 726 F.Supp. 2d. 1172, 1189 (S.D. Cal. 2010) (quoting Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 31, Comment A (2010) ). Additionally, the threat of bodily harm must be immediate. Steel,
726F.Supp.2dat 1189;Hardinv. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 813 F.Supp.2d 1167, 1178 (E.D. Cal.2011)
(plaintiff did not have an apprehension of immediate harm even though the defendant acted
aggressively by flipping off the plaintiff and "said he was going to get him[,]" because there was "no
indication that he was going to attack the [p]laintiff at that point[,]" even in the face of an actual
threat to do harm).
These principles essentially correspond to the elements of assault found in Idaho's criminal
code, under which assault is defined as:
(a) An unlawful attempt, coupled with apparent ability, to commit a violent injwy on
the person of another; or
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(b) An intentional, unlawful threat by word or act to do violence to the person of
another, coupled with an apparent ability to do so, and doing some act which creates
a well-founded fear in such another person that such violence is imminent.
I. C. § 18-901 (emphasis added). See also James v. City of Boise, 2016 WL 1162984 at 16 (Idaho
S.Ct. 2016) (not yet published in permanent law reports) (recognizing that intentional torts listed
in the ITCA could also constitute a crime).
The examples cited by Ribi in his prior motion to dismiss provide helpful illustrations. (See
Ribi'sApril 25 Rule 12(c)Memorandumat7-8)(citingCastrov. Local 1199, 964F. Supp. 719, 73132 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (defendant's visible anger, becoming "red in the face, slamming the table with
his hand, and advancing towards plaintiff in his wheeled chair insufficient to constitute assault);

Williams, 880 F. Supp. at 994 (defendant's use of a racial slur, backing plaintiff against a wall, and
threatening to "get him" insufficient to constitute assault)).
Despite Hammer's new detailed allegations (many of which are merely conclusions and
irrelevant to whether an assault occurred) she still fails to adequately plead an assault. Where her
original complaint merely showed that a "loud argument" occurred, her Amended Complaint now
merely alleges a loud argument combined with an apparent physical attempt to prevent Hammer
from talking to the mayor about the budget. Hammer alleges that Ribi pivoted towards her, with his
arms raised to about shoulder height, and he "took a step, thrust or lunge" towards her with his hands
outstretched, getting as close as about six inches stating "No! you will not talk to the Mayor!" before
Hammer stepped back, walked unopposed around Ribi and returned to the City Council chambers.

(See Amended Complaint, 1139-59.) (emphasis added) In Hammer's own words, she believed that
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Ribi was about to make physical contact with her in order to prevent her from moving towards the
chambers by grabbing her shoulders and stopping her that way. (Id, 156.)
These allegations simply do not show anything approaching an unlawful attempt, coupled

with apparent ability, to commit a violent injury on Hammer, nor do they show an intentional,
unlawful threat to do violence, coupled with an overt act, creating a reasonable fear of imminent
violence.4 These facts likewise do no demonstrate a threat of a harmful or offensive contact. Instead,
Hammer now alleges merely that Ribi made a single, unsuccessful attempted to stop her from
returning to City Council chambers. Her own pleading indicates that she easily avoided that attempt
simply by stepping backwards, and then was unopposed as she walked around Ribi to return to the
chambers. This is analogous to Castro and Williams, supra, where similar conduct did not constitute
assault. Simply put, a loud argument with a minor element of some potential limited physicality of
the kind here (no clenched fist, no aiming a blow, no showing a weapon) is insufficient to support
Hammer's claim. Based on Hammer's detailed yet conclusory and inadequate pleading, she has failed
as a matter of law to show that she is entitled to relief for a claim of assault.
Overall, Hammer's Amended Complaint is disingenuous and plainly designed to improperly
take advantage ofthe discussion in defendant's briefing and during oral argument about Hammer's
deficient allegations. Far from merely alleging "a couple more facts," the newest complaint sets out
extensive additional, detailed allegations never before raised despite years oflitigation. Not only do

Yiolence is more than mere unwanted physical contact or attempted physical contact as
Hammer has alleged here. It connotes an intent to do harm, to hurt, damage, abuse, injure or kill
something. It is a more intense level of physical force or attempted physical force. See, e.g., Black's
Law Dictionary, "violence" (10th ed. 2014); Merriam-Webster Dictionary, "violence" (available at
www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/violence) (last visited May 26, 2016).
4
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these new allegations fail to plead an assault (or to rebut the immunity presumption, as discussed
below), in submitting a signed pleading containing such baseless and disingenuous allegations in
order to overcome a motion to dismiss, Hammer and her attorney's conduct reflects a complete
disregard for appropriate judicial process.

B.

Ribi is Immune from Suit Under the Idaho Tort Claims Act
The Court did not need to previously rule on whether Ribi is immune under the Idaho Tort

Claims Act ("ITCA") because it found that Hammer failed to plead an assault. If, however, the Court
finds that Hammer has remedied her deficient pleadings as to her assault claim it is important that
the Court then address the threshold issue of immunity, as this is an issue that must generally be
resolved as early as possible in litigation.

1.

Immunity Must Be Resolved as Early As Possible in Litigation

Immunity under ITCA is not merely an exception to liability, it is immunity from suit itself.
"The Idaho Tort Claims Act, I.C. §§ 6-901-929, abrogates the doctrine of sovereign immunity and
renders a governmental entity liable for damages arising out of its negligent acts or omissions.
However, it preserves the traditional rule of immunity in certain specific situations." Lawton v. City

ofPocatello, 126 Idaho 454, 458 (1994) (emphasis added)(citing Sterling v. Bloom, 111 Idaho 211,
214-15 (1986)); see also Teurlings v. Larson, 156 Idaho 65, 71 (2014)(holding that, under LC.§ 6904(4), "Idaho has not waived its sovereign immunity" for the acts listed under that exception).
"Historically, the doctrine of sovereign immunity barred suits brought against the government."

Walker v. Shoshone Cnty., 112 Idaho 991 (1987) (emphasis added) (discussing the judicial and
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legislative history that resulted

in the enactment of the ITCA). In other words, traditionally the

government was absolutely immune from suit.
The ITCA is a waiver ofsome ofldaho's sovereign immunity, but the listed exceptions retain
the state's sovereign immunity for those circumstances. Consistent with the basic doctrine of
sovereign immunity, this is immunity from suit, not immunity to liability. As a result, the immunity
under ITCA is essentially a qualified version of absolute immunity from suit under the doctrine of
sovereign immunity.
The United States Supreme Court has made clear that questions ofqualified immunity should
be addressed as early as possible in litigation to avoid depriving a party of its intended effect (i.e.,
immunity from suit):
Because qualified immunity is 1immunity form suit rather than a mere defense to
liability ... it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.'
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) (emphasis deleted). Indeed, we have
made clear that the 'driving force' behind creation ofthe qualified immunity doctrine
was a desire to ensure that "'insubstantial claims" against government officials [will]
be resolved prior to discovery.' Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 n. 2
(1987). Accordingly, 'we repeatedly have stressed the importance of resolving
immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in litigation." Hunter v. Bryant, 502
U.S. 224,227 (1991) (per curium).

Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231-32 (2009); accord Rosenbergerv. Kootenai Cnty Sheriffs
Dep't, 140 Idaho 853,857 (2004). Indeed, "[i]mmunity ordinarily should be decided by the court
long before trial." Hunter, 502 U.S. at 228. Thus, questions of immunity should be addressed as soon

as possible in litigation to avoid subjecting a governmental entity or its employees to laborious
litigation if the immunity applies.
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Consistent with these principles, if the Court concludes that Hammer has adequately pled a
claim for assault, it should then address whether Ribi is nonetheless immune from suit at this early
stage in the proceedings.

2.

Hammer's Amended Complaint Fails to Overcome the Presumption of
Immunity

The Idaho Tort Claims Act generally authorizes tort claims against cities and their
employees5 for wrongful acts that occur within the course and scope of their employment. LC. § 6903(1 ). However, the ITCA specifically exempts employees for assault when "acting within the
course and scope of their employment and without malice or criminal intent. ... " LC. § 6-904(3).
Therefore, it is clear that as a matter of law an employee can be immune even if he has committed
an assault. Further, the presumption is "that any act or omission of an employee within the time and
at the place of his employment is within the course and scope of his employment and without malice
or criminal intent." LC. § 6-903(5) (emphasis added). It is undisputed based on Hammer's Amended
Complaint that the alleged assault occurred during a break in a city council meeting at city hall.
Consequently, the "time and place" requirement is satisfied here and analysis mandates the
presumption that Ribi is immune from suit. It is Hammer's burden to show otherwise, which she has
failed to do because her allegations do not show that: (a) Ribi acted outside the course and scope of
his employment; or that (b) Ribi acted maliciously or with criminal intent.

a.

The Amended Complaint Fails to Adequately Show that Ribi
Acted Outside the Course and Scope of His Employment.

The term "employee" includes elected officials. LC. § 6-902(4).

5

DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
TO DISMISS AMENDED COMPLAINT - 11.

Page 374 of 526

Under the ITCA, the clear presumption is that "any action or omission of an employee within
the time and at the place of his employment is within the course and scope of his employment. ... "
I.C. § 6-903(5); Pounds v. Denison, 120 Idaho 425 (1990). Additionally, the Idaho Supreme Court
has explained that "[a]cts that are within the scope of employment are 'those acts which are so
closely connected with what the servant is supposed to do, and so fairly and reasonably incidental
to it, that they may be regarded as methods, even though quite improper ones, of carrying out the
objectives of employment."' Anderson, 137 Idaho at 518 (quoting Richard J. & Esther E. Wooley

Trust v. DeBest Plumbing, Inc., 133 Idaho 180, 184 (1999)) (emphasis added). In other words, "an
employee's conduct is within the scope of employment 'if it is of the kind which he [or she] is
employed to perform, occurs substantially within the authorized limits of time and space, and is
actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master."' Id. (emphasis in Anderson) (bracketed
language added); Teurlings, 156 Idaho at74-75.
Significantly, an intentional tort can occur within the course and scope of employment. See,

e.g., Anderson v. City of Pocatello, 112 Idaho 176 (1986) (police shooting); Evans v. Twin Falls
Cnty., 118 Idaho 210 (1990)(assault and battery); Limbert v. Twin Falls Cnty., 131 Idaho 344 (346
(Ct. App. 1998) (battery). The analyses of whether an intentional tort occurred and whether it was
within the course and scope of employment are separate and distinct. Thus, whether an employee
acted within the course and scope of his employment does not turn on whether the employee
committed an intentional tort. Otherwise, the applicable immunity provisions of ITCA would be
meaningless, as the existence of a tort would negate the immunity under this logic. Instead, whether
the conduct was within the course and scope of employment is analyzed under the above standard.
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At most, Hammer's allegations about the alleged assault itself could be classified as an
improper method "of carrying out the objective of employment," which is simply not sufficient to
remove the statutory immunity. Hammer's original allegations regarding Ribi's conduct, which are
repeated in the Amended Complaint, place him directly "within the time and place of his
employment." She alleges that the incident occurred during a break in a City Council meeting, in the
hallway of City Hall and after the alleged assault the two returned to council chambers. Not only this,
but the content of the alleged confrontation arose directly out of an alleged argument regarding
budget matters that had just been discussed during the City Council meeting. There is no factual
allegation of any statement that does not directly relate in some way to the business of the city; in
fact, all the statements made were in direct relation to an issue pending before the City Council.
There is nothing from the context or the substance of the alleged interaction that would be
considered outside the course and scope of Ribi's official responsibilities which would rebut the
statutory presumption ofimmunity. Hammer's alleged facts clearly and unambiguously place Ribi's
conduct well within the course and scope of his duties as an elected official, and as such, the
statutory immunity should apply.
Hammer's new allegations fail to show that Ribi's conduct was outside the course and scope
of his employment. Specifically, she now states in a conclusory fashion without any factual or legal
basis that the conversation leading up to the alleged assault was itself outside the course and scope
of employment:
45.
As one member of the Sun Valley City Council, Defendant Ribi had no
authority in any area of Sun Valley City Hall outside the limited scope of his
activities in the Sun Valley City Council Chamber during Sun Valley City Council
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meetings. Therefore, by contacting Ms. Hammer and discussing Sun Valley budget
matters with Ms. Hammer outside of the confines of the Sun Valley City Council
Chamber, Defendant Ribi was acting outside the limited scope of his duties as a Sun
Valley City Council member.
46.
As a Sun Valley City Council member Defendant Ribi held no individual
authority to unilaterally require that changes be made to the Sun Valley budget or
Sun Valley budget documents. Therefore, by demanding that Ms. Hammer make
changes to the Sun Valley budget and budget documents that Defendant Ribi
individually wanted made, Defendant Ribi was acting outside the limited scope of
his duties as a Sun Valley City Council member.
4 7.
As a Sun Valley City Council member Defendant Ribi held no individual
authority to direct Ms. Hammer to perform any acts at his individual direction, as Ms.
Hammer reported directly and solely to Mayor Willich. Therefore, by directing that
Ms. Hammer make no changes tot he Sun Valley budget and budget documents that
Defendant Ribi individually wanted made, Defendant Ribi was acting outside the
limited scope of his duties as a Sun Valley City Council member.
(Amended Complaint, 1145-47) (emphasis added).

In other words, Hammer's allegations are that Ribi acted outside the course and scope of his
employment because she believes that: (1) he had no "authority" outside of the geographic area of
the actual City Council chamber; (2) he had no "authority" to require changes be made to a city
budget; and (3) he had no "authority" to direct Hammer generally in a supervisory capacity. Thus,
by allegedly demanding that changes be made to city budget documents in a hallway outside of
council chambers he was acting outside the course and scope of his employment. These assertions
are without any logical basis.
To reiterate, Ribi is presumed immune if his conduct occurred "within the time and at the
place" of his employment. This is indisputably the case here, where the alleged misconduct occurred
at City Hall, during a break in a City Council meeting. Hammer's allegations seeking to overcome
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this presumption are nothing but her own personal beliefs and conclusions about Ribi's ''authority"
unsupported by any legal basis. The Court is therefore not required to accept these conclusory
allegations as true.
More so, Hammer's focus on Ribi's "authority" misses the point. The issue is not what the
precise scope ofRibi's official authority was as a City Council Member. Instead, the correct analysis
is whether the conduct occurred "substantially within the authorized limits of time and space ... "
of employment. Anderson, 137 Idaho at 518; Teurlings, 156 Idaho at74-75. Hammer conflates the
issue of whether the alleged incident occurred within the authorized limits of time and space with
whether Ribi had specific "authority" from his official duties as a city council member to discuss the
budget matters with Hammer or direct her to do anything related to budget matters. However, for
purposes here at the pleading stage, the Court can assume that Ribi exceeded the authority of his
elected office by discussing these budget issues with Hammer outside of council chambers (though
it would be an absurd result to actually conclude that a city council member cannot talk about budget
managers with a city administrator except in council chambers when they are statutorily required to
prepare and approve that budget).
Overall, the correct "course and scope" analysis here is this: First, whether being involved
with the city budget is the kind of work Ribi was elected to perform. Second, whether Ribi acted
within the authorized time and space limits of his employment. Last, whether Ribi's conduct was
done, at least in part, in service of the City of Sun Valley. Id
The dispute between Ribi and Hammer on September 15 revolved around the city's budget,
which plainly relates directly to Ribi's employment as a City Council Member. See, e.g., LC. § 50-

DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
TO DISMISS AMENDED COMPLAINT - 15.

Page 378 of 526

1002 ("Annual Budget").6 Thus, even assuming it was improper for Ribi to discuss the budget with
Hammer outside of council chambers, or demand anything of her related to the budget, the
allegations plainly show that the conversation was still closely connected to issues for which Ribi
was employed, i.e., the city's budget. Additionally, as discussed above, the alleged assault occurred
at city hall during a break in a city council meeting and thus was substantially within the authorized
limits of time and space ofRioi's employment as a city council member. Last, even ifRibi acted
inappropriately in his alleged interaction with Hammer, as pled, the Amended Complaint makes
clear that the alleged assault arose out ofRibi's problems with the budget and Hammer's role therein.
Thus, as pled, the alleged incident was done, at least in part, in service of Sun Valley, regardless of
whatever other alleged motive Hammer may believe Ribi had or the overall propriety of his alleged
conduct. Consequently, Hammer's allegations fail to overcome the presumption that Ribi was acting
within the course and scope of his employment.
b.

The Amended Complaint Fails to Show that Ribi Acted
Maliciously or With Criminal Intent.

Because the alleged incident on September 15 occurred within the time and at the place of
Ribi's employment, the presumption is also that Ribi acted without malice or criminal intent. LC. §
6-903(5). Hammer's own description of the alleged assault, including her new allegations that she
is now pleading for the first time in years of litigation, do not overcome those presumptions.

"Criminal intent" under the ITCA simply 'means the intentional commission of what the
person knows to be a crime." James v. City of Boise, 2016 WL 1162984, at *18 (Idaho Mar. 23,
"The city council of each city shall, prior to passing the annual appropriation ordinance,
prepare a budget .... " LC.§ 50-1002.
6
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2016) (not yet published in Idaho reporter). There are no allegations in the Amended Complaint
suggesting that Ribi acted with criminal intent and it does not appear that Hammer contends he did.
"Malice" under the ITCA means "'the intentional commission of a wrongful or unlawful act,
without legal justification or excuse and with ill will, whether or not injury was intended."' Miller
v. Idaho State Patrol, 150 Idaho 856, 870 (2011) (quoting Beco Constr. Co. v. City ofIdaho Falls,
124 Idaho 859,864 (1993). In other words, malice requires animosity and a desire to do harm for
harm's sake. Restatement (Second) of Torts, ch. 29 Introductory Note (2014). This is often referred
to as "actual malice," and differs from "legal malice" in that it requires the additional element of "ill
will." Anderson, 112 Idaho at 182-83.
Hammer uses the word "malice" twice in her Amended Complaint but only in a conclusory
manner, which the Court need not accept. (See Amended Complaint, ,r,r 8, 72.) She does not plead
sufficient facts showing that Ribi acted maliciously in order to overcome the statutory presumption.
Instead, she has only pled that Ribi was merely attempting to stop her from returning to the council
chambers while they argued about the budget, when he allegedly raised his arms and stepped towards
her, yelling: ''No! You will not talk to the Mayor!" (Id., ,r 56) There is nothing in these allegations
showing Ribi acted maliciously. In a light most favorable to her, Hammer only pleads that Ribi
wanted to continue the conversation about the city budget and not include the mayor. These
allegations fail to overcome the statutory presumption ofimmunity and, accordingly, Ribi is immune
from suit.
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V.
CONCLUSION
As shown above, Hammer's Amended Complaint still fails to show that she is entitled to any
relief. Hammer has not pled an assault and, even if she has, she has failed to plead sufficient facts
to overcome Ribi's statutory immunity. Ribi therefore respectfully requests that the Court dismiss
her Complaint with prejudice and grant no additional leave for her to file another amended
complaint.
DATED this 10th day of June, 2016.

NAYLOR & HALES, P.C.
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Caldwell, ID 83607
Attorney for Plaintiff

~
_

.Mail
and Delivered
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APPEARANCES:

19

For the Plaintiff:

JAMES R. DONOVAL, ESQ.
Attorney at Law
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1
2

(
t

---

And Ms. Hammer, we submitted as part of the
documents to Sun Valley In the cases her medical records

1

Harassment Is defined as being told that your

2

conduct ls not appreciated and is not wanted and you
continue with that conduct. Harassment Isn't necessarily

3

from both her counselor she was seeing and her medical

3

4

professional where they had in their records that she had

4

sexual harassment or harassment based on religion or

5

been discussing with them the effect of Mr. Ribi's

5

anything else. It is being told to stop doing what you're

6

misconduct on her both from a personal basis and from a

6

doing.

7

physical basis.

7

8
9

So there's plenty of evidence in this record
that there was a lot going on related to Mr. Rib! and hls

10
11

harassment, hostility, abuse, his emotional state through

12
13

administrator. So we're not bringing this based on our

the entire period that Sharon was the Sun valley

just personal opinions of this. There's a lot of

14
15

information in this record about Mr. R!bi and his

16
17

hostility towards Ms. Hammer.

instability during that period of time and his anger and

8

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

17
18
18 evidence, Mr. Ribi was told on numerous occasions that his
19 conduct was beyond the nonns of what a city council member 19
20 was supposed to be doing, that he had no authority to
20
21 direct Sharon in what she was doing because she reported
21
22
22 directly to Mr. - to former Mayor Wiliich, not to the city
23
23 council, that he was hostile and belligerent through all of
24
24 these events that occurred over three years, and that by
25
25 anyone's definition it was harassment.
As part of the documents we provided In

We don't know what Mr. Ribi did not understand
about no or stop it, but he continued to try to order
Ms. Hammer to do things, to do it in a belligerent manner
on multiple occasions after he was told to stop It.
Mr. Ribi has no remorse about it. He has no empathy about
it. He won't acknowledge that any of this happened, even
though in September of 2010 he was given the harassment
policy specifically because it applied to city council
members as well.
And Mr. Rlbi's basic response any time he was
told that he was acting out of line was basically "So
what,• or as Mayor Willich testified in his deposition, his
response was basically, •screw you.• That's a quote from
Mayor Willich.
And when you confront somebody who is acting
out of line and is scaring you by his conduct and the
response is "Screw you• or "So what," that makes the person
even scarier, Your Honor.
There is plenty of evidence in this record that

11

(

1

1

2

head dcesn't work that doesn't let him acknowledge the word

2

3

"no" or "stop it."

3

to know that.

-.

4

Now, at trial that's an important issue.

play, and the defendant doesn't have to raise it. The

6

I didn't assault Sharon, I didn't Intend to hurt her, you
know, I thought I was doing my job In trying to force her

7

8

to change the budget on that day. He's going to get on the

9

stand, and one of the issues that the jury should

10

understand Is Mr. Rlbi potentially suffers from an Illness

11

that prohibits him from understanding that he is lying or

12

he doesn't recognize that his conduct is wrong.

13
14

history of it. If this was just a single event that

That's why we want •• and there's a long

15 Mr. Rlbl on one day got a little upset and was discussing
16 something kind of loudly with Sharon, that's different, but
17 there's a long history of Mr. Ribi and his harassment of
18 Sharon that I think requires or at least provides a basis
19 for why Mr. Ribi should be required to go through a mental
20 exam.
21

..

Federal Rule 35(a), which is exactly the same as Idaho Rule
35(a), the United States Supreme Court said it doesn't only

7

Mr. Ribi is going to get on the stand and he's going to say

If Mr. Ribl does have some form of mental

Now, under the Schlagenhauf case, the United
States Supreme Court case we provided you, under at least

4

5
6

5

(

12

Mr. Rlbi suffered from something. Something In Mr. Rlbi's

apply to a plaintiff who puts their own mental state in

8 plaintiff can raise the mental state of the defendant. The
9 only iSsue is, Is the mental state of the defendant in
10 controversy, and I don't think there's any question that
11 Mr. Rlbi's mental state is In controversy here.
12
THE COURT: Thank you.
Mr. Naylor?
13
14
MR. NAYLOR: Your Honor, this is not a
15 harassment case. It's an assault case.
16
17
18
19

the history of harassment plays into the malice part of the

20

assault. I think there was an ongoing malicious Intent of

21

Mr. Ribi towards Ms. Hammer, so the hlStory of hlS

THE COURT: I want to clarify that.
Do you agree with that?
MR. DONOVAL: I do agree with it, but I think

22

illness that prohibits him from understanding his

22

harassment of her can and Is a part and parcel of why he

23

misconduct or even understanding that he's lying, that it

23

assaulted her. But it ts strictly an assault case, Your

24
25

doesn't absolve him from civil llablllty, but It might

24

Honor.

explain why he did what he did, and the jury should be able

25

13

THE COUIU: All right. "Strictly an assault

14

APPENDIX A
Page 2 of 6
Page 384 of 526

1

case.• I'm going to take you at your word there because

1

2

your pleadings sort of frame a preliminary harassment, it

2

3

goes into that realm, and then it looks like what you're

3

4

trying to plead is an assault case. So I'm going to take

5

this as pleading of an assault case because you're telling

6

me It's not a harassment case.

4 counsel, but when we get a demand to settle the case within
5 48 hours or a threat that this mental evaluation and the
6 punitive damages motions are going to be filed with the

7
8

And I also gathered from Mr. Naylor's briefing
or somewhere in here that parts of that were dismissed in

citing to that decision.
What we have here, and l'm loathe to bring this
up in this realm and describe motivations on the part of

7 Court and that the pleadings will be set forth with the
8
9

extensive affidavits and factual allegations that are all
unfounded medically, then I'm concerned. Because as

9
10

the federal court case, the harassment issue, and the judge
let this go forward - the federal judge let this go

10

Justice Douglas said in the Schlagenhauf case, even though

11

forward for the civil assault claim and that the rest of it

11

he was in the minority, he said that to -- applying Rule 35

12 was dealt with in federal court.
So now that that's clarified, that's helpful.
13
14 Thank you, Mr. Naylor.
15

MR. NAYLOR: Thank you.

16

This allegation or thlS request, this motion

17
18

from 1964, there have been rarely situations where a

19
20

Even In that Schlagenhauf case, the mental examination was

fbr a mental exam, if you look at the Schlagenhauf case

defendant has been placed under the mental exam situation.

12 to defendants requires safeguards to protect against 'the
13 awful risks of blackmail that exist in a rule of that breadth.·
14
THE COURT: Awful risk of what exists? Say
15 that again. I just didn't hear what you said.
16
MR. NAYLOR: You bet.
17
"The awful risks of blackmail that exist in a
18 rule of that breadth."
19
THE COURT: Okay.
20
MR. NAYLOR: So, In other words, if you take

21
22

denied by the court even though it said that there might be

21
22

counsel's argument to the extreme, and his pleadings infer

circumstances In which it might be plausible, It was not

23
24
25

plausible in that case. They rejected it.

23

and a party's mental state is at issue, then any party can

24
25

question In a civil lawsuit. And so thatjust begs the

And so you have to look at all of the facts,
and since 1964 there have not been very many cases at all

that for credibility purposes that the mental examination

be mentally examined because credibility is always a

15

(

1
2

question.

3

diagnoses. Those are not even -- those would be considered

show good cause and the mental health of the party has to

3

sparse facts not substantially related to any issue that is

4

be at Issue. And there are many cases where a plaintiff

actually here at issue.

5

puts their mental or physical health in controversy, but it

6

is not enough for the attorney simply to aver that there

4
5
6

the Court's consideration was that the timing of that

7

should be -- that there's some mental issue with why the

7

letter was within two weeks of this alleged assault

8

party acted In the way they did when that conduct isn't

8

occurring. Mr. Donoval writes an extensive accusatory

9
10

letter to Mr. Hanson asserting that he doesn't have any

This Is strictly a situation where you have to

assistant who made some notes. But those are not

The reason we put the Evan Hanson letter in for

9
10

even at issue.

11

was not entitled in that Schlagenhauf case to a mental

11

took issue with his whole methodology and his abmty and

12

health examination of the bus driver because the moving

12

credentials, and nowhere in that letter from Mr. Oonoval

13

party only had the assertions of the attorney based on

13

was there any assertion that there had been an assault by

14
15

sparse facts, which was insufficient to show that the bus

14

Mr. Ribi on Ms. Hammer and that that factored in in any way.

driver had a mental condition warranting wide-ranging

15

16

psychiatric or neurological examinations.

16

17

(_

16

1
2

The court In the majority said the moving party

Here what counsel Is relying on ls the letter

qualifications to do marital counseling or diagnoses or he

So when you consider alf of the circumstances
here, you have very sparse facts, actually, no medical

17 facts whatsoever, and there's no good cause for this Court

18
19
20
21

of the -- the notes of Evan Hanson, a counselor who

18

to find that Mr. Ribl's mental health at the time of an

Mrs. Hammer -- Ms. Hammer was seeing based -- fbr marital

19

alleged assault that is confined in time can be at issue at

problems that she was having with Mr. Oonoval at the time

20

this time. And because of the threatened use of this tool

and then some notes in there where it wasn't even a

at the time when trying to extract a settlement is the form

22

diagnosis. Mr. Hanson would be loathe, I'm sure, to say

21
22

23
24

that he was diagnosing Mr. Ribi, whom he has never
examined, never seen, never met, and -- but plaintiff is

25

relying on that at this point, as welf as a physician's

17

23
24
25

of the blackmail I think that Justice Douglas was talking
about.
The fact that Mr. Donoval here and in h,s
pleadings and what's been made public can make these wife!

18
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1

no verbal threats of physical harm, there's no display of

1

2

Immediate course that could have resulted in a battery,

2

3

which is an assault, so you have to have not only the

3

that the issues related to all the harassment ind the other

4

words, words alone are not enough, you have to have some

4

stuff are relevant, but I get your point. You're saying

5

action or conduct that creates an immediate threat of force

5

that theyre not irrelevant in the assaut claim, but -·

6

or fear -- I mean, of physical harm, so, for that reasm,

6

THE COURT: Okay, You just sai:f --

7

you don't even have an assault alleged in this complaint.

7

MR. DONOVAL: That they're not relevant·-

8

And to amend the complaint at this late date,

8

(Multiple people talking.)

9

THE COURT: Wait, wait, wait

9

there isn't good cause to show that·· it's past the

THE COURT: I know. That's okay.
MR. DONOVAL: Judge, I was first going to argue

10

deadline. It could have -- I mean, this motion to dismiss

10

11

has been pending for weeks, and the plaintiff hasn't

11

record. I think you Just said that they're not Irrelevant,

12

alleged -- hasn't moved to -- didn't file a motion to amend

12

and I think you meant not relevant.

13

until Monday, this last Monday, which was the deadline to

13

14

file an amended complaint. And he's basically saying he's

14

1S

not really even asking the Court to amend the complaint,

15

16

he's just saying If I lose because 1 haven't pied enough

16

17

facts, give me one more chance. And that doesn't seem to

17

MR. DONOVAL: Contrary to Mr. Naylor's

18

be good cause for a motion to amend at this point in time.

18

claims •• well, first of all, this same language, exact
same language, is the language that was sitting in the

I just want to clarify something for the

MR. DONOVAL: That was my Chicago innercity
English.
THE COURT: Okay. l get what you're saying.
Goahead.

19

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Naylor.

19

20

Mr. Donoval?

20

federal case for two years that was not dismissed for two

21

MR. DONOVAL: How come l'm the one you were

21

years. Although they tried to dismiss it, Judge Lodge did

22

not enter any orders saying that this -- the pleading for

23

the assault dalm is lnvaffd and needs additional

24

information. He never said it. He just said I'm not

25

taking control or it. So there was no need for us to amend

22

going to hit, Judge?

23
24

THE COURT: Because I was arguing with you,
that's WhV.

25

MR. DONOVAL: I'm joking.

63

(

1

the proper allegatkms of what an assault is, Judge. So I

was no motion to dismiss that

2

don't think there's any question that she has adequately

3

court by which we would be necessary -- needed to amend the

3

pied in this complaint that there was an assault.

4

complaint.

4
But, that having been said, Paragraph 40,

5

Now, contrary to what Mr. Naylor said, you have
not closed the pleadings in this case. We signed a

6

"Eventually, Ms. Hammer told Defendant Ribi that she was

6

stipulation that we sent to you, and then your scheduling

7

going to discuss the matter with Mayor Willlch. At that

7

order did not put in the provision about closing the

8

point, Defendant Ribi raised his arms, turned toward

8

pleadings. So right now there ls no closing the pleadings.

9

Ms. Hammer, and In a physically threatening manner yelled,

9

As l said in my response, this Is not a 12(c) motion, this

10
11

'No! You wm not talk to the mayor!'"
"ln reaction to Defendant Ribi's physically and

10

is a 12(b) -- whatever It Is -- (6) motion because the

11

pleadings are not closed.

12

verbally violent outbur.;t," this is Paragraph 41,

12

13

"Ms. Hammer's heart began racing, she became alarmed,

13

or two minor phrases that would allege what we've told you

14

immediately stepped back towards the copy machines and away

14

Ms. Hammer is alleging happened in this incident, we should

15

from Defendant Rlbl, and stated, 'Whoa!' As a result of

15

be able to add a couple more facts, to place in a couple

16

Defendant Ribi's physical actions and yelling directed at

16

other facts to satisfy you.

17

Ms. Hammer, she was fearful of immediate harmful or

17

18

offensive contact with her body by Defendant Ribi. •

18

provides Mr. Naylor and Mr. Ribi with -- as you said in one

19

'--·

was being granted by the

64
1

2

5

(

the complaint or seek to amend the complaint because there

Paragraph 47, "As a result of Defendant Ribi's

So even If you find that we have not added one

But we think the complaint, as alleged, dearly

19

case when you dismissed my complaint because it was too

20

act, Ms. Hammer feared that such harmful or offensive

20

wordy, a basis for understanding what they're being charged

21

contact with her person was imminent.•

21

with. Those paragraphs, Paragraphs 40, 41, and 47, clearly

22

do that in this case.

22

1 don't know how else you could possibly make

23

an assault daim. Mr. Ribl made statements at Ms. Hammer,

23

24

turned towards her, and Ms. Hammer feared that that cmduct

24

Idaho Code 6·904 states, "A government entity and its

25

was meant to be a physical Imminent attack on her. That is

25

employees, while acting within the course and scope of

65

Now, a couple things I want to talk about.

66
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1

committed an assault. "In a physically threatening manner"

1

cases where courts have looked at this, and those cases are

2

means different things to different people and that is a

2

closer to the Une than this case and courts have dismissed

3

conclusion.

3

them.

4
;···

5
6

What I have so far is a loud argument that made
someone uncomfortable.
"You will not talk to the mayor" is not a

4

With regard to the motion to amend the

5

complaint, the law is -- well, the law requires great

6

liberality In permitting amendments. Trial in this case ts

7

verbal threat under Idaho Code 18-901 or under any other

7

set in, it looks like, 2017. January of 2017 there's a

8

version of the law.

8

pretrial conference with a trtal February 8th. We're a

9

long ways from trial.

9

There is a big difference between a loud

10

argument and an assault. The plaintiff must state a claim

10

11

for relief that ls plausible on its face and the plaintiff

11

Generally, a motion to amend I would think
would be accompanied by the proposed amended pleading so

12

has to allege facts which would show that an assault ls

12

the Court can look at it and say, well, did anything change

13

plausible or plausibly occurred. And right at this point I

13

in this amended pleading or are you alleging the same thing

14

don't have that.

14

in different words so that you still don't phrase a cause

15

My ruling is that the current complaint does

15

of action for assault and, if so, the Court would say, no,

16

not a daim -- does not state a dalm for assault, that it

16

you're not getting the amended complaint, either, because

17

Is subject to dismissal under Rule 12(c) or 12(b)(6),

17

you haven't alleged anything more than what you alleged

18

whichever one you want. From theSe pleadings the Court

18

previously, but there hasn't been a proposed amended

19

cannot glean a threat to do bodHy harm or an unlawful

19

pleading filed.

20

threat by word or act to do violence. These allegations

20

21

fall short of allegations of assault.

21

said, your word is, quote, I want to add a couple more

22

facts. I get the feeling that It's going to be difficult

22

Cases In other states that Mr. Naylor has cited

l get the feeling, Mr. Oonoval, that -- you

23

that come closer than the allegations here to making out a

23

for you to Improve on this pleading because l think ycu

24

case of assault have been dismissed. I think the briefing

24

know where the line is and 1 think you're careful about

25

on the defendant's part Is good and It shows some other

25

what you can say happened and what Ms. Hammer -- I think

79
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1

she's careful about what she can say happened. And there

80
1

take a look and see what you filed. So I'll grant you

2

may be some additional facts that you want to allege, but

2

leave to file an amended complaint. If ycu don't, it's

3

It's got to be facts and you've got to allege them

3

done.

4

sufficient to constitute assault.

4

5

My feeling -- the only reason I'm saying thiS

5

MR. DONOVAL: Can l make one comment, Your
Honor?

6

iS because my feellng ls that If you had those, you might

6

THE COURT: Sure.

7

have said them already. You didn't. Maybe you do have a

7

MR. DONOVAL: This complaint I didn't

8

couple additional more facts, I don't know. I'm going to

B prepare -· l did prepare it, but the actual detailed

9

give you a chance to show me. So I'm going to let you

9

10

amend your complaint. like I say, it would have been

10

11

preferable to see the amended complaint pr!Or to now.

11

12

I will dismiss the present complaint for

allegations were Just copied from the federal complaint
that I did not put the actual detailed statements in.
THE COURT: Okay.

12

MR. DONOVAL: So it was prior counsel that had

13

used this phraseology for what occurred assuming that that

13

assault in 15 days, and I'm going to count those days.

14

Today is May 9th. So that would be -- I'll say by the 24th

14

would Ry in federal court in regards to what the standard

15

at -- I won't count today, so the 24th of May by 5:00. If

15

is for an assault claim.

16

there is no amended complaint filed by that date, then this

16

1?

case Is dismissed and I will sign a judgment dismissing the

17

THE COURT: Okay. We'll see what you come up
with.

18

daim because the only claim alleged, counsel have made

18

MR. DONOVAL: Thank you, Your Honor.

19

clear, is a claim for assault. If there is no amended

19

MR. NAYLOR: Judge, do you want me to just

20

complaint filed by May 24th at 5:00, the case is dismissed

20

21

and the motion ls granted, and I'll sign a judgment saying

21

22

the case is dismissed, and if there's been no amended

22

MR. NAYLOR: I will.

23

complaint, the case is over.

23

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

24

Any questions?

25

MR. DONOVAL: No, Your Honor.

24
25

If you have an amended complaint flied by May
24th, that wlD take the place of this complaint. We'll

81

draft, then, all the orders?
THE COURT: If you would.
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MR. NAYLOR: No.

2

THE COURT: Okay. We'll be in recess. Thank

3

4

THE COURT: Mr. Naylor?

I, SUSAN P. ISRAEL, CSR #244, Official

Court

Reporter, Fifth Judicial District, State of Idaho, do

5

~

Pages 1

7

6
7

8

8

therein as stenographically reported by me to the best of

9

9

my ability and contains all of the material requested.

10
12

10
11
12

13

13

14

14

5
6

{WHEREUPON, the proceedings were conc:11,lded at

4:35p.m.)

11

certify that the foregoing transcript, consisting of

to 83, induslve, is a true and accurate record of

the proceedings had on the date and at the time indicated

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand

this 15th day of May, 2016.

15

15

.._x!,,£,d.A,t:P. ~~

16

16

SUSAN P. ISRAEL, CSR NO. 244

17

17

18

18

19
20
21

19

22

22

23

n

24

24

20

21

25

25

(

3

4

you.

REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE
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ANNOTATED BY DEFENSE COUNSEL
HIGHLIGHTED LANGUAGE REFLECTS CHANGES BETWEEN
ORIGINAL COMPLAINT AND AMENDED COMPLAINT

Attorney for Plaintiff Sharon R. Hammer

IN THE DISTR1CT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
SHARON R. HAMMER,

case No.

CV._ 2D l 5- t-/Z ?J

Plaintiff,

vs.
NILS RlBI, in his individual capacity,

AMENDEDCOMPLAINTFOR
CIVIL ASSAULT AND DEMAND
FOR JURY TRIAL

Defendant

COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Sharon R. Hammer ("Ms. Hammer''), by and through her
counsel of record, James R. Donoval, and for her Amended Complaint against Defendant Nils
Ribi ("Defendant Ribi''), complains and alleges as follows:

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
1.

Plaintiff Sharon R. Hammer seeks damages in this civil action against Defendant

Ribi for committing civil assault against Ms. Hammer under Idaho law during an altercation
which occurred on September 15, 2011, which is more thoroughly detailed herein.

JIJRISDICTION AND VENUE
2.

This action was originally brought in the U.S. District Court For Idaho on May 3,

2013 in the matter of Hammer v. Sun Valley, et al.t 1:13-cv-211-EJL (the "Federal Case"), as a
pendant and supplemental claim to multiple other federal claims raised by Ms. Hammer in the
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Federal Case.
3.

In entering summary judgment on Ms. Hammer's final pending Federal claim in

the Federal Case on July 28, 2015, Hon. Judge Edward Lodge decided not to continue to assert
supplemental jurisdiction· over the civil assault claim, and dismissed the assault claim pursuant
to 28 U.S. Cade 1367/c).

4.

Pursuant to 28 U.S. Cade 1367/d), Ms. Hammer was allowed to file the civil

assault claim herein within thirty (30) days of the entry of Judge Lodge's July 28, 2015 Order
regardless of whether the statute of limitations of a civil assault claim in Idaho has tolled

pursuant to Idaho Statute 5-219(5),;\!liillillii~
5.

Venue is proper in this judicial district as Defendant Ribi resides in Blaine

County, Idaho.

PARTIES
6.

At all times relevant hereto, Ms. Hammet resided in Blaine County, State of

Idaho. Ms. Hammer served as the City Administrator of the City of Sun Valley, Idaho ("Sun
Valley"), from June 1, 2008 until January 19, 2012. Ms. Hammer also worked as a paid-on-call
firefighter and EMT for Sun Valley during that time.
7.

At all times relevant hereto, Defendant Ribi was an elected Sun Valley City

Council Member. Defendant Ribi•s first term on the Sun Valley City Council began in or about

January 2006 through January 2010. Defendant Ribi's final tenn on the Sun Valley City Council
expired in January 2014.
8.

The alleged acts engaged in by Defendant Ribi associated with hls.assaultofMs.

Hammer on September 15, 2011, were done outside of the course and scope of his role as a
member of the Sun Valley City Council and with malice or reckless disregard for Ms. Hammer)s
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protected rights.

Other Relevant Sun Valley Actors
9.

At all times relevant hereto, but ending on January 3, 2012, Wayne Willich

("Mayor Willich") acted as the elected Mayor of Sun Valley. Mayor Willich's tenn as Mayor of
Sun Valley ended on or about January 3, 2012.
10.

At all times relevant hereto, but ending on January 3, 2012 when he was swomin

as the Mayor Of Sun Valley, DeWayne Briscoe ("Council President Briscoe") acted as the
President of the Sun Valley City Council.
11.

At all times relevant hereto, but ending on January 3, 2012, Joan Lamb

("Councilwoman Lamb,,) acted as an elected Sun Valley City Council Member. Councilwoman
Lamb's term as a Sun Valley City Council Member ended on or about January 3, 2012.
12.

At all times relevant hereto, Adam King ("City Attorney King'') was employed by

Sun Valley as the City Attorney.

13.

At all times relevant hereto, Cam Daggett ("Police Chief Daggett") was employed

by Sun Valley as the Sun Valley Police Chief.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
The Sun Valley Anti-Harassment Poli!:)'
14.

Prior to commencement of Ms. Hammer's tenure as the Sun Valley City

Administrator, the Sun Valley City Council formally adopted a Sun Valley Personnel Policies
And Procedure Manual (the "Personnel Manual"). The Personnel Manual remained in effect
during Ms. Hammer's tenure as the Sun Valley City Administrator.
15.

Within S~tfoti ,7.5 of the Personnel Manual, Sun Valley expressly adopted a

harassment policy that prohibited ''harassment in any fonn, including verbal, physical and visual
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harassment" either "by or against any of its Employees." (the "Anti-Harassment Policy'').
Although not specifically defined in the Anti~Harassment Policy, the general definition of

"harassment'' in Black's Law Dictionary is "xepeated conduct that is not wanted and is known to

all parties as offensive".
16.

Pursuant to the Anti-Harassment Policy, when a Sun Valley employee believes

that he or she has been harassed "by a co-worker, Supervisor, any City official, or individual
outside of the City organization," the Anti-Harassment Policy guidelines instrnct the employee to
"immediately notify his/her Department Head of the facts of the incident or incidents and the
name(s) of the individual(s) involved." Further, pursuant to the Anti-Harassment Policy, if the
harassment complaint is against "a member of the City Council, the Employee should report the
complaint to the Mayor."
Ms. Hammer's Complaints Against Defendant Ribi For Harassment Under Sun Valley's
Anti-Harassment Policy
17.

Throughout her employment with Sun Valley, Ms. Hammer was repeatedly and

continuously harassed, physically and emotionally intimidated, and verbally abused by

Defendant Ribi.
18.

Ms. Hammer repeatedly reported such incidents of harassment, intimidation, and

abuse by Defendant Ribi, as well as her fears regarding her personal safety related to Defendant
Ribi, to Mayor Willicb, as was required by the Ann-Harassment Policy.
19.

On several occasions Mayor Willich directed Ms. Hammer·.not

to 'c»trlioni

Defendant Ribi directly, because of Defendant Rtoi's tenuous emotional state and be~'!ls¢Ms.
Haritlller w~ a female, but to insteadteport all harassment and other misconducfon the p~ oi

Defendant Ribi to Mayor Willich, and that Mayor Willich would instead conftont.J:>¢fe.t1dant
R.ibi about Defendant Ribi's harassment and abusive conduct towards Ms. Harm:ner.
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On multiple occasions, Mayor Willi ch met with Defendant Ribi fu which Mayor

W:ij)ich descri'bed Ms.;}:lamtnetfiJears,r~µued to,J)efep.(iant :Ribi and directed Defendant Ribi
that he was to cease any further form of harassment, intimidation or hostility toward Ms.
Hammer.
21.

In September of 2010, Defendant Ribi was provided a copy of the Anti-

Harassment Policy specifically because of the allegations Ms. Hammer was making of
harassment, intimidation and hostility against Defendant Ribi.
22.

During 2010 and 2011, Mayor Willich held multiple discussions with

Councilwoman Lamb in which both agreed that Defendant Ribi's conduct towards Ms. Hammer
was disturbing and that Defendant Ribi should be made aware that his conduct of harassment and

hostility towards Ms. Hammer must cease.
23.

During several Sun Valley City Council meetings during 2010 and 2011,

Councilwoman Lamb advised Defendant Ribi that bis conduct towards Ms. Hammer was
improper.
24.

Paragraph 24 omits "fonner" before "Mayor Wil!ich ... "

During the early months of 2011, Mayor Willich and Council President Briscoe

held meetings in which Council President Briscoe was made aware of the harassment allegations
of Ms. Hammer against Defendant Ribi. Council President Briscoe refused to take any actions
against Defendant Ribi or to make public the allegations of Defendant Ribi's violation of the
Anti-Harassment Policy because Council President Briscoe did not believe that doing so was part
of his job as the Sun Valley City Council President. On information and belief, Council President
Briscoe thereafter held private conversations with Defendant Ribi regarding Ms. Hammer's
harassment allegations against Defendant Ribi.
25.

On multiple occasions Ms. Hammer met with City Attorney King and described
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in detail the harassment and intimidation she had been subject to from Defendant Ribi.
26.

In May of 2011, Ms. Hammer held a meeting with City Attorney King in which

the predominant topic was the continued harassment and hostility that Ms. Hammer was being

subjected to from Defendant Ribi.
27.

At some time during 2011, City Attorney King contacted the Idaho Attorney

General's office to obtain advice about what Sun Valley, Mayor Willich and Ms. Hammer
should to do about Defendant Ribi's violation of the Anti-Harassment Policy.
28.

In August of 2011, Mayor Willich met with. City Attorney King during which the

predominant topic was Defendant Ribi's harassment and abusive conduct towards Ms. Hammer,
and what Sun Valley, Mayor Wil1ich and Ms. Hammer should do about Defendant Ribi's
violation of the Anti-Harassment Policy.
29.

Paragraph 28 omits "former" before "Mayor Willich ..."

At the August of 2011 meeting, City Attorney King told Mayor Willich that,

based on advice City Attorney King ba9 iec.eived. fmm ·tb,~Jdallo Attom~y Generat~ ·offic~
because Defendant Ribi was an elected official that there was really nothing that could be done
to Defendant Ribi, other than to inform Defendant Ribi that his harassment of Ms. Hammer
needed to cease. 1At. the tune, City Attorney Kinfadyjsed Mayor ,Willfoh th:a1 any disclosure of
Defendant Ribi,s harassment of Ms. Hammer would be considered "political", especially
considering that a municipal election was coming up in November of 2011.
30.

At the August of 2011 meeting, Mayor Willich told City Attorney King that after

the November 2011 municipal election that he was going to publicly disclose Defendant Ribi's
harassment of Ms. Hammer and other improper conduct.
31.

On infonnation and belief, City Attorney King thereafter held discussions with

Defendant Ribi ;in which City Attorney Khigtold,Jl;>efenda:nt Ril>i ofM&. Harinp.ertsif~

of
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U(}fdtdantluoi and advised Defendant Ribi of the concerns of Ms. Hammer and Mayor Willich
of Defendant Ribi's harassment of Ms. Hammer in violation of the Anti-Harassment Policy, and
that Mayor Willich was going to disclose Defendant Ribi' s harassment of Ms. Hammer publicly
after the November 2011 municipal election.

32.

After the August meeting with City Attorney King, 'but b~: September 15i

201 I, Mayor Willich also held discussions dil'ectly with Defendant Ribi in which Mayor Willich
again told Defendant Ribi that Ms~ Hmmner'"~feariµlof lJefendantR.l'bi a.rid that Defendant
Rihi must cease any hostile conduct towards Ms. Hammer.

33.

During 2011, Ms. Hammer held meetings with Police Chief Daggett in which Ms.

Hammer discussed Defendant Ribi's harassment and hostility towards her and in which Police
Chief Daggett acknowledged that Defendant Ribi was a bully towards Ms. Hammer. Police
Chief Daggett advised Ms. Hammer that the Sun Valley Police Department would be on notice
when Defendant Ribi was in Sun Valley City Hall and that Ms. Hammer should lock her Sun
Paragraph 33 omits quotation

Valley City Hall office door when Defendant Ribi was in Sun Valley City Hall. marks around "bully" and "on

34.

noti~e"

Mayor Willich has confinned, under oath, that the conduct of Detendant Ribi

towards Ms. Hammer, prior to September 15, 2011, was "harassment, by anyone's definition of
harassment."

35.

'Prior to th~ end ofhis tenure as Mayor of Sun Valley, Mayor Willich formally

found DefendantR:ibi)ctbe iri violation of the Anti-Harassmem;fplicy, as he yias authorized to

do pllX'SUanUo S~on 8.7 of the Pers:onnelManual,
36.

Ma.yot,Willich's fin<;lings that Dtfendant lliJ,ihad violated th~ Ni1i::.:Eiat~ent

a

Policy in ,hjs conduct towards· M$. 'H~et. :was· •'fina1Jand l>indµig decision<of the City Of
Sun Valleypms~t to Section 8.1

0

ofth~ .Personnel Manual.
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The Detailed Assault Allegations
37.

Prior to September 15, 2011, based on all of the prior incidents of harassment,

hostility and abuse Ms. Hammer had previously suffered at the hands of Defendant Ribi, and

because of all of the discussions Ms. Hammer held with Mayor Willich, City Attorney King and
Police Chief Daggett regarding Ms. Hammer's fears of Defendant Ribi, Ms. Hammer held a
heightened sense of concern over Defendant Ribi's potential for physical violence towards Ms.

Hammer and his intent to hann Ms. Hammer.
38.

Prior to September 15, 2011, based on all of the prior discussions that Defendant

Ribi had been part of with Mayor Willicb, Councilwoman Lamb, Council President Briscoe and
City Attorney King, and that Defendant Ribi had been provided a copy of the Anti-Harassment
Policy specifically because of Ms. Hammer's numerous harassment complaints against

Defendant Ribi, Defendant Ribi was on notice that Ms. Hammer considered Defendant Rihi to be

potentially physically dangerous to Ms. Hammer.
39.

On or about September 15, 2011, a Sun Valley City Council meeting was held.

During the meeting, discussion was held regarding acceptable methods for modifying budgeted
line items.
40.

During a break in the meeting, Ms. Hammer left the Sun Valley City Council

Chamber to make copies of some documents. ;Jl,nb~'kno~ to Iv1s. :Hammer, Defendant Ribi
followed Ms. Hammer to the front area of Sun Valley City Hall, near the reception desk and

copy room, .apprQxima{ely one fmndred and'fifty feet (lSO)<from.;the ;$µn Valley>Council
Cliattiber table wherel)efendantRJbi had,. p~yiously been seated. Paragraph 40 omits "area" after "copy room"
41;

When Ms. I:Iamm~r cam~ put.oi)he..~opy:rpom witl1 ¢9pies: D~d!Uit lltl>i·W~

standinfat the counter of the Sim \1,alley'~ity Hall re@Ptlon,desk ,appr~#imaiely :fivec(5)t~et
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frnm the doQr tQ the copy roc,m:

Ribi pegan speakin;gto :Ms. Hainmex::
·43.

Ms. Hammet' stopped appro~~)y,:jwo t<>three feet awayfrom.Defen~Ribi,

to listen to :wh~Defendant Rtoi was sayingJAtthatpomt; Defendant 1ijp1•'$Jeft si(le·of his body
was closest to Ms~ Hammer,,with Defendanf lbbifacijtg towffl'ds the reception area counter top.

44.

Defendant Rihi told Ms. Hammer he w~: eertain changes made to the ,s$

V:a1ley budget and certain docum.eI:lij~~ted to the Sun Valley budget tlulfOeien~t Rtbi had

45.

A.s one membe,i;.Of the Sun Valley City CquncjF, l?~~dantRibi had no authority

in any area of Stm Vjlley:City Hall outside1heJin1ite(\;S,9(}pe ofhis activities in the Sun Valley

City,(!ouncil Chamber during'Sun Valley City Council meetings}.'J'herefore, by contacting Ms.
Halljiner an.d discussing Sun Valley budg~tm~t!e.i:s,;witb, Ms. Hammer outside of the e<>nfiri.es of
the Sun Valley City Council Chamber. DefendantRioi was acting outsid~ the limite4 scope of
hiS' ihlties as a Sun Valley City .Council member.

'46.

As

a

Sun Valley .Cfty,..Council member Defendant··Ribi held no

individual

authority to unilaterally require that changes'.1-i~rmade,to the Sun Valley budget or Slln Valley

budget documents. Therefore, by <:le~an<ling that Ms.

Hamm~ jn~e change$Jo the Sun Valley

budget and budget documents @fDet~ndant Ribi individually wanted

made,; l)~endant Rioi

!was:i®ng'Qtitside the limited SC9I}e of his dutie$afa:S$ Valley City Council member.

4'V

As a:.suii}Valley City Corinijf]nein.b,'e,'f D~fe11q@'t1llilir;held no individual

authority to direct Ms?Hanmier to perform @Y,cact_s athis indivi@,al,dtnitio11/as Ms. Hammer
reported directly and soleljto Ma,.yor .Willich.. Therefore, by cl~tirig that

Ms.. Hammer make
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changes, to the S1n1 Valley budget ,an~::cJ>udget documents ffi!lt,:. Defend@(,1§1» individually

;wanted made, Defenda.nt Ribi was: acting outsi'de the limited s~pe of his pµties:as ~~unYalley
City'.,Council ni¢mber.
48.

Ms. Hammer tried to explain to Defendant Ribi the generally accepted accounting

practices and procedures for modifying municipal budgets. Defendant Ribi became very agitated
and continuously interrupted Ms. Hammer to tell her that he wanted particular changes made to
the Sun Valley budget documents which contravened the generally accepted accounting practices
for municipal governments, and which tb,e.rither Sun Valley City Cou:q~l mem.bers had not

approved.
49.

Every time Ms. Hammer tried to speak to Defendant Ribi about the correct

budgeting procedures or that the modilicatiQns he sought were.:n,.ot approved by the other Sun

Valley City Council members, Defendant Ribi cut her off, raised his arms in the air and began
waiving his hands, saying angrily: "You don't understand!" Paragraph 49 omits "As the conversation continued,
Defendant Ribi became more and more enraged."

50.

As the.~counter with Defendant Rl'l>i proceeded, Defendant Ribi's demeanor,

faci~ expressiollS, hand gestures, tone of voicetand o~erall body.posture and body language

became hostiltnUld ~ening to.Ms..Hammer.
SL

Ms. J:lammer

tried to defuse .tb,e tension, by sp~ing caln,uy and in .a fow

volum~ but .as the confrontation c;ontinued, DefendanfRibi became more and igore enraged.
52.

·Eventually, Ms•. Hammer told:Deftllndan.t Ribi that she wasgoing to discuss the

matter withMayorWilUch.
53.

Upon Ms. Harrinler telling Dtien<lant Ribi that she was g<.ling to speak with

Mayor .Willich, Defendant '.Ribi raised his

arms ·to appmximately shoulder. height, pivoted

.fowaids )As.: Banimerlso thatJ>efehcl~t Rl'bi was directly ,facing Ms. Hammer/and'. t®ltat least
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one step towar¢3:Ms. Hammer with his hands ou~J:r~t~edatMs.Hmwner,s shQuldtrlevel.
,54,

The conduct ofI)efend~f :rubi in moviilg'towards,Ms/H~ was .what can

b~ be described ~ a thrus{.9r a lunge.
55.

'At the same time th.at I>efl;{ldant .Ripi took~ step, tlnusfor lunge towards Ms.

,Hammer :with his ))ands outstretched afshouldef\lieight, P~fendant Ri'bi y~ed: "Nd! You will
npt talk toJhe Mayod>'
56.

At/the mon1ent that Defendant Ribi stepped, thrust or lunged towards Ms.

Hammer. Ms. Hammer believed, based onJ;)efen~Emt Rt"bi~~ yelling ''You Yfi}l noftalk t~> the
Mayor; tllit I)efendant Ribi was abouffu grabMst ,Hamm~ afoundthe shoulder tQ physicWly
prevent her ftommoving towards the Sun Nalley City Council Chamber,: or that Defendant R.i"hi

was going to push or otherwise 1llake physical cbntact with Ms. Hammer.
57.

Dl.lr,ing Defendant Ribi's ihrust or 'JU11ge tQW.ards .· Ms. Hammer, .at the closest

point, Defendant Ribi's outstretched arms came witllin six inches of Ms. H8Ill,Iller's shoulders.

58.

As a result. of .Defendant· Ribits• phyajcal actions a11.d ye!Ung directed at

Ms. Hammer~ she WIW feru:ful of nnm.edjat~ J1annful or offensive contact :with her body by
Defendant Ribi.
59.

In reaction to Defendant Ribi's physical movements towards Ms. Hammer and his

verbal outburst, Ms. Hammer's heart began racing, she became alarmed,

•and, just before

Defendant Ribi's .hands\made physical .eontact with 1vls. Hammer's shoulders) Ms. Hammer
stepped back away from Defendant Ribi, and stated: ·"Whoa!"
60.

The assault of Ms. Hammer was witnessed by former Sun Valley Administrative

Assistant David Blampied who was sittingat

the d~k immediately behind the'receptio11 desk

upon which Defendant Rihf had placed ithe Sun Valley budgef't;elated p.ap~t which, was
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Upon information and belief, several other Sun Valley employees either

witnessed Defendant Ribi's assault of Ms. Hammer or heard some or all of the altercation.

62.

Ms. Hammer then turned away from Defendant Ribi and walked down the

hallway of Sun Valley City Hall and back into the Sun Valley City Council Chamber where
Mayor Willich, several Sun Valley City Council members and several Sun Valley staff members
were present.

CQllileil Chamber afte,r,Jh¢assault byI>efendantRtoi, Ms. Hanmier was v:i$wlyupset and shaken
byhercq~frontation with.D¢enc1ant Ribj.

64..

Defendant R.ibi fo1Joyved Ms. H•er ~own the hallway and in~·the Sun Valley

City Council Chm:l'lber; and thei:eafter actecfas if nothing had happened.
65.

Immediately following the Sun Valley City Council meeting of September 15,

2011, Ms. Hammer held separate meetings with Mayor Willich, City Attorney King, and Police
Chief Daggett. During each meeting, Ms. Hammer described the physical altercation by

Defendant Ribi. Ms. Hammer also expressed her concern over Defendant Ri"bi's increasingly
agitated, erratic and threatening behavior, which now had become clearly physically threatening,
and sought advice on how to respond to Defendant Ribi.
66.

M'ayor WUlic;h .advisecliMs,

Hammer that,

in response: Jo the assault of Ms.

Hammer, he would orde:d)efendant Ribi to l:i.ave no further d4"ect co11tact with Ms•. Hammer.
67.

May0fWillich has'confmneci/@der oathi that he the~fter helc:l.(1.Qi$cussio~ with

David Blampiecl in; whi.~ David :Blampied c<>ni,imied that .h~.had witn~sed Defeqf,lant Ribi's

assault of Ms. :E{~er.
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Upon infonnation and belief, thereafter Mayor Willich spoke with Defendant Ribi

about the assault incident and directed Defendant Ribi to ~ot dire<:tly 00111:aci Ms.,Ramnfotany

farther andin$tead come to Mayor Willich with any issues that Defendant Ribi would have
otherwise sought to discuss with Ms. Hammer or any other Sun Valley employee.

CIVIL ASSAULT AGAINST MS. HAMMER
(Against Defendant Ribi, Outside The Scope Of His Role As A Sun Valley City Council
Member)
69.

On September 15, 2011, Defendant Ribi, in

~

conductand words, acted

intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person of Ms. Hammer, or intending to
cause an immediate fear of such contact.

,10.

As'ar~lt ofPefendan(Rilrl's actj()n,st Ms: Hammet.feared that SU~,lwmful or

offensive ~ntact with her person \1\!'~ immin~

71.

AB a result of Defendant Ribi's actions, Ms. Hammer was injured and is entitled

to damages as may be awarded at the trial in this matter.
72.

The alleged acts engaged in· by Defendant Ribi of assaulting Ms. Hammer were

done outside of the course and scope of his limited role as a member of the Sun Valley City
Council and with malice or reckless disregard for Ms. Hammer's protected rights.
73.

Ms. Hammer reserves the right to file a petition and seek a ruling of the Court

allowing her to seek punitive damages against Defendant Ribi.

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
Plaintiff demands a trial by jury in this action on all issues and all claims herein.
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PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Sharon R. Hammer respectfully requests judgment against
Defendant Nils Ribi, as follows:

1.

For nominal, special and general damages that fully and fairly compensate Ms.

Hammer for Defendant Ribi's wrongful acts complained ofherein;
2.

That, upon filing a petition seeking punitive damages, that Ms. Hammer be

granted an Order allowing for punitive damages against Defendant Ribi for assaulting Ms.
Hammer in bad faith and with improper motives, and for his willful, reckless, wanton and callous
indifference to Ms. Hammer's protected rights, especially considering Defendant Ribi's role as
an elected public official;
3.

For Ms. Hammer's attorneys fees, cost of suit, and disbursement herein;

4.

For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and equitable.

DATEDthis

/?th dayofMay,2016.

Att mey For Plaintiff
S on R. Hammer
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PROOF OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that a tme and correct copy of the attached document was served by
facsimile and U.S mail, proper postage pre-paid to the above listed recipients on or before 5:00
p.m. on May Ji_ 2016.

To:

Kirtlan Naylor
Naylor & Hales
950 W. Bannock St., Suite 610
Boise, ID 83702

Jryis R. Donoval
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James R. Donoval, ISB #8142
4481 N. Dresden Pl., Suite D
Garden City, ID 83714
Telephone: (312) 859-2029
Facsimile: (208) 649-1603
Email: jdonoval@aol.com
Attorney for Plaintiff Sharon R. Hammer

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

SHARON R. HAMMER,
Case No. CV-2015-428
Plaintiff,
DISCLOSURE OF RETAINED

EXPERT PURSUANT TO

vs.

J.R.C.P. 26(4)(A)(l)O}
NILS RIBI, in his individual capacity,
Defendant.

COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Sharon R. Hammer ("Ms. Hammer"), by and through her

counsel of record, James R. Donoval, and pursuant to Order of Court discloses her expert as to
certain matters pursuant to LR.C.P. 26(4)(A)(l )(i).
Ms. Hammer has retained Scott A. Eliason, M.D. ("Dr. Eliason") as an expert witness to
testify as to matters related to Defendant Nils Ribi's ("Defendant Ribi") mental health and
potential mental illness, and to matters related to Ms. Hammer's emotional suffering due to the
assault and conduct of Defendant Ribi. Attached is Dr. Eliason's Resume/CV.
As to Defendant Ribi, assuming that the Court grants Ms. Hammer's request to
reconsider its denial of Ms. Hammer's Motion To Require An LR.C.P. 35(a) Mental Health
Examination Of Defendant Nils Ribi, it is expected that Dr. Eliason will interview and examine
Defendant Ribi and provide his expert opinion as to whether Defendant Ribi suffers from some
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form of mental illness, and in particular a personality disorder such as antisocial personality
disorder, dissocial personality disorder or narcissistic personality disorder. Based on Defendant
Ribi's mental illness or disorders, it is expected that Dr. Eliason will opine on Defendant Ribi's
inability to recognize right from wrong and Defendant Ribi' s ability to tell the truth or recognize
that he is not telling the truth. It is also expected that, based on Defendant Ribi's mental illness or
disorders, that Dr. Eliason will discuss Defendant Ribi's inherent inability to have any
compassion or empathy. All of Dr. Eliason's opinions will relate to Defendant Ribi's hostility
towards Ms. Hammer and his assault of Ms. Hammer and his ability to be forthright in his
testimony at trial.
It is also expected that Ms. Hammer will request that the Court allow Dr. Eliason to
observe Defendant Ribi's testimony at trial and thereafter testify as to whether Defendant Ribi's
mannerisms and testimony at trial show evidence of Defendant Ribi's mental health issues and
his inability to tell the truth at trial (see Wright & Gold. Federal Practice & Procedures, § 6097;

US. v. Hiss, 88 F.Supp. 559 (U.S. S.D.N.Y. 1950); US. v. Lindstrom, 698 F.2d 1154 (U.S.
App.11 1h 1983); Revels v. Vincenz, 382 F.3d 870 (U.S. App.8th 2004); Lanni v. Jersey, 177
F.R.D. 295 (U.S. N.J. 1998); Frazier v. Topeka Metal Specialties, 2001 WL 138893 (U.S. Kan.
2001); Sudtelgte v. Reno, 1994 WL 3406 (U.S. W.D.Missouri 1994)).
Although Ms. Hammer will provide her own testimony as to her own suffering and
mental anguish due to Defendant Ribi's conduct in assaulting Ms. Hammer which a layperson
should be able to understand (see Cook v. Skyline Corp., 135 Idaho 26, 13 P.3d 857 (Id. Sup.Ct.
2000)), Dr. Eliason is in the process of interviewing Ms. Hammer related to the history between
Defendant Ribi and Ms. Hammer and the assault incident, and is preparing a written report as to
the effects that Defendant Ribi's assault has had on Ms. Hammer, both physically and
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emotionally. The report(s) of Dr. Eliason are expected to be completed shortly and will be
provided to Defendant Ribi' s counsel.
Dr. Eliason is in the process of preparing a list of other cases he has testified in and that
list will be provided to Defendant Ribi' s counsel upon completion.

Dr. Eliason is being paid at a rate of$350 per hour by Ms. Hammer.
DATED this 14th day of June, 2016.

S. HAMMER'S ATIORNEY
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PROOF OF SERVICE

The undersigned certifies that a true and correct copy of the attached document was served by
facsimile and U.S mail, proper postage pre-paid to the above listed recipients on or before 5:00
p.m. on June 14, 2016.
To:

Kirtlan Naylor
Naylor & Hales
950 W. Bannock St., Suite 610
Boise, ID 83702
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Scott Anders Eliason M.D.
Forensic Psychiatrist
Boise Forensic Psychiatry
2976 E State St, 120-432
Eagle, ID 83616
Phone: (208) 275-9202
Fax: (208) 493-4209

Education
July 2007 - July 2008 Forensic Psychiatry Fellowship
Specialized training in civil and criminal forensic psychiatry cases including
evaluations, report writing, forensic consultations, and expert testimony

UCSF Psychiatry and the Law Program
San Francisco, CA 94143
San Quentin Prison
San Quentin, CA 94964
Maguire Correctional Facility
300 Bradford St.
Redwood City, CA 94063
2006-2007 Chief Resident
University of Washington Psychiatry Residency, Spokane Track
Sacred Heart Medical Center, Spokane Mental Health Clinic
Spokane, WA 99202
2005-2007 Residency Training - Graduated June 2007
University of Washington Psychiatry Residency, Spokane Track
Sacred Heart Medical Center, Spokane Mental Health Clinic, Eastern State Hospital
Spokane, WA 99202

Eastern Washington State Hospital Forensic Unit
Medical Lake, WA 99022

2003-2005 Residency Training
University of Washington Psychiatry Residency, Spokane Track
University of Washington Hospital, Harborview Hospital, VA Hospital
Seattle, WA 98125
1999-2003 Doctor of Medicine
Medical College of Wisconsin
Milwaukee, WI 53216
1996-1999 Bachelor of Science, Microbiology
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Brigham Young University
Provo, UT 84604
1993-1994 College Courses
Ricks College (now Brigham Young University- Idaho)
Rexburg, ID 83440
Teaching Experience

2009-Present

Supervising and Training Nurse Practitioners and Nurse Practitioner Students,
Physician Assistants and Physician Assistant Students

2008-Present

Clinical Instructor, University--of Washington Psychiatry Residency- Boise Tract.
Supervise and train psychiatry residents from the University of Washington.

2007-2008

Forensic Fellow, taught medical students, law students, psychiatric residents, and
community mental health providers through lectures, classes, and work supervision.

2006-2007

Chief Resident, University of Washington, Spokane Tract, collaborated with faculty to
modify teaching curriculum for both medical students and psychiatry residents.

2003-2006

Resident, Outpatient Clinics and Inpatient Rotations, taught medical students in both
continuity clinic and clerkship rotations.

Recent CME

NCCHC Mental Health Conference July 2014
NCCHC Spring Meeting April 2015
Professional Associations

Member of American Psychiatric Association
Member of American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law
Member of the American Medical Association
Member of the Suicidology Committee of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law

Licensure & Certification
2013 Certified Correctional Healthcare Professional- Mental Health
2010 Certified Correctional Healthcare Professional
2009 Board Certified Forensic Psychiatrist
2008 Certified Diplomate of the American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology
2008 Qualified Medical Examiner State of California
2007 American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology Board Eligible
Step 1 of ABPN Board- passed
.
2007 Advanced Clinical Trainer for Suicide Risk Assessment at QPR Institute
2006 Idaho State License#: M-9576
2005 Buprenophrine Certified
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Employment
May 2011- Present

Psychiatric Director at Ada County Jail

April 2010- Present

Full Time Regional Psychiatric Director for Corizon in the State of Idaho

March 2009- Feb 2013

Inpatient Psychiatrist at Eastern Idaho Regional Medical Center, Behavioral
Health Center one weekend per month

January 2009-Present

Part Time Private Prac.~jce and Medical Director of Boise Forensic Psychiatry

August 2008-April 2010

Full Time Community Mental Health Psychiatrist at Region IV Adult Mental
Health Clinic
Medical Director State of Idaho Health and Welfare, Behavioral Health
Division

July 2008- December 2008 Clinical Director at the Idaho State School and Hospital- managing treatment
of both inpatient and outpatient clients with developmental disability and
mental illness.
Idaho State Forensic Psychiatry Director- Helping design, plan, and then direct
the first locked forensic psychiatry unit in Idaho.
Forensic psychiatry private practice - Performing independent medical-legalpsychiatric evaluation and expert testimony.

August 2005- April 2007

Managed locked inpatient psychiatric unit at Sacred Heart Hospital in Spokane
Washington two weekends a month.

Sept. 2005- Feb. 2007

Conducted nine disability evaluations a month for the Washington State
Department of Social Services.

Child and Adolescent Psychiatry Experience

May 2008- Present Inpatient Psychiatrist at Eastern Idaho Regional Medical Center. Evaluating and Treating
children and adolescents one weekend per month.
January 2009- Present Outpatient Psychiatrist at Eagle River Psychiatry, treating and evaluating adolescents
August 2008- December 2008 Psychiatrist at Region III mental health clinic evaluating and treating children
and adolescents
July 2008- December 2008 Psychiatrist for the Support and Outreach Team at the Idaho State School and
Hospital. Performed Consultations for patients with mental illness and developmental disabilities'throughout
the State of Idaho.
September 2005-June 2007 Managed the Child and Adolescent Psychiatry Unit at Sacred Heart in Spokane
1-2 weekends a month.
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Janwuy-October 2006 Spokane Mental Health Clinic Outpatient Child Psychiatry
January-April 2006 Inpatient Child and Adolescent Unit

Presentations
NCCHC Conference Presentation: Genetic Testing in Psychiatry: Practical for Corrections?
NCCHC Conference Presentation: Psychogenic Polydipsia
NCCHC Conference Presentation: Suicide Risk Factors
NCCHC Conference Presentation: DSM 5 in corrections
Presentation at the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law conference in October 2011: Management
of Deliberate Self Harming Inmates: Novel Uses ofDBT
Idaho Department of Corrections Trainings- Differential Diagnosis, Traumatic Brain Injury, and PostTraumatic Stress Disorder
Grand Round: Correctional Psychiatry
Grand Round: When Patients Lie
Grand Round: Pregnancy and Psychiatry
Presentation at the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law conference in October 2008: MurderSuicide: A review of the recent literature.
Grand Rounds: Violence Risk Assessment
Forensic Lectures at University of California San Francisco: Murder-Suicide
Guest Lecturer at University of San Francisco: Forensic Psychiatry
Grand Rounds: Drugs for Drugs: Using Medication to Treat Chemical Dependency
Grand Rounds: The Truth about Benzos
Grand Rounds: Insomnia
Resident Didactics: Complementary and Alternative Treatment in Mental Health

Forensic Experience
Competency to stand trial evaluations
Insanity defense evaluations
Pre-sentencing evaluations
Board of Parole evaluations
Three-strike law mitigation evaluations
Psychiatric Malpractice evaluations
Fitness for duty evaluations
Violence Risk Assessment
Psychological Damages
Child custody evaluations
Worker's Compensation evaluations
Disability evaluations for Department of Social Security
Civil Commitment evaluations of Sex offenders
Psychosexual Evaluations
Death Penalty Mitigation evaluations

Publications

1. Scott Eliason. Murder-Suicide: A Review of the Recent Literature. J Am Acad Psychiatry Law, Sep
2009; 37: 371 - 376
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2. Scott Eliason and John Chamberlain. Competence to Stand Trial. J Am Acad Psychiatry Law, Jun 2008;
36: 155-257
3. Scott Eliason and John Chamberlain. Immunity for Professional Review Committees. J Am Acad
Psychiatry Law, Jun 2008; 36: 257 - 258.
Research Experience
September 1997 - December 1998
Brigham Young University, Animal Science Department

Bench researcher
Dr. David Kooyman

February 2006 - 2007
Washington State University Spokane Campus
Literature Review
The Addictive Potential of Benzodiazepines
Dr. Clarke St. Dennis
September 2006-March 2007
Washington State University Spokane Campus
Literature Review and Data Analysis
Epidemiology of Major Mental Disorders in Methamphetamine Users
Dr. John Roll
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[ISB No. 3569]
Jacob H. Naylor
[ISB No. 8474]
Tyler D. Williams
[ISB No. 8512)
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NAYLOR & HALES, P.C.
JoLynn Drage. Clerk District
Attorneys at Law
Court Blaine Cou.!1.!.L?1:1ho
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 610
Boise, ID 83702
Telephone No. (208) 383-9511
Facsimile No. (208) 383-9516
Email: kirt@naylorhales.com; jake@naylorhales.com; tdw@naylorhales.com
Attorneys for Defendant Nils Ribi

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
SHARON R. HAMMER,
Case No. CV2015-428

-I

Plaintiff,

~::::

2
DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE IN
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

VS.

NILS RIBI, in his individual capacity,
Defendant.

(_I)

C:
('

C>
~

Defendant Nils Ribi, by and through his attorney of record, Naylor & Hales, P.C., hereby
responds to Plaintiff Sharon R. Hammer's Motion for Summary Judgment. As shown below,
Hammer's motion is frivolous and must be denied.

I.
INTRODUCTION

Hammer's motion for "summary judgment" is not a motion for summary judgment at all.
Instead, it is an express attempt to obtain pre-trial rulings on evidentiary matters, to obtain a jury
instruction on the elements of assault, and to obtain a ruling that the Court cannot, as a matter oflaw,
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rule on the issue of whether Ribi acted in the course and scope of his employment. Seeking
resolution of these issues in the present motion is outside the scope of a Rule 56 motion and reflects
a profound misunderstanding of the role of summary judgment, and is a waste of the parties' and the
Court's time and resources.
II.
ARGUMENT

The basic summary judgment standard is so well settled that it often goes without saying in
parties' briefs and judicial decisions. Nevertheless, it bears repeating here given Hammer's inability
to understand the rule. To be clear, "[a] party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may ... move with or without supporting affidavits
for a summary judgment in that party's favor upon all or any part thereof." I.R.C.P. 56(b) (summary
judgment for claimant). Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a jud&ment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c)
(emphasis added); Shapley v. Centurion Life Ins. Co., 154 Idaho 875 (2013).
Thus, for example, a claimant may move for partial summary judgment on liability and
obtain a judgment thereon, leaving damages as an issue for trial, or may move for summary judgment
on one full claim out of multiple claims. The rule does not, however, allow a claimant to seek
evidentiary rulings, or to obtain a certain jury instruction, or to obtain a ruling that a court cannot rule
on a certain issue as a matter of law, or even for the court to merely declare certain facts
"undisputed" without the party also asking the court to make a determination as to liability in
plaintiffs favor. Such "relief' is not a judgment and is outside the scope of Rule 56. See, e.g.,

DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 2.
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Castillon v. Corrections Corp. of America, Inc., 2015 WL 4506907 (D. Idaho 2015) (J. Lodge)
(decision adopting Magistrate Court's report and recommendation and incorporating it fully therein)
(taking Plaintiffs to task for improperly filing motion for summary judgment in an attempt to resolve
non-summary judgment issues).
In this case, Hammer specifically asks the Court to grant her "summary judgment" on the
following matters: ( 1) what the elements of an assault claim are; (2) that the alleged hostile conduct
by Ribi prior to September 15 is admissible at trial; (3) that Ribi's mental health may be inquired to
during trial and that Hammer can provide related expert testimony; and (4) that the issue of whether
Ribi acted outside the course and scope of his employment is an issue on which the Court, as a
matter oflaw, cannot rule. Not only does Hammer not ask the Court to find there is no question of
fact on the requested issues, she utterly fails to explain why any of these things would entitle her to
judgment as a matter of law.

The Court has issued a scheduling order that contains deadlines for submitting expert reports,
motions in limine, trial briefs, and proposed jury instructions. (See April 19, 2016 Scheduling Order).
More so, to the extent Hammer believes there is a triable issue as to the course and scope of Ribi's
employment, that is an issue to be addressed in response to Ribi's pending motion to dismiss or in
response to a future motion for summary judgment brought by Ribi. Hypothetically, it could even
be brought later by Hammer if the evidence showed no triable issue as to Ribi's liability (which is
not the case). Hammer's requests here, wrongly styled as a motion for "summary judgment," is
simply an untimely and wasteful request for the Court's intervention in matters not appropriate under
Rule 56. See also I.R.C.P. 1 (reflecting the policy of procedural rules to secure the just, speedy and
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inexpensive resolution of actions). The Court need not participate in Hammer's invitation to engage
in a pointless exercise at this juncture that does not remotely comply with the rules.

III.
CONCLUSION
As shown above Hammer's motion for summary judgment must be denied because it is
outside the scope of Rule 56. Ribi requests his costs and attorney fees in having to respond to
Hammer's frivolous motion, pursuant to Rule 11 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.

DATED this 24th day of June, 2016.
NAYLOR & HALES, P.C.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 24th day of June, 2016, I caused to be served, by the
method(s) indicated, a true and correct copy of the foregoing upon:
James R. Donoval
4110 Eaton Ave., Ste. D
Caldwell, ID 83607
Attorney for Plaintiff

U.S. Mail
_/Hand Delivered
jL Fax Transmission: 649-1603
_
Email: jdonoval@aol.com

9556_20 Defs MSJ Response FINAL.wpd
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
SHARON R. HAMMER,

_...

Case No. CV2015-428

'

Plaintiff,

DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO
PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONS FOR
RECONSIDERATION

vs.
NILS RIBI, in his individual capacity,

t

t)

-a:
'

'

Defendant.
Defendant Nils Ribi, by and through his attorney of record, Naylor & Hales, P .C., hereby
responds to Plaintiff Sharon R. Hammer's motions to reconsider dismissal of the complaint and to
reconsider denial of her motion for a Rule 35 mental health examination. As shown below, both
motions should be denied.

I
BACKGROUND
The Court denied Hammer's motion for a Rule 35 independent mental health examination
(''IME") during a hearing on May 9, 2016, because Ribi's mental health is not in controversy in this
lawsuit and there is no good cause to require such an examination. During the same hearing the
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Court also granted Ribi's motion to dismiss because the Complaint failed to state a claim for assault.
The Court, however, granted leave for Hammer to file an amended complaint, which she did shortly
thereafter. Both oral decisions were followed by written orders. (See May 12, 2016 Orders.) On June
14, 2016, Hammer filed a "Disclosure of Retained Expert Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 26(4)(1 )(I)" in which
she only identifies Scott A. Eliason, M.D., as an expert who will purportedly testify as to matters
related to both Ribi's mental health (if reconsideration is granted) and who has been specially
retained by Hammer at a rate of $350.00 per hour to provide expert testimony as to her own alleged
mental suffering as an element of damages.
Even though Ribi's mental health is plainly not an issue in this lawsuit, as was previously
fully briefed by the parties and discussed during the May 9 hearing, Hammer seeks reconsideration
and continues to baselessly contend that she is entitled to have Ribi undergo an intrusive mental
health examination so that, apparently, she can challenge his "credibility" and ability to "know right
from wrong." Hammer's arguments however, have already been addressed and the additional case
law she cites are completely distinguishable from this case. Her motion for reconsideration of the
denial of her Rule 35 motion should therefore be denied.
Likewise, Hammer seeks reconsideration of the dismissal of her complaint, even though she
was granted to leave to file an Amended Complaint and, in fact, did so. Yet she insists on further
wasting the Court's and Ribi's time and resources with this baseless motion. The Court should deny
this motion as well.
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II.
RECONSIDERATION STANDARD
Rule 11 provides that a party may seek reconsideration of any interlocutory order. I.R.C.P.
11 (a)(2)(B). the court must apply the same standard to its analysis that it "applied when deciding the
original order that is being reconsidered." Id Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266, 276 (2012).
Thus, "if the original order was a matter within the trial court's discretion, then so is the decision to
grant or deny the motion for reconsideration. If the original order was governed by a different
standard, then that standard applies to the motion for reconsideration." Id
In this case, the decision denying Hammer's motion for a Rule 35 examination was
discretionary and, accordingly, the decision on reconsideration is also discretionary. See I.R.C.P.
35(a) (using permissive language of"may); see also Sun Valley Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power

Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94 (1991) (stating abuse of discretion standard). The decision granting Ribi's
motion to dismiss was based on the "failure to state a claim" standard of Rule 12(c) or 12(b)(6)1 and
that standard likewise applies to Hammer's motion for reconsideration. See, e.g., Brooks v. Geico

General Ins. Co., 153 Idaho 546 (2012) (setting out 12(b)(6) standard).

III.
ARGUMENT
Hammer's motions for reconsideration do not raise any legitimate basis for the Court to
reconsider its prior rulings on Ribi's motion to dismiss or Hammer's motion for a Rule 35
independent mental health examination of Ribi. Instead, Hammer merely raises the same tired

Ribi brought his original motion to dismiss under Rule 12(c) because the answer had been
filed and there were no other pleadings to be filed (e.g., cross-claims, counterclaims). Hammer
contended that Rule l 2(b)(6) and not Rule 12(c) applied because the Court had not yet entered an
order "closing the pleadings." This dispute is immaterial because the standard for dismissal is
identical under both rules.
1
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arguments as before, purportedly supported now by additional case law, which she contends require
a different outcome. Hammer, however, also misconstrues the Court's rulings and incorrectly relies
on case law that provides no help to her here. The Court correctly ruled on both motions and there
is therefore no basis to grant Hammer's motions.

A.

The Court Correctly Denied Hammer's Motion for a Rule 35 Mental Health
Examination of Ribi
The Court denied Hammer's motion for a Rule 35 IME because Ribi's mental health is not

in controversy in this case and there is no good cause to order the examination. Specifically, the
Court stated that Ribi's mental state is relevant to the extent he intended to cause contact, but whether
he has the ability to distinguish right from wrong is not an element of assault. (May 9, 2016 Hearing
Tr. at30.) Ribi's mental health simply has no real bearing on whetheranassaultoccurredornot. (Id.)
On reconsideration, Hammer argues: (1) Ribi's mental health and prior alleged harassment
of Hammer is relevant and admissible as to intent and credibility; (2) the Court applied the wrong
elements of civil assault; and (3) Ribi put his own mental health at issue in a different lawsuit. More
so, Hammer cites to numerous cases she contends support her arguments. These arguments,
however, are meritless and the case law she relies on is completely inapposite.

1.

The Relevancy and Admissibility of Ribi's Mental Health Is A Separate
and Distinct Issue of Whether an IME Should Be Ordered

Hammer goes on at length arguing that Ribi's mental health is relevant to his credibility and
would be admissible at trial. Framing the issue this way, however, is incorrect. To be clear, showing
that a party's mental health is "in controversy" and that there is "good cause" for an IME is "not met
by mere conclusory allegations of the pleadings - nor by mere relevance to the case . . . ."

Sch/agenhaufv. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 118-119 (1964) (emphasis added). Instead, as previously
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briefed, it "require[ s] an affirmative showing by the movant that each condition as to which the
examination is sought is really and genuinely in controversy and that good cause exists for ordering
each particular examination. 11 Id. (emphasis added) (see also Def s April 29, 2016 Response to Rule
35 Motion at 5-7.)
Certainly a person's mental health relates to how that person functions in society. This is an
obvious point that Ribi does not dispute. That does not mean, however, that a party may conduct a
fishing expedition by way of an intrusive mental health examination simply to allow that party to
challenge another party's credibility and ability to "know right from wrong." This is especially the
case where, as here, the motion is based on nothing but the party's bare and conclusory allegations
about the person's mental health. If that was all it took to obtain an IME then practically every party
in every case would be entitled to one. It would simply be a matter of course in all litigation. But
mere relevancy is not enough, as Schlagenhaufmakes abundantly clear. Thus, Hammer's extensive
argument and case citation about relevancy and admissibility of evidence, which makes up the bulk
of her arguments on reconsideration, adds nothing to the discussion and does not warrant a different
outcome.
With respect to the case law cited by Hammer, this warrants further discussion because
Hammer grossly misunderstands those cases, none of which provide much if any help to her at all
in this case. In order to highlight the inapplicability of those cases here, a brief overview of each case
is set forth below, categorized by issue.

a.

Cases Related to Raising Mental Health as an Issue

Hammer cites to several cases for the proposition that "a party will be subject to a mental
examination when the party's mental health is in issue 'irrespective of who raises the issue' of the
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party's mental condition." (Plfs Rule 35 Reconsideration Memo at 6.) She also seems to suggest that
these cases are factually analogous. This is not so. To be clear, Ribi does not dispute that any party
may obtain an IME. In other words, a party does not have to place his or her own mental health in
controversy in order for an IME to be ordered. Nevertheless, as shown by the cases cited by Hammer,
the circumstances where raising another party's mental health as an issue are factually much different
than the present case.

In re Stevenson's Estate, 44 Ill. 2d 525 (S. Ct. Ill. 1970). This case involves a special
proceeding brought by three sons and their grandmother against their mother. The plaintiffs instituted
an action under the Illinois Probate Act that specifically authorized the appointment of a conservator
to an estate ifit could be shown that the manager of the estate (their mother) was incapable of doing
so because of an "imperfection of mentality" within the meaning of the act. In order to make this
showing the plaintiffs needed to obtain an IME of the defendant. They based the motion on multiple
affidavits of witness' with personal knowledge, including an affidavit containing a transcript of a
telephone conversation between the defendant and one of the plaintiffs, which was recorded after
the defendant had made several concerning phone calls at all hours of the day and night. The court
granted the motion because the facts showed a legitimate concern with ability of the defendant to
manage the estate due to deteriorating mental health, even thought the defendant did not herself place
her mental health at issue. Notably, the court specifically stated that "The need for careful application
of the 'in controversy' and 'good cause' limitations of the rule is particularly evidence in a case of
this type where the person sought to be examined has not raised the issue of his physical or mental
condition." Id. at 768-69 (emphasis added).
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In re Levitin, 48 Misc.3d 908 (N.Y. Sur. 2015). 2 This is another probate case involving the
trust in charge of the famed Archie Comics. The wife of the decedent came into control of the trust
as the co-executor and proceeded to grossly mismanage it to the point of near-ruin. The other coexecutor sought to have her removed because of her erratic behavior and mental health problems
made her unable to be a fiduciary of the company. To that end he sought an IME, which was based
on statements by numerous disinterested witnesses, evidence that she had poor hygiene and did not
change clothes for several days, an instance of being physically removed from Comic Con, despite
having been banned from the event and in violation of a restraining order, and various audio
recordings made of her. All of this was reviewed by a psychiatrist who was able to provide an
affidavit based on actual medical knowledge (as opposed to opinions from Hammer and Donoval).
The court granted the motion for an IME in the context of the principle that "New York has a vested
interest in requiring fiduciaries to comply with orders of the court to ensure the protection of the trust
assets and the innocent beneficiaries." Id at 917. Based on the medical evidence and several firsthand accounts by disinterested witnesses, there was a proper basis to order the IME in light of the
court's obligation to ensure the protection of trust assets and the rights of beneficiaries. None of this
is present in Hammer's case.

Goodman v. Harris Cnty, 571 F.3d 388 (5th Cir. 2009). This is a case previously cited by
Hammer in support of her Rule 35 motion. It involves a police shooting where the victim died. The
plaintiff (the estate) sought to obtain an IME of the police-officer defendant, which was approved

New York Surrogate's Court is a specialized court that "hears cases involving the affairs of
decedents, including the probate ofwills and the administration of estates. It also handles adoptions."
See New York State Unified Court System website, available at
http://nycourts.gov/courts/nyc/surrogates/index.shtml (last visited June 20, 2016).
2
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by the district court because the defendant had "indicated that he intended to prove what happened
on the night of the shooting through the use of psychological evidence of [the victim's] mental state."
The District Court allowed an IME of the defendant to "even the playing field." On appeal, the main
focus was on the admissibility of the expert's testimony, with no real analysis of the basis for the
IME. It serves only as an example of a plaintiff obtaining an IME of a defendant to "even the playing
field," which is simply not the case in the present matter.

b.

Cases Related to "Historic Misconduct" of a Party

Hammer cites to numerous cases as supposed examples of where an IME was granted "for
the same type of historic" misconduct that Ribi allegedly showed Hammer. However, none of these
cases are factually similar to the circumstances here.

Odom v. Odom, 2001 WL 1543476 (Tenn. App. 2001) (unpublished). This is a child
custody case where the parents accused each other of sexual and physical abuse of their child. The
mother sought an IME of father, her children and herself, which was denied. The father's mental
health was not "in controversy" because his claims that his children were abused by their older halfbrother and that their mother had interfered with his visitation did not implicate his mental health.
Thus, his own pleadings did not place his mental health in controversy. Then the court analyzed the
mother's pleadings. She contended, as a defense, that the father was less fit than she was based on
the fact that he was undergoing counseling, had been placed on medication for the treatment of
mental health problems, and had an emotional outburst at the home during which he had wielded a
gun. Based on these facts, the court concluded that the father's mental health was in controversy.
However, the court found that there was no good cause for the examination because the mother
failed to show that she could not obtain the information she sought through other means, as she had
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known about those things for a long time before filing her motion yet took no action. The mother
also sought an IME of the children based on a credibility argument that she believed they had been
coerced into lying about being abused. The court denied this request, specifically stating that the
"credibility defense" could be pursued without subjecting them to "a battery of psychological tests."
Thus, just like here, Hammer could challenge Ribi's credibility in other ways, without Ribi being
subject to an intrusive examination.
Gentile v. Gentil, 2010 WL 2812627 (Tenn. App.Ct. 2010) (unpublished). This is another

child custody dispute case where both parents were ordered to undergo a forensic parenting
evaluation. Mental health was at issue under the specific language of the Tennessee child custody
statute that required the court to consider the "mental health" of the parents. More so, because the
mental health is not necessarily always in controversy in every custody case, the court discussed the
facts that the parties had entered into an Agreed Order that neither party would "threaten or harass"
each other. Yet, the record contained ample evidence of displays of hostility and rage, obscenities
during visitation exchanges. Both sides were recording and videotaping the exchanges. Based on
these things, IME of both sides were ordered.
In re Marriage of Gove, 117 Ariz. 324 (Ariz. App.1977). This is a marriage dissolution and

custody battle case. The father was awarded custody in the divorce. Both parties were ordered to
submit to mental examinations related to their attempts to obtain custody and evidence of mental
health problems. The mother, who challenged the order on appeal, had engaged in erratic behavior
that bore directly on the custody of the children, including frantic and excessive spending, numerous
out of town trips, and an "unusually zealous approach" to her religious activities that was not the case
before. Further, numerous disinterested friends had suggested the wife was mentally disturbed and
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a psychiatrist who had personally met and treated the wife and had substantial contact with her, had
tentatively diagnosed her, and had advised that she needed psychiatric help. The psychiatrist also
submitted his own affidavit to stating as much.

Barth v. Barth, 74 A.D.2d 1002 (N.Y. App. 1980). This is yet another custody case where
the issue of the parents' mental health as it related to their ability to care for their children was
involved. However, the case was decided without getting into any details of the case and so it is of
no real use. While an IME was ordered, it was undisputed in the case that the mother had emotional
problems and the father had submitted an affidavit based on personal knowledge of such problems,
instead of bare, conclusory allegations.

Boyles v. Mid-Florida Television Corp., 431 So.2d 627 (Fla. App.1983). This was a motion
for IME brought by a defendant against a plaintiff in a defamation lawsuit. The grounds were that
the plaintiff had alleged "mental pain and anguish, humiliation and depression[]" - thus putting it
at issue. Nevertheless, the court found that there was not a basis for an IME because unlike other
types of defamation cases where a defendant may call a plaintiff "psychotic" and then the truth of
that statement becomes an issue, here it only related to damages and the court expressed the view
that such was probably not appropriate for an expert opinion in the case.

Kees v. Med. Bd. Of California, 7 Cal. App.4th 1801, 1815 (Cal App. 1992). This case
involved a petition for a writ of mandate to review a decision of a state medical board where the
doctor's license was revoked. Under California law, doctors were required to submit to a psychiatric
exam under certain conditions, including where the physician's ability to practice medicine may be
impaired, and the doctor refused to do so and was disciplined under agency rules. This has absolutely
no bearing on Hammer's case whatsoever.
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Alyssa B. v. State of Alaska, 123 P.3d 646, 651 (Alaska. S. Ct. 2005). This is a child
protection case where a child was committed to the temporary custody of the DHW, which
discontinued visitation between mother and child due to mother's misbehavior during visits. DHW
informed mother she needed to undergo a mental health evaluation because it believed she had a
mental illness. DHW filed a petition seeking an adjudication that child was in need of aid and
seeking an evaluation because of concerns that the mother's mental illness places the "child at
substantial risk of physical harm or mental injury." The basis for the DHW's motion was present
evidence of (1) threatening, abusive, hostile, and inappropriate behaviors; (2) it needed an evaluation
to make reasonable efforts to reunify the family and (3) basis of CP action was in part the mother's
mental or emotional condition placed child at risk. Notably, DHW submitted affidavit from social
worker that discussed concerns raised by physicians who had actually treated the mother, statements
by the mother herself about having major depression and statements by her brother about her
behavior and family history of mental illness.

In Re Levitin, 48 Misc.3d 908,917 (N.Y. Surr. 2015). Hammer cites this case again. See
discussion above.

c.

Cases Related to Mental Health Bearing on Credibility

As discussed above, mere relevancy is not enough to obtain an IME. Nevertheless, Hammer
cites to several cases standing for the general proposition that "a party may make use of the witness'
mental condition to challenge his credibility."(Plfs Rule 35 Reconsideration Memo at 15.) Be that
as it may, such is a very fact specific analysis and any decision as to the admissibility of evidence
is a matter taken up in a motion in limine or at trial. None of the cases cited by Hammer involve
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whether an IME should be granted and, in any event, do not even dictate that any of the evidence
here would ultimately be admissible.

Revels v. Vincenz, 382 F.3d 870, 877 (8th Cir. 2004). This is a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 case
brought by inmate against psychiatric hospital officials for claims of deliberate indifference (under
Fourteenth Amendment). On cross examination at trial, defense counsel asked plaintiff: "And you
admit that there were times in the past that you've heard voices?" The court let this evidence in over
objection and Plaintiff answered affirmatively. The plaintiff argued on appeal on appeal that the
question was beyond scope of direct and that the risk of unfair prejudice substantially outweighed
the probative value ofthe evidence. The standard of appeal here was "plain error" because the appeal
was on a different basis than the objection. The appellate court upheld the admissibility of the
evidence, and in so doing noted that mental condition bears on witness' credibility.

Lanni v. Jersey, 177 F.R.D. 295 (D. N.J. 1998). This is an ADA claim. The district court
ruled on both parties' motions in limine that forensic psychiatric expert was qualified to proffer an
opinion about the plaintiffs learning disabilities and mental condition. The expert would testify to,
among other things, how plaintiffs psychiatric condition would explain perceived mistreatment at
work. The main issue on appeal was the qualifications of the expert.

Frazier v. Topeka Metal Specialities, 2001 WL 138893 (D. Kan. 2001 ). This is a race-based
harassment lawsuit. The plaintiff saw a psychiatrist and was diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia
and antisocial personality disorder. His doctor believed that plaintiffs impression was that the men
at work were really just joking around and trying to include Plaintiff, but that schizophrenics take
horsing around and joking negatively. In other words, he could not perceive what was going on
around him. This made him believe he was being racially harassed. The court simply found, at the
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summary judgment stage, that Plaintiff had made out a prima facie claim for hostile work
environment and whether Plaintiffs mental condition and his inability to perceive events around him
is a credibility issue to be determined by a jury, not at summary judgment.

Sudtelgte v. Reno, 1994 WL 3406 (W.D. Missouri 1994). Plaintiff was an FBI special agent
terminated because of mental illness. All parties agreed she continued to suffer from disabling
mental illness. She claimed it was caused by sexual harassment. The case went to court trial, and the
court's findings of fact and conclusions of law found that her testimony was unreliable. 3

U.S. v. Lindstrom, 698 F.2d 1154 (11th Cir. 1983). This is a criminal case involving mail
fraud and conspiracy to commit mail fraud. The district court limited defense counsel's ability to
cross-examine prosecution's key witness regarding documented mental illness (including delusions)
and psychiatric commitment as a form of impeachment. On appeal, the court found that this violated
the confrontation clause, which is simply not an issue in the present civil case.

d.

Cases Related to Admissibility of "Prior Hostility"

Hammer cites to two very old Idaho criminal cases where the Supreme Court addressed the
admissibility of prior threats of violence, stating that such evidence is "always relevant" and "may
tend to establish an accused's attitude toward the victim ... " State v. Muguerza, 46 Idaho 456
(1928); State v. Marlar, 94 Idaho 803 (1972). It is not clear why, exactly, Hammer relies on these
cases. They are criminal cases dealing with admissibility of evidence in those specific contexts and
they do not have anything to do with whether an IME should be granted or even issues of how a
witness' mental health may come into play at a trial. These cases serve no purpose here.

N ote that Hammer quotes from this case that the court determined the party was "'narcissistic
and that her testimony ... was unreliable and not credible." (Plfs Rule 35 Reconsideration Memo
at 15.) This quoted language does not appear in the decision.
3
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2.

The Court Applied the Correct Elements of Assault When Ruling on
Hammer's Rule 35 Motion

Hammer argues that the Court should not have looked to any authority on the elements of
assault outside of the Idaho model jury instructions, which she contends is the only relevant
definition. (Plt's Rule 35 Reconsideration Memo at 12 n. 14.) This is an absurd contention,
especially given that Hammer herself relies on cases involving criminal allegations of assault. (See
Section l .d., supra.) Regardless, the Court is not limited in looking only to jury instructions for
guidance and analysis on the elements of any claim. In fact, jury instructions are derived from
statutes and case law, which reflects the law, not the other way around. The Court appropriately
discussed the assault elements during the May 9 hearing and, as has been briefed elsewhere, may
look to other sources of law for discussion of those elements, including similar elements in the
criminal code. (See Det's Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint Memo at 5-7 (discussing elements
of assault).)

3.

The Separate Rihi v. Donoval Lawsuit Is Irrelevant

Hammer last contends that Ribi has himself placed his mental health in controversy in this
case because he sued Donoval for defamation in a separate lawsuit and asserted there that he does
not have a mental illness. Hammer previously raised this argument, but complains that the Court did
not expressly discuss it during the May 9 hearing. The Court, however, need not explicitly address
each and every ridiculous point raised by Hammer. Doing so would waste the Court's time to no end.
Nevertheless, to be clear, Rule 35 mandates that a party's mental health be "in controversy." This
plainly refers to the actual case in front of the court, not other cases that have been long resolved.
More so, there is plainly a distinction between a defamation lawsuit where truthfulness of the
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allegations about mental health problems may be an issue - even a core issue - and an assault
lawsuit where the truthfulness of such is not an element of the claim. This is a frivolous argument
made by Hammer that the Court need not humor.

4.

Hammer's Use of Her Own Specially Retained Psychiatrist to Provide
the Independent Mental Health Examination is Highly Suspect

Ribi previously argued that Hammer improperly sought an IME in order to extort a settlement
and to take advantage of the litigation exception to defamation by using this lawsuit as yet another
opportunity to maliciously and baselessly accuse Ribi of mental health problems - even though that
has no bearing on whether or not she was actually assaulted. (See Defs Response to Motion for
Mental Health Examination.) The recent revelation that Hammer's proposed "independent" mental
health examiner is also her own specially retained expert only further reflects her improper
motivation in seeking an IME. Rather than utilizing Rule 35 to obtain a fair and independent
evaluation, Hammer plainly wants to use a hired gun in an attempt to embarrass and annoy Ribi.
Indeed, "the purpose of Rule 35 ... is to put both the plaintiff and defendant on an equal
footing with regard to evaluating [a party's] mental status." Duncan v. Upjohn Co., 155 F.R.D. 23,
26-27 (D. Conn. 1994). In fact, a doctor performing an IME is akin to an officer of the court.
Warrick v. Brode, 46 F.R.D. 427,428 (D. Del. 1969). As the Warrick court explained:

The examination authorized by Rule 35 providing for protective devices, does not
provide for the presence of counsel. This is as it should be, because an examination
should be divested as far as possible of any adversary character. The examining
doctor is, in effect, an 'officer of the court' performing a non-adversary duty. The very
presence of a lawyer for the examined party injects a partisan character into what
should otherwise be a wholly objective inquiry.... Moreover, having attorneys
present would tend to move the forum of the controversy from the courtroom to the
doctor's office.
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Id.; accord Di Bari v. Incaica CiaArmadora, S.A., 126 F.R.D. 12, 13 (E.D. N.Y. 1989) (addressing
the presence of examinee's attorney at IME and nothing that "far from being adversarial in nature,
these examinations should be divested as far as possible of any adversary character."); Brandenberg

v. El Al Israel Airlines, 79 F.R.D. 543,546 (S.D.N.Y 1978) (noting that the special nature ofanIME
relies "upon unimpeded one-on-one communication between doctor and patient," which is why
federal courts ordinarily deny the presence of attorneys in the exam).
Yet, despite the plainly neutral character of an IME, Hammer seeks to have her own specially
retained psychiatrist perform it. Further, Hammer indicates that she intends to also have Dr. Eliason
observe Ribi at trial so that he can offer an opinion about Ribi's alleged "inability to recognize right
from wrong," his "ability to tell the truth or recognize that he is not telling the truth," his "inherent
inability to have compassion or empathy[,]" and his "inability to tell the truth at trial[.]" (June 14
Expert Disclosure at 2.) This flies in the face of the independence of an IME and it strains
comprehension how Hammer can actually believe offering a clearly biased hired gun like this serves
any proper purpose under Rule 3 5.

B.

The Court Correctly Granted Ribi's Motion to Dismiss
The Court granted Ribi's motion to dismiss because Hammer failed to adequately plead facts

showing that she was entitled to relief for her assault claim. On reconsideration, Hammer argues
unpersuasively that the Court applied the wrong standard. The Court, however, correctly applied the
law. It is well settled in Idaho that a plaintiff must allege "'sufficient facts in support of his claim,
which if true, would entitle [her] to relief."' Hoffer v. City of Boise, 151 Idaho 400, 402 (2011)
(quoting Orrock v. Appleton, 147 Idaho 613, 618 (2009)) (emphasis and bracketed language added).
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Hammer's contention that the Court erred in requiring that she plead sufficient facts that, if true,
would show entitlement to relief, is directly contrary to this well-established law.
More so, the Court granted Hammer leave to file an amended complaint, which she did. As
such, there is no reason for her to have filed a motion for reconsideration of the dismissal. The
Amended Complaint effectively replaced her original Complaint and her concerns are therefore
moot. This motion serves only to waste more time and expenses of the Court and the parties.
DATED this 24th day of June, 2016.

NAYLOR & HALES, P.C.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

SHARON R. HAMMER,
Case No. CV-2015-428
Plaintiff,
vs.
NILS RIBI, in his individual capacity,

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Defendant.

COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Sharon R. Hammer ("Ms. Hammer"), by and through her

counsel of record, James R. Donoval, and in Reply in support of her Motion For Partial
Summary Judgment as to four (4) particular issues in the matter, states as follows:
Rule 56. Summary Judgment

lR.C.P. 56(a) states, in relevant part:
"(a) Summary Judgment- For Claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim,
counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain declaratory judgment may, at any time after the
expiration of twenty (20) days from the service of process upon the adverse party or that
party's appearance in the action or after service of a motion for summary by the adverse
party, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in the party's
favor upon all or any part thereof(emphasis added).
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LR.P.C. 56(a) makes clear that an entire case or an entire claim is not required to be at

issue on summary judgment, but that lesser parts of claims (i.e. "any part thereof'') may be raised
on summary judgment.
In his Response, Defendant Ribi is correct that !R.C.P. 56(c) does state that a district
court can ultimately enter a judgment based on a summary judgment motion. However, LR.C.P.
56(d) goes on to state:

"(d) Case Not Fully Adjudicated On Motion For Summary Judgment. If on motion
under this rule judgment is not rendered upon tlte wltole case or for all the relief asked
(emphasis added) and a trial is necessary, the court at hearing of the motion, by
examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if
practicable ascertain what material/acts exi.<;t without substantial controversy (emphasis
added) and what material facts are in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make an
order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy (emphasis added),
including the extent to which the amount of damages or other relief (emphasis added) is
not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action as are just."
Like LR.C.P. 56(a), I.R.C.P. 56(d) does not limit the conduct and rulings of an Idaho
district court on summary judgment to dismissing entire claims, and to entering judgment under
LR.C.P. 56(c), but that the district court can enter summary judgment as to facts at issue and

"other relief' which the parties seek. In fact, nowhere in the single case that the Defendant relied
on to support his claim that this Court cannot rule on "issues" on summary judgment, such as the
issues raised in Ms. Hammer's Motion For Partial Summary Judgment (i.e. Shapley v. Centurion

Life Ins. Co., 154 Idaho 875,303 P.3d 234 (Id. Sup.Ct. 2013)) 1, does the Idaho Supreme Court
state that an Idaho district court can only enter final judgments at summary judgment, as is
asserted by the Defendant.

1 Ms. Hammer acknowledges that the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the entry of summary judgment in the Shapley
v. Centurion Life case. But nowhere in the Shapley v. Centurion life case does the Idaho Supreme Court discuss
whether a district court can enter summary judgment on "issues" that do not resolve a claim in total or as to other
issues in the pending case, as is asserted by Defendant Ribi.
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Instead, in Esser v. Lost River Ballistics Tech., Inc., 145 Idaho 912,919, 188 P.3d 854
(Id. Sup.Ct. 2008), the Idaho Supreme Court made clear that it is not just claims and causes of
action that should be resolved at summary judgment, but "issues" pending before the district
court ("The trial court must also examine the pleadings to determine whether all or only some
issues raised in the pleadings have been placed at issue by the motion for summary judgment",

@919. The district court must then determine whether there is any genuine issue of fact raised by
"each issue (emphasis added) raised by the motion", @919.

At the May 9, 2016 hearing, the Court, sua sponte, discussed several issues that are
pertinent to the case, but which were not fully briefed as part of the motions that were then
pending. The Court's determinations at that hearing were, in essence, summary judgment rulings
on Defendant Ribi's behalf, when Defendant Ribi had not sought those summary judgment
findings, nor was Ms. Hammer allowed to defend against those assertions that were sua sponte
raised and ruled on by the Court. Defendant Ribi, having been the beneficiary of the Court's sua
sponte findings, now asserts that Ms. Hammer should not also be entitled to raise particular
issues for the Court to rule on. That assertion is patently unfair.
The Court's Sua Sponte Oral Findings At the May 9, 2016 Hearing Should Be Clarified At
Summary Judgment
At the May 9, 2016 hearing, the Court, sua sponte, raised several issues which Ms.
Hammer agrees are pertinent and important to the case. However, the specific issues were not
briefed, and the Court discussed the matters sua sponte based on its generic perceptions of
matters related to a civil assault claim under Idaho law, not based on established legal precedent.
Ms. Hammer raised four (4) issues in her Motion For Partial Summary Judgment which the
Court is requested to make clear and concise rulings on that are substantial to the case herein, all
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of which were generally and vaguely, and not specifically, discussed sua sponte by the Court at
the May 9, 2016 hearing. The four (4) issues are:
1) Under Idaho law, the established elements of a civil assault claim are unequivocally
the formally adopted elements defined by the Idaho Supreme Court in Idaho Civil Jury

Instruction 4.30.
2) Pursuant to the Idaho Supreme Court (State v. Muguerza, 46 Idaho 456,268 P. I (Id.
Sup.Ct. 1928) and State v Marlar, 94 Idaho 803,498 P.2d 1276 (Id. Sup.Ct. 1972)) the hostile
conduct of Defendant Ribi towards Ms. Hammer prior to the September 15, 2011 assault is
relevant and admissible related to the assault itself.
3) Ms. Hammer is entitled to enter evidence of Defendant Ribi's mental health problems
at trial in an assault case, especially when there has been a history of abusive conduct by
Defendant Ribi towards Ms. Hammer.
4) The jury, and not the Court, is entitled to make the determination of whether
Defendant Ribi's conduct towards Ms. Hammer on September 15, 2011, leading up to the assault
itself, separate from the assault, was within the scope of Defendant Ribi's duties as a Sun Valley
City Council member.
Ms. Hammer understands why Defendant Ribi is reticent to have to answer to these four
(4) "issues" at summary judgment, as he is on the wrong side of legal precedent as to each issue.
As Defendant Ribi has chosen not to respond to any of the issues in his Response, the Court
should recognize that Defendant Ribi has therefore conceded all four (4) issues.

ISSUE I
The Elements Of Civil Assault Under Idaho Law
As was described in Ms. Hammer's Memorandum In Support Of Partial Summary
Judgment, the elements of a civil assault formally adopted by the Idaho Supreme Court in Idaho
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Civil Jury Instruction 4.30 are:

"1) The defendant acted intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the
person of the plaintiff or a third person, or an immediate fear of such contact; and
2) As a result, the plaintiff feared such contact was imminent."
And was described in Ms. Hammer's Memorandum In Support Of Partial Summary
Judgment, even the U.S. District Court for Idaho has accepted this definition as the sole
definition of the elements of civil assault under Idaho law (Pollitt v. CSN International, 2007
WL 294249, 5 (U.S. Idaho 2007)).
The Court's sua sponte reference to a horn book definition of assault under Miller v.
Idaho State Patrol, 150 Idaho 856,871,252 P.3d 1274 (Id. Sup.Ct. 2011) or to the Idaho

criminal code definition of criminal assault under Idaho Code § 18-901 2 at the May 9, 2016
hearing, makes clear that the Court was misinformed as to the proper elements of civil assault
under Idaho law when making any of its oral rulings that day. And, none of the cases cited by
Defendant Ribi in any of its pleadings are applicable because they use definitions of civil and
criminal assault from New York3 and California4 that are not comparable to the Idaho Supreme
Court's definition of civil assault under Idaho Civil Jury Instruction 4. 30. The Court's
misunderstanding of what the elements of civil assault under Idaho law are at the May 9, 2016
hearing polluted everything the Court thought and did that day.
The Court should rectify its failure to recognize the sole definition of civil assault under
2 Idaho Code§ 18-901 specifically includes "violence" as part of the conduct of the accused towards the victim.
Idaho Civil Jury Instruction 4.30 describes the conduct of the accused as being a much lower level of"harmful or
offensive".
3 The New York case cited by Defendant Ribi (Williams v. Port Authority, 880 F.Supp. 980 (U.S. E.D.N.Y. 1995))
relates to the New York criminal definition of assault, which specifically includes the phrase "violence" as part of
the action of the accused, which is also included in the Idaho criminal assault statute (Idaho Code§ 18-901) but is
not found in the definition of civil assault described in Idaho Civil Jwy Instruction 4. 30.
4 As is the case with the New York case relied on by Defendant Ribi, the two California cases relied upon by
Defendant Ribi (Steel v. City OfSan Diego, 726 F.Supp.2d 1172 (U.S. S.D.Cal. 2010) and Hardin v. Wal-Mart, 813
F.Supp.2d 1167 (U.S. E.D.Cal. 2011)) include a much different definition of assault under California law than is
found in Idaho Civil Jury Instruction 4.30.
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Idaho law as being the definition described in Idaho Civil Jury Instruction 4.30 and enter
summary judgment confirming that the proper definition of civil assault described in Idaho Civil

Jury Instruction 4.30 as being applied to this case. Because the Court failed to recognize the
proper definition of civil assault under Idaho law at the May 9, 2016 hearing, the Court is
obligated to reconsider all of the motions and issues that were presented to it that day, as has
been requested by Ms. Hammer.

ISSUED
The Admission Of Evidence Of Prior Harassment And Hostility Of Defendant Ribi Against
Ms. Hammer At Trial
As is thoroughly described in Ms. Hammer's Memorandum In Support Of Motion For
Partial Summary Judgment, at the May 9, 2016 hearing, the Court concluded, sua sponte, and
without briefs on the issue, that none of the prior history of Defendant Ribi's harassment and
hostility towards Ms. Hammer would be allowed into evidence at trial in the matter.
Pursuant to I.R.E. 404(b), evidence of prior acts of misconduct of a litigant which relate
to "motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident" is allowed to be presented at trial. And, pursuant to JR.E. 405(b), specific acts which
go towards showing the character traits of a litigant are allowed to be presented as evidence at
trial.
Based on I.R.E. 404(b) and JR.E. 405(b), when it comes to assault cases, the Idaho
Supreme Court has confirmed that hostile conduct of the accused towards the victim is relevant
and admissible at trial. In State v. Muguerza, 46 Idaho 456, 268 P. 1, 2 (Id. Sup.Ct. 1928), the
Idaho Supreme Court stated:
"Prior threats of the accused or evidence of previous trouble are always relevant
(emphasis added) to illustrate mental attitude of the accused towards the prosecuting
witness at the time of the assault".
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And in State v. Marlar, 94 Idaho 803,498 P.2d 1276 (Id. Sup.Ct. 1972)5, the Idaho
Supreme Court confirmed that the prior threats and hostile conduct of the accused towards the
victim in an assault case are always relevant by stating:
"Prior threats may comprise part of the mosaic of the criminal event in that they may tend
to establish an accused's attitude toward the victim or an intent to inflict hann upon him."
The Idaho Supreme Court has made clear that, in an assault case, the prior history of
hostility and threatening conduct of the defendant towards the victim is always relevant and
admissible related to the accused's mental attitude and state of mind towards the victim at the
time of the assault.
There is no question that, at the May 9, 2016 hearing, the Court misunderstood and
misapplied the Idaho Supreme Court's directions that all of the harassment and abusive conduct
Ms. Hammer suffered at Defendant Ribi's hands is always both relevant and admissible to
illustrate the mental attitude, state of mind and intent of Defendant Ribi towards Ms. Hammer at
the time of the alleged assault. As was the case with the Court's failure to understand the proper
elements of civil assault under Idaho law, the Court allowed its misunderstanding of the
admissibility of Defendant Ribi's hostile and abusive conduct towards Ms. Hammer prior to the
September 15, 2011 assault to pollute its discussion and decisions at the May 9, 2016 hearing
related to all matters pending before it that day. Ms. Hammer is therefore entitled to a definitive
ruling by the Court that all of Defendant Ribi's prior hostility and harassment towards Ms.
Hammer is relevant and admissible at trial in this case. Because the Court failed to recognize that
Idaho legal precedent requires the Court to allow the evidence of Defendant Ribi's prior acts of
hostility towards Ms. Hammer into evidence at trial, the Court is obligated to reconsider all of
s It should be noted that in State v. Marlar, the statement of"I'll put you in the morgue" was detennined not to be
relevant or admissible because it was made during a telephone call made after the alleged assault, and there was no
confirmation that it was actually made by the accused.
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the motions and issues presented to it on May 9,2016, as has been requested by Ms. Hammer.
ISSUE ill
The Admission Of Evidence Of Defendant Ribi's Mental Health At Trial
At the May 9, 2016 hearing, the Court, sua sponte, ruled out that Defendant Ribi's
potential mental illness can be raised as an issue at trial.
However, as was described in Ms. Hammer's Memorandum In Support Of Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment, under lR.E. 608, evidence of mental illness may be offered for the
purpose ofraising questions not only about a witness' capacity but also the witness' character for
truthfulness or untruthfulness. Ms. Hammer provided several cases which stand for that
proposition, none of which has been countered by anything in Defendant Ribi' s Response.
As was the case with several issues, at the May 9, 2016 hearing, the Court sua sponte
rejected that any mention of Defendant Ribi's potential mental health issues can be raised at trial,
without any briefing on the issue. The Court refused to recognize that under !R.E. 608, and
relevant case law, that Ms. Hammer will have the right to challenge the mental health of
Defendant Ribi as it goes to both his capacity for truthfulness and his credibility. Ms. Hammer is
entitled to a definitive ruling on that issue. In addition, Ms. Hammer is entitled to have the Court
reconsider whether Defendant Ribi is required to be subject to a I.R.C.P. 35(a) mental health
examination, which the Court denied, in large part, because the Court sua sponte asserted that
Defendant Ribi's mental health is not an issue at trial, when it should be, and is.

ISSUE IV
The Jury, Not The Court, Must Determine Whether Defendant Ribi's Conduct Related To
The Assault Was Outside The Scope Of His Duties As A Sun Valley City Council Member
Or Outrageous For Punitive Damages Purposes
As was detailed in Ms. Hammer's Memorandum In Support Of Motion For Partial

Summary Judgment, the question of whether any of the conduct of Defendant R.ibi leading up to,
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and as part of, the assault of Ms. Hammer on September 15, 2011 was within the scope of
Defendant Ribi's duty as a Sun Valley City Council member - is one that must be left to the jury.
At the May 9, 2016 hearing, the Court concluded, correctly, that if Defendant Ribi did
assault Ms. Hammer, the assault was clearly outside the scope of his duties as a Sun Valley City
Council member. However, the Court concluded (in direct contradiction to the Idaho Supreme
Court's directions that the question of whether conduct of a government employee is within the
scope of that employees duties must be left to a jury) that all of the conduct of Defendant Ribi
leading up to the actual assault was within Defendant Ribi' s duties as a Sun Valley City Council
member.

In Teurlings v. Larson, 156 Idaho 686, 691-692, 302 P.3d 26 (Id. Sup.Ct. 2013), the
Idaho Supreme Court made clear where there is any issue as to whether any conduct of the
government officials is within or outside the scope of employment, that question must be left to
the jury. Contrary to the Court's sue sponte assertions at the May 9, 2016 hearing, a jury has the
right to determine whether any or all of Defendant Ribi's conduct prior to the assault was outside
the scope of his duties as a Sun Valley City Council member, not just the assault itself. Ms.
Hammer is entitled to a finding that the question of whether Defendant Ribi's pre-assault
conduct towards Ms. Hammer was outside the scope of his duties as a Sun Valley City Council
member is a question left to the jury in this matter.

DATED this

tftft

day

ogj;{,

2016.

'
BY~-..,-f-~~~~~~~~~~~s R. DONOVAL
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James R. Donoval, ISB #8142
4481 N. Dresden Pl., Suite D
Garden City, ID 83714
Telephone: (312) 859-2029
Facsimile: (208) 649-1603
Email: jdonoval@aol.com
Attorney for Plaintiff Sharon R. Hammer

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

SHARON R. HAMMER,
Case No. CV-2015-428
Plaintiff,

RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS
AMENDED COMPLAINT

vs.
NILS RIBI, in his individual capacity,
Defendant.

COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Sharon R. Hammer ("Ms. Hammer"), by and through her
counsel of record, James R. Donoval, and in Response to Defendant Nils Ribi's ("Defendant
Ribi") Motion To Dismiss Amended Complaint (the "Motion To Dismiss") in the matter, and
states as follows:

Introduction
On May 12, 2016, after briefing and hearings in the matter, this Court entered its Order
Granting Defendant's Motion To Dismiss And Granting Plaintiff Leave To Amend The
Complaint. Pursuant to the Court's direction, Ms. Hammer filed an Amended Complaint,
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correcting any factual deficiencies that may have existed in the original Complaint related to Ms.
Hammer's civil assault claim against Defendant Ribi 1•
Defendant Ribi's request to dismiss the Amended Complaint, simply reiterates his
assertions in his request to dismiss the original Complaint, much of which was denied by the
Court at the May 9, 2016 hearing on the matter.
The Court's Sua Sponte Oral Findings At the May 9, 2016 Hearing Should Be Clarified
And Corrected
At the May 9, 2016 hearing, the Court, sua sponte, raised several issues which Ms.
Hammer agrees are pertinent and important to the case. However, the specific issues were not
briefed, and the Court discussed the matters sua sponte based on the Court's generic perceptions
of matters related to a civil assault claim under Idaho law, not based on established legal
precedent. In regards to three (3) issues, the Court made negative sua sponte findings against Ms.
Hammer's interests in this case, and based on those improper sua sponte negative findings, the
Court dismissed the original Complaint. Those three sua sponte negative inferences were that:
1) The Court failed to recognize that, under Idaho law, the established elements of a civil
assault claim are solely and unequivocally the formally adopted elements defined by the Idaho
Supreme Court in Idaho Civil Jury Instruction 4.30.
2) The Court failed to recognize that pursuant to the Idaho Supreme Court (State v.

Muguerza, 46 Idaho 456,268 P. 1 (Id. Sup.Ct. 1928) and State v Marlar, 94 Idaho 803,498 P.2d
1276 (Id. Sup.Ct. 1972)) the hostile conduct of Defendant Ribi towards Ms. Hammer prior to the
September 15, 2011 assault is relevant and admissible related to the assault itself.

1 Ms. Hammer has filed her Motion To Reconsider Dismissal Of Complaint, asserting that the Court should not have
dismissed the original Complaint, for many of the same reasons described herein.
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3) The Court failed to recognize, in contradiction to Idaho legal precedent, that only the
jury, and not the Court, is entitled to make the determination of whether Defendant Ribi's actions
on September 15, 2011, leading up to the assault, separate from the assault itself, were within the
scope of Defendant Ribi 's duties as a Sun Valley City Council member.
Because of the sua sponte nature of the Court's findings at the May 9, 2016 hearing, and
because of the Court's misperception ofldaho legal precedent related to these matters, Ms.
Hammer has sought reconsideration of the Court's dismissal of the original Complaint. At a
minimum, in response to Defendant Ribi's request to dismiss the Amended Complaint, the Court
should be fully apprised of the legal precedent related to these matters when it is ruling on the
validity of the Amended Complaint.
Ms. Hammer also asserts that because, on two separate occasions, Defendant Ribi filed
an answer to Ms. Hammer's civil assault claim, under Idaho case law, Defendant Ribi is now
estopped from asserting that Ms. Hammer has failed to adequately plead her civil assault claim.

ISSUE I
Ms. Hammer Has Properly Raised Sufficient Facts To Support A Civil Assault Claim
Under Idaho Law
The elements of a civil assault established by the Idaho Supreme Court in Idaho Civil

Jury Instruction 4.30 are:
"1) The defendant acted intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the
person of the plaintiff or a third person, or an immediate fear of such contact; and
2) As a result, the plaintiff feared such contact was imminent."

In Pollitt v. CSN International, 2007 WL 294249, 5 (U.S. Idaho 2007) the U.S. District
Court for Idaho confirmed that under Idaho law the elements of civil assault are those described
in Idaho Civil Jury Instruction 4.30.
In the Amended Complaint, Ms. Hammer (the former Sun Valley City Administrator)
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asserts that, for the better part of three years, during 2009 through 2011, Defendant Ribi (a
former Sun Valley City Council member) was hostile to and harassed Ms. Hammer on numerous
occasions (Amended Complaint, Para. 17-36). The hostility and harassment of Ms. Hammer
were reported to several Sun Valley officials, including former Sun Valley Mayor Wayne
Willich ("Former Mayor Willich') (Amended Complaint, Para. 17-36). Ms. Hammer asserts that
she was concerned about Defendant Ribi's "tenuous emotional state" and because he targeted her
as a female (Amended Complaint, Para. 19), and that she had "fears regarding her personal
safety related to Defendant Ribi" (Amended Complaint, Para. 18).
During a break in a Sun Valley City Council meeting on September 15, 2011, she left
Former Mayor Willich and the members of the Sun Valley City Council, including Defendant
Ribi, in the Sun Valley City Hall Council Chamber, to walk approximately one hundred (100)
feet to the front of the Sun Valley City Hall, near the front desk, and into the copy room, to make
some copies (Amended Complaint, Para. 39-40). Unbeknownst to Ms. Hammer, Defendant Ribi,
who had farther to walk to follow Ms. Hammer because he had been sitting at the dais at the
front of the Sun Valley City Council Chamber, followed Ms. Hammer the one hundred fifty
(150) feet he had to travel to the front of Sun Valley City Hall (Amended Complaint, Para. 4041 ). Defendant Ribi began to demand that Ms. Hammer make changes to the Sun Valley budget,
which Defendant Ribi had no authority to demand, and which Ms. Hammer disagreed with
(Amended Complaint Para. 44-49). Defendant Ribi's voice raised and his actions became
"hostile and threatening" (Amended Complaint Para. 50) and Defendant Ribi became "enraged"
(Amended Complaint, Para. 51 ). At some point Ms. Hammer told Defendant Ribi that she was
going to discuss the matter with Former Mayor Willich (Amended Complaint, Para. 52), who
was still only one hundred (100) feet away in the Sun Valley City Council Chamber. Defendant
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Ribi then yelled "No! You will not talk to the Mayor!" (Amended Complaint, Para. 55), at the
same time as he took at least one step towards Ms. Hammer (Amended Complaint, Para. 53, 55)
and "pivoted towards Ms. Hammer" (Amended Complaint, Para. 53), and as he raised his
outstretched arms and hands within inches of her shoulders (Amended Complaint, Para. 53, 55
and 57). The combination of Defendant Ribi's yelling that Ms. Hammer was not going to be
allowed to go back to the Sun Valley City Council Chamber and speak to Former Mayor Willich,
and his arm and hand movements towards Ms. Hammer's shoulders, indicated that he was going
to physically prohibit Ms. Hammer from moving towards the Sun Valley City Council Chamber
where Former Mayor Willich was still located (Amended Complaint, Para. 56). Ms. Hammer
asserts that Defendant Ribi's conduct in yelling that Ms. Hammer was not going to be allowed to
talk to Former Mayor Willich, and his actions in moving towards her with his hands about to
touch her shoulders, placed her in fear of "imminent harmful or offensive contact with her body"
(Amended Complaint, Para. 58) in order to stop her from going back to the Sun Valley City
Council Chamber to speak to Former Mayor Willich (Amended Complaint, Para. 56). The
assault of Ms. Hammer by Defendant Ribi was witnessed by former Sun Valley Administrative
Assistant David Blampied (Amended Complaint, Para. 60). Former Mayor Willich has testified,
under oath, that when Ms. Hammer did eventually return to the Sun Valley City Council
Chamber she was visibly upset and shaken (Amended Complaint, Para. 63).
The Idaho Supreme Court has confirmed on numerous occasions that Idaho civil
procedure requires only that a defendant be put on "notice" of what he/she is being required to
defend against. In Cook v. Skyline Corp., 135 Idaho 26, 33, 13 P.3d 857 (Id. Sup.Ct. 2000) the
Idaho Supreme Court confirmed that the Idaho Rules Of Civil Procedure established a system of
notice pleading (citing to Straley v. Idaho Nuclear Corp., 94 Idaho 917, 921, 500 P .2d 218, 222
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(Id. Sup.Ct. 1972). In such a system, a pleading "which sets forth a claim for relief ... need only
contain 'a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' in
addition to alleging jurisdiction of the court and a demand for judgment .... " (citing to Archer v.
Shields Lumber Co., 91 Idaho 861,866,434 P.2d 79, 84 (Id. Sup.Ct. 1967) (quotingl.R.C.P.
"8(a)). In Cook v. Skyline Corp., @33, the Idaho Supreme Court confirmed that notice pleading
frees the parties from pleading particular issues or theories, and allows parties to get through the
courthouse door by merely stating claims upon which relief can be granted."
Multiple Idaho Supreme Court cases since Cook v. Skyline Corp. have confirmed that
there is no need for "slavishly" providing factual minutia to support a cause of action and instead
a plaintiff must simply state "claims" upon which relief can be granted (see Brown v. City Of
Pocatello, 148 Idaho 802,807,229 P.3d 1164 (Id. Sup.Ct. 2010). In fact, in Mortensen v.
Stewart Title Co., 149 Idaho 437,443,235 P.3d 387 (Id. Sup.Ct. 2010) the Idaho Supreme Court
confirmed that all the complaint must do is allege facts which could (emphasis added) put the
defendant on notice of the claim against him/her (citing Seiniger Law Office, P.A. v. N Pac. Ins.
Co., 145 Idaho 241,247,178 P.3d 606,612 (Id. Sup.Ct. 2008) and Vendelin v. Costco Wholesale
Corp., 140 Idaho 416, 427-28, 95 P.3d 34, 45-46 (Id. Sup.Ct. 2004)). In Mortensen v. Stewart
Title,@ 443, the Idaho Supreme Court went on to state that a complaint satisfies the "notice"
pleading requirements "so long as the factual allegations themselves could fairly put the
opposing party on notice of the claim against it."
There is no question that, as plead in the Amended Complaint, Defendant Ribi was put on
"notice" that he was being charged with civil assault which occurred on September 15, 2011 as is
defined in Idaho Civil Jury Instruction 4.30, namely, that, 1) Defendant Ribi intended to cause a
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harmful or offensive contact with the person of Ms. Hammer, or an immediate fear of such
contact; and, 2) as a result, Ms. Hammer feared such contact was imminent.
At the May 9, 2016 hearing the Court discussed what it believed the elements of civil
assault in Idaho are, ignoring what the Idaho Supreme Court has approved as the proper elements
of civil assault under Idaho Civil Jury Instruction 4.30. Instead, the Court stated:
"I looked at the Miller v. Idaho Patrol case. It doesn't say much about what
constitutes an assault. I do not think that the Supreme Court, if push comes to shove, is
going to use a different definition - they didn't really elaborate on this, but I don't think
they're going to use a different definition in Idaho as to what constitutes an assault, and
that's set forth in Idaho Code§ 18-901 2 .
I do not know why they would have a different definition for civil assault. I think
if you're claiming assault, it's common-law or it's a statutory definition of assault. I don't
know that you get one definition of civil assault and another definition of criminal
assault. I think that's the essence of assault is that you're committing an unlawful
intentional act. So, at least arguably, I would suggest that the Supreme Court would use
the definition in the statute, Idaho Code § 18-901, and there's certain things that have to
have alleged or should be in order to constitute assault. I'm not making that ruling as a
matter oflaw, that the Idaho Supreme Court would use that definition, but it's a pretty
good one and I don't know why they wouldn't." (Transcript, Pg. 77-78)
Ms. Hammer asserts that the Court erred by looking to horn book language in Miller v.

Idaho State Patrol, 150 Idaho 856,871,252 P.3d 1274 (Id. Sup.Ct. 2011) or the definition of
criminal assault in Idaho Code § 18-901 for guidance as to what the proper definition of civil
assault is in Idaho when the Idaho Supreme Court has formally adopted Idaho Civil Jury

Instruction 4.30 as the definition of civil assault in Idaho 3 •
In Miller v. Idaho State Patrol,@ 871, in a blood catheterization case, the Idaho Supreme
Court discussed a generic definition of civil assault described in 6A Corpus Juris Secundum

Assault §6 (2010) as being "an unlawful threat or offer to do bodily harm or injury to another".
However, the Idaho Supreme Court went no further in analyzing whether that generic horn book
Contrary to the Court's claim, in Miller v. Idaho State Patrol the Idaho Supreme Court did not refer to Idaho Code
§ 18-901.
3 It should be noted that Ms. Hammer had extensively cited to Idaho Civil Jury Instruction 4. 30 in her briefs but the
Court made no reference to Idaho Civil Jury Instruction 4.30 in its discussions at the May 9, 2016 hearing.
2
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definition of assault is the final definition of civil assault under Idaho law (as opposed to the
definition under Idaho Civil Jury Instruction 4.30) because the Idaho Supreme Court found that
the officer in that case was immune from prosecution for civil assault (regardless of the
definition) because there was a statutory right for the officer to obtain a blood sample from the
plaintiff in that case.
The Idaho Code§ 18-901 definition of criminal assault, which the Court asserted at the
May 9, 2016 hearing as being the proper definition of civil assault as well, is much different than
the definition of civil assault under Idaho Civil Jury Instruction 4.30, contrary to the Court's
assertion at the May 9, 2016 hearing. Under Idaho Code

f 18-901, criminal assault is defined as

being "(a) an unlawful attempt, coupled with apparent ability, to commit a violent (emphasis
added) injury on the person of another; or (b) An intentional, unlawful threat by word or act to
do violence (emphasis added) to the person of another, coupled with an apparent ability to do so,
and doing some act which creates a well-founded fear in such other person that such violence
(emphasis added) is imminent." The criminal definition of assault in Idaho Code§ 18-901 makes
clear that there is a "violence" component associated with criminal assault which is nowhere
found in the civil assault definition under Idaho Civil Jury Instruction 4.30. Under Idaho Civil

Jury Instruction 4.30 all the plaintiff needs show is that the accused intended to cause "harmful
or offensive contact" with plaintiff, not that the defendant was going to be violent.
At the May 9, 2016 hearing, the Court also described that the cases cited by Defendant
Ribi in his briefs from New York and California, were somehow indicative of why Ms.
Hammer's civil assault cause of action against Defendant Ribi should be dismissed, stating:
"Cases in other states that Mr. Naylor has cited that come closer than the allegations here
to making out a case of assault have been dismissed. I think the briefing on the
defendant's part is good and it shows some other cases where courts have looked at this,
and those cases are closer to the line than this case and courts have dismissed them."
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(Transcript, Pg. 79-80)
However, the New York case cited by Defendant Ribi (Williams v. Port Authority, 880
F.Supp. 980 (U.S. E.D.N.Y. 1995)), relied upon by the Court at the May 9, 2016 hearing, and
which Defendant Ribi again relies upon in his request to dismiss the Amended Complaint, relates
to the New York criminal definition of assault, which specifically includes the phrase "violence"
as part of the action of the accused (which is also included in the Idaho criminal assault statute

(Idaho Code §' 18-901)) but is not found in the definition of civil assault described in Idaho Civil
Jury Instruction 4.30. It should also be noted that both the accused and the victim in the Williams
v. Port Authority case were blue collar, male, dock workers. At least four (4) cases related to the
New York definition of assault since Williams v. Port Authority, where the victim was a female
and the accused was a male, have all determined that the female raised sufficient facts to support
a claim of civil assault against a male defendant (see Cohen v. Davis, 926 F.Supp. 399 (U.S.
S.D.N.Y. 1996); Carroll v. Bayeriche Landesbank, 125 F.Supp.2d 58 (U.S. S.D.N.Y. 2000);

Campoverde v. Sony Pictures, 2002 WI 31163804 (U.S. S.D.N.Y. 2002); and, Hayles v.
Advanced Travel, 2004 WL 26548 (U.S. S.D.N.Y. 2004)).
The two California cases submitted by Defendant Ribi, which the Court relied on at the
May 9, 2016 hearing, and which Defendant Ribi is also relying upon in his request to dismiss the
Amended Complaint, are even less instructive, as they also use a definition of civil assault much
different than Idaho definition of civil assault under Idaho Civil Jury Instruction 4.30. In Steel v.

City Of San Diego, 726 F.Supp.2d 1172 (U.S. S.D.Cal. 2010) a male process server served a
summons on a male related to a divorce matter. In Steel v. City Of San Diego the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District Of California dismissed the civil assault claim under California
law because there was no evidence of physical threat by the mere service of the summons on the
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male recipient. And in Hardin v. Wal-Mart, 813 F.Supp.2d 1167 (U.S. E.D.Cal. 2011), the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District Of California dismissed the civil assault claim by a male
against another male based on the mere giving of"the finger" and the claim that "I'm going to
get you" without any further evidence of immediate physical contact. As was the case with the
New York case of Williams v. Port Authority, both Steel v. City Of San Diego and Hardin v.

Wal-Mart are cases involving male verse male asserted assault. However, as was the case related
to female verse male assault claims under New York law after Williams v. Port Authority, under
California law, after Steel v. City Of San Diego and Hardin v. Wal-Mart, at least one case in
which the victim was a female against a male offender concluded that the female raised adequate
allegations of civil assault against the male defendant under California law (see Rhodes v. Placer

County, 2011 WL 1302264 (U.S. E.D.Cal. 2011)).
Where the asserted assault is by a male upon another male, courts may be hesitant to
allow such a claim to proceed to trial. However, the Court cannot be oblivious to the fact that
where the claim of civil assault is by a female against a male, courts have a long history of
allowing those cases to proceed to trial (regardless of the formal definition of civil assault). In
fact, in her research, Ms. Hammer cannot find one case where a court has dismissed a civil
assault claim made by a female against a male4.
At the May 9, 2016 hearing, the Court totally ignored the definition of civil assault
adopted by the Idaho Supreme Court in Idaho Civil Jury Instruction 4.30, and instead allowed
the generic horn book definition of assault described in Miller v. Idaho State Patrol, the
definition of criminal assault under Idaho Code § 18-901, and the findings in California and New
4 It should be noted that both former Sun Valley Mayor Wayne Willich and former Sun Valley City Council member
Joan Lamb testified, under oath, that Defendant Ribi harassed and treated Ms. Hammer in an inappropriate matter,
and that he targeted Ms. Hammer because she was a female as opposed to a male. So it is not surprising that
Defendant Ribi would attempt to have civil assault claims against him dismissed based on cases where the victim
was a male as opposed to a female.
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York cases which have different statutory definitions of assault and were all male verse male
cases - to totally pollute its thinking related to what the proper elements of a civil assault are
under Idaho law, especially when it is a male assaulting a female. The only definition of civil
assault that is relevant in this matter is the definition provided for in Idaho Civil Jury Instruction

4.30. Ms. Hammer is entitled to a definitive ruling by the Court that the elements of civil assault
at issue in this case are those found in Idaho Civil Jury Instruction 4.30, and not the irrelevant
definitions of assault in Miller v. Idaho State Patrol (the Corpus Juris Secundum version), in

Idaho Code§ 18-901 (the Idaho criminal assault statute), or the male verse male New York and
California assault cases which the Court relied on at the May 9, 2016 hearing. Instead, if the
Court is going to look at any cases from other states, it should look to the six (6) New York and
California cases in which various courts allowed civil assault claims by females against male
offenders to proceed.
Finally, at the May 9, 2016 hearing, for some reason, the Court converted a civil assault
claim under Idaho law to a fact pleading claim rather than a notice pleading claim when it stated:

"This is not a notice pleading issue (emphasis added) ... You have to pleadfacts,facts,
facts (emphasis added), which allow the Court to conclude that a case is - prima facie
case is alleged. So whether this gives the defendant notice of what they're defending
isn't the issue here. This isn't a question of notice pleading (emphasis added)."
(Transcript@ 74-75)
The Court's statements make clear that the Court, for some un-described reason, chose to
ignore established Idaho precedent that civil causes of action are meant to be guided by "notice'
pleading principles, and not "fact" pleading principles, and held Ms. Hammer to a higher
standard of pleading than is required by the Idaho Supreme Court when it dismissed the original
Complaint. The Court should not do so in regards to the Amended Complaint.
As Ms. Hammer has adequately plead the elements of civil assault under Idaho law (i.e.
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under Idaho Civil Jury Instruction 4.30), as are required under the "notice" pleading principles
established by the Idaho Supreme Court, especially in a situation where it is a female asserting
she was assaulted by a male, Defendant Ribi's request to dismiss the Amended Complaint should
be denied.

ISSUE II
Because Defendant Ribi Previously Filed Answers To Ms. Hammer's Civil Assault Claims,
He Is Estopped From Later Claiming That Ms. Hammer Insufficiently Plead Her Civil
Assault Claim
On May 3, 2013, Ms. Hammer filed her fourteen (14) count Complaint in the U.S. Court
for Idaho (Hammer v. Sun Valley, et al., l :13-cv-211-EJL (U.S. Idaho) (the "Federal Law
Suit")), which included one count for civil assault under Idaho law. On July 25, 2013, Defendant
Ribi filed his Answer in the Federal Law Suit, denying the civil assault claim, without seeking
dismissal of the civil assault claim because Ms. Hammer had not adequately plead a civil assault
claim under Idaho law. In fact, Defendant Ribi never sought dismissal of the Idaho civil assault
claim in the Federal Law Suit, but instead sought summary judgment on Ms. Hammer's Idaho
civil assault claim, which was not granted by the U.S. Court for Idaho.
After the U.S. Court for Idaho ruled that it would not retain jurisdiction of the Idaho civil
assault claim against Defendant Ribi, on August 14, 2015, Ms. Hammer filed her single count
Complaint for civil assault under Idaho law herein, using the exact same factual allegations of
the civil assault claims against Defendant Ribi that had been plead in the Federal Law Suit. On
February 4, 2016, Defendant Ribi filed his Answer herein, denying the civil assault allegations.
As he had in regards to the Federal Law Suit, Defendant Ribi did not seek to dismiss the
Complaint herein based on a failure to state a cause of action for civil assault under Idaho law,
prior to filing his Answer herein. Instead, several months later, Defendant Ribi chose to file his
Motion To Dismiss the original Complaint herein. Again, now, even though Defendant Ribi had
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previously filed an Answer to the civil assault allegations in this case, Defendant Ribi has filed a
Motion To Dismiss the Amended Complaint
In at least three (3) Idaho cases, the Idaho Supreme Court has confirmed that by filing an
answer, a defendant has admitted that he is on "notice" as to what the claims are that he is facing.
In the previously mentioned Mortensen v. Stewart Title, @ 443, the Idaho Supreme Court
confirmed that a complaint properly states a cause of action

if the defendant responds to the

claim in its answer (emphasis added). Likewise in both the previously mentioned Seiniger case
and in Zattiero v. Homedale School District, 137 Idaho 568, 51 P.3d 382 (Id. Sup.Ct. 2004), the
Idaho Supreme Court confirmed that the defendants in those cases were clearly on notice of what
the claims against them were because they filed an answer.
Likewise, in this case, under Idaho case law, by filing an Answer in the Federal Law Suit
and an Answer in this case denying the allegations that Defendant Ribi had assaulted Ms.
Hammer, Defendant Ribi has admitted that he understood what the claims against him were.
Under Idaho's "notice" pleading procedural requirements, and Idaho case law precedent,
Defendant Ribi is estopped from later asserting that he is not on "notice" of what the civil assault
claims against him are by filing a motion to dismiss. Had Defendant Ribi really not understood
what the claims against him were, he should have filed a motion to dismiss prior to filing his
Answer herein.
ISSUE III
The Admission Of Evidence Of Prior Harassment And Hostility Of Defendant Ribi Against
Ms. Hammer is Relevant And Admissible At Trial And Are A Legitimate Part Of The
Allegations Of Assault Against Defend ant Ribi

At the May 9, 2016 hearing, the Court extensively described that none of the prior history
of Defendant Ribi's harassment and hostility towards Ms. Hammer would be allowed into
evidence at trial in the matter.
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First, the Court stated:
"If what you've plead is an assault that takes place in 15 minutes, 20 minutes, maybe
there's a half an hour of events that lead up to it, how - maybe Mr. Ribi harassed her
every day for years. How is that getting into evidence?" (Transcript, Pg. 22)
Second, the Court stated:
"What you're proving is a course of conduct of harassment which led to an assault. And,
No. 1, I'm not sure that would ever get into evidence on a - the motive for an assault I
don't think matters. I don't know that there's relevant or a jury would ever hear it."
(Transcript, Pg. 26)
Third, the Court stated:
"Whether he was harassing or belligerent or hostile on other occasions won't prove or
disprove an assault case. That would probably be, frankly, evidence excluded by the rules
of evidence as prior bad acts and they don't prove or disprove the fact in issue, which is
whether he acted voluntarily and intended contact in order to perhaps commit or
commence an assault." (Transcript, Pg. 32)
Fourth, the Court stated:
"Whatever Mr. Ribi did or did not do prior to the time he's alleged to have committed an
assault are immaterial." (Transcript, Pg. 53)
Finally, at the end of the hearing, the Court confirmed to Mr. Donoval that, from the
Court's perspective:
"All the harassment and other stuff are irrelevant." (Transcript, Pg. 64)
However, the Court's assertions that evidence of Defendant Ribi's prior hostile conduct
towards Ms. Hammer is neither relevant nor admissible contrad\cts Idaho rules of evidence and
Idaho case law on the issue.
Two separate Idaho Rules Of Evidence ("I.R.E.") provide for the admissibility of
testimony related to the type of historical conduct of Defendant Ribi towards Ms. Hammer prior
to the assault.

IR.E. 404(b) provides, in relevant part, that "Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts ...
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may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident".
I.R.E. 405(b) provides "In cases in which character or a trait of character of a person is an
essential element of a charge, claim, or defense, proof may also be made of specific instances of
the person's conduct".
In two separate cases, the Idaho Supreme Court has affirmed that the prior hostility and
threatening behavior of a defendant in an assault case is both relevant and admissible related to
an assault claim.
In State v. Muguerza, 46 Idaho 456,268 P. 1, 2 (Id. Sup.Ct. 1928), a case in which the
defendant was charged with assault, the district court allowed testimony of previous
conversations between the defendant and the assault victim in which the defendant made threats
to the victim. In State v. Muguerza, the Idaho Supreme Court stated:
"Prior threats of the accused or evidence of previous trouble are always relevant
(emphasis added) to illustrate mental attitude of the accused towards the prosecuting
witness at the time of the assault".
Likewise, in State v. Marlar, 94 Idaho 803,498 P.2d 1276 (id. Sup.Ct. 1972)5, an
assault case in which the accused was asserted to have made a threatening telephone call to the
victim, the Idaho Supreme Court discussed the relevancy and admissibility of hostility and
threats made by the accused to the victim of an assault pr~vious to the assault. In State v. Marlar,
@ 809, the Idaho Supreme Court confirmed the findings in State v. Maguerza that the prior
threats of the accused are always relevant to an assault claim. In State v. Marlar,@ 810, the
Idaho Supreme Court went on to state:

should be noted that in State v. Marlar, the statement of"I'll put you in the morgue" was determined not to be
relevant or admissible because it was made during a telephone call made after the alleged assault, and there was no
confirmation that it was actually made by the accused.
5 It

Response To Motion To Dismiss Amended Complaint - 15
Page 458 of 526

"Prior threats may comprise part of the mosaic of the criminal event in that they may tend
to establish an accused's attitude toward the victim or an intent to inflict harm upon him."
The Idaho Supreme Court has made clear that, in an assault case, the prior history of
hostility and threatening conduct of the defendant towards the victim is always relevant and
admissible related to the accused's mental attitude and state of mind towards the victim at the
time of the assault.
There is no question that the Court misunderstood and misapplied the Idaho Supreme
Court's directions that all of the harassment and abusive conduct Ms. Hammer suffered at
Defendant Ribi's hands is always both relevant and admissible to illustrate the mental attitude,
state of mind and intent of Defendant Ribi towards Ms. Hammer at the time of the alleged
assault. Ms. Hammer is entitled to a definitive ruling by the Court that all of Defendant Ribi's
prior hostility and harassment towards Ms. Hammer is relevant and admissible at trial.
Ms. Hammer has the right, pursuant to Idaho case law precedent, to describe at trial how
Defendant Ribi's hostile conduct towards her over the previous three years, made her wary that
Defendant Ribi was going to cause physical contact against her during the September 15, 2011
assault incident. This Court erred by finding, sua sponte, at the May 9, 2016 hearing, that the
prior hostile conduct of Defendant Ribi towards Ms. Hammer is not a substantial element of her
assault claim against Defendant Ribi.
ISSUE1 IV
The Court Has Already Conclusively Determined That If Defend ant Ribi Assaulted Ms.
Hammer, That Conduct Is Outside The Scope Of Duties Of A Sun Valley City Council
Member
As part of Defendant Ribi's Motion To Dismiss, Defendant Ribi asserted that he was
immune from civil liability under the Idaho Code § 6-904 even if he assaulted Ms. Hammer,
because all of his conduct on September 15, 2011 was within the scope of his duties as a Sun
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Valley City Council member.
At the May 9, 2016 hearing the Court conclusively stated:
"I am going to rule that he is within the course and scope of his duties as an elected
official unless he committed an assault." (Transcript, Pg. 51)
Defendant Ribi is now, again, seeking a re-determination that even ifhe assaulted Ms.
Hammer that he is immune from liability under Idaho Code § 6-904. As the Court has already
made findings that an assault of Ms. Hammer by Defendant Ribi is outside the scope of duties of
a Sun Valley City Council member, the Court should reject any re-argument by Defendant Ribi
related to that issue.
ISSUE V
The Jury, Not The Court, Must Determine Whether Defendant Ribi's Conduct Up To The
Assault Was Also Outside The Scope Of His Duties As A Sun Valley City Council Member
As part of Defendant Ribi's Motion To Dismiss, Defendant Ribi asserted that he was
immune from civil liability under the Idaho Code § 6-904 because all of his conduct on
September 15, 2011, including all conduct leading up to the assault, was within the scope of his
duties as a Sun Valley City Council member.
At the May 9, 2016 hearing, the Court concluded that all of the conduct of Defendant
Ribi up until the point in time that he is asserted to actually have assaulted Ms. Hammer was
within the scope of duties of a Sun Valley City Council member. The Court stated:
"One of the major arguments that Mr. Donoval is making here is questioning Mr. Ribi's
authority to order Ms. Hammer around or tell her what to do. This case is not going to
tum ... on the vagaries or niceties of employment law and who has authority, whether
Mr. Ribi has authority to tell ... Ms. Hammer what to do or where those lines of authority
start and stop. That's not what the case is about. Mr. Ribi's authority to tell her what to
do or not to do is not an issue." (Transcript, Pg. 46)
"I'll assume that he told her, you're not going to go see the mayor. Whether that's within
the course and scope of employment, that's my point about this case is not going to tum
on that. This is not an employment law issue." (Transcript, Pg. 49)
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"I am going to rule that he is within the course and scope of his duties as an elected
official unless he committed an assault." (Transcript, Pg. 51)
"Whatever Mr. Ribi did or did not do prior to the time he's alleged to have committed an
assault are immaterial." (Transcript, Pg. 53)
However, in Teurlings v. Larson, 156 Idaho 686, 691-692, 302 P.3d 26 (Id. Sup.Ct.
2013), the Idaho Supreme Court stated that in determining whether an employee was acting
within the scope of employment under Idaho Code § 6-904, that such a determination is a
question which must be left to the jury. (see also Sadid v. Vailas, 943 F.Supp.2d 1125, 1136
(U.S. Idaho 2013) - the question of whether conduct of an accused under Idaho Code§ 6-904 is
within the scope of his/her duties is not to be determined at summary judgment or on the
pleadings).
Separate from the assault itself, Ms. Hammer asserts that Defendant Ribi's conduct
leading up to the assault incident was not part of his duties as a Sun Valley City Council
member.
First, Ms. Hammer asserts that she worked exclusively for Former Mayor Willich, and
did not report to Defendant Ribi. Idaho Code§ 50-602 (Exhibit A, Response To Motion To
Dismiss) specifically provides that, as Mayor of Sun Valley, Former Mayor Willich had the
superintending control of all the officers of Sun Valley, including Ms. Hammer. In addition, both
Section 3.2 of the Sun Valley Personnel Policies (Exhibit B, Response To Motion To Dismiss)
and the Sun Valley City Administrator Job Description (Exhibit C, Response To Motion To
Dismiss) specifically provide that, as the Sun Valley City Administrator, Ms. Hammer reported
directly to, and only to, Former Mayor Willich. The Sun Valley City Council And Mayor Powers
And Authorities (Exhibit D, Response To Motion Dismiss) describes the limited role of the Sun
Valley City Council to "establish policy and function in a legislative capacity" and "adopt,
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revise, codify, or compile all ordinances, rules and regulations". Nothing in the Sun Valley City
Council And Mayor Powers And Authorities provides for any authority of an individual Sun
Valley City Council member to direct any Sun Valley employee, including the Sun Valley
Administrator, to do anything. Nor does any Idaho statute, rule or regulation provide any
authority of an Idaho city council member to provide any direction to any municipal employee.
Therefore any individual demands that Defendant Ribi made to Ms. Hammer to change the Sun
Valley budget, which were part and parcel of the assault, were outside the scope of his limited
authority as a Sun Valley City Council member, as he had no individual authority or right to be
directing Ms. Hammer's conduct.
Second, the assault occurred during a break in the Sun Valley City Council meeting, and
outside the parameters of a Sun Valley City Council meeting itself, during a period when Ms.
Hammer had no duties towards any of the four (4) Sun Valley City Council members, including
Defendant Ribi.
Third, Defendant Ribi' s physical area of responsibility was limited to the Sun Valley City
Council chamber itself, and thus Defendant Ribi's following of Ms. Hammer to the Sun Valley
receptionist/copy area of Sun Valley City Hall, well away from the Sun Valley City Council
chamber, was outside the scope of his physical area of responsibility as a Sun Valley City
Council member.
Fourth, as Ms. Hammer tried to explain to Defendant Ribi, his attempts to coerce Ms.
Hammer into making changes to Sun Valley budgets and budget documents were outside the
purview of his limited responsibilities or authority as a singular member of the four (4) member
Sun Valley City Council to discuss matters among themselves, during public meetings, within
the confines of the Sun Valley City Council chamber, and make group decisions.

Response To Motion To Dismiss Amended Complaint - 19
Page 462 of 526

As was the case in Teurlings v. Larson(@ 1233), and contrary to the Court's assertions, a
jury has the right to find that all of Defendant Ribi's conduct prior to the assault was outside the
scope ofhis duties as a Sun Valley City Council member, not just the assault itself. The Court
improperly took those rights away from both Ms. Hammer and the jury in this case, in
contradiction to the directions of the Idaho Supreme Court that the assertion of whether conduct
of an accused is within the scope of the person's government duties is to be liberally allowed,

Grabicki v. City OfLewiston, 154 Idaho 686, 691-692, 302 P.3d 26 (Id. Sup.Ct. 2013). Ms.
Hammer is entitled to a finding that the question of whether Defendant Ribi's pre-assault
conduct towards Ms. Hammer was outside the scope of his duties as a Sun Valley City Council
member is a question left to the jury in this matter, and to present those issues to a jury for
findings.
ISSUE VI
Whether Defendant Ribi Acted With Malice When He Assaulted Ms. Hammer Is To Be
Left To the Jury

In Miller v. Idaho State Patrol, the Idaho Supreme Court defined malice for Idaho Code
§ 6-904 purposes as being "the intentional commission of a wrongful or unlawful act, without

legal justification or excuse and with ill will, whether or not injury was intended".
Ms. Hammer asserts that there is sufficient, if not substantial, allegations in the pleadings
and herein that Defendant Ribi acted maliciously towards Ms. Hammer when he assaulted her.
As is described above, and which must be taken as true for purposes of the motion to dismiss,
Ms. Hammer had made numerous complaints of harassment and hostility towards Defendant
Ribi, and was in fear of physical harm from Defendant Ribi6, which were known by multiple Sun

6

As has been described in Ms. Hammer's Motion For I.R.C.P. Rule 35(a) Examination Of Defendant Ribi and
Motion For Punitive Damages Against Defendant Ribi submitted to the Court, which includes affidavits, exhibits
and depositions from various law suits between Ms. Hammer, Sun Valley and its officials, Ms. Hammer met several
times with a personal counselor (Evan Hanson) and her medical professional (Nannette Ford) in early 2011
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Valley officials and employees, including Defendant Ribi himself. Ms. Hammer has alleged that
Former Mayor Willich and Former City Attorney King discussed his harassment and hostility
towards Ms. Hammer with Defendant Ribi on numerous occasions and directed him to cease his
hostile conduct towards Ms. Hammer, which Defendant Ribi refused to comply with. There is no
question that Council Member Ribi held ill will towards Ms. Hammer for some undefined
reason, which resulted in numerous other abusive encounters with Ms. Hammer even before the
September 15, 2011 assault.
In addition, Ms. Hammer's refusal to accede to Defendant Ribi's unilateral demands to
change the Sun Valley budget and budget documents, and her telling Defendant Ribi that that she
instead was going to discuss Defendant Ribi's demands and conduct with Former Mayor Willich,
and Defendant Ribi's admitted "heated" response to her refusal to comply with his unwarranted
demands, itself, provides the "ill will" necessary related to why the assault occurred to withstand
a summary judgment finding.
Finally, an assault, by its very nature, is a malicious act. Nobody accidently assaults
someone, as it requires the combination of purposeful conduct and ability to cause physical
harm.

As has been described in the previously cited Moore v. Peck (@9), in Dunn v. Nance,
2009 WL 1956429, 8 (U.S. Idaho 2009), and in Curtis v. Gooding, 844 .Supp.2d 1101, 1108
(U.S. Idaho 2012), dismissal of a matter under Idaho Code § 6-904 where the plaintiff asserts
that the defendant was malicious in his/her conduct, as Ms. Hammer asserts in regards to
Defendant Ribi's conduct, is improper at the pleading stage or at summary judgment. Such is the

regarding her concerns about Defendant Ribi's hostile nature and her safety around Defendant Ribi. Mr. Hanson
advised Ms. Hammer that he believed Defendant Ribi had a mental illness and suffered from narcissistic personality
disorder, and that Defendant Ribi was potentially dangerous to Ms. Hammer.
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case herein.
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PROOF OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that a true and correct copy of the attached document was served by
facsimile and/U.S mail, proper postage pre-paid to the above listed recipients on or before 5:00
, 2016.
p.m. on -;/v'i Y ?
I

To:

Kirtlan Naylor
Naylor & Hales
950 W. Bannock St., Suite 610
Boise, ID 83 702

Response To Motion To Dismiss Amended Complaint - 23
Page 466 of 526

FILED

AM·--c

PJ,A .•

James R. Donoval, ISB #8142
4481 N. Dresden Pl., Suite D
Garden City, ID 83714
Telephone: (312) 859-2029
Facsimile: (208) 649-1603
Email: jdonoval@aol.com
Attorney for Plaintiff Sharon R. Hammer

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

SHARON R. HAMMER,
Case No. CV-2015-428
Plaintiff,
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO RECONSIDER
DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT

vs.
NILS RIBI, in his individual capacity,
Defendant.

COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Sharon R. Hammer ("Ms. Hammer"), by and through her

counsel of record, James R. Donoval, and in Reply in support of her request for this Court to
reconsider the entry of its Order dismissing the Complaint herein states as follows:
BASIS FOR RECONSIDERATION

In Johnson v. North Idaho College, 153 Idaho 58, 278 P.3d 928 (Id. Sup.Ct. 2012) the
Idaho Supreme Court confirmed that "A motion for reconsideration is a motion which allows the
court - when new law is applied to previously presented facts, when new facts are applied to
previously presented law, or any combination thereof (emphasis added) - to reconsider the
correctness of an interlocutory order". The Johnson v. North Idaho College findings make clear
that on reconsideration, a litigant may seek that a district court reflects on whether it properly
applied already submitted facts to already existing Idaho law.
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Ms. Hammer asserts that where a district court has failed to recognize what the proper
elements of a civil claim are (as Ms. Hammer asserts the Court did in regards to the proper
elements of civil assault under Idaho law) or where the district court fails to recognize previous
Idaho case law precedent (in this case that the filing of an answer prohibits the defendant from
later claiming that the compliant is deficient in providing "notice" of what the defendant is being
charged with) - that the district court is compelled to reconsider its prior ruling.
Defendant Ribi has chosen not to respond to the substance of Ms. Hammer's
reconsideration request, and has instead submitted a short, two paragraph Response (attached as
Exhibit A herein). Ms. Hammer understand why Defendant Ribi has failed to respond to the
substantive issues raised by Ms. Hammer in her Motion To Reconsider Dismissal Of Complaint
("Motion To Reconsider"), as Defendant Ribi is woefully on the wrong side of Idaho legal
precedent related to the issues raised in the Motion To Reconsider.
ISSUE I
As Idaho Is A Notice Pleading State, The Court Should Not Have Found That A Civil
Assault Claim Requires Fact Pleading

As is described in Ms. Hammer's Memorandum In Support of the Motion To Reconsider,
the sole and unequivocal elements of civil assault under Idaho law are found in Idaho Civil Jury
Instruction 4.30 which was adopted by the Idaho Supreme Court, namely:

"1) The defendant acted intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the
person of the plaintiff or a third person, or an immediate fear of such contact; and
2) As a result, the plaintiff feared such contact was imminent."
In the Complaint, Ms. Hammer extensively described the harassment and hostility she
was subject to by Defendant Ribi for an extended period, which she notified numerous Sun
Valley officials of (Complaint, Para. 17-33). Ms. Hammer asserts that during a break in a Sun
Valley City Council meeting on September 15, 2011, Ms. Hammer walked to the front of the
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Sun Valley City Council Chamber, and was followed by Defendant Ribi (Complaint, Para. 37).
Defendant Ribi then demanded changes be made to the Sun Valley budget, which he had no
authority to do, and which Ms. Hammer disagreed with (Complaint, Para. 38). When Ms.
Hammer disagreed with Defendant Ribi he "became very agitated" (Complaint, Para. 38), began
waiving his arms in the air (Complaint, Para. 39), began speaking "angrily" (Complaint, Para.
39) and became "enraged" (Complaint, Para. 39). Ms. Hammer told Defendant Rribi she was
going to speak to former Mayor Wayne Willich, who was still in the Sun Valley City Council
Chamber (Complaint, Para. 40). At that point, Defendant Ribi "raised his arms", "turned toward
Ms. Hammer'', and "in a physically threatening manner'' yelled: "No! You will not talk to the
Mayor!" (Complaint, Para. 40). Ms. Hammer was "fearful of immediate harmful or offensive
contact with her body by Defendant Ribi" (Complaint, Para. 41). The assault of Ms. Hammer was
witnessed by former Sun Valley Administrative Assistant David Blampied (Complaint, Para.
44). Ms. Hammer asserted in the Complaint that "Defendant Ribi acted intending to cause a
harmful or offensive contact with the person of Ms. Hammer, or intending to cause an immediate
fear of such contact (Complaint, Para. 46) and that "as a result of Defendant Ribi's act,
Ms. Hammer feared that such harmful or offensive contact with her person was imminent"
(Complaint, Para. 47).
At the May 9, 2016 hearing the Court discussed what it believed the elements of civil
assault in Idaho are, ignoring what the Idaho Supreme Court has approved as the proper elements
of civil assault under Idaho Civil Jury Instruction 4.30. Instead, the Court stated:
"I looked at the Miller v. Idaho Patrol case. It doesn't say much about what
constitutes an assault. I do not think that the Supreme Court, if push comes to shove, is
going to use a different definition- they didn't really elaborate on this, but I don't think
they're going to use a different definition in Idaho as to what constitutes an assault, and
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that's set forth in Idaho Code§ 18-901 1•
I do not know why they would have a different definition for civil assault. I think
if you're claiming assault, it's common-law or it's a statutory definition of assault. I don't
know that you get one definition of civil assault and another definition of criminal
assault. I think that's the essence of assault is that you're committing an unlawful
intentional act. So, at least arguably, I would suggest that the Supreme Court would use
the definition in the statute, Idaho Code§ 18-901, and there's certain things that have to
have alleged or should be in order to constitute assault. I'm not making that ruling as a
matter oflaw, that the Idaho Supreme Court would use that definition, but it's a pretty
good one and I don't know why they wouldn't." (Transcript, Pg. 77-78)
Ms. Hammer asserts that the Court erred by looking to horn book language in Miller v.

Idaho State Patrol, 150 Idaho 856,871,252 P.3d 1274 (Id. Sup.Ct. 2011) or the definition of
criminal assault in Idaho Code § 18-901 for guidance as to what the proper definition of civil
assault is in Idaho when the Idaho Supreme Court has formally adopted Idaho Civil Jury

Instruction 4.30 as the definition of civil assault in Idaho 2 •
In Miller v. Idaho State Patrol,@ 871, in a blood catheterization case, the Idaho Supreme
Court discussed a generic definition of civil assault described in 6A Corpus Juris Secundum

Assault §6 (2010) as being "an unlawful threat or offer to do bodily harm or injury to another".
However, the Idaho Supreme Court went no further in analyzing whether that generic horn book
definition of assault is the final definition of civil assault under Idaho law (as opposed to the
definition under Idaho Civil Jury Instruction 4.30) because the Idaho Supreme Court found that
the officer in that case was immune from prosecution for civil assault (regardless of the
definition) because there was a statutory right for the officer to obtain a blood sample from the
plaintiff in that case.
The Idaho Code § 18-901 definition of criminal assault, which the Court asserted at the
May 9, 2016 hearing as being the proper definition of civil assault as well, is much different than
1 Contrary

f 18-901.

to the Court's claim, in Miller v. Idaho State Patrol the Idaho Supreme Court did not refer to Idaho Code

it should be noted that Ms. Hammer had extensively cited to Idaho Civil Jury Instruction 4.30 in her briefs but the
Court made no reference to Idaho Civil Jury Instruction 4.30 in its discussions at the May 9, 2016 hearing.
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the definition of civil assault under Idaho Civil Jury Instruction 4.30, contrary to the Court's
assertion at the May 9, 2016 hearing. Under Idaho Code§ 18-901, criminal assault is defined as
being "(a) an unlawful attempt, coupled with apparent ability, to commit a violent (emphasis
added) injury on the person of another; or (b) An intentional, unlawful threat by word or act to
do violence (emphasis added) to the person of another, coupled with an apparent ability to do so,
and doing some act which creates a well-founded fear in such other person that such violence
(emphasis added) is imminent." The criminal definition of assault in Idaho Code§ 18-901 makes
clear that there is a "violence" component associated with criminal assault which is nowhere
found in the civil assault definition under Idaho Civil Jury Instruction 4.30. Under Idaho Civil

Jury Instruction 4. 3 0 all the plaintiff needs show is that the accused intended to cause "harmful
or offensive contact" with plaintiff, not that the defendant was going to be violent.
At the May 9, 2016 hearing, the Court also described that the cases cited by Defendant
Ribi in his briefs from New York and California, were somehow indicative of why Ms.
Hammer's civil assault cause of action against Defendant Ribi should be dismissed, stating:
"Cases in other states that Mr. Naylor has cited that come closer than the allegations here
to making out a case of assault have been dismissed. I think the briefing on the
defendant's part is good and it shows some other cases where courts have looked at this,
and those cases are closer to the line than this case and courts have dismissed them."
(Transcript, Pg. 79-80)
However, the New York case cited by Defendant Ribi (Williams v. Port Authority, 880
F.Supp. 980 (U.S. E.D.N.Y. 1995)), relied upon by the Court at the May 9, 2016 hearing, and
which Defendant Ribi again relies upon in his request to dismiss the Amended Complaint, relates
to the New York criminal definition of assault, which specifically includes the phrase "violence"
as part of the action of the accused (which is also included in the Idaho criminal assault statute

(Idaho Code § 18-901)) but is not found in the definition of civil assault described in Idaho Civil
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Jury Instruction 4.30. It should also be noted that both the accused and the victim in the Williams
v. Port Authority case were blue collar, male, dock workers. At least four (4) cases related to the
New York definition of assault since Williams v. Port Authority, where the victim was a female
and the accused was a male, have all determined that the female raised sufficient facts to support
a claim of civil assault against a male defendant (see Cohen v. Davis, 926 F.Supp. 399 (U.S.
S.D.N.Y. 1996); Carroll v. Bayeriche Landesbank, 125 F.Supp.2d 58 (U.S. S.D.N.Y. 2000);
Campoverde v. Sony Pictures, 2002 Wl 31163804 (U.S. S.D.N.Y. 2002); and, Hayles v.
Advanced Travel, 2004 WL 26548 (U.S. S.D.N.Y. 2004)).
The two California cases submitted by Defendant Ribi, which the Court relied on at the
May 9, 2016 hearing, and which Defendant Ribi is also relying upon in his request to dismiss the
Amended Complaint, are even less instructive, as they also use a definition of civil assault much
different than Idaho definition of civil assault under Idaho Civil Jury Instruction 4.30. In Steel v.
City Of San Diego, 726 F.Supp.2d 1172 (U.S. S.D.Cal. 2010) a male process server served a
summons on a male related to a divorce matter. In Steel v. City Of San Diego the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District Of California dismissed the civil assault claim under California
law because there was no evidence of physical threat by the mere service of the summons on the
male recipient. And in Hardin v. Wal-Mart, 813 F.Supp.2d 1167 (U.S. E.D.Cal. 2011), the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District Of California dismissed the civil assault claim by a male
against another male based on the mere giving of "the finger" and the claim that "I'm going to
get you" without any further evidence of immediate physical contact. As was the case with the
New York case of Williams v. Port Authority, both Steel v. City Of San Diego and Hardin v.
Wal-Mart are cases involving male verse male asserted assault. However, as was the case related
to female verse male assault claims under New York law after Williams v. Port Authority, under

Reply Re: Motion To Reconsider Dismissal Of Complain - 6
Page 472 of 526

California law, after Steel v. City Of San Diego and Hardin v. Wal-Mart, at least one case in
which the victim was a female against a male offender concluded that the female raised adequate
allegations of civil assault against the male defendant under California law (see Rhodes v. Placer

County, 2011 WL 1302264 (U.S. E.D.Cal. 2011)).
Where the asserted assault is by a male upon another male, courts may be hesitant to
allow such a claim to proceed to trial. However, the Court cannot be oblivious to the fact that
where the claim of civil assault is by a female against a male, courts have a long history of
allowing those cases to proceed to trial (regardless of the formal definition of civil assault). In
fact, in her research, Ms. Hammer cannot find one case where a court has dismissed a civil
assault claim made by a female against a male3 •
At the May 9, 2016 hearing, the Court totally ignored the definition of civil assault
adopted by the Idaho Supreme Court in Idaho Civil Jury Instruction 4.30, and instead allowed
the generic horn book definition of assault described in Miller v. Idaho State Patrol, the
definition of criminal assault under Idaho Code

€ 18-901, and the findings in California and New

York cases which have different statutory definitions of assault and were all male verse male
cases - to totally pollute its thinking related to what the proper elements of a civil assault are
under Idaho law, especially when it is a male assaulting a female. The only definition of civil
assault that is relevant in this matter is the definition provided for in Idaho Civil Jury Instruction

4.30.
As the Court used an improper definition of civil assault to guide its ruling in dismissing
the Complaint, Ms. Hammer is entitled to reconsideration and rehearing of the Court's findings
It should be noted that both former Sun Valley Mayor Wayne Willich and former Sun Valley City Council member
Joan Lamb testified, under oath, that Defendant Ribi harassed and treated Ms. Hammer in an inappropriate matter,
and that he targeted Ms. Hammer because she was a female as opposed to a male. So it is not surprising that
Defendant Ribi would attempt to have civil assault claims against him dismissed based on cases where the victim
was a male as opposed to a female.

3
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on May 9, 2016. If the Court is going to look to any cases from other states, it should look to the
five (5) New York and California cases in which various courts allowed civil assault claims by
females against male offenders to proceed.
Finally, at the May 9, 2016 hearing, for some reason, the Court converted a civil assault
claim under Idaho law to a fact pleading claim rather than a notice pleading claim when it stated:

"This is not a notice pleading issue (emphasis added) ... You have to plead facts, facts,
facts (emphasis added), which allow the Court to conclude that a case is - prima facie
case is alleged. So whether this gives the defendant notice of what they're defending
isn't the issue here. This isn't a question of notice pleading (emphasis added)."
(Transcript@ 74-75)
The Court's statements make clear that the Court, for some un-described reason, chose to
ignore established Idaho precedent that civil causes of action are meant to be guided by "notice'
pleading principles, and not "fact" pleading principles, and held Ms. Hammer to a higher
standard of pleading than is required by the Idaho Supreme Court when it dismissed the original
Complaint. The Court should acknowledge it erred in using a "fact" pleading basis for
dismissing the original Complaint and confirm that under a "notice" pleading basis, Ms. Hammer
adequately plead facts to support a civil assault claim under Idaho Civil Jury Instruction 4.30.
As Ms. Hammer adequately plead the elements of civil assault under Idaho law (i.e.
under Idaho Civil Jury Instruction 4.30) in the original Complaint, as is required under the
"notice" pleading principles established by the Idaho Supreme Court, especially in a situation
where it is a female asserting she was assaulted by a male, the Court should reverse its dismissal
of the original Complaint.
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ISSUE II
By Filing An Answer To The Complaint, Defendant Ribi Admitted He Was On Notice Of
What He Was Being Required To Defend Against

As was described in Ms. Hammer's Memorandum In Support of the Motion For
Reconsideration, in at least three cases the Idaho Supreme Court has confirmed that by filing an
answer, a defendant has admitted that he/she is on "notice" as to what the claims are that he/she
is facing (see Morterisen v. Stewart Title, 149 Idaho 437, 443, 235 P.3d 387 (Id. Sup.Ct. 2010);
Seiniger Law Office, P.A. v. N Pac. Iris. Co., 145 Idaho 241, 178 P.3d 606 (Id. Sup.Ct. 2008);
and, Zattiero v. Homedale School District, 137 Idaho 568, 51 P.3d 382 (Id. Sup.Ct. 2004). The
Court, in dismissing Ms. Hammer's original Complaint, simply ignored these instructions by the
Idaho Supreme Court and, even though Defendant Ribi had filed the Answer in this case,
determined that Defendant Ribi had not been placed on "notice" that he was being charged with
a civil assault claim under Idaho law in this case. As the Court's dismissal of Ms. Hammer's
original Complaint directly contradicts the Idaho Supreme Court's directions in a situation like
this, the Court should vacate its dismissal of the original Complaint.

WHEREFORE, Ms. Hammer prays that this Court enter an Order, reversing its findings
dismissing Ms. Hammer's Complaint, and confirming that the Complaint filed by Ms. Hammer
herein, which Defendant Ribi had alreadr answered, adequately put Defendant Ribi on "notice"
that Defendant Ribi was facing a civil assault claim under Idaho law for an incident that occurred
at Sun Valley City Hall between Defendant Ribi and Ms. Hammer during a break in a Sun
Valley City Council meeting on September 15, 2011.
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DATED this

SHARON R. HAMMER

.·//7

By

R])

(_ .~.. LJ

JAMESrfl. DONOVAL
i

MS. ~AMMER'S ATTORNEY
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PROOF OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that a true and correct copy of the attached document was served by
facsimile andL.S mjil, proper postage pre-paid to the above listed recipients on or before 5:00
p.m. on JV)
?
, 2016.
To:

Kirtlan Naylor
Naylor & Hales
950 W. Bannock St., Suite 610
Boise, ID 83702
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Kirtlan G. Naylor
[ISB No. 3569]
Jacob H. Naylor
{ISB No. 8474]
Tyler D. Williams
[ISB No. 8512]
NAYLOR & HALES, P.C.
Attorneys at Law
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 610
Boise, ID 83702
Telephone No. (208) 383-9511
Facsimile No. (208) 383-9516
Email: kirt@naylorhales.com; jake@naylorhales.com; tdw@.naylorhales.com
Attorneys for Defendant Nils Ribi

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
SHARON R. HAMMER,

Case No. CV2015-428
Plaintiff,
vs.
NILS RIBI, in his individual capacity,

DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO
PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONS FOR
RECONSIDERATION

Defendant.
Defendant Nils Ribi, by and through his attorney of record, Naylor & Hales, P.C., hereby
responds to Plaintiff Sharon R. Hammer's motions to reconsider dismissal of the complaint and to
reconsider denial of her motion for a Rule 35 mental health examination. As shown·below, both
motions should be denied.

I
BACKGROUND
The Court denied Han1mer's motion for a Rule 35 independent mental health examination
( 11

IME 11 ) during a hearing on May 9, 2016, because Ribi's mental health is not in controversy in this

lawsuit and there is no good cause to require such an examination. During the same hearing the
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Id.; accordDiBariv. Incaica Cia Armadora, S.A., 126 F.R.D. 12, 13 (E.D. N.Y. 1989)(addressing
the presence of examinee's attorney at IME and nothing that "far from being adversarial in nature,
these examinations should be divested as far as possible of any adversary character."); Brandenberg

v. El Al Israel Airlines, 79 F.R.D. 543,546(S.D.N.Y 1978) (notingthatthespecial nature ofan IME
relies "upon unimpeded one-on-one conununication between doctor and patient," which is why
federal courts ordinarily deny the presence of attorneys in the exam).
Yet, despite the plainly neutral character ofan IME, Hammer seeks to have her own specially
retained psychiatrist perfonn it. Further, Hammer indicates that she intends to also have Dr. Eliason
observe Ribi at trial so that he can offer an opinion about Ribi's alleged "inability to recognize right
from wrong," his "ability to tell the truth or recognize that he is not telling the truth,'1 his "inherent
inability to have compassion or empathy[,]" and his "inability to tell the truth at trial[.]" (June 14
Expert Disclosure at 2.) This flies in the face of the independence of an IME and it strains
comprehension how Hammer can actually believe offering a clearly biased hired gun like this serves
any proper purpose under Rule 35.
B.

The Court Correctly Granted Ribi's Motion to Dismiss

The CoUI1 granted Ribi's motion to dismiss because Hammer failed to adequately plead facts
showing that she was entitled to relief for her assault claim. On reconsideration, Hammer argues
unpersuasively that the Court applied the wrong standard. The Court, however, correctly applied the
law. It is well settled in Idaho that a plaintiff must allege "'sufficient facts in support of his claim,
which if true, would entitle [her] to relief III Hoffer v. City of Boise, 151 Idaho 400, 402 (2011)
(quoting Orrock v. Appleton, 147 Idaho 613, 618 (2009)) (emphasis and bracketed language added).
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Hammer's contention that the Court erred in requiring that she plead sufficient facts that, if true,
would show entitlement to relief, is directly contrary to this well-established law.
More so, the Court granted Hammer leave to file an amended complaint, which she did. As

such, there is no reason for her to have filed a motion for reconsideration of the dismissal. The
Amended Complaint effectively replaced her original Complaint and her concerns are therefore
moot. This motion serves only to waste more time and expenses of the Court and the parties.
DATED this 241h day of June, 2016.

NAYLOR & HALES, P.C.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 24th day of June, 2016, I caused to be served, by the
method(s) indicated, a true and correct copy of the foregoing upon:
James R. Donoval
4110 Eaton Ave., Ste. D
Caldwell, ID 83607
Attorney for Plaintiff

_
U.S.Mail
· /Hand Delivered
_7_ Fiax Transmission: 649-1603
_
Email: jdonoval@aol.com

9556_23 Oefs llri•f Response to Reconsiderntion (Rule 35 111>d MTD):•,]ld
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BLAINE COUNTY

SHARON R. HAMMER,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
NILS RIBI, in his individual capacity,
)
)
Defendant.
)
)
)
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _.)

Case No.:

tV 2..CWS - 42.t:,

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S
MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION

Plaintiff filed two Motions for Reconsideration. These involve the Court's prior denial of
Hammer's Motion for a Rule 35 IME of Nels Ribi, and the other involved Hammer's Motion for
Reconsideration of the Court's prior order dismissing Hammer's Complaint for failure to allege
the civil offense of assault. Hammer does not allege any new facts to support either of these
motions for reconsideration. Oral argument on these motions is denied pursuant to IRCP
7(b)(3)(F).
The Court having considered Plaintiff's Motions for Reconsideration, and good cause
appearing therefor:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND THIS DOES ORDER that both of Plaintiff's Motions
for Reconsideration are DENIED.

DATED this

G, day of July, 2016.

l(: 6°

/'ff/\
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District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

1

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
day of July, 2016, I caused to be served a true
copy of the foregoing ORDER, document by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of
the following:

James R. Donoval
4110 Eaton Ave., Ste. D
Caldwell, ID 83607
Email: jdonoval@aol.com

_ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
_ Overnight Mail
FAX
XEmail

Kirtlan Naylor
Naylor & Hales
950 W. Bannock St., Ste. 610
Boise, ID 83 702
Fax: (208) 383-9516

_ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
_ Overnight Mail
FAX
_1Email

~I: JLlrf@.nttjlc.rhttus.co""'-

Deputy Clerk
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Court Blaine County, Idaho

Kirtlan G. Naylor
[ISB No. 3569]
Jacob H. Naylor
[ISB No. 8474]
Tyler D. Williams
[ISB No. 8512}
NAYLOR&HALES, P.C.
Attomeys at Law
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 610
Boise, ID 83702
Telephone No. (208) 383-951 l
Facsimile No. (208) 3 83-9516
Email: kirt@naylorhales.com; jake@naylorhales.com: tdw@navlorhales.com
Attorneys for Defendant Nils Ribi

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
SHARON R. HAMMER,
Case No. CV2015-428
Plaintiff,
vs.

NILS RIBI, in his individual capacity,

DEFENDANT'S REPLY
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO DISMISS AMENDED
COMPLAINT

Defendant.
Defendant, Nils Ribi, by and through his attorneys of record, Naylor & Hales, P.C., hereby
submits this Reply Memorandum in Support of his Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Amended
Complaint under I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6). Hammer's opposition briefing simply repeats the same tired
misstatements of law-which are cunently duplicated in her briefing for her pending motions-that
fail to adequately rebut Ribi' s motion to dismiss. As such, dismissal is proper.

I.
ARGUMENT
Hammer's cmTent opposition briefing provides little new or accurate legal analysis. In short,
her opposition is duplicative to her motion to reconsider dismissal of her first complaint, in that she
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alleges that this Court's findings were a "misperception of Idaho legal precedent" and were
"poJluted." However, it is clear that this misdirection is simply a tactic to avoid the inadequacies of
her Amended Complaint and that her rhetoric is without basis.

A.

Hammer Has Failed To Raise Sufficient Facts to Support a Claim of
Civil Assault.

Hammer tries to argue that this Court failed to apply the appropriate standard for assault by
looking to the statutorv definition of assault as found in LC. § 18-901 instead of relying solely upon
the suggested Idaho Civil Jury Instruction ("IDJI") 4.30. There is no legal basis to exclusively rely
on the language of a model jury instruction above that of a statute or the common law. In fact,
contrary to Hammer's repeated assertions, the Idaho Supreme Court has not "approved" the IDJl to
be the "proper elements of civil assault," but instead has explicitly stated that it "is not approving
any specific instruction." (Introduction to the Idaho Civil Jury Instrnctions, published on the Idaho
Supreme Court website at https://www.isc.idaho.gov/main/civil-jury-instructions) As useful as they
may be to instruct a jury at trial or to state basic elements of the law, there is no legal basis to solely
rely on the jury instructions for legal precedent to the exclusion of controlling law.
In fact, the standard for civil assault that has actually been "approved" by the Idaho Supreme
Court is found in James v. City of Boise, 2016 WL 1162984 at 16 (Idaho S.Ct. 2016) (not yet
published in permanent law reports). There, the Supreme Court addressed the tort liability of assault,
battery, and false imprisonment through citation to their criminal statutes. In addition, it proceeded
through a lengthy analysis of the meaning of the term "criminal intent" as applied to the exception
to liability as found in the Idaho Tort Claims Act and, in doing so, differentiated between that tem1
and the mens rea of the comparable crimes and their applicability in tort. In discussing battery
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specifically, it stated, "[t]here is no difference between the intent necessary to commit the tort of
battery and intent necessary to commit the crime of battery." Id. at* 18. It further made clear that an
intentional tort could also be a crime. Thus, it is clear from James that the Idaho Supreme Court has
adopted the standards of the criminal statutes for use in the determination as to whether tort liability
applies. All Hammer's pages of argument in an attempt to persuade this Court to only apply a
suggested model jury instruction over an established statute and controlling case law are meritless.
As argued previously, when looking at the elements of assault found in J.C. § 18-901,
Hammer's Amended Complaint fails to state a claim. Even after multiple rounds of briefing,
Hammer is still confused as to the legal basis by which dismissal is appropriate. She believes that
simply by stating that she wishes to bring a claim of assault that this is enough to satisfy the notice
pleading requirement ofldaho. She argues that as long as Ribi knows that she has raised a claim of
assault that notice pleading is satisfied. Again, while this might be the case in a nonnally pled
complaint, Hammer's complaint is anything but normal. It is the copious amount of factual recitation
that she has included that clearly establishes that the facts as pied preclude a finding of assault.
This Court clearly recognized this distinction when it noted that its prior dismissal "isn't a
question of notice pleading." (Transcript p. 75 :5-10, see Response to Motion to Dismiss Amended
Complaint, p. 11) It is clear that Hammer is facially alleging that an assault occurred. The issue here
is not whether such notice has been provided. Instead, the issue is whether the facts, as pled, show
that she is entitled to relief.
An action for a breach of contract is useful as an illustrative example. In this hypothetical
scenario, the plaintiff raises allegations of a breach by the defendant pursuant to a specific provision
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in a written contract between the two. In support of this complaint, he attaches a copy of the written
contract, which is incorporated into the complaint. However, it is clear from the written provisions
of the contract and the facts alleged that there is no breach as a matter of law. The defendant moves
for dismissal not because he is not on notice that there is a breach alleged against him, but rather
because the facts as pied fail to show any entitlement to relief. In that hypothetical, dismissal is
warranted. In a similar manner here, Hammer has superficially alleged an assault, but the facts as
alleged do not support that assault. As such, it is not a question of notice, but a question of
sufficiency, and Hammer's Amended Complaint fails for that reason.
In like manner, any answer filed by Ribi does not automatically concede that Hammer's
complaint is sufficient as a matter of law and cannot be dismissed. Such an interpretation is
contradictory to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, which allow for a dismissal on the pleadings
after an answer is filed. I.R.C.P. 12(c) The cases cited by Hammer support the proposition that a
defendant cannot claim they had no notice of a claim if they are able to answer that claim, even if
in artfully pled in the complaint. To repeat, Ha1ru11er's complaint warrants dismissal not because
there is no notice of an alleged assault, but rather because the facts as pied therein actively preclude
a finding that the alleged assault occuned and that Hammer is entitled to relief. Hammer's cases are
inapplicable and distinguishable here for that reason.
Hammer also suggests that there is a different standard of assault when the alleged victim is
a female. However, Idaho has not adopted a "reasonable woman" standard. See, e.g., Fowler v.
Kootenai Cnty, 128 Idaho 740 (1995) (deciding to maintain "reasonable person" standard instead of

"reasonable woman" standard in discrimination case). Further, the cases Hammer cites for this
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proposition do not actually address a "reasonable woman" standard; they merely happen to involve
a woman as the alleged victim. More so, the cases Hammer cites for this proposition factually do not
help her. Each of the cases involve incidents where the aggressor engaged in an overt act of violence
unlike the present facts. See Hayles v. Advanced Travel, 2004 WL 26548 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)
(defendant raised his clenched fist to plaintiffs face in a threatening manner); Cohen v. Davis, 926
F. Supp. 399 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (security guard pursued defendant in an obvious attempt to catch and
grab her, which he in fact did); Campoverde v. Sony Pictures Ent., 2002 WL 31163804 (S.D.N. Y.
2002) (defendant took substantial steps to prevent plaintiffs from leaving a building, including
having eight of its employees surround a door to prevent plaintiffs from leaving a room, followed
by an additional "large group" of employees blocking a second exit, with two large men in front,
followed by an employee physically pushing one plaintiff (male)' out of the way to reach the second
plaintiff (female), followed by a request to use the phone to call the police, which was met with
laughter, then abrupt and threatening movement by multiple guards towards plaintiffs, forcing them
backwards); Carroll v. Bayeriche Landesbank, 125 F.Supp. 2d 58 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (defendant
stormed into plaintiffs office and "came at her" as if it was a "fist fight.").

B.

Ribi Is Entitled To Immunity Pursuant to the ITCA.

As argued previously, immunity under ITCA is not merely an exception to liability, it is
immunity from suit itself. "Historically, the doctrine of sovereign immunity barred suits brought
against the government." Walker v. Shoshone Cnty., 112 Idaho 991 (1987) (emphasis added)
(discussing the judicial and legislative history that resulted in the enactment of the ITCA). In other

Hammer's representation that these cases all include female plaintiffs is inaccurate.

1
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words, traditionally the government was absolutely immune from suit. Here, it is clear Hammer's
Amended Complaint fails to rebut the statutory presumption that Ribi was acting within the course
and scope of his employment and without malice or criminal intent. I.C. § 6-904(3). Therefore, Ribi
is immune even ifhe committed an assault.
The context of all the events in Hammer's Amended Complaint lead to a determination as
a matter oflaw that Ribi was acting within the course and scope of his employment. Hammer seeks
to artificially limit Ribi 's course and scope of employment to an absurdly narrow result, which is not
supported by any precedent. It is telling that in the Amended Complaint, there is still no allegation
that anything Ribi did was not in furtherance of the business of the City of Sun Valley, as Hammer
has pied his conversation to be directly and exclusively related to the budgetary issues that the City
Council was contemporaneously addressing.
Hammer argues that dete1minations of course and scope and malice can only be made by a
jury. (Response to Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint, p. I 7-21) This is not accurate. Her
reliance on Teurlings v. Larson, 156 Idaho 65 (2013), and Sadidv. Vailas, 943 F.Supp.2d 1125 (D.
Idaho 2013), are inaccurate as both those cases do not stand for the blanket assertion that operating
within the course and scope of employment is a question which "must" be left to the jury. Instead,
there were issues of fact in both of those cases based on the evidence presented that specifically
required a finderof fact to determine credibility prior to making that course and scope determination.
Hammer overreaches with the actual holdings of those cases to try and support her incorrect legal
argument.

DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
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Further, the presumption is "that any act or omission of an employee within the time and at
the place of his emplovment is within the course and scope of his employment and without malice
or criminal intent." I.C. § 6-903(5) (emphasis added). The issue is not what the precise scope of
Ribi's official authority was as a City Council Member. Instead, the correct analysis is whether the
conduct occurred "substantially within the authorized limits of time and space ... " of employment.

Anderson, 137 Idaho at 518; Teurlings, 156 Idaho at74-75. It is undisputed based on Hammer's
Amended Complaint that the alleged assault occurred during a break in a city council meeting at city
hall. Consequently, no reasonable juror could ever find that the "time and place" requirement is not
satisfied here. It is Hammer's burden to show otherwise, which the facts as pied in her Amended
Complaint cannot do because her allegations do not show that: (a) Ribi acted outside the course and
scope of his employment; or that (b) Ribi acted maliciously or with criminal intent.
C.

Hammer's Arguments Regarding the Admission of Evidence Are
Unrelated to Ribi's Motion to Dismiss.

Hammer raises the issue in her response that evidence against Ribi should be admissible at
trial, which is simply copied from her motion for reconsideration of this Court's prior dismissal, and
has no basis in this current motion. The admissibility of whatever other allegations Hammer may
have against Ribi to support her continuing allegations and claims of harassment are irrelevant to the
fact that her Amended Complaint fails to support a valid claim of assault and should be dismissed.
II.

CONCLUSION
As shown above and through prior pleadings, Hammer's Amended Complaint still fails to
show that she is entitled to any relief. Hammer has not pied an assault and, even if she has, she has
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failed to plead sufficient facts to overcome Ribi's statutory immunity. Ribi therefore respectfully
requests that the Court dismiss her Complaint with prejudice and grant no additional leave for her
to file another amended complaint.
DATED this

7th

day of July, 2016.
NAYLOR & HALES, P.C.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 7th day of July, 2016, I caused to be served, by the
method(s) indicated, a true and correct copy of the foregoing upon:
James R. Donoval
4110 Eaton Ave., Ste. D
Caldwell, ID 83607

Attorney.for Plaintiff

/u.S.Mail
_ _,,,.Hand Delivered
_V_ F,ax Transmission: 649-1603
Email: jdonoval@.aol.com
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James R. Donoval, ISB #8142
4481 N. Dresden Pl., Suite D
Garden City, ID 83714
Telephone: (312) 859-2029
Facsimile: (208) 649-1603
Email: jdonoval@aol.com

Jolynn Dr8{J6, Clsrk District
Court 819/ne Cou , le£~"

Attorney for Plaintiff Sharon R. Hammer

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRJCT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
SHARON R. HAMMER,
Case No. CV-2015-428
Plaintiff,
ORDER ON PENDING
MOTIONS AND DISMISSING
THIS CASE

VS.

3/5

NILS RIBI, in his individual capacity,
Defendant.

The following motions were before this Court at the hearing held on July 11, 2016, with
counsel for the Plaintiff and counsel for the Defendant present, and this Court makes the
following decisions for the reasons stated on the record.
1) The Defendant's Motion To Dismiss asserting the failure to state a cause of action for
civil assault is DENIED.
2) The Defendant's Motion To Dismiss asserting immunity of the Defendant under the
Idaho Tort Claims Act both as to the Defendant's conduct being within the scope of his
employment and as to lack of malice is GRANTED.
3) The Defendant's Motion For Rule 11 Sanctions is DENIED.
4) The Plaintiff's Motion For Summary Judgment is DENIED.
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THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND THIS ORDER DOES ORDER that
this case is DISMISSED as to all claims.
DATED this

(Sclay of July, 2016.

Robert~~
District Judge
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Page 494 of 526

4 /5

2

12:18:26p.m.

Line 1

13-07-2016

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

q

I hereby certify that on the \
day of July, 2016, I caused to be served, by the method
indicated, a true and correct copy of the forgoing.
James R. Donoval
4481 N. Dresden Pl., Suite D
Garden City, ID 83714
Attorney for Plaintiff

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Fax: (208) 649-1603
Email: jdonooval@aol.com

Kirtlan Naylor
Naylor & Hales
950 W. Bannock St., Suite 610
Boise, ID 83 702
Attorney for Defendant

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Fax: (208) 383-9516
Email: kirt@naylorhales.com
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OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
SHARON R. HAMMER,
Case No. CV2015-428
Plaintiff,

JUDGMENT

vs.
NILS RIBI, in his individual capacity,
Defendant.
JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:

The Plaintiffs complaint is dismissed with prejudice as to all claims.

,,,-DATED t h i s ~ day of July, 2016.

Robert J. Elgee
District Judge

JUDGMENT - 1.
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on t h e ~ day of July, 2016, I caused to be served, by the
method(s) indicated, a true and correct copy of the foregoing upon:

James R. Donoval
4110 Eaton Ave., Ste. D
Caldwell, ID 83607
Attorney for Plaintiff

Kirtlan G. Naylor
Jacob H. Naylor
Tyler D. Williams
NAYLOR & HALES, P .C.
Attorneys at Law
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 610
Boise, ID 83702

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
_ _/'ax Transmission: 649-1603
_v Email: jdonoval@aol.com
U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
_
_)'ax Transmission:383-9516
_d Email: kirt@naylorhales.com:
jake@naylorhales.com;
tdw@naylorhales.com

Attorneys for Defendant

Clerk
9556_29 Judb'lllCnt.wpd
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James R. Donoval
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Attorney for Appellant Sharon R. Hammer
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
SHARON R HAMMER,
Case No. CV-2015-428
Plaintiff-Appellant,

NOTICE OF APPEAL
vs.

NILS RIBI,
Defendant- Re

TO:

ndent.

THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT, NILS RIBI; NOTICE IS HEREBY
GIVEN THAT:

1.

The above-named Appellant, SHARON R HAMMER, appeals against the above-

named Respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from a) the May 12, 2016 Order Granting
Defendant's Motion To Dismiss And Granting Plaintiff Leave To Amend The Complaint (Exhibit
A) and the July 7, 2016 Order Denying Plaintiff's Motions For Reconsideration ofthat order (Exhibit
C); b) the May 12, 2016 Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion For A Rule 35 Mental Examination Of
Defendant (Exhibit B) and the July 7, 2016 Order Denying Plaintiff's Motions For Reconsideration
ofthat order (Exhibit C); b) the July 19, 2016 Order On Pending Motions And Dismissing The Case
(Exhibit D); in the above-entitled action, the Honorable Judge Robert J. Elgee, presiding. Also
attached as Exhibit Eis the Judgment dated July 19, 2016.
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2.

Appellant has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the Orders described

in paragraph I above are appealable Orders under and pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule l l(a)(l).
3.

Appellant requests a review of the following issues:
(a) Did the District Court err by not confirming that the correct elements of civil

assault under Idaho law are those found in Idaho Civil Jury Instruction 4.30 adopted by the Idaho
Supreme Court?

(b) Did the District Court err as a matter of law by dismissing the Appellant's
Complaint for failing to adequately plead facts to support a cause of action for civil assault?
(c) Did the District Court err as a matter of law by dismissing the Appellant's
Amended Complaint finding that the Respondent was immune from civil liability for civil assault
pursuant Idaho Code § 6-904 based on the District Court's findings that the Respondent's actions in
assaulting the Appellant were within the course and scope ofthe Respondent's duties as a Sun Valley
City Council member?
(d) Did the District Court err as a matter of law by dismissing the Appellant's
Amended Complaint finding that the Appellant had not adequately plead facts which would allow a
jury to determine whether the conduct of the Respondent in assaulting the Appellant was done with
malice pursuant to Idaho Code § 6-904?
(e) Did the District Court err as a matter of that law that the Respondent should not

be required to be subject to an LR.C.P. 35(a) mental examination?
4.

A May 10, 2016 Order was entered sealing a document submitted as part of the

5.

The Appellant has either already received, or has requested the preparation of,

record.

transcripts of the two non--evidential hearings in the matter (i.e. May 9, 2016 and July 11, 2016), and

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2
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has paid the appropriate estimate of costs of preparing such transcripts.
6.

Appellant requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's record:

a) 8/14/15 - Complaint For Civil Assault And Damages And Demand For Jury Trial;
b) 2/4/16-Defendant's Answer To Plaintiff's Complaint And Demand For Jury Trial;
c) 4/13/16 - Motion To Require An IR. C.P. 35(a) Mental Examination Of Defendant
Nils Ribi;
d) 4/20/16-Memorandum In Support Of Motion To Require An I.R.C.P. 35(a) Mental
Health Examination Of Defendant Nils Ribi;
e) 4/20/16-Affidavit Of Counsel In Support Of Motion To Require An IR.C.P. 35(a)
Mental Health Examination Of Defendant Nils Ribi;

f) 4/20/16 -Affidavit Of Sharon R. Hammer In Support Of Motion To Require An
I.R.C.P. 35{a) Mental Health Examination Of Defendant Nils Ribi;
g) 4/25/16-Motion To Dismiss Under IR.C.P. 12(c);
h) 4/25/16-Defendant's Memorandum In Support Of Motion To Dismiss Under I.R.C.P.
12(c);
i) 4/29/16- Defendant's Response To Motion For Mental Health Examination. NOTE:
Appendix A Filed UNDER SEAL;
k) 4/29/16-Motion To Seal, Motion To Shorten Time And Notice Of Hearing;
1) 5/2/16- Motion To Amend Complaint;
m) 5/2/16-0bjection/Response To Defendant's Motion To Dismiss Under LR.C.P.
12(c);
n) 5/5/16-Reply Memorandum In Support Of Defendant's Motion To Dismiss Under
I.R.C.P. 12(c);
o) 5/5/16-Supplemental Affidavit Of Counsel In Support Of Motion To Require An
LR. C.P. 35(a) Mental Health Examination Of Defendant Nils Ribi;
p) 5/5/16- Reply In Support Of Motion To Require AnLR.C.P. 35(a) Mental
Examination Of Defendant Nils Ribi;
q) 5/10/16 - Order Sealing Document;
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r) 5/12/16-0rder Denying Plaintiff's Motion For A Rule 35 Mental Examination Of
Defendant;
s) 5/12/16-0rder Granting Defendant's Motion To Dismiss And Granting Plaintiff
Leave To Amend The Complaint;
t) 5/16/16-Motion To Reconsider Denial Of Motion To Require An I.R.C.P. 35(a)
Mental Examination Of Defendant Nils Ribi;
u) 5/16/16-Motion To Reconsider Dismissal Of Complaint;
v) 5/20/16 - Amended Complaint For Civil Assault And Demand For Jury Trial;
w) 5/27/16-Defendant's Motion To Dismiss Amended Complaint;

x) 6/3/16-Memorandum In Support Of Motion To Reconsider Dismissal Of Complaint;
y) 6/3/18 - Plaintiff's Motion For Partial Summary Judgment;
z) 6/6/16- Second Supplemental Affidavit Of Counsel In Support Of Motion To Require
AnlR.C.P. 35(a) Mental Examination Of Defendant Nils Ribi;
aa) 6/6/16- Memorandum In Support Of Plaintiff's Motion For Partial Summary
Judgment;
bb) 6/6/16- Memorandum In Support Of Motion To Reconsider Denial Of Motion To
Require An LR.C.P. 35(a) Mental Examination Of Defendant Nils Ribi;
cc) 6/10/16- Defendant's Memorandum In Support Of Motion To Dismiss Amended
Complaint;
dd) 6/24/16-Defendant's Response To Plaintiff's Motions For Reconsideration;
ee) 6/24/16 - Defendant's Response In Opposition To Plaintiff's Motion For Summary
Judgment;

fl) 7/4/16-Reply In Support Of Plaintiff's Motion For Partial Summary Judgment;
gg) 7/6/16-Reply In Support Of Motion To Reconsider Dismissal Of Complaint;
hh) 7/6/16-Response To Defendant's Motion To Dismiss Amended Complaint;
ii) 7/7/16 - Defendant's Reply Memorandum In Support Of Motion To Dismiss
Amended Complaint;
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jj) 7/7/16-0rder Denying Plaintiff's Motions For Reconsideration;
kk) 7/19/16- Order On Pending Motions And Dismissing This Case;
ll) 7/19/16 - Judgment.

7.

I certify:
(a)

That the transcript of the non-evidential hearing of May 9, 2016 has already

been obtained and that the transcript ofthe non-evidential hearing of July 11, 2016 has been ordered.
(b)

That the estimated fee to prepare the transcript ofthe non-evidential hearing of

July 11, 2016 has been paid.
(c)

That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been paid.

(d)

That the appellate filing fee has been paid.

(e)

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to

Idaho Appellate Rule 20.
DATED this

/7ff/ dayofAugust,2016.

Attorney For Appellant
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this f
day of August, 2016, a true and correct copy of
the foregoing document was served on the following individual(s) by the method indicated:
Kirtlan Naylor
Naylor & Hales
950 W. Bannock St., Suite 610
Boise, ID 83 702
Counsel for Resporulent

[X]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

U.S. Mail
Fax:
Overnight Delivery
Messenger Delivery
Email:
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
. -

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

SHARON R. HAMMER,
Case No. CV2015-428
Plaintiff,
vs.
NILS RIB!, in his individual capacity,

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS AND
GRANTING PLAINTIFF LEAVE TO
AMEND THE COMPLAINT

Defendant.

The Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, having come before this Court for a hearing held on
May 9, 2016, is granted for the reasons stated on the record. Plaintiff is granted leave to amend
her complaint, which must be filed no later than May 24, 2016, at 5:00 p.m. If no amended
complaint is filed by that date and time the case will be dismissed.

DATED this

_l_t_ day of May, 2016.

District Judge

ORDER- 1.
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the _lL day of May, 2016, I caused to be served, by the
method(s) indicated, a true and correct copy of the foregoing upon:
James R. Donoval
4110 Eaton Ave., Ste. D
Caldwell, ID 83607
Attorney for Plaintiff
Kirtlan G. Naylor
Jacob H. Naylor
Tyler D. Williams
NAYLOR & HALES, P.C.
Attorneys at Law
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 610
Boise, ID 83702
Attorneys for Defendant

_1_

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Fax Transmission: 649-1603
Email: jdonoval@aol.com

__i_

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Fax Transmission:383-9516
Email: kirt(@,naylorhales.com~

jake{@.naylorhales.com;
tdw@naylorhales.com

~
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

. -

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
SHARON R. HAMMER,
Case No. CV2015-428

Plaintiff,
vs.
NILS RIBI, in his individual capacity,

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS
MOTION FOR A RULE 35 MENTAL
EXAMINATION OF DEFENDANT

Defendant.

The Plaintiffs Motion for a Rule 35 Mental Examination of Defendant, having come
before this Court for a hearing held on May 9, 2016, is denied for the reasons stated on the
record.
DATED this

_f.l_ day of May, 2016.

District Judge

ORDER- 1.
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ---12_ day of May, 2016, I caused to be served, by the
method(s) indicated, a true and correct copy of the foregoing upon:
James R. Donoval
4110 Eaton Ave., Ste. D
Caldwell, ID 83607
Attorney for Plaintiff
Kirtlan G. Naylor
Jacob H. Naylor
Tyler D. Williams
NAYLOR & HALES, P.C.
Attorneys at Law
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 610
Boise, ID 83702
Attorneys for Defendant

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Fax Transmission: 649-1603
Email: jdonoval@aol.com

I

U.S. Mail

-A

Hand Delivered
Fax Transmission:383-9516
Email: kirt(a),naylorhales.com:
jake(a).naylorhales.com:
tdw@naylorhales.com
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIFfH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BLAINE COUNTY

SHARON R. HAMMER.

)
)
)

Plaintiff,
vs.
NILS RIBI, in his individual capacity,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No.:

tv 2.0\e; - 1../2.!!)

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S
MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION

Plaintiff filed two Motions for Reconsideration. These involve the Court's prior denial of
Hammer's Motion for a Rule 35 IME ofNels Ribi, and the other involved Hammer's Motion for
Reconsideration of the Court's prior order dismissing Hammer's Complaint for failure to allege
the civil offense of assault. Hammer does not allege any new facts to support either of these
motions for reconsideration. Oral argument on these motions is denied pursuant to IRCP
7(b)(3)(F).

The Court having considered Plaintifrs Motions for Reconsideration, and good cause
appearing therefor:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND

nns DOES ORDER that both of Plaintiffs Motions

for Reconsideration are DENIED.

DATED this

C, day of July, 2016. 4.: Jo P-.M.
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
day of July, 2016, I caused to be served a true
copy of the foregoing ORDER document by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of
the following:

James R. Donoval
4110 :Eaton Ave., Ste. D
Caldwell, ID 83607
Email: jdonoval@aol.com

Kirtlan Naylor
Naylor & Hales
950 W. Bannock St., Ste. 610
Boise, ID 83702
Fax: (208) 383-9516

~{: 1Ltr'f-€nttjwt\ttl.J.<' .(O""-

_ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
- Overnight Mail

FAX

XEmail
_ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
- Overnight Mail

FAX
__lEmail

c~~:-1
Deputy Clerk

\
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James R. Donoval, ISB #8142
4481 N. Dresden Pl., Suite D

Garden City, ID 83714
Telephone: (312) 859-2029
Facsimile: (208) 649-1603
Email: jdonoval@aol.com
Attorney for Plaintiff Sharon R. Hammer

IN THE D1STR1CT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRJCT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNfY OF BLAINE

SHARON R. HAMMER.
Case No. CV-2015-428

Plaintiff:
ORDER ON PENDING
MOTIONS AND DISMISSING

vs.

THIS CASE

NILS RIB!, in his individual capacity,
Defendant.

The following motions were before this Court at the hearing held on July 11, 2016, with
counsel for the Plaintiff and counsel for the Defendant present, and this Court makes the
following decisions for the reasons stated on the record.
1) The Defendant's Motion To Dismiss asserting the failure to state a cause of action for

civil assault is DENIED.
2) The Defendant's Motion To Dismiss asserting immunity of the Defendant m1der the
Idaho Tort Claims Act both as to the Defendant's conduct being within the scope of his

employment and as to lack of malice is GRANTED.
3) The Defendant's Motion For Rule 11 Sanctions is DENIED.

4) The Plaintiff's Motion For Summary Judgment is DENIED.

Order On Motions - 1
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THEREFORE. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND nns ORDER DOES ORDER that
this case is DISMISSED as to all claims.

DATED this t

<day of July, 2016.
District Judge

Order On Motions -2
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

q

I hereby certify that on the \
day of July, 2016, I caused to be served, by the method
indicated, a true and correct copy of the forgoing.

James R. DonovaJ

U.S. Mail

4481 N. Dresden Pl., Suite D

Garden City, ID 83714
Attorneyfor Plaintiff

Hand Delivered
Fax: (208) 649-1603
Email: jdonooval@aol.com

Kirtlan Naylor
Naylor & Hales

Hand Delivered

950 W. Bannock St., Suite 610

Boi~ ID 83702
Attorney for Defendant

U.S. Mail
Fax: (208) 383-9516
Email: kirt@naylorhales.com
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFfH JUDICIAL DI

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
SHARON R HAMMER,

Case No. CV2015-428
Plain@:

JUDGMENT

vs.

NILS RIBI, in his individual capacity,
Defendant.

JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:
The Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed with prejudice as to all claims.

,,,.DATED this~ day of July, 2016.

Robert J. Elgee
District Judge

JUDGMENT - 1.
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day of July, 2016, I caused to be served, by the
method(s) indicated, a true and correct copy ofthe foregoing upon:

James R. Donoval
4110 Eaton Ave., Ste. D

Caldwell, ID 83607
Attorney for Plaintiff

Kirtlan G. Naylor
Jacob H. Naylor
Tyler D. Williams
NAYLOR & HALES, P .C.
Attorneys at Law
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 610
Boise, ID 83 702

_
_

U.S.Mail
Hand Delivered
_ _,,Fax Transmission: 649-1603
_v Email: jdonoval@aol.com

_
_

U.S.Mail
Hand Delivered
_ Yax Transmission:383-9516
_d Email: kirt@naylorhales.com:
jake@naylorhales.com;

tdw@naylorhales.com

Attorneys for Defendant

Clerk
9SS6_29 Juclgmcnt.wpcl
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FROM: Fax

TO: 1-208-788-5527

PAGE: 002 OF 003

Kirtlan 0. Naylor
(ISB No. 3569]
Jacob H. Naylor
[ISB No. 8474]
Tyler D. Williams
[ISB No. 8512]
NAYLOR & HALES, P.C.
SEP
Attorneys at Law
950 W. Bailllock Street, Suite 610
Boise, ID 83702
Telephone No. (208) 383-9511
Facsimile No. (208) 383-9516
Email: kirt@naylorhales.com; jake@naylorhales.com: tdw@naylorhales.com

- 1 2016

Attorneys for Defendant Nils Ribi

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
SHARON R. HAMMER,
Case No. CV2015-428
Plaintiff,

DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT'S
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL
RECORD

vs.
NILS RIBI, in his individual capacity,
Defendant.

TO:

THE ABOVE-NAMED APPELLANT AND THE PARTY'S ATTORNEY, AND
THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN, that the Defendant-Respondents, in the above-entitled

proceeding hereby request pursuant to I.A.R. 19, the inclusion ofthe following material in the clerk's
appellate record in addition to the materials already requested by Plaintiff-Appellant.
1.

A copy of the following document pursuant to I.A.R. 19(c):
A.

6/14/2016 Disclosure of Retained Expert Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 26(4)(A)(1)(1)
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2.

FROM: FaK

TO: 1-208-788-5527

PAGE: 003 OF 003

I certify that a copy of this request was served upon the Clerk of the District

Court and upon an parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 20.
DATED this pt day of September, 2016.
NAYLOR & HALES, P.C .

. N ylor, Of the Firm
Attorneys or Defendant-Respondents

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 1st day of September, 2016, I caused to be served, by the
method(s) indicated, a true and correct copy of the foregoing upon:
James R. Donoval
4110 Eaton Ave., Ste. D
Caldwell, ID 83607
Attorney for Plaintiff

U.S. Mail

Crystal Rigby
Deputy Clerk
201 2nd Ave. S. Ste. 106
Hailey, ID 83333

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Fax Transmission: (208) 788-5527
Email: crigby@co.blaine.id.us

Hand Delivered

Fax Transmission: 649-1603
Email: jdonoval@aol.com

4/J.l---

JacH~ytor
9556_30 Supp IAR 19 Request for Documents.wpd
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44447-2016

SUPREME COURT NO.

FILED
RE:

SHARON R. HAMMER

vs.
NILS RIBI

Notice is hereby given that on October 11,
2016, a Reporter's Transcript on Appeal in the
above-entitled case, consisting of two volumes and
159 total pages, was lodged with the District Court
Clerk of the County of Blaine, State of Idaho.
The hearings included in the transcripts are as follows:
May 9, 2016 - Motion for Mental Exam, Motion to Add
A Claim for Punitive Damages, Motion
To Dismiss
July 11, 2016 - Defendant's Motion To Dismiss

SU~~ P.

ISRAEL, CSR NO. 244

DATE
*Appeal Transcript emailed to:

James Donoval@
jdonoval@aol.com
Kirtlan Naylor@
kirt@naylorhales.com
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
SHARON R. HAMMER,
Plaintiff/ Appellant,

Supreme Court No. 44447

vs.

CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS

NILS RISI ,

Defendant/Respondent,

I, Crystal Rigby, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the State of Idaho
in and for the County of Blaine, do hereby certify that the following documents will be submitted as
exhibits to the Record :

Confidential Exhibits

1- Appendix A of Defendant's Response to Motion for Mental Health Examination

11 IN WITNEC}()t:EREOF , I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said Court this
---1.b_ day of
•
, 2016.

By~ ~ ~_..~...__-===::::::::-4-........:c=....""""
Crystal Rigby, Deputy Cler

EXHIBIT LIST-1
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
SHARON R. HAMMER,

)

)
Plaintiff/ Appellant,

Supreme Court No. 44447

)
)
)
)
)
)

vs.

NILS RIBI ,

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE

Defendant/Respondent,
____
___ _ ________))
STATE OF IDAHO
County of Blaine

)
) ss.
)

I, Crystal Rigby, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Blaine, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing
Clerk's Record on Appeal was compiled and bound under my direction and is a true, full and
correct Record of the pleadings and documents as are automatically required under Rule 28 of
the Idaho Appellate Rules as well as those requested by the Appellant.
I do further certify that all exhibits offered or admitted in the above-entitled cause and
exhibits requested by the Appellant will be duly lodged with the Clerk of the Supreme Court along
with the Clerk's Record on Appeal and the Court Reporter's Transcript on Appeal.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said
Court at Hailey, Idaho, this -12- day of
(x::;;\--. , 2016.
Jolynn Drage, Clerk of the Court
~ -

By_ ___:::=_---3-e:::::.:::::-=::,.....1:,,,,.,.~~
Crystal Rigby, Deputy Cler

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE - 1
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

SHARON R. HAMMER
Plaintiff/Appellant,

vs.

NILS RIBI,

_________________
Defendant/Respondent.

Supreme Court No. 44447

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Crystal Rigby, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District
of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Blaine, do hereby certify that I have
personally served or mailed, by United States mail, one copy of the Clerk's Record and
Court Reporter's Transcript to each of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows:

James R. Donoval
1048 N. Torrey Pines Ave.
Eagle, Idaho 83616

Kirtlan G. Naylor
950 W . Bannock Street, Ste. 610
Boise, Idaho 83702

Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant

Attorney for Defendant/Respondent

IN WITNELLW HEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal
of the said Court this
day of
2016.

Ock ·

,

JOLYNN DRAGE, Clerk of the Court

\
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